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This thesis focuses on the fact that, with the economic liberalization in developing 
countries, the traditional methods of financing infrastructure development projects have changed, 
making way for more innovative investment mechanisms such as Build Own Operate (“BOO”) and 
Build Operate Transfer (“BOT”) models, more commonly knows as “project financing”.  
 
Traditionally, foreign direct investment (FDI), which refers to international investment 
where an investor obtains a lasting interest in an enterprise in another country, was restricted in the 
public utility and physical infrastructure sectors due to nationalist sentiments and concerns of 
foreign economic and political influence over strategic public utilities and state assets. Thus, the 
necessary finances for infrastructure development projects in developing countries were found by 
making allocations from the national budgets and by accepting grants from international 
development agencies such as the World Bank and from developed countries. 
 
Further, traditionally, the development of Infrastructure has been the province of the public 
sector. However, in recent years the private sector has begun to be involved in developing 
infrastructure projects and in providing utility services to the public, mainly as a result of the fiscal 
constraints on the public sector and the lack of technology and know-how with the public sector to 
develop and manage modern infrastructure facilities. As a result, innovative investment mechanisms 
such as project financing are being increasingly used in developing countries to develop 
infrastructure projects.    
 
In project financing, infrastructure projects in developing countries are developed with the 
direct and active participation of the private sector in partnership with public sector entities in host 
countries and international development agencies. The public sector entities in host countries 
participate in projects mainly as granters of concessions to develop projects and as regulators of 
developed projects. International development agencies participate in projects mainly as lenders 
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and/or advisers. The private sector entities participate in several different key roles such as   
investors, project developers, construction contractors and project operators. In addition, there are 
several other participants such as end-users, underwriters and suppliers in modern day infrastructure 
development projects financed and developed with project financing. These several parties have 
diverse interests in participating in development projects and they are all required to be risk takers. 
As a result, the risks associated with project financing are some times more complex compared to 
those associated with traditional forms of developing infrastructure development projects, where, 
although part of the funding for developing projects come from external sources such as 
international development agencies and developed countries, the most active participant and the key 
risk taker is the host country in which the development project takes place.   
 
For example, as unlike in traditional foreign investment, in project financing, the private 
sector is involved in financing, development and  management of infrastructure projects, the end 
users of infrastructure facilities, mainly the general public, usually do not benefit from government 
subsidies. As a result, in many developing countries, there is public hostility towards private sector 
participation in the development of infrastructure. Such hostility sometimes result in long drawn 
anti-development campaigns by the public and legal battles between governments and private sector 
project participants on one side and the members of the public and various public interest groups 
supporting them (for example, Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs)) on the other side. Such 
opposition to development activities often result in costing time and money for the investors, host 
governments and other profit seeking project participants. Sometimes such opposition can even lead 
to projects being abandoned.  
 
Further, there is growing demand for political and administrative decentralization in some 
developing countries, where state, local, or subordinate governments are demanding, inter alia, 
more power over state assets. Caught in this web of power struggle are the profits seeking 
international investors and project developers who prefer to deal with central governments rather 
than with the local governments. Also caught in the web are the end users of utilities who prefer 
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central government development and administration of infrastructure facilities to private sector 
participation or local government control. Unlike in traditional forms of project development, in 
project financing, as there are several key project participants who invest, lend money to, develop  
and, operate projects, the power struggle between central governments and subordinate 
governments over control of assets directly affect all such parties. 
 
The demand for complete separation and political autonomy in some regions in some 
developing countries adds another twist to the problem. As there are no time tested solutions 
available to the developing countries, investors and other project participants who may be adversely 
affected due to project locations falling under the jurisdictions of new powers due to political 
separation, it is an issue that needs to be considered by all parties interested in engaging in 
development projects located or likely to be located in disputed regions.  
 
In some developing countries, there is the risk of failure to balance the sometimes 
conflicting interests between the need for infrastructure development and the duty of protecting the 
rights of indigenous communities and ethnic minorities who may be sometimes adversely affected 
due to development projects. This happens when, projects are intentionally developed ignoring the 
adverse implications they might have on the environment and society. Unlike in traditional FDI, in 
project financing, there is more room for the rights of indigenous communities and ethnic minorities 
being undermined and compromised, mainly due to profit seeking motives of the private sector 
actors and corrupt government officials.  
 
As the duty to protect indigenous rights and minority rights has grown to become a global 
phenomenon, the protests and possible legal battles that may ensue from the violation of such rights 
could affect several participants in modern day infrastructure development projects. For example, in 
addition to cost overruns and delays that may be experienced in connection with development 
projects which may affect all project participants, the bad publicity that may result from such 
actions might have a severe adverse impact on the image and goodwill of multinational companies 
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participating in projects financing as investors, project promoters or in various other capacities. In 
addition, such bad publicity might also harm the image of international organizations participating 
in projects as lenders and/or advisers.    
 
Despite the complex nature of the aforesaid risks associated with modern day infrastructure 
development projects, it is undeniable that private sector participation in development of 
infrastructure facilities could provide a boost to the economic growth in developing countries. 
Therefore, it is of common benefit to investors, host countries and other project participants’ to 
ensure that an investment climate which balances the conflicting interests between making profits 
and achieving sustainable development exists.   
 
In the circumstances, this thesis investigates some aspects of the key issues surrounding 
project financing methods used by most developing countries to attract much needed foreign 
investment and technology for infrastructure development. More particularly, the thesis attempts to 
resolve issues relating to the changing nature of risks associated with FDI with the growing use of 
project financing techniques to develop infrastructure development projects in developing countries. 
The thesis aims to argue that the key participants in project financing need to consider the nature 
and effects of these changing risks as such changes are not traditionally considered by parties to 
infrastructure development projects. Further, since the existing studies have not given substantial 
consideration to the perspective of the end-users and of those such as indigenous groups and ethnic 
minorities who may be adversely affected due to infrastructure facilities developed with private 
sector participation, this thesis aims to present their respective perspectives which needs to be 
considered in order to ensure the success of development projects.  
 
The thesis argues that if sufficient attention is not given to recognising the changing nature 
of risks associated with FDI, and steps are not taken to mitigate them, the future success of project 
financing as an innovative and more beneficial mechanism for developing infrastructure projects 
cannot be guaranteed. The thesis therefore, explores measures to address these concerns and seeks 
 XII
to make suggestions and recommendations aimed at mitigating the key risks associated with modern 
day infrastructure development projects.  
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Chapter 1- Introduction 
 
1.1. General Statement 
 
Until about the mid 1970s, the provision of utility services and administration of physical 
infrastructure in developing countries were tightly guarded by the public sector, with government 
departments or statutory corporations enjoying a monopoly. Foreign direct investment (FDI) was 
restricted in the public utility and physical infrastructure sectors due to nationalist sentiments and 
concerns of foreign economic and political influence over strategic public utilities and state assets. 
The fact that many developing countries were under the colonial power of Western European states 
until the early or middle part of the last century may have contributed towards this fear that FDI 
may serve as a new form of economic colonialism in which, foreign companies might exploit the 
resources of the developing countries. In the circumstances, during the period prior to 1970s, the 
necessary finances for development and maintenance of infrastructure projects were met mainly by 
national budgetary allocations.  
 
In recent years, however, restrictions on FDI in many developing economies have been 
substantially reduced as a result of international treatises, external pressures from the World Bank, 
and due to unilateral actions on the part of the developing country governments which have realised 
the importance of FDI for economic growth. The global and political development has contributed 
towards removing or radically altering some perceptions about the control and distributional 
function of utilities. Further, the generally poor performance of public utilities and changing views 
on the role of the state in the economy have contributed to the public provision of infrastructure 
falling from grace. Growing demand for increased as well as quality infrastructure services has not 
allowed developing countries to curtail the need for infrastructure development even when 
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budgetary constraints limit the scope of government funding, thus providing a further impetus for 
the change in the developing country governments’ approach towards FDI.  
 
From another angle, financial deregulation in the capital markets has introduced new 
suppliers of equity capital into-cross border investment, thus, making room for private sector 
provision of utility services.1 Finally, technological developments in telecommunications and 
electricity generation industries have reduced capital intensity and the lead times involved in the 
provision of infrastructure services, thus, expanding the potential for competition in activities that 
were once dominated by state monopolies. 
 
In sum, the aforesaid changes have resulted in one of the swiftest and dramatic changes of 
context for utilities and infrastructure industries in developing countries. Intense global competition 
between large multinational companies (MNCs) (both in terms of operations and ownership) with 
deep roots in the capital markets have replaced a landscape of national, over-regulated monopolies 
in fragmented markets, financed primarily through budgetary sources, mostly, deficits.2 With MNCs 
competing with each other to access new and developing markets, and with developing countries 
becoming more and more adoptive towards open economic policies, FDI has grown as one of the 
most important forms of international capital flows for developing countries during the last three 
decades.  
 
With FDI gaining popularity as the most preferred sources of finance for development of 
infrastructure in developing countries, many bilateral assistance programmes and international 
development banks have started to move away from direct financing of infrastructure projects 
toward programs and actions that facilitate the mobilization of bilateral and international investment 
from non-government sources. The private sector (domestic and international) is thus, increasingly 
sought after by developing country governments as a partner in infrastructure development. A 
                                                 
1 Nestor, S. and Mahboobi, L., “Privatisation of Public Utilities: the OECD Experience”, (OECD, 1999).  
 Online: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/24/1929700.pdf 
2 Ibid. 
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related aim of governments in this context has been to free scarce home-grown capital resources to 
fund other development necessities, such as, education, health care, and social welfare (which fall 
into the category of social infrastructure development) as these sectors are hardly the preferred 
playing fields for profit oriented MNCs.  
 
The process by which governments are turning increasingly to market mechanisms and the 
private sector for the development of infrastructure projects which inherently involves the transfer 
of risk from the government to the private sector is popularly known as “project financing”.3 The 
most sought after project financing techniques for infrastructure development such as Build Own 
Operate (BOO) or Build Operate Transfer (BOT) models focus on financing projects with a 
combination of debt and equity from several key players including international financing 
organizations and private sector project developers, thus, making it s a complex arrangement where 
several parties with diverse interests come together to develop projects. 
 
Although innovative, project financing is not flawless. The risks associated with project 
financing are some times more complex than those associated with traditional forms of FDI. Project 
financing techniques are not old and have not been sufficiently tested as they have been around only 
for little over three decades. Most of the projects financed with project financing techniques have a 
life term of 20-30 years. As a result, there are not many projects around that have run their full life 
cycle to serve as examples of successes or failures. Thus, the ways of identifying risks and sharing 
them between governments, investors, lenders, and other private sector project participants are still 
being explored on a trial and error basis. Trying to harmonise the diverse interests of all project 
participants, whilst, also trying to achieve project success is a challenge all project participants. 
  
Another important issue concerning project financing and associated industry deregulation 
is their national affordability or in other words, the impact privately financed infrastructure projects 
                                                 
3 Ljung, P., Head, C., Sunman, H., Trends in the Financing of Water and Energy Resources Projects, Thematic Review III.2 prepared as an input to the World 
Commission on Dams (World Commission on Dams, Cape Town, 2000). Online: http://www.dams.org/kbase/thematic/tr32_scp.htm 
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have on the consumer, particularly, in low-income developing economies. As new project-financing 
processes necessarily result in the need for cost-recovery tariffs, this in turn requires special 
attention to tariff structures in developing economies, and policies on affordable ("life-line") rates 
for low-income consumers. This poses a challenge to the developing country governments who 
faces the dilemma of having to satisfy investors as well as consumers at the same time. 
 
Sometimes, given the need for the developing countries to develop infrastructure projects in 
order to cater to the increasing demand for utility services, there seems to be a tendency towards 
compromising the interests of some ethnic, indigenous or minority groups.  This has some times 
resulted in causing severe and irreparable damage to the interests of project participants as well as 
the victims of such compromise. Thus, issues such as land acquisition policies of the host country, 
payment of compensation to the displaced persons, and protection given to indigenous groups are 
important concerns relating to modern day infrastructure development projects that need to be 
addressed.  
 
From the investor perspective, the uncertain economic and political conditions in 
developing countries are the major risk factors that need careful consideration when decisions are 
made concerning financing of infrastructure development projects. With the growing demand for 
political liberalisation in some developing countries and the increasing interest in regional 
integration, there is no guarantee that political structures and borders of autonomy in developing 
countries would remain static. In the circumstances, the nature of the risks associated with 
traditional forms of FDI have either assumed a new face or are likely to assume a new face in 
relation to infrastructure development projects with long concession periods, some times running 
into 20 -30 years.   
 
Many argue that project financing techniques such as BOO/BOT methods are “win-win” 
options for developing countries as well as investors, lenders and other project participants. The 
main arguments that are put forward to argue the benefits for the developing countries include the 
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inability of the public finance to meet the growing needs for infrastructure development and the 
limited or non-recourse nature of project financing which reduces or removes the burden of 
servicing debt and equity from the developing countries. The main argument supporting the view 
that project financing techniques are equally beneficial to the investors, lenders and other project 
participants is that markets previously under state monopolies could now be accessed by the 
privates sector.  
 
Theoretically speaking, project financing techniques such as BOO and BOT have some 
what removed the burden of servicing debt and equity from developing countries by transferring 
that burden to purpose specific project companies which are set up to run the projects during their 
agreed life terms. The non-recourse or limited-recourse nature of project financing, which will be 
discussed in detail later, means that the lenders and investors do not look beyond the project assets 
and project income for their loan payments and profit earnings. However, in practice, these 
theoretical benefits only looks convincing on paper as in some developing countries, due to the 
unique nature of the risks associated, many development projects that are financed with techniques 
that are in fact not limited or non-recourse in nature. For example, many low income countries with 
political and or economic instability continue to be burdened with the obligation of servicing debt 
and equity with government pay-back guarantees.  
 
Further, although it is theoretically correct to say that project financing techniques has 
opened the doors for the private sector to invest and participate in previously inaccessible sectors, 
the actual situation is somewhat different. Due to policy and regulatory inadequacies as well as 
hostile reaction of end-users towards private sector involvement in certain utility service sectors, 
project developers, investors and lenders do not find their entry into many developing countries 
easy. 
 
To ensure that all the project participants in infrastructure development projects benefit 
from the use of project financing techniques, it is extremely important that all risks associated with 
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the projects are identified at the earliest, and, measures taken to minimise them. It is also important 
to ensure that projects are actually developed in the interest of the public and not due to any corrupt 
motivations or political interests of the law makers or project developers. In other words, it is 
important that investment agreements are harnessed to become essential engines for sustainable 
development. Further, investment agreement negotiations should be opened to the scrutiny of all 
interested stakeholders. Only then would there be a realistic possibility of achieving investment 
agreements that are truly in the public interest.  
 
At present, international investment law provides extraordinary rights and remedies for 
foreign investors simply because they are foreign owners of property. The investors also argue 
under international law that they cannot be held liable in their home states for acts or damages 
caused by their foreign owned investments because of the same foreign property status. Thus, it is 
important that the negotiators of investment agreements for the developing countries find clear and 
precise ways to hold the investors liable and accountable in the event of any default. For example, 
an international agreement which does away with the forum non convenience rule could ensure that 
the right to make a profit is coupled with the liability for how that profit was made.4 The reshaping 
of the purpose of investment agreements from protecting foreign investors to agreements which 
contribute towards sustainable development would provide a proper basis for protecting the inherent 
obligation of states to act in the best interest of their people.  
 
In order to ensure that risks associated with infrastructure development projects are duly 
assessed, investment promotion policies of developing countries as well as foreign investment 
agreements should be subjected to a conceptual shift from the promotion and protection of any 
investment towards promotion and protection of sustainable investment. The tools needed to do this 
include: environmental and social impact assessments, environmental managements systems, 
corporate codes of conduct, measures for the protection of the rights of end-users and the parties 
                                                 
4 Mann, H., “The Corporate v. Public Agenda: Protecting Foreign Investors in the Post-NAFTA Experience” (October, 2002),  International Institute for Sustainable 
Development. Online: http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/campbell/XBorder/Mann%20Oped.pdf. 
 
 7
who may be adversely affected due to investment projects, stable political and regulatory 
environment and an effective and efficient dispute resolution mechanisms.5  
 
In the circumstances, in summary, the aim of this thesis is threefold: (1) to describe the 
transition of investment needs of developing countries from direct financing by foreign investors to 
project financing methods; (2) to identify the various traditional and non-traditional risks associated 
with project financing measures and to analyse the practices in use and new practices that could be 
proposed to negotiate and allocate risks among the project participants in order to achieve 
sustainable development; and (3) To review the key implications to developing countries from the 
use of project financing, including the influences the changing project financing climate has on the 
policy, regulatory, planning and decision-making frameworks of developing countries; and to 
propose measures that could be adopted by key project participants for future success of project 
financing. 
 
1.2. Purpose and Justification of the Study 
 
As noted in the previous section, with the opening up of closed economies and providing 
access for private sector to participate in development activities, FDI has grown steadily in its 
importance, relative to other forms of international investment. According to UNCTAD, during the 
last three decades FDI has accounted for about 3/4th of total International Capital Flows. Thus, it is 
most likely that FDI flows would continue to dwarf official sector financing, and would remain the 
most important engine of growth in a majority of the developing countries. According to Professor 
Kregal, FDI should be considered as an “investment in "domestic bricks and mortar" which once 
                                                 
5  See generally, Mann, H., “The Right of States to Regulate and International Investment Law”, A Comment at the Expert Meeting on the Development Dimension of 
FDI: Policies to Enhance the Role of FDI in Support of the Competitiveness of the Enterprise Sector and the Economic Performance of Host Economies, Taking 
into Account the Trade/Investment Interface in the National and International Context, (November 2002, Geneva, Switzerland). 
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installed, cannot be easily repatriated and represents a permanent contribution to a country's 
resources”.6  
 
However, although private sector led FDI and more particularly, new and innovative FDI 
methods such as the use of project financing techniques is seen as a catalyst for economic growth of 
developing countries, it is important to note that the nature and the effects of some of the risks 
associated with traditional forms of FDI have changed considerably or in recent times, especially, 
when it concerns infrastructure development projects. Three main factors have contributed to the 
said changes. These being (1) the changing political culture among developing countries (2) the 
multi-party participation in the development of infrastructure projects with the use new and 
innovative FDI methods such as project financing techniques and (3) international as well as 
national recognition of the rights of the indigenous communities.  
 
The risks that have assumed a new out look as a result of the factors mentioned above and 
in response to the complex nature of project financing techniques include risks such as the demand 
for political decentralisation; demand for separation of unitary states; unlawful invasions and 
foreign occupations; terrorist activities and war situations; social objections and judicial obstacles 
for development; challenges posed by parties adversely affected due to infrastructure development 
projects, i.e. the indigenous communities, all of which are risks falling under the broad definition of 
“political risks”. 
 
With the growth of FDI, the number of studies devoted to FDI too has grown. However, the 
number of issues that require further legal as well as economic research and analysis does not seem 
to have decreased. Many books, articles and papers have been written extensively on the advantages 
and disadvantages of FDI, the modes of project financing and the allocation of risks associated with 
them. However, no substantive studies have been done to identify the changing nature of some of 
                                                 




the risks associated with FDI, especially the above mentioned risks which fall under the category of 
risks broadly defined as political risks, which have in recent times shown signs of challenging the 
growth of project financing as an innovative and effective mechanism for development of 
infrastructure projects in developing countries.  
 
Further, while the existing studies have concentrated amply on the perspectives of the host 
nations, investors and project developers, very little attention has been given to the perspectives of 
the end-users of the facilities developed using new FDI measures such as project financing. 
Similarly, very little attention has been given to the interests of those who may be adversely 
affected due to infrastructure development projects, for example, indigenous groups.  
 
In addition, there are several other issues relating to the use of new and innovative methods 
of FDI which remain unanswered or partially answered. These include questions such as: How good 
are the new and innovative methods of FDI? How is FDI affected by the growth of newly created 
assets in emerging markets? How is the immergence of new risks likely to change the patterns of 
competitive advantage of firms and location advantage of countries? What is the impact of FDI on 
minorities and indigenous groups in host countries? Should governments and international 
institutions control FDI flows and, if so, how can they influence them? 
 
This thesis investigates some aspects of the aforesaid key issues surrounding the use of new 
and innovative methods of FDI such as project financing. Particularly, it attempts to resolve issues 
relating to FDI attraction policies of the host country governments and the changing nature of 
traditional risks associated with FDI. Further, the thesis seeks to analyse measures already in use 
and new measures that could be used to mitigate and or avoid such risks which threaten the ability 
techniques such as project financing to respond to the infrastructure development needs of 
developing countries.  
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The thesis identifies some legal and regulatory measures that have been taken by some 
developing countries as well as model laws and guidelines that are being promoted by some 
international organizations to mitigate the effects of risks associated with infrastructure 
development projects. Further, the thesis analyses various lacunas in these measures and propose 
improvements that are necessary to ensure that the use of FDI mechanisms such as project financing 
benefits all project participants without compromising or adversely affecting the rights of those 
parties who are not direct beneficiaries of investment projects.  
 
The thesis concludes that if sufficient attention is not given to recognising the changing 
nature of traditional risks associated with FDI and minimising those, the future success of project 
financing as an innovative and effective mechanism for developing infrastructure projects cannot be 
guaranteed. The thesis submits that, as a result, project financing may fail to make a positive impact 
towards sustainable development. The thesis therefore explores measures to address these concerns 
and, in addition seeks to make suggestions and recommendations aimed at reducing the key risks 
associated with modern day infrastructure development projects.  
 
1.3. The Scope of the Study  
 
The thesis provides a brief overview of the key features of traditional forms of foreign 
investment and examines in more detail the recent trends, policies, and practices for financing 
infrastructure projects involving various mixes of government, private sector, commercial bank and 
international financial institution participation. The manner in which the different emerging 
financing techniques promise to influence traditional government, private sector and community 
roles in the planning, project selection, design, construction and operation stages of infrastructure 
projects is also assessed, whilst, focussing in detail on traditional and non-traditional risks which 
threaten the progress of such financing techniques. Finally, whilst discussing the advantages and 
disadvantages of project financing techniques for infrastructure development projects, suggestions 
and proposals concerning measures that should be taken by primarily, the developing countries, 
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investors, and international organizations, for future success of project financing are made. In 
addition, the thesis will also look at issues concerning infrastructure development with project 
financing techniques from the perspective of indigenous and minority groups who are often 
adversely affected due to development activities in the interest of the majority.   
 
The study is not limited to any geographic boundaries. However, the main focus is on 
developing countries in Asia, Africa and the Americas. The developing countries from these three 
regions are used to pick examples and for the purpose of case studies to support the analysis in the 
thesis. The political, social and economic environments of developing countries in the said regions 
in general set the foundation for the analysis of changing nature of traditional risks and emerging 
new risks that developing countries as well as investors and other key project participants have to, 
or may need to, face in future, in connection with infrastructure development projects. Although the 
study’s temporal focus is on present and future challenges to infrastructure development through 
project financing, historical events are discussed to the extent that they are relevant or related to the 
analysis made in the thesis. 
 
The main arguments presented in the thesis are as follows: 
I. developing countries need FDI for infrastructure development due to their 
incapacity to cater to the growing demand for increased and modern infrastructure 
facilities with home grown finances or by raising external finances following 
traditional methods; 
II. Since the 1980’s various “project financing” techniques have gained popularity 
among developing countries, foreign investors and lenders as both innovative and 
better project development mechanisms when compared to traditional FDI methods 
for developing infrastructure projects; 
III. Due to the multi-party participation in project financing transactions, the complex 
nature of risk sharing and contractual structuring involved in project financing and, 
the changing political, economic, and social conditions in developing countries, 
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some of the traditional risks associated with FDI have assumed a new out look in 
recent times;7 and 
IV. If the developing countries and other key project participants such as foreign 
investors and lenders fail to recognize: 1) the changing nature of some of the risks 
associated with FDI given their association with infrastructure projects developed 
with project financing mechanisms; and 2) the risks that have shown signs of 
affecting the progress of infrastructure development projects in developing 
countries; and take appropriate measures to identify and mitigate them to the best of 
their ability, project financing might fail to lead developing countries towards 
sustainable development and provide a win-win option for all project participants. 
 
1.4. Definition of Key Concepts used in the Thesis 
 
The thesis deals with five key concepts, namely, “developing countries”, “FDI”, “project 
financing”, “infrastructure development” and “sustainable development”. Of these, the concepts of 
“FDI” and “project financing” are defined and explained in Chapters two and three respectively, 
where they are dealt with in detail.  In the circumstances, Sections 1.4.1 – 1.4.3 below concentrate 
on providing definitions to the other three key concepts. 
 
1.4.1.  “Infrastructure Development” 
 
The term “Infrastructure” is a broad concept and could be linked to every facet of the 
economy and human life. According to one definition, “the term infrastructure has been used since 
1927 to refer collectively to the roads, bridges, rail lines and similar public works that are required 
for an industrial economy or a portion of it, to function”.8 According to another definition, the term 
“infrastructure” as a noun has two meanings. Firstly, it means the basic structure or features of a 
                                                 
7 These aspects are dealt with in detail in Chapters 4 and 5 of this Thesis. 
8 Online:http://www.answers.com/topic/infrastructure 
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system or organization. Secondly, it means the stock of basic facilities and capital equipment 
needed for the functioning of a country or area.9 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, the term “infrastructure” has been used to identify and refer 
to the physical assets of a country that provides utility services to its public or contribute to the 
national income of the country by providing services to the users of such assets. Such assets include 
infrastructure facilities such as roads, ports, power generation facilities, telecommunication 
facilities, dams and water related development projects, to name a few. These systems tend to be 
high-cost investments and location-specific so that they cannot be moved from place to place. 
Although, a country’s infrastructure development activities also includes the development of 
welfare systems and services such as health care and education, I have categorized development 
related to such services as social infrastructure development in order to distinguish them from the 
project development activities relating to project financing transactions. 
 
 1.4.2.  “Developing Countries” 
 
The term "developing country" is often used to refer to low-income and middle-income 
countries as the use of the term is convenient. The term is also sometimes generally used to refer to 
countries which have not achieved a significant degree of industrialization relative to their 
populations, and which have a low standard of living.10  
 
If one is interested in a technical definition of the term “developing country” it is interesting 
to note that the development of a country could be measured with statistical indexes such as income 
per capita (GDP), life expectancy, the rate of literacy, et al.11 The United Nations (UN) has 
                                                 
9 Online:http://www.answers.com/library/WordNet-cid-1190203284 
10 Online:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Developing_country 
11For more detailed technical information about these indicators, please see the Human Development Report Website: 
http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/understanding/resources.cfm. 
 14
developed the Human Development Index (HDI), a compound indicator of these statistics, to gauge 
the level of human development for countries where data is available.12 
 
In addition to the term “developing country” terms such as less developed countries 
(LDCs), least economically developed countries (LEDCs), "underdeveloped nations" or 
"undeveloped nations", “third world nations”, “the South” “emerging market economies” and "non-
industrialized nations" are popularly used to refer to developing countries. In recent times, 
international organizations have started to use the term least developed countries (LDCs) for the 
poorest nations which can in no sense be regarded as developing.  
 
In my view, the terms used to refer to developing countries depends on the intent and to the 
constructs of those who utilize the terms. The WTO for example, allows each nation to decide for 
itself (self designation) whether it will be designated as "undeveloped" or "developing". As a result 
some countries which may be designated as developed according to particular criteria may be 
designated as developing according to different criteria. A good example is the case of Singapore, 
which could be classified as developed nation since it is ranked among the top 25 nations in the 
world according to the HDI used by the World Bank, but is considered a developing country by self 
designation at the World Trade Organization (WTO).13 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, the term “developing countries” is used for its convenience to 
identify countries which have undergone a period of transition from closed economies to open 
economies since their independence from colonial rule and are attempting to attract FDI for 
physical infrastructure development in order to cater to the increasing demand for modern and 
increased infrastructure services by the people. For the purpose of showing various examples and, 
                                                 
12 The UN Human Development Index (HDI) is a comparative measure of poverty, literacy, education, life expectancy, childbirth, and other factors for countries 
worldwide. The index was developed in 1990 by the Pakistani economist Mahbub ul Haq, and has been used since 1993 by the United Nations Development 
Programme in its annual report. See: UN Human Development Index Report (2005). Online: http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005/pdf/HDR05_HDI.pdf 
13 More than two-thirds of the WTO’s 144 members (including Singapore) are considered to be developing countries by virtue of their self-designation as such. See: A 
Glossary of Agricultural and World Trade Organization Terms - http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/wto/cancun/wto_a2.htm 
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for case studies, countries have been selected using researcher’s discretion on the availability of 
examples and cases and the appropriateness of those examples and cases, for supporting the 
arguments presented in the thesis. However, it should be noted that all of the countries referred to in 
this thesis as developing countries fall under the category of developing countries according to the 
Human Poverty Index (HPI) used in the UN Human Development Index Report of 2005.14 Further, 
the countries identified and referred to as developing countries in this thesis also fall under the 
category of “developing countries” according to the OECD.15 
 
1.4.3.  “Sustainable Development” 
 
There are many definitions of the terms “sustainability” and “sustainable development”. 
The best known is the definition given by the World Commission on Environment and 
Development. In its report, famously known as the Brundtland Report (1987), it is suggested that 
sustainable development is a process of developing land, cities, business, communities, etc. that 
"meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs".16 Accordingly, development is sustainable where the exploitation of resources, the 
direction of investments, the orientation of technological development, and institutional change are 
made consistent with the future as well as present needs. 
 
According to some sources, the precise meaning of sustainable development is widely 
debated. For example, “two years after the Brundtland Commission's Report popularized the term, 
over 140 definitions of sustainable development had been catalogued”.17 However, the term 
"sustainability" has since been defined with reference to scientific principles. For example, the 
Swedish scientist, Karl-Henrik Robèrt had defined the term setting out four scientific principles 
                                                 
14 UN Human Development Index Report, supra note 12, p. 229. 
15 Online:http://www.icml9.org/public/documents/pdf/es/OECD.pdf 
16 The report titled “Our Common Future” of the World Commission on Environment and Development (1987), also known as the Brundtland Commission, which 




17 Online:  http://sustainable-development.wikiverse.org/ and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sustainable_development 
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based on laws of thermodynamics for the sustainability of the planet Earth (the “Natural Step’s  
Definition”).18 The Natural Step's definition of sustainability includes four system conditions that 
lead to a sustainable society. The Natural Step Framework holds that “in a sustainable society, 
nature won’t be subject to systematically increasing: 
1. Concentrations of substances extracted from the earth’s crust; 
2. Concentrations of substances produced by society; 
3. Degradation by physical means;  
And, in that society, 
4. human needs are met worldwide.”19 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, I have used the term “sustainable development” to refer to 
development initiatives of the developing countries which are consistent with their future as well as 
present development needs. In other words, to refer to development projects which have been 
initiated after careful analysis of: the prevailing development needs of the countries; the risks 
attached to development projects designed to cater to such needs; the interests of the affected 
parties; the level of confidence that the project participants could place on the success of projects 
which carry long concession periods; and the present and future benefits to the developing countries 




The principal research method followed in this thesis is based on surveying the existing 
academic literature on foreign direct investment and project financing to establish theoretical and 
practical principles and guidelines for resolving the pertinent policy and structural questions raised 
thereof in connection with investment promotion, risk allocation, and securing national interests.  
 
                                                 
18 Robèrt, Karl-Henrik. (2002). The Natural Step Story: Seeding a Quiet Revolution. Gabriola Island, BC: New Society Publishers.  
19 Source: Natural Step US (2002). Online:  www.naturalstep.org 
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The second research approach used in this thesis is the analysis of case studies from several 
developing countries with the intent of showing examples of how the ignorance of or intentional 
overlooking of risks associated with infrastructure development have led to failure of investment 
initiatives. The case studies are also used to draw conclusions on measures for avoiding future 
failures and highlighting the initiatives necessary for future success of FDI and more particularly 
project financing, in development of much needed infrastructure in developing countries. 
 
The third research approach concerns empirical research conducted by way of discovery 
and analysis of existing policy initiatives and policy structures in several developing countries 
towards promotion of FDI and using innovative methods such as project financing for development 
of infrastructure facilities.  
 
The fourth research approach concerns pragmatic historical review and analysis of issues 
concerning FDI and project financing in particular. This approach is used to gain an understanding 
of how the practices in developing countries have evolved over the years in connection with 
infrastructure development and draw lessons for the future from the learning experience of past 
practice.  
 
The final research approach concerns active engagement and communication with policy 
makers, investors, general public as well as parties such as indigenous groups and minorities who 
are adversely affected due to FDI. 
 
1.6. Organisation of the Work 
 
Chapter 1of the thesis introduces the aims of the thesis by providing a general summary of 
the research undertaken and its importance. In addition it details the purpose of study, its 
justification, the scope, and the methodologies used.  
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Chapter 2 deals with the nature and historical background of international capital flows and 
distinguishes FDI from the other sources of international capital flows. In addition, this chapter sets 
the scene for what follows by defining FDI and briefly detailing recent trends in FDI. 
 
Chapter 3 introduces the concept of Project Financing as a new and innovative method of 
financing infrastructure projects.  It deals with the key features of the concept and explains the 
complex contractual structure of project financing transactions. It also deals with the complex 
mechanism of risk allocation in Project Financing.  
 
Chapter 4 deals with the changing nature of traditional risks associated with project 
financing and analyses the effects of such changes given the transformation of basic FDI into more 
complex contractual arrangements in project financing structures. The chapter deals with issues 
such as decentralisation, cessation of states, and hostile taking of property during foreign invasions 
which are issues that have not been the subjects of detail study or analysis in connection with 
innovative methods of FDI such as project financing. 
 
Chapter 5 deals with the social and judicial obstacles to the use of project financing as an 
innovative method for sustainable development of infrastructure in developing countries. The 
chapter also suggests measures that could be adapted to balance the interest between development 
needs and social and judicial concerns. 
 
Chapter 6 deals with the issue of the rights of indigenous groups and the effect development 
of infrastructure projects have on such rights. This chapter provides several examples by way of 
case studies to highlight the importance of giving due consideration to the rights of minorities and 
indigenous groups when taking development related decisions.  
 
Finally, Chapter 7 formulates general conclusions and recommendations, and proposes 
issues for further study and analysis. 
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Chapter 2 – FDI: Definition, Nature, Historical Aspects and 
Current Trends 
 
2.1. Definition and Classification of Foreign Investment 
 
The definition of foreign investment can be best made based on balance of payments 
transactions between residents and non-residents of a country. Accordingly, foreign investment is 
investment made by individuals or enterprises that have their centre of economic interest in an 
economy other than the economy in which they invest.  
 
The classification of foreign investment or in other words international capital flows is 
possible on a variety of bases.20 Under the definition and classification of international accounts 
presented by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Balance-of-Payments Manual, foreign 
investment is classified into the following components:21 
 Commercial loans - These primarily take the form of loans by banks to 
foreign businesses or governments.  
 Official flows - This category refers generally to the forms of development 
assistance given by developed countries to developing countries. 
 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) - This category refers to international 
investment in which the investor obtains a lasting interest in an enterprise in another 
country. 
 Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI) - FPI is a category of investment 
instruments that are more easily traded, may be less permanent, and do not represent a 
controlling stake in an enterprise. These include investments via equity instruments (stocks) 
                                                 
20  Feldstein, M., International Capital Flows,  (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999) 
21  International Monitory Fund, IMF Balance of Payments Manual (5th ed.),  (Washington D.C.: IMF Publications, 1993). 
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or debt (bonds) of a foreign enterprise which does not necessarily represent a long-term 
interest.22 
 
Table 2.1below sets out another possible classification scheme based on the agents involved 
in the transaction, namely private or public (government), and on the basis of the transaction itself. 
On the basis of the agents involved in the transaction, the investment can be classified as either 
private or public. On the basis of the transaction, it can be divided into credit type (e.g. short or 
long-term borrowing and lending) and non-credit type, such as investments, grants, or contributions.  
 
Table 2.1 – Classification of Capital Flows 
 
 
As noted above, foreign investment can come into a country in various forms. However, the 
composition of these flows has changed dramatically over the years with FDI and FPI taking the 
largest shares of total net resource flows to developing countries.23 In 1985, international bank 
                                                 
22  Portfolio investment includes investments by a resident entity in one country in the equity and debt securities of an enterprise resident in another country, which seek 
primarily capital gains and do not necessarily reflect a significant and lasting interest in the enterprise. The category includes investments in bonds, notes, money 
market instruments and financial derivatives other than those included under direct investment, or in other words, investments which are both below the ten per cent 
rule and do not involve affiliated enterprises. In addition to securities issued by enterprises, foreigners can also purchase sovereign bonds issued by governments. 
According to the IMF’s 1996 Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey Guide the essential characteristic of instruments classified as portfolio instruments is that 
they are traded or tradable. 
23  Information on total net resource flows to developing countries as reported by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) shows that in 1985, official development finance still accounted for 56 percent of total net resource flows to developing 
countries, while in 1997 it accounted for only 23 per cent of the total. Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Foreign 
Base of classification 
 










Investment abroad by individuals 
 
Loans between governments 
















Individuals buying stocks of foreign 
companies 
Joint ventures; investment in 
infrastructure projects overseas 
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lending accounted for more than 50 per cent of total private flows to developing countries, FDI for 
22 per cent and FPI for 18 per cent; in 1997, their respective shares were estimated at 8 per cent, 43 
per cent and 48 per cent (the remainder being grants from non-governmental organisations).24 
 
This changing pattern of foreign investment flows is the result of the process of 
globalisation of production through the internalisation of transactions within the MNEs (inducing 
more FDI activities) and the increasing securitisation of financial transactions (inducing more cross-
border FPI in equities and bonds). Both types of flows have different characteristics and might have 
different implications for the development strategies of recipient countries.  
 
Although there are several forms of foreign investment as noted above, what has been most 
influential in developing the infrastructure facilities in developing countries is FDI. Therefore, for 
the purpose of this thesis, concentration will be on FDI and, project financing as a more innovative 
and advantageous form of FDI. A distinction has to be made however, between FPI and FDI.  
 
FDI and FPI have different characteristics. A better understanding of the specific attributes 
of the FDI and FPI flows could be made by assessing the impact of these flows on recipient 
economies and defining policy approaches towards investment flows.25 FPI can be defined as 
investment in foreign shares, bonds and money market papers, on a financial basis, with the primary 
intention of the owner of the capital to maximize his utility, which is the risk-adjusted return on his 
asset portfolio. Portfolio investors are passive holders of assets who do not aim at majority 
ownership of the company or project in which they hold shares. They do not take part in the 
management and decision making process. In other words, the objectives of portfolio investors are 
more of a short-term speculative nature. In that, they can quickly reorganize their portfolios through 
buying or selling, responding only to higher returns offered elsewhere or higher risks in the host 
                                                                                                                                                     
Portfolio Investment (FPI) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): Characteristics, Similarities, Complementarities and Differences, Policy Implications and 
Development Impact, (Geneva: UNCTAD, June, 1999). 
24  Id. 
25  Id.  
 22
economy. Therefore, portfolio investors are usually regarded by researchers as being far more 
sensitive to changes in the country’s investment climate as compared to direct investors. 
 
As opposed portfolio investment, FDI is medium to long term investment aimed at 
obtaining direct managerial controlling power over the use of the capital. As noted earlier, FDI is 
the category of international investment in which a resident entity in one economy obtains a lasting 
interest in an enterprise resident in another. A lasting interest implies the existence of a long-term 
relationship between the direct investor and the enterprise and a significant degree of influence by 
the investor on the management of the enterprise. The criterion used is that "a direct investment is 
established when a resident in one economy owns 10 per cent or more of the ordinary shares or 
voting power of an incorporated enterprise, or the equivalent for an unincorporated enterprise. All 
subsequent transactions between affiliated enterprises, both incorporated and unincorporated, are 
direct investment transactions".26  
 
The fundamental difference between FDI and FPI is that the direct investors are direct and 
active participants in the decision-making process over their capital, despite the fact that in the long 
run their objective, just like those of the portfolio investors, is maximization of return on the capital. 
Foreign direct investors often make investments into concurrent or co-operative foreign firms. To 
shape a successful business venture, they provide not only financial, but also professional and 
technological support. Thus, FDI involves not only international transfer of capital, but also such 
resources as technology, management, information, organisational and marketing skills. 
 
Furthermore, FDI is a long-term commitment to engage in economic activities in the host 
country and has been proven to be less volatile compared to other forms of international capital 
                                                 
26  This is the definition of FDI utilized in the IMF’s 1993 Balance of Payments Manual (see supra note 21) and also in the OECD, Detailed Benchmark Definition of 
Foreign Direct Investment (2nd ed.) (France: OECD Publishing, 1992). Although the IMF and OECD specify the 10 per cent criterion, a survey conducted jointly 
by these institutions on foreign direct investment statistics in 1997 indicated that about three-fourths of the 96 OECD and non-OECD respondent countries analyzed 
in the survey applied the 10 per cent rule. Many countries do not use a predetermined threshold and many non-OECD countries rely on investment approval 
authorities for the collection of their FDI statistics. See “Foreign Direct Investment: Survey of Implementation of Methodological Standards”, Financial Market 
Trends, OECD, November 1998.  
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flows.27 In other words, foreign direct investors are not reacting as drastically to changes in the 
investment climate as others do. They usually aim at long-term profit and are unlikely to withdraw 
investment in short period due to high transaction costs. The nature of the market for FDI favours 
those investors who have the patience and capacity to actively work through the problems 
associated with the businesses in which they invest. The time between making an investment and its 
realisation can often take years as a result of many factors, including detailed and complex 
negotiations with the host country government and other parties involved. 
 
The decision to undertake FDI in any particular country is influenced mainly by that 
country's determinants, while FPI can be affected by factors external to host economies such as 
financial policies in capital exporting countries, the state of liquidity in international capital markets 
and, changes in the pattern of diversification of international portfolio.28 Furthermore, FDI is firm 
and sector specific while FPI is not. FPI is more fungible. FPI has a greater macroeconomic impact 
(through changes in asset prices and liquidity in the financial sector), while FDI can have a 
significant impact at the microeconomic level, shaping the productive structure of a host country. 
FDI can transfer technology and improve market access, while FPI can help to strengthen the 
process of domestic capital market development.29 
 
FPI is more volatile than FDI. Volatility is characterised by the high frequency of the 
reversibility of FPI flows or by the high variability in the volume of capital inflows. Reversibility 
and variability result from the fact that FPI flows are highly sensitive to changes in their 
determinants. Volatility of capital flows can create an unstable investment environment detrimental 
to growth and development.30 There are many channels through which volatility exert a negative 
impact on the economy. The first is through unexpected changes in the availability of finance, and 
                                                 
27 International Monetary Fund, Effects of Financial Globalization on Developing Countries: Some Empirical Evidence, (Washington D.C.: IMF Publications, 2003). 
28  See supra,  note 20. 
29 UNCTAD, Trends in FDI and Ways and Means of Enhancing FDI Flows to and among Developing Countries, in particular LDCs and Countries Receiving Relatively 
Low FDI Inflows, with a view to Increasing the Benefits they Entail, and Taking into Account the Factors which Play a Part in Private Sector Firms’ Choices of 
Investment Locations, Commission on Investment, Technology and Related Financial Issues ( Fourth Session, Geneva, 4-8 October 1999), TD/B/COM.2/21 
30  Id. 
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consequential changes in its cost and in asset prices. This will induce high variability in expected 
profits, and making investment planning difficult. The second is through the effects of 
compensatory adjustment in monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policies in the face of rapid 
changes in the availability of external finance. And finally, capital volatility has an impact on 
consumption, and consequently on growth.31 
 
FDI flows are generally sustainable. FDI is made in recipient countries through the 
establishment of production lines or long term development projects, which would be difficult to 
dissolve in a short time. Therefore, disinvestments or reversibility is much more difficult to 
undertake than in the case of portfolio investment, which can be easily sold off on financial 
markets.32 
 
The policy regimes governing these two types of foreign investment are also different. 
Policies to attract FPI would have to proceed in a more cautious way, as the volatility of FPI flows 
could have a negative impact on recipient economies. In this respect careful consideration could be 
given to the question of including or excluding portfolio investment from investment agreements. 
Countries should be allowed to adopt measures (other than fiscal and monetary measures) to "fine-
tune" capital inflows and outflows in order to avoid sudden and unexpected boom-bust cycles of 
capital flows, especially of portfolio investment. It would be preferable that such measures are 
market-based as the cost involved might be minimised. 
 
Finally, it could be said that there seems to be a pattern whereby FPI becomes an important 
source of capital for higher-income countries, whereas, FDI remains the significant source of capital 
for development activities of the developing countries. Using IMF balance of payments data on 
capital flows, it can be shown from figure 1 below that over the period 1991-1998, FDI and FPI 
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represented about 90% (respectively 51% and 39%) of total capital flows to emerging markets. It is 
interesting to note that, on a regional basis, countries in Latin America, in the Middle-East and 
Europe and countries in transition relied mostly on FPI as a source of capital flows. In Asia, for the 
five more advanced East Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, the Republic of 




This observation is broadly confirmed by a country breakdown. Figure 2 below reports 
detailed information on capital flows over the period 1993-1997 for 29 countries (for which a 
consistent set of data is available). The ten countries that attracted more FPI than FDI are in the 
higher income bracket (with per capita GDP exceeding US$ 2,500), with the exception of India and 
the Philippines. For eight of them, the volume of external finance raised through bonds was higher 
than that raised through equities.33 
                                                 
33 These countries are: Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexico, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Russia, South Africa, Thailand and Uruguay. For Mexico, FDI and FPI 






2.2. The Growth of FDI and its Effects on Development during the Pre- 
World War 2 Period 
 
The international capital movement is not a new phenomenon. It has been taking place 
among Western European countries and their colonies for several centuries. FDI is also not a new 
concept. It has existed for thousands of years since Sumerian and Finician traders started to build 
their own branch houses abroad to store their commodities before selling them. From the late 16th 
century, investing in trading branches abroad became a common practice for European traders, 
especially the English and Dutch East Indies companies.34  
 
However, Capital movement at international level became prominent only after the 
Industrial Revolution in Western Europe in early 1800s.35 At first, the movement of capital was 
dominated by British investors purchasing foreign securities. This foreign capital was attracted by 
generally higher returns abroad and investment successes in France, Prussia, Austria and Russia 
in the early 1800s.36 But this provoked a speculative boom which in the early 1820s ended up in a 
major series of defaults on foreign loans by Latin American and Southern European countries. 
This was followed in the 1830s by a similar speculative boom in the American loan market which 
collapsed by 1840.37 
 
The arrival of the Industrial Revolution brought about significant changes in the nature of 
FDI. Investors started to build industrial enterprises overseas seeking a variety of opportunities.38 
For example, American companies set up factories and banks in the relatively less industrialized 
Canada and Mexico to take advantage of the close proximity to their emerging markets. At the 
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same time, they built factories in relatively more Industrialized England to get closer to suppliers, 
skilled labour and probably to learn from their English colleagues’ experience. At the same time, 
European firms took advantage of the rapidly growing U.S. market.39 
 
Beginning of the1850s saw a major acceleration in the international movement of capital 
with the development of the railway industry in continental Europe.40 Before 1870, the majority 
of foreign investment was made by one European country into another, with the rest going 
predominantly to the U.S., but in the last quarter of the century there was a rapid build-up of 
investment in places such as India, Canada, and Argentina, followed by a moderate flow of 
investment into Africa and South-East Asia. The majority of capital went into the purchase of 
foreign government securities, as well as portfolio investments in transportation, mining and 
manufacturing companies.41  
 
The role of FDI was negligible until 1890s, when huge multi-unit industrial oligopolistic 
firms appeared suddenly in Europe, U.S., and Japan, and almost immediately started to invest 
abroad in marketing.42 These firms, though limited to few sectors including:  petrochemical, 
electrical, and transportation, started to invest overseas in early 1900s. As a result the world 
economy continued to grow between the periods 1900 to1914. By 1914, the stock of foreign 
capital held by the British reached ₤ 4 billion and those by the French ₤ 1.8 billion.43  For the 
British, dividends and interest from foreign investment became an essential source of national 
income which for many years compensated them for a trade deficit.44  
 
                                                 
39 See generally, Ashworth, W.,  The International Economy since 1850 (London: Longmans, 1967), Ch.2. 
40  Teichova, A., M. Levy-Leboyer, and H. Nussbaum (Eds.), Multinational Enterprise in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: University Press, 1989),  Ch.2. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43  Obstfeld, M. and Taylor, A., Globalization and Capital Markets, Working Paper N8846  (2002), Cambridge M.A.: National Bureau of Economic Research.  
44  See Ashworth  supra  note 39. 
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In the early 19th century, financial institutions comprised a small sector on the periphery 
of the economy. But by 1914, they had developed into a sophisticated global network with an 
ever-expanding range of involvement in all sectors of the economy.45 
 
 World War I brought about significant changes in the international economy as Europe 
began to import its capital to finance its war related activities.46 At the end of the war, the U.S. 
emerged as the largest international creditor on current account, while the British and French 
investments abroad had been reduced dramatically, and the German investment had virtually 
vanished.47 Further, the outbreak of World War I led to a breakdown of the gold standard, but it 
also led to a sharp fall in trade. The situation was exacerbated further in the 1930s by the Great 
Depression. By the mid-1930s the international movement of factors of production virtually 
ceased. Things only began to improve only after World War II.48  
 
2.3. The Growth of FDI and its Effects on Development during the Post 
World War 2 Period 
 
Capital mobility was recovered gradually, under the control of the International Monitory 
Fund (IMF), in the 1950s and 1960s, although the banks continued to be reluctant to lend to the 
developing countries after the defaults of the 1930s.49 Its growth, however, accelerated in the 
1970s and 1980s after the revival of bank lending by the recycling of petrodollars in the 1970s, 
the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system, and introduction of floating exchange rates in major 




48 Rogoff, Kenneth S., “Disinflation:An Unsung Benefit of Globalization?”, Finance & Development (December 2003), pp 54 -55. 
49 Brenner, R., “Uneven Development and the Long Downturn: The Advanced Capitalist Economies from Boom to Stagnation, 1951-1998”, New Left Review 
(1998), pp. 229 - 265; 
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industrialized countries.50 But it was still on a much lesser scale in comparison to the early years 
such as 1913 and 1929.51  
 
The continuous spread of FDI and international business around the world has been one 
of the major developments of the post-World War Two era. MNCs (mainly American 
multinational companies) dominated just after the war with the number of their subsidiaries 
tripling between 1950 and 1967, but the economic growth in other industrialized countries led to 
increasingly many of their companies becoming global.52 MNCs were constantly shifting their 
facilities to conquer new markets and seeking the most efficient, low cost production sites.53  
 
The end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and early 1990s and the arrival of globalization 
saw an unprecedented growth in trade and investment in an increasingly integrated and 
interdependent world economy.54 Figure 2.3 below, shows the changes in accumulated stock of 
capital since World War II. As can be seen from this figure, the value of foreign capital had 
increased by a substantial amount during this period.  
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As a result of the aforementioned developments during the post world war period, there 
are no more self-sufficient countries in the modern world. With regionalisation and globalisation 
in full swing, countries are dependent on each other more than ever before.55 Although there was 
a time that one could argue that foreign investments were made by developed countries in 
developing countries, this is no longer an accurate statement. Even developed countries such as 
USA, France, Britain, Germany and Sweden to name a few, rely on foreign investment. As a 
result, foreign investment can no longer be interpreted narrowly as an investment made by a rich 
country or an international entity in a poor country.  
 
A far as developing countries are concerned, the nature of foreign investment has 
changed over time. The policies in developing countries that favoured import substitution in the 
1950’s and 1960’s surrendered in the 1970’s to policies that favoured natural resource based 
development.56 Then came the transition into free market economies in the 1980’s and the 
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increased private sector involvement in development activities in the 1990’s. In 1996, global 
flows of FDI increased for the fifth consecutive year amounting to US$349 billion.57  The global 
stock of FDI climbed to about US $3.2 trillion, double its level of three years earlier.58 According 
to UNCTAD, the total FDI flow reached almost US$370 billion in l997, compared to less than 
US$100 billion per year, on average, during the decade of the l980s.59  
 
However, although FDI has grown over the years the benefits of increased investment 
flows have not been spread evenly, as over 60% of all FDI flows into developed countries.60  
Whilst the share of FDI flowing to developing countries is increasing (about 37% as of 2000), it 
tends to be concentrated in a few countries.61 Direct investment flows to China now exceed those 
to the rest of developing Asia which itself accounts for two-thirds of developing country 
investment.62 
 
However, as a result of its growth during the last two decades, today FDI has become an 
important source of capital, technology, know-how and other valuable resources for developing 
countries, that otherwise would be unavailable. It also contributes to political power as 
democratic societies in developing countries prefer governments which seek to guide their 
counties towards development. In other words, to the transition economies whose internal sources 
of finance dried up due to economic recessions and collapse of government budgets, FDI has 
become a fundamental factor in their modernization efforts.  
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Not all development economists agree that FDI contributes to economic growth.63 To the 
contrary, it is argued by some that FDI tends to block the spread of skills and technology as well 
as other opportunities for domestic enterprises, while the excessive profits made by foreign 
companies are repatriated and not made available for host country’s taxation and/or domestic 
investment.64 Even if they contribute to growth, this growth may be biased as MNCs distort 
consumption patterns, generate enclaves of capital, technology, skilled labour and infrastructure 
incompatible with the domestic economy, and widely generate negative externalities which 
reduce welfare of host countries.65 
 
Further, MNCs have become an object of criticism for academics, as well as mainly left 
wing politicians for the reason that profit oriented MNCs are becoming an expensive a source for 
development. Over exploitation of host country assets, the international division of labour, and 
the hierarchy created by MNCs which some perceived to be a cause for widespread poverty, are 
some arguments put forward by the critics. The loss of state subsidies in basic infrastructure due 
to MNC participation in the provision of these services too has contributed to this growing 
criticism of MNCs. 
 
The history of relationships between governments and MNCs has not been easy and 
involved both periods of conflict and those of cooperation. Most developing countries imposed 
severe restrictions and performance requirements on foreign direct investors during the 1960s and 
1970s and large amounts of investment were nationalized. But severe debt crises and financial 
meltdowns during the 1980s and 1990s left many developing country governments with no 
alternative but to lift the barriers, establish investment promotion agencies, and compete with 
other countries for more FDI. 
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However, although many countries, including, some former socialist countries have 
reformed their policies and legislation to invite and accommodate FDI, the openness to FDI still 
remains partial in some countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and North Korea. While there has 
been a growing acknowledgement of the role that FDI can play in stimulating economic growth 
and development, there still remains considerable scepticism as to inevitability or universability 
of the benefits from FDI among some countries. In fact at a Global Investment Forum hosted by 
UNCTAD, it was expressed by some representatives from developing countries that more 
research and analysis is needed about the critical issues at stake in a multilateral framework on 
investment.66 Further, it is reported that many speakers at the forum stressed on the complexity of 
the issues related to the effects of economic policy liberalisation on the quantity, quality and 
distribution of FDI, and its impact on development.67  
 
Another fear among some developing countries, concerning the growth of FDI, is the 
belief that it will kill the local industry, as local industrialists will not be able to compete with 
MNCs. This has been a view point expressed by many left wing politicians in developing 
countries such as India and Sri Lanka. Particularly, in India, due to the strength of the left wing 
politicians in the Parliament, laws directed at whole hearted liberalisation of FDI have not been 
forthcoming.  
 
Despite this scepticism among few developing countries, the broader picture is that, in 
their bid to attract more and more foreign investors, countries compete with each other to offer 
the most liberal investment regimes and the largest incentives. For example, out of the 114 
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changes of FDI laws of 65 countries in 1996, 98 were of a liberalising nature.68 For the period of 
1991-1996 as a whole, only 27 out of a total of 599 FDI law changes were in the direction of 
greater control.69 This competition and interest in foreign direct investment has strengthened the 
hand of MNCs that are using their home country governments to persuade other countries to 
create risk-free environment for their activities with no governmental interference or regulations. 
 
In addition to the growing competition among developing countries to attract FDI, in 
recent times, there has been increased activity at both international and regional levels to promote 
FDI.  For example, the Uruguay Round agreement on international trade70 contains a number of 
provisions relating to investment liberalisation and protection,71 although these measures are 
considered insufficient because they confine themselves to the interface between trade and 
investment. Further, there has been pressure for a comprehensive investment regime, with the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) at the helm, even before the Uruguay Round was 
completed. This pressure is still on, although the subsequent initiatives to formulate a Multilateral 
Investment Agreement (MAI)72 failed with the unsuccessful conclusion of the third Ministerial 
Conference of the WTO held in Seattle in November/December, 1999.73  
 
Another development that has given a boost to a new trend in foreign investment is the 
growing interest among countries for regional integration. This concept has grown in a piecemeal 
fashion all over the world with the EU setting the trend for the creation of fully-fledged regional 
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trading blocks. Foreign investors advocate for greater regional integration because of the 
opportunities it affords for more efficient production and grater sales. Successful integration 
efforts are likely to be accompanied by a rapid increase in FDI inflows and in cross-border 
investments within the region and by greater rationalisation and consolidation of firms and 
sectors. According to a survey done in Argentina of manufacturing investors, the existence of 
Mercosur74 has been identified as one of the main reasons for investing, after prospects of 
domestic market and stability of macroeconomic policy.75 In ASEAN, and SAARC, too foreign 
investors have shown keenness to take advantage of the growth triangles and other sub-regional 
zones. Regional trade has been growing as a result. 
 
One key advantage of regional integration from the perspective of developing countries is 
that, countries which have not yet received sizable attention from foreign investors either because 
of small domestic markets or lack of awareness on the part of the investors as to investment 
opportunities stand to gain by being a part of a regional market. From investor prospective, 
regional integration allows MNCs to reorganize their activities on a regional or global basis, 
rather than on a country-to-country basis, and thereby expand their investment network. 
 
Rationalisation and consolidation through FDI help to bring about the structural 
adjustments towards a more efficient allocation of economic activities within the region. The 
benefits which accrue are those stemming from integration itself, but FDI plays a critical role in 
accelerating and enhancing those benefits.76 Globalization and Regionalization thus, present a 
number of trends which should in principle be very positive for FDI in developing countries. 
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These include: the emergence of globally integrated production and marketing networks; the 
associated reduction in transactions costs arising out from the spread of information and 
communication technologies; and a policy environment that is now more favourable to foreign 
investors.77  
 
As a reasonable consequence of the trends discussed above, the world should have 
experienced a boom in FDI in developing countries in recent times. Yet, the last 3-4 years have 
seen a declining trend in FDI.78 Recent data released from UNCTAD in its World Investment 
Report (UNCTAD, 2003b) 79 and the World Bank (Global Development Finance 2003)80 clearly 
suggests a downturn in FDI inflows. Global FDI inflows, already down by over 40 per cent in 
2001 to 823.8 US$ billion, fell by 20 per cent to US$ 651 billion in 2002. In the case of the 
developing world in particular, the overall picture is gloomier since there was a 23 per cent 
decline in 2002 (US$162.1 billion as compared to US$209.4 billion in the previous year).81  
 
The main factor behind this decline has been the slow economic growth in most parts of 
the world and dim prospects for recovery, at least in the short term. Also important were the 
falling stock market valuations; lower corporate profitability; a slowdown in the pace of corporate 
restructuring in some industries; and winding down of privatization in some countries.82 
 
 However, despite this downturn, with its enormous potential to develop infrastructure, 
create jobs, raise productivity, and enhance transfer technology, FDI is a vital factor in the long-
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term economic development of the developing countries. In the circumstances, a prediction could 
be made that decline of FDI during the last few years is unlikely to be a continuing trend. Given 
that traditional sources of financing such as budgetary contributions and foreign loans for 
infrastructure development in developing countries is unlikely to take an upward trend in the 
years to come, the future of development for poor countries lie in sustainable development 
through FDI.   
 
2.4. Importance of FDI for Development 
 
By its very nature, FDI brings into the recipient developing country, resources that are 
otherwise not freely available in that country. These include modern technology, management 
know-how, skilled labour, and some times even access to international production networks and 
major markets. These assets can play an important role in the modernisation of the national 
economy and in the acceleration of economic growth. In addition, FDI can make a contribution to 
growth in a more traditional manner. That is by raising the investment rate and expanding the 
stock of capital in the host economy.83  
 
It is widely recognised by governments as reflected in paragraph 36 of “A Partnership for 
Growth and Development” adopted by UNCTAD IX in 1996 that “foreign direct investment 
(FDI) can play a key role in developing countries that FDI can play a key role in the economic 
growth and development process. The importance of FDI for development has dramatically 
increased in recent years. As noted earlier, FDI is now considered to be an instrument through 
which economies are being integrated at the level of production into the globalising world 
economy by bringing a package of assets, including capital, technology, managerial capacities 
                                                 
83 UNCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment and Development (UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/10 (vol. I)), Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements (New York and 
Geneva: United Nations, 1999).  
 39
and skills, and access to foreign markets. It also stimulates technological capacity-building for 
production, innovation and entrepreneurship within the larger domestic economy through 
catalysing backward and forward linkages.”84 
 
FDI can increase growth in two ways. It increases total investment by attracting higher 
levels of domestic investment. Further, through the interaction of advanced technology with the 
host country’s human capital, FDI can be more productive than to domestic investment.85 The 
most significant channel through which FDI contributes to productivity growth is perhaps through 
increased access to technology through market transactions such as joint ventures, licensing, and 
goods trade.86 
 
FDI has the potential to rapidly restructure industries at a regional level or a global level 
and to transform host economies into prodigious exporters of manufactured goods or services to 
the world market.87 In so doing, FDI can serve to integrate national markets into the world 
economy far more effectively than could have been achieved by traditional trade flows alone. 
 
In an environment characterised by open economic policy, free trade, effective 
competition policy, macroeconomic stability, privatisation and deregulation, undoubtedly the 
benefits from FDI will be enhanced, as in such an environment, FDI could play a significant role 
in improving the capacity of developing countries playing host to FDI to respond to the 
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opportunities offered by global economic integration. This is a goal which is increasingly 
recognised by as one of the significant aims of any development strategy.88 
 
However, it needs to be understood that integration with the global economy will not 
come through by the mere presence of MNCs in the export sector of a country. The MNCs will 
have to be present in the sectors providing services to the national economy of the country. Thus, 
the presence of MNCs in the provision of infrastructure is important, as the availability of a solid 
infrastructure will be the foundation on which any national economy could be built or rebuilt. The 
physical infrastructure needs of most developing countries are well beyond the funding or 
construction capacity of their governments as scarce public funds are utilised to provide basic 
social infrastructure like free education and health to the public. Thus, the presence of MNCs 
would enable the developing country governments to divert scarce home-grown funds towards 
developing social infrastructure whilst FDI will drive the development of physical infrastructure. 
 
There has been extensive research on the determinants of FDI.89 There are areas in which 
the impact of FDI can be negative, for example, in cases where competition is stifled, restrictive 
business practices are used or transfer prices are manipulated. Furthermore, Small economies  
may need to guard against too much FDI too quickly: flows of FDI that are too large for the 
absorptive capacity of the host economy are likely to bring about negative side effects such as the 
appreciation of the exchange rate, which in turn has a negative impact both on export 
development and import substitution.90 In fact this is one of the major concerns of those who still 
tend to moot the need to attract FDI for the development of national economies. 
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Further, external finance can become a real burden for the host economy if the cost of 
such finance exceeds the benefit derived and weighs heavily on the balance of payments. Such 
cost takes the form of interest and dividend payments in the case of FPI, repatriation of earnings 
and profits, either openly or through transfer prices, and imports of capital and intermediate 
goods, in the case of FDI. Negative impact can also arise when foreign investment flows displace 
domestic savings through a substitution effect or when foreign investment crowd out domestic 
firms through unfair competition or monopolising domestic savings (as could happen in the case 
of FDI). Furthermore, volatility or rapid reversal of investment flows can be detrimental to 
economic development as it increases risks and uncertainties and induce high instability in 
macroeconomic variables. 
 
FDI entails a loss of control on domestic production, and even possibly on domestic 
development options. As FDI is firm and sector specific, the development of particular sectors of 
production will be left to foreigners' choice and not to deliberate domestic options. Furthermore, 
FDI can crowd out domestic enterprises through unfair competition and through raising important 
sums of local savings.91 FDI can also have a negative impact on the balance of payments if 
production by affiliates requires important volumes of imports, the more so if production is 
geared towards host country's domestic markets and not towards export markets.92 FDI can be 
costly in the long run, as repatriated earnings and royalties tend to increase with the maturity of 
affiliates. 
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2.5. The Emergence of Project Finance as an Innovative Technique for 
FDI  
 
2.5.1. Failure of Traditional Sources of Finance 
 
Traditionally, infrastructure needs in countries have been financed both by internal and 
external resources. Internally, the financial needs to develop infrastructure was found through 
equity provided by the central or the local governments. Any insufficiency in such funding was 
usually supplemented by direct borrowing from external sources. 
 
The external sources of funding for major infrastructure development needs have been 
primarily, Multilateral Development Banks and Bilateral Aid Agencies. However, on occasions 
governments have also borrowed directly from developed countries and from private sources such 
as bond markets and commercial banks or supplemented financial needs for development through 
equity offerings for investors and contractors.  
 
In recent years Multilateral Development Banks have been severely criticised for failing 
to support sustainable development in developing countries.93 Such criticism has come from a 
variety of sources including politicians, scholars, lawyers, and non governmental organisations 
(NGOs), and even some officials of the Multilateral Development Banks. These critics have, 
among other things, charged the Multilateral Development Banks, of supporting several 
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environmentally and economically unsuitable projects, promoting development policies that 
adversely affect the environment and not helping the poorest developing countries.94  
 
In a recent review of 40 years of World Bank experience in infrastructure development, 
the World Bank itself noted that a significant number of its infrastructure projects suffered from 
“institutional failures.”95 The main reason cited as being responsible is that such failures stem 
from heavy dependence on public financing, when money has flowed through channels where 
scrutiny has often been limited because public sponsorship has provided high levels of comfort to 
lenders.96 
 
Another argument supporting the view that Multilateral Development Banks have failed 
to satisfy the infrastructure developments needs of developing countries is that these institutions 
have had the tendency in the past of forcing conditions on borrowing countries and compelling 
changes in their administrative networks and financial and investment policies, which have not 
yielded successful results as expected.97 Further, such campaigns by the Multilateral Development 
Banks to change the established structures and frameworks within borrowing countries have 
resulted in some developing countries retreating from looking for finances from these institutions. 
One example that has been cited is that the World Bank has been, despite rhetoric within the 
articles of agreement instituting policy of non-interference in member states political affairs, 
instrumental in rearranging the constitutional frame work of certain borrowing nations by 
exploiting their financial leverage and imposing restrictive conditions on loans given.98 
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In any event, multilateral debt financing from traditional financing agencies has proven 
during the last couple of decades to be inadequate to effectively manage the risks connected with 
financing large infrastructure projects in developing countries. As a result, multilateral agencies 
have drastically reduced the direct funding (loan) availability for infrastructure projects. This is 
mainly due to the reason that unlike in the case of traditional foreign loans which are 
denominated in foreign currency, infrastructure development projects usually rely upon revenues 
from domestic consumers’ payable in local currency to service debt. Thus, if exchange rates 
fluctuate, infrastructure projects financed with such international loans can be directly affected. 99  
The following figure shows how the debt financing of development projects have been reduced 
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Like in the case of funding from Multilateral Development Banks, funding from Bilateral 
Aid Agencies too has failed to achieve the anticipated success, mainly due to “tying of aid” or in 
other words due to the requirement that funds be spent on goods and services purchased only 
from specified countries. Such aid tying prevents international competition in procurement and 
thus, can have the tendency to lower overall quality of project developers bidding on a project for 
infrastructure development.101 
 
The aforesaid failures of traditional sources of funding for infrastructure development 
have been further aggravated by the diminishing role that the governments in developing 
countries play in financing infrastructure projects. Due to the precarious public finances in these 
countries, which is the result of both internal and external shocks such as political instability, civil 
wars, international trade imbalance and ever increasing budget deficits, funds from public sources 
are not forthcoming for much needed development. 
 
Further, there has also been an increasing global experience of widespread dissatisfaction 
with the role of the State in the development of infrastructure in developing countries and, a 
corresponding increase in private sector participation in infrastructure development since the 
beginning of the late 1980’s. The main reasons behind this dissatisfaction have been the inability 
of developing country governments to provide modern and technologically advanced 
infrastructure facilities, and their inability to cater to the growing demand for basic utilities such 
as water, power and telecommunication. However, the aforementioned global dissatisfaction of 
the role of governments in developing and managing infrastructure facilities should not be 
misunderstood to mean that the general public of the developing countries are totally dissatisfied 
with public sector control of infrastructure facilities and would like them to be replaced with the 
private sector. As explained later in detail in Chapter 5, the general public of the developing 
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countries are not totally in favour of whole scale privatisation of   state infrastructure. Instead, 
they want the developing country governments to play an effective role in developing 
infrastructure facilities with private sector participation, as this brings necessary finances for 
development and modern technology. However, they do not desire that developing countries 
loose overall control over the manner in which infrastructure facilities are developed and services 
are provided. The main reason for this is the fear of loosing subsidised infrastructure services 
usually provided by the government.   
 
While public funding for infrastructure development has been reduced, infrastructure 
investment requirements have remained high. In 1994, the World Bank estimated them at $200 
billion a year for developing countries.102 Since then other World Bank studies have increased 
these estimates. In East Asia and Latin America alone average annual investment requirements 
through 2005 have been estimated at US$150 billion and US$ 60 billion respectively, thus, 
further strengthening the case for FDI in infrastructure development.103  
 
Further, until the 1980s, most foreign direct investment projects funded by 
international funding agencies took place in highly regulated economies, which were 
oriented toward producing for protected domestic markets or exploitation of their natural 
resources.104 There were no investments in non-tradables such as infrastructure. The 
policy environment in these countries also influenced the ownership structure of projects, 
with few wholly foreign-owned ventures. However, since the 1980s, a policy shift had 
occurred in these countries with more and more developing countries opening their 
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economies and relying on FDI for development of all aspects of their economies, 
including development of physical infrastructure with private sector participation. 
 
As a result, projects are increasingly based on production for global markets or 
provision of non-tradables and reliance on contractual marketing arrangements has 
grown.105 Foreign control has increased, with more projects majority owned by foreign 
investors and more wholly foreign-owned projects. Further, privatization has brought 
foreign investors into many previously local enterprises.106 
 
In this background “Project Financing” techniques have become the front runner in 
modern day infrastructure development projects. They appeal to the governments of developing 
countries because such schemes reduce or eliminate the need for governments to use precarious 
public funds or to borrow funds from traditional lenders such as the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) by transferring the funding obligation to private investors. This is 
especially important where governments have reached borrowing limits whether such limits are 
imposed by the governments themselves or by the lending agencies; or the available borrowings 
need to be allocated into social infrastructure development.107 Further, given the failure of the 
traditional sources of funding for infrastructure development, developing countries have 
welcomed project financing as an innovative forms of financing infrastructure development 
which brings into their countries funds as well as efficient private sector management know-how 
and modern technology.  
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2.5.2. Emergence of Project Financing 
 
Project financing as a new and modern form of FDI emerged during the beginning of 
1980s and continue to remain to date the most innovative and beneficial mode of financing 
infrastructure development needs of developing countries. Thus, although there has been an 
overall decline in the FDI available for development, the new infrastructure projects in 
developing countries continue to attract foreign and private sector investors. For example, in 
recent times, the Middle East region108 has become an oasis of project financing opportunity. 
Lenders have closed an estimated US$ 27 billion in project loans during the period 1998 – 2003, 
with another US$ 54 billion of loans in various stages of development or financing.109 In Asia, 
Africa and Latin America too, project financing remains a viable and effective means of 
financing infrastructure development. 
 
Several factors have contributed to the dramatic growth in project financing. Many 
countries have sought a greater role for the private sector, including investment areas once seen as 
the domain of the public sector. This shift called for major regulatory reforms, which 
governments, by and large, rightly embarked on. Encouraged by the availability of long-term 
foreign capital and with strong backing for policy reforms from international financial 
institutions, project financing has expanded. By sector, telecommunications has taken the lead, 
with investments amounting to 43 per cent of flows to all infrastructure sectors, while energy’s 
share was 36 per cent.110   
 
                                                 
108 For the purposes of this thesis, the “Middle East region” includes the area from North Africa to the Gulf region (i.e. Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Lebanon, 
Syria, Jordan, Israel, the Gaza Strip, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Yemen, Oman and the United Arab Emirates). 
109 See generally, Wilde Sapte, D.W.,  A Guide to Project Finance, (London: Euromoney Publications, 2004) 
110 World Bank, PPI Project Database. 
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Furthermore, financing most large scale infrastructure development projects are beyond 
the capacity of many developing countries due to budgetary constraints. Thus, developing country 
governments continue to woo the participation of foreign and private sector investors in 
development of infrastructure facilities by opening their markets and by various regulatory 
reforms intended at providing easy access to investors. In addition, the traditional financing 
agencies for development such as the World Bank and the ADB also continue to promote project 
financing as a more suitable source of funding for infrastructure development in developing 
countries.111  
 
The explosive growth of the economies with the corresponding mass migration of the 
rural population into the cities in search of employment and other financial and social benefits 
like better schooling and health facilities have resulted in an overloading of the often antiquated 
infrastructure systems found in most developing countries. According to the United Nations (UN) 
population forecasters, 75% of the people in Asia live in the countryside and by the year 2004 an 
extra 1.5 billion people will be added to the one billion odd people now living in Asia’s main 
cities.112 Adding to this concern is the public outcry against government ignorance and neglect 
with regard to the development of infrastructure in areas outside the capitals and other few main 
cities in these countries. 
 
The physical infrastructure needs in developing countries include all forms from low 
technology highways to installation of high-technology power generation and telecommunication 
facilities. According to a research done by a Singapore based research company in 1994 the 
estimate for Asian regions infrastructure requirements alone for the decade up to 2004 was over 
                                                 
111 See generally, Osius, Margaret E. and Carlson, C., “International Financing Sources in Support of “Pro-Poor/Pro-Growth” Infrastructure Development”, Paper 
prepared for US AID Povnet Conference (Berlin, October 27, 2004). 
112 News Week (Asia Edition), “Asia’s Choking Cities” (May 9th 1994) p. 17. 
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US$ 3 trillion.113 Particularly acute in the developing countries is the need for new power 
generation. With the increasing population the need for electricity plants has reached a crisis 
level. The South Asian region’s need alone for new power generation capacity has been 
calculated as much as 460,000 megawatts (MW) in the ten years (1994 - 2004) which was equal 
to about 75% of the capacity in whole of Asia in the year 1993. 114  The predicted cost is between 
US$ 50 billion to US$ 60 billion.115 Lack of access to safe water by a reasonable percentage of the 
people is another major problem faced by most developing countries while telecommunication 
too requires immediate attention. 
 
Table 2.2 below shows some indication as to how acute is the problem of lack of 
infrastructure facilities in four selected Asian Countries. 
 












Access to Safe 
Water 
(% of population) 
Sri Lanka 75 7 536 60 
India 86 6 893 73 
Pakistan 77 8 229 55 
Bangladesh 22 2 59 78 
 Source: World Development Reports 1994 - 2003. 
 
The underdevelopment in these countries with regard to physical infrastructure can be 
best understood when compared to some of the better-developed countries in the Asian region. 
Table 2.3 below shows a comparison of Sri Lanka with Malaysia and Thailand with regard to 
access to safe water, electricity and telephone facilities. 
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Table 2.3 Access to Safe Water in Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Thailand  
 
Indicator Sri Lanka Malaysia Thailand 
Population with Safe Access to 
Drinking Water        (%) 
60 78 77 
Households with Access to 
Electricity     (%) 
33 64 43 
Telephone Density Lines                 
(per 1000 people) 
12 111 31 
 Source: Background Information Document, Private Sector Infrastructure Development Company 
 Ltd., Sri Lanka. 
 
The demand for development of infrastructure grows daily around the world where 
economies are springing to life with an unexpected sense of urgency. Investors are signalling a 
desire to participate in these changes by identifying investments that provide predictable 
international earnings for the long term. The traditional modes of financing infrastructure are no 
longer freely available or efficient, and thus, there is a growing competitiveness among 
developing countries to finance their infrastructure needs through project financing techniques.  
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Chapter 3 - Project Financing: The New Face of FDI  
 
3.1. What does “Project Financing” mean? 
 
There is no universally accepted legal definition for “Project Financing”. An article that 
was published in the Wall Street Journal few years ago on the Enron Corporation defined project 
financing as: “…a term that typically refers to money lent to build power plants or oil 
refineries”,116 thus, ignoring the fact that there are various other types of infrastructure projects 
such as highways, ports and telecommunication facilities to name a few, which are financed using 
project financing techniques. This example illustrates the confusion that exists in defining project 
financing.  
 
What then is project financing? In essence, it is an innovative technique by which 
finances are raised for a particular project and in which several project participants distribute 
project risks and responsibilities among them to ensure the project’s success. Clifford Chance, an 
internationally renowned law firm with significant expertise in project financing describes the 
term as follows: 
“Project Finance is a term used to refer to a wide range of financing structures. However, 
these structures have one feature in common, that is, the financing is not primarily 
dependant on the credit support of the sponsor or the value of the physical assets involved. 
In project financing, those providing senior debt plays a substantial degree of reliance on 
the performance of the project itself”.117 
 
According to Hoffman: 
 “ (t)he term is generally used to refer to the arrangement of debt, equity, and credit 
enhancement for the construction or the refinancing of a particular facility in a capital - intensive 
industry, in which lenders base credit appraisals on the projected revenues from the operation of 
                                                 
116 Pacelle, M., Schroeder, M. and Emshwiller, J., “Enron has one-year restructuring target”, Wall Street Journal (13 December 2001), p. 3. 
117 Clifford Chance,  Project Finance, (Clifford Chance Publications, 1991) p. 1. 
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the facility, rather than on the general assets or the corporate credit of the promoter of the 
facility, and in which they rely on the assets of the facility, including the revenue producing 
contracts and cash flow, as  collateral for the debt”.118  
 
Peter K. Nevitt gives the following definition to Project Financing:  
"A financing of a particular economic unit in which a lender is satisfied to look initially to 
the cash flows and earnings of that economic unit as the source of funds from which a loan 
will be repaid and to the assets of the economic unit as collateral for the loan."119 
 
Accordingly, project financing is a financing and project development mechanism which 
involves the creation of a legally independent project company financed with non-recourse or 
limited recourse debt, for the purpose of investing in a capital asset, usually with a single purpose 
and a limited life. The lending for the project is based on the merits of the project rather than 
credit of the project sponsor. From the point of view of the participants in a project (from the 
project promoter to the end-user of the utility produced by the project), project financing is a 
mechanism by which risks associated with it are shared and negotiated between several 
participants. Project financing is accordingly, an innovative and timely financing and risk sharing 
technique that is used on many high-profile corporate projects120 and for various infrastructure 
development projects in both developed and developing countries.  
 
Modern project financing techniques first emerged about three decades ago, mainly in 
mining, oil and gas sectors, aiming to attract foreign funding for development.121  Even at that 
time, the provision of public utilities such as power, water, and telecommunication, as well as 
developing infrastructure projects such as ports, roads, and highways were treated as the domain 
of the public sector, and thus, were not open for private sector financing or participation.122 The 
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moneys for development of such facilities were raised by direct borrowing by governments from 
international funding agencies such as the World Bank or raising funds by issuing, for example, 
government bonds. However, following the debt crisis of the early 1980s, developing countries 
significantly restricted public borrowing (see figure 3.1 below), and as a result public funding 
available for infrastructure development got drastically reduced, although the infrastructure 





As a result governments were compelled to open access to infrastructure facilities such as 
highways, telecommunication facilities, airports and seaports, water, and power, which were 
traditionally thought to be the domain of the public sector to the private investors.123 Accordingly, 
project financing started emerging as the preferred alternative to conventional methods of 
financing infrastructure and other large-scale projects worldwide and as a result, in recent years, 
reforming the provision and financing of infrastructure services in developing countries have 
focused on project financing techniques.  
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Project financing is seen as a better alternative to public financing as it allows countries 
to both minimize the deficiencies of public administration and to avoid the need for external 
borrowing.124 Further, it is also seen as a solution for the failure of traditional sources of funding 
for infrastructure development. Governments have found that the scarce resources available 
internally are better allocated to social programmes like health, education and poverty alleviation 
to name a few. Thus, the private sector is being sought to develop new infrastructure projects, and 
in many parts of the world, government funded and operated infrastructure is increasingly being 
replaced by privately financed schemes. The following figure shows how the project financing 






Source: World Bank, Private Infrastructure Project database.  
 
Project financing should be distinguished from traditional corporate lending. Traditional 
corporate lending is where the primary source of repayment for investors and creditors is the 
sponsoring company, backed by its entire balance sheet, and not the project alone. Although even 
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now, creditors usually seek assurance of the economic viability of the project being financed so 
that it is not a drain on the corporate sponsor’s existing pool of assets, an important influence on 
their credit decision in corporate finance is the overall strength of the sponsor’s balance sheet as 
well as business reputation. Depending on this strength, creditors will still retain a significant 
level of comfort in being repaid even if the individual project fails. In corporate finance, if a 
project fails, its lenders do not necessarily suffer as long as the company owning the project 
remains financially viable. On the other hand, in project financing, if the project fails, investors 
and creditors can expect significant losses. However, as will be noted in detail later in this 
chapter, project financing, as we understand today, can either be full recourse, limited recourse or 
non-recourse, the latter two being more popular; recourse here meaning the availability of 
security or other similar comfort to the party who makes finances available to a project, in the 
event of default by the borrower. 
 
The two basic principles discussed above which differentiate conventional financing from 
project financing are actually rather old ideas and go back a few hundred years.125 Centuries ago 
primitive forms of project financing were used in various countries. For example, in the fifth 
century B.C.E., the Commercial Code of Athens acknowledged a form of project financing to 
finance shipping ventures. Lenders agreed to look only to the future sales of the cargo and the 
ship for repayment. If the ship was lost at sea, the debt was in effect discharged without any 
liability to the vessel or cargo-owners.126 The Devon silver mines in southwest England in the 
thirteenth century relied on a form of project debt supplied by a Florentine investment banker, a 
precursor of the non-recourse future flow projects of today. In both instances, sponsors of these 
commercial ventures formed special purpose companies and relied on limited or non-recourse 
debt to fund many of the start-up and operating costs of the enterprise. Given that, debtors faced 
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the possibility of imprisonment (or worse) at the hands of their creditors, the concept of non-
recourse debt must have seemed enticing, at least from the debtor’s view.127 In the 18th and 19th 
centuries, large pubic works and infrastructure projects, such as roads, canals, water, electricity, 
and coal gas, were often financed through private sector funding sources. Public debt financing, 
therefore, as a vehicle to fund public works and infrastructure, is a trend that began in the late 
1800’s.128 
 
Even today, if one looks at any infrastructure project financed with project-financing 
techniques, at the very core is a government concession to a private project developer. When a 
concession is given, it is mostly for the use of some natural resource in a country. The concession 
grantee will bare fruits from the concession so long as the concession stands and the government 
that granted the concession would usually benefit from profit sharing or taxes. The main 
difference between the historical concessions and modern day concessions is that, in modern day 
concessions, the host governments incorporate various contractual provisions in the concession 
agreement and other related subsidiary agreements to ensure that they will continue to benefit 
from the resource during and after the concession period. 
 
3.2. Key Features of Project Financing 
 
3.2.1. “Non-Recourse” or “Limited Recourse” Nature of Project 
Financing 
 
A key feature of project financing is that it allows a project sponsor to avoid providing 
lenders with “recourse” to its general assets in case of project failure, as the concentration for 
loan repayment is restricted mainly to project cash flows and project assets. This feature is 




generally refereed to as the “non-recourse” nature of project financing. Thus, if project financing 
is non recourse in nature, then, a direct legal obligation is not imposed on the project sponsor to 
repay the debt or to make interest payment when the cash flow is too low. This is because the 
lenders prefer to consider the project revenue flows as collateral to the loans.129  
 
It is also important to note that this non-recourse nature of project financing in tern 
allows the sponsor to finance the project off its balance sheet. The “off-balance sheet financing” 
characteristic is a significant part of project financing. From the borrower’s point of view, it 
means that the loan either does not appear in the balance sheet at all, since it will be repaid by the 
cash flow of the project itself or it does not appear as a debt. The result being that the borrower is 
saved from the appearance of a big financial exposure which otherwise would affect the financial 
ratios of the borrower.130 
 
Although project financing is mainly characterized as “non-recourse financing”, 
situations in which creditors have absolutely no recourse against the project sponsors (the real 
beneficiaries of the credit transactions) are rare. More commonly, lenders demand “limited 
recourse” against the project sponsors until certain stipulated milestones in the project are reached 
or require the sponsors to assume certain project-related risks. Thus, project financing is "limited-
recourse" when the lenders may look to cash or assets outside the project as additional support for 
the loan. An example of extra security would include a guarantee from a project sponsor, a 
performance warranty from the operator, or additional equity contributions from investors. 
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3.2.2. Public Sector and Private Sector Partnership 
 
Project financing brings together governments on the one hand and investors, lenders and 
private sector project developers (sometimes also referred to as sponsors or promoters) on the 
other. Theoretically speaking, it enables host governments to attract private capital investment 
without guaranteeing payment of project costs and without completely rearranging internal 
economic frameworks through direct privatisation. From the lenders point of view, they may be 
more than willing to lend on project-specific basis, in situations, where, developing countries 
would present an otherwise unfavourable credit risk due to political unrest or other similar non-
economic factors. For private investors and project sponsors, project financing opens up markets, 
which are otherwise dominated by public sector entities. 
 
The most compelling reason for the private sector project promoters or sponsors to use 
project financing techniques is that risks associated with a new project will remain separate from 
their existing businesses.131 Thus, if a project were to fail, that would not jeopardize the financial 
integrity of the project sponsor’s main business. Further, proper structuring of the legal and 
financial features of the project can protect the sponsor’s capital base and debt capacity. This is so 
because as noted earlier, in project financing, projects are financed without requiring much 
sponsor equity or guarantee as in traditional corporate finance.132 
 
For developing countries, project financing gives the hope that a well structured and 
economically viable project will attract long term financing even if such project may dwarf its 
sponsor’s own resources or entails risks they the sponsor is unable to bear alone. With a 
                                                 
131 International Finance Corporation (IFC), Lessons of Experience Series No. 7, Project Finance in Developing Countries (Washington  D.C.: IFC Publications, 
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mechanism for sharing costs, risks, and rewards of a project among a number of unrelated parties, 
a privatisation of infrastructure improvement program will have a greater chance of raising the 
volume of funds it requires.133 Further, developing countries will have the advantage of benefiting 
from modern technology and efficient management practices when infrastructure projects are 
developed by the private sector and foreign investors. Governments in developing countries will 
thus, normally require foreign investors to transfer important technology to local institutions and 
train local staff in the operation and maintenance of the technology as necessary prerequisites of 
enabling foreign investment. 
 
Table 3.1 below identifies the most significant advantages and disadvantages in the 
public private partnerships formed in project financing: 
                                                 




Table 3.1 Advantages and Disadvantages in Public-Private Partnerships in Project 
Financing 
 
Some Significant Advantages and Disadvantages of Public Private Partnership in Project Financing 
Advantages Benefiting Party 
Moulding a project in a form which is 
compatible with government policies 
Maximising national sovereignty 
Receiving subsidised or risk-free participation 
Sharing in the rewards of value added services 
Training of labour and inheritance of modern technology  
Minimising any perceived adverse effects of FDI 
Improving predictability and stability of 







Access to new and previously restricted markets and sources of new profit 
Minimising political risk and better allocation of risks 







Exposure to risk of incompatibility with foreign partners 
Need to grant long term concessions over national assets  
Need to contribute capital or other assets 
Need to provide undertakings, guarantees and buy-back agreements to provide 
comfort to the investors and lenders 
Need to offer tax and other incentives 
Possibility of political and public criticism resulting from giving access to 
private sector to previously subsidised public utility sectors 







“Soft” value of host country’s capital 
contributions 
Less efficient decision-making and financing Structures 
Exposure to risk of loss of confidential commercial information and know how 
 











3.2.3. Syndicated Debt and Equity Contributions  
 
Most developing countries have annual budget deficits running into billions of dollars. 
With the cost of social infrastructure services increasing every year, allocation of scarce public 
funds for physical infrastructure is becoming increasingly difficult. As a result, infrastructure 
projects are increasingly initiated by the private sector and tend to be complex and expensive.  
 
The competitiveness of the financing package is becoming an overwhelmingly important 
component in the acceptability of the overall project package. The ability to bring together multi-
source competitive financing has become a critical factor in winning international projects. 
Success involves being able to bring together a mix of local, foreign and multinational private and 
public sector sources.  
 
The funds for infrastructure projects through project financing are provided through the 
arrangement of debt and equity. Equity contribution for a project can take various forms 
including stock purchase and general and limited partnership capital contributions. These form 
the basis for project economies since the amount of equity determines, in part the amount of debt 
the project can service, and the amount of funds available for contingencies and unexpected 
expenses.134 Also, the amount of equity contribution is sometimes indicative of the value placed 
on the project by the project sponsor and decreases the burden placed on the project to service 
debt, thereby reducing the risk of repayment which gives the sponsor and the investor an 
incentive to make the project work by placing equity at risk.135 
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In project financing, debt too can take various forms, the two main categories being 
senior debt (loans secured by a lien in the assets of the project and by other security 
agreements)136 and subordinate debt (often provided by the sponsors or the host government and 
used as an alternative for capital contribution). The distinction between these two types is that: 
former is the first priority to be served from the cash flow of the project or in the event of 
borrowers default.137 The most important financial component of project financing is, of course 
the senior debt which is the largest funding source for the infrastructure projects under this mode. 
 
In a project financing structure, various potential sources of finance should be considered 
in relation to each project participant’s objectives; the financing cost of the project; possible 
sources of plant, equipment and services; probable currencies; and estimated earnings after the 
project completion.138 The final structure and the terms of the financing are dependant upon such 
factors as the amount of financing needed, the degree of risks involved, and the cost associated 
with allocating risks among the project participants.139 
 
The current trend in developing countries is for private sector project developers to act as 
project promoters and, after making the initial representations to the host government or after 
winning a preliminary bid, to make representations to the relevant host governments with a 
financing and construction plan after considering financial and project viability tests. Once these 
initial steps are concluded, the project negotiations usually commences with the participation of 
all the main parties to the project (who usually include the Government Representatives, Project 
Promoter, Equity Investors and Debt Financiers).   
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Private sector project promoters who usually take the initiative to develop infrastructure 
projects are likely to obtain the necessary funding for infrastructure projects from a variety of 
sources mentioned earlier. However, in the first instance, it may be necessary to provide a high 
proportion of equity finance to start the project with a low debt/equity ratio unless the parties or 
other guarantors can guarantee loans. Arguably the most difficult element in private infrastructure 
is likely to be the provision of sufficient equity or guarantees. Usually most infrastructure projects 
are high cost undertakings and the equity percentage the equity investors even collectively 
undertake does not exceed 40% of the investment cost. Thus it is normal to see most 
infrastructure projects being financed on a 60-40 or 70-30 debt–equity ratio. 
 
The equity for the project basically comes from the parties to the project company who 
are the equity investors. In addition, other parties may also participate in the project by making 
equity contributions. These other parties will usually include the host government who will take a 
share in equity as a royalty share for the concession it has granted. Other project participants such 
as managers, contractors, suppliers and utility purchasers may also make equity contributions in 
addition to their separate interests in the project.140 When part of equity is raised by listing the 
project company in capital markets and by the issuance of bonds and certificates, other 
commercial investors may also participate by investing in the project expecting financial returns, 
independent of any other interest in the project. 
 
The debt portion of the project investment generally comes from international 
multilateral funding agencies such as the International Finance Corporation (IFC), Asian 
development Bank (ADB), Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDCC), and Japan 
International Investment Corporation (JAIC) to name a few. In addition, bilateral funding 
                                                 
140 The motivation for such participants to provide financing for the project can vary. The contractor; equipment vendor; and the raw material supplier; for example, 
may be motivated by the declining market for their goods and services where they can by participating in the project create a new market for their goods or 
services. See generally Nevitt, supra note 119 at  pp. 9 - 20. 
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agencies, export credit agencies, international and domestic banks, and other financial investors 
such as trust funds may also become creditors of infrastructure development projects by lending 
to the debt portion of the project investment.   
 
3.2.4. Multilateralism    
 
Another unique feature in project financing is that project participants include 
governments and public sector entities, private sector companies, international funding agencies, 
international and domestic banks, contractors, suppliers and insurers, to name the key parties, all 
of whom have diverse interests and come from different fields. These different players are 
brought together by their public or commercial needs and they team up for achieving the 
individual goals by cooperating with each other. For example, a government or a public sector 
entity may have the need to improve a public utility service such as power supply but, might lack 
the necessary funds and modern technology required for the development. A private sector 
company might have the skills and technology to develop the project and have the need to spread 
its operations globally. However, it might lack the funds to undertake a mammoth operation on its 
own. The banks and other financial agencies which invest on investment projects may have the 
funds to invest but, might lack the resources or the enthusiasm to develop and manage large scale 
long-term projects. The construction contractors, suppliers and other service providers such as 
insurers and technical experts may wish to participate in a large scale project for commercial 
reasons. Thus, if these parties get together as a team they could collectively work towards making 
the needed project a success, although their individual needs and/or expectations may be 
different.  
 
Accordingly, a consortium of interested and inter-locking partners come together and 
pools their resources to see a particular project through and hopefully to profit from the venture. 
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Apart from the host country, investors (with usually one of the investors being the project’s 
sponsor or promoter) and lenders who play the key roles in negotiating and developing 
infrastructure projects, there are several other participants who play important roles in any given 
project financing structure. These parties include material and input suppliers, contractors, 
operators, consumers, under-writers to the debt and equity offerings, credit enhancing and rating 
agencies, and insurers.  
 
The creation of a special purpose vehicle or a special purpose corporation and trustees to 
connect the different players together is an essential requirement in project financing.141 The 
following figure shows how the special purpose vehicle (Project Company) connects the different 
parties in a typical project financing structure: 
 
 Figure 3.3 
 









Each of the aforesaid parties has a critical part to play, often at different stages of a 
project’s life. Because, project financing is non-recourse or limited-recourse to the project 
sponsor, financial responsibility for various risks must be allocated to parties that will assume 
                                                 
141 Sellahewa, G.R., ‘Financial Techniques for Private Infrastructure Development’, Paper presented at the National Law and Economy Conference, Colombo, Sri 
Lanka (1995). 
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recourse liability and who posses adequate credit to accept the risk allocated. The allocation of 
risks can vary from transaction to transaction and is largely dependent on the bargaining position 
of the participants and the ability of the project to cover risk contingencies with the underlying 
cash flow and reverse accounts. 
 
Many scholars have written on the characteristics of the main participants in project 
financing and their often different roles in a typical project that is financed and developed using 
project financing techniques.142 Thus, in this section, this thesis does not undertake a detailed 
discussion on the characteristics of each project participant; rather brief descriptions are given on 
the roles played by each key project participant.  
 
a. Concession Granter (the Government) 
 
The role of the host government in a particular project will depend on the nature of the 
project. In an ideal world the host government would prefer to act as regulator of an infrastructure 
project developed with project financing and have minimum involvement with the funding and 
the management of the project. However, it is usually the case that host governments are expected 
to play a greater role.143 As a result, in some developing countries in addition to the concession 
contract the host governments may be required to enter into a support agreement that confirms 
their continued commitment towards the development of the project. At a minimum, the host 
government is likely to be involved in the issuance of a concession to develop the project and in 
addition in the issuance of   consents and permits on a periodic basis throughout the duration of 
the project. In some cases, the host government may actually be the purchaser or off-taker of the 
produce of the project. In some cases the host government may even be a shareholder of the 
                                                 
142 For example see Sapte, D.W. supra note 109.; Nevitt, P., and Fabozzi, F.J., Project Financing (7th ed.), (London: Euromoney Publications, 2000); and Tinsley 
R., Advanced Project Financing, (London: Euromoney Publications, 2000). 
143 Sapte, D.W., supra note 109 at  p. 24. 
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project company, when it had contributed to the capital or had secured a “golden share” during 
the project negotiations in consideration of the concession it had granted and as security for 
parting with the management and control of a state asset to the private sector.144  
 
The power of government agencies to enter into contracts associated with infrastructure 
projects and performs obligations there under and, the capacity in which they enter into such 
contracts (agent of the government or otherwise) is a critical issue in project financing. The 
doctrine of ultra vires is largely irrelevant to companies, as the law relating to corporations in all 
countries usually provide that they have the powers of a natural person, subject to any express 
exclusion in a company's constituent documents. However, this is not the case with statutory 
authorities. It is settled law that a statutory authority constituted under legislation has only the 
powers given to it under the relevant statute that created it.145 Therefore, statutory powers and 
functions exercised by statutory authorities must, without doubt, be wide enough to empower 
them to enter into each of the project contracts to which they become parties. If the authorities do 
not have the requisite powers, their actions may be ultra vires and therefore void. 
 
b. Project Promoter (Project Sponsor/Project Developer) 
 
A project needs a leader who can take the initiative to drive the project from the start-up 
stage to its completion. In project financing, such leader can be a single entity or a joint-venture. 
A Project promoter will have to resort to its own resources for the equity injections required by its 
                                                 
144 The popular definition of the term “golden share” used in the financial circles is that it refers to a type of share that gives its shareholder veto power over changes 
to the company's charter (see for example the glossary of financial terms used by NASDAQ - http://ir.nasdaq.com/glossary.cfm.) In project financing, the 
golden share could entitle the government to va veto over major dispositions of assets, a change of control, mergers or other major corporate changes. With the 
protection of the golden share, the government could relinquish majority ownership over state assets, yet still retaining a measure of control to appease the 
political opposition to private sector participation in the development of infrastructure projects.  
145 In Trustees of Dundee Harbour v D & J Nicol [1915] AC 550 at p. 570, Lord Parmoor stated: "It is settled law that a body …..constituted by statute, have no 
authority except such as Parliament has conferred upon them, and that they must find a sanction for any powers which they claim to possess in their 
incorporating statute or statutes. These powers may be expressly authorized or implied as fairly incidental to what is expressly authorized." 
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position of authority.146 Depending on the project, there may also be investors who come in either 
for the anticipated returns or for a combination of purposes, including the possibility of being 
suppliers to the project. Such investors may provide either pure equity or quasi-equity financing 
such as subordinated loans (with an equity kicker), i.e. a loan with a right to convert all or part of 
it into common stock, or as a success fee.147 Thus, usually investors take a stake in the project 
company, which is normally a single purpose company (SPC)148 established for the ownership 
and or operation and management of the project.  
 
Project promoters can come into the scene of a project in two different ways. Sometimes 
they act as sponsors of a project by bidding for a project already identified by a host government 
as an infrastructure project to be developed with private sector participation.  There are other 
instances where the project promoter identifies a commercially viable project and make 
representations to the host government to obtain a concession to develop it.   
 
It is not uncommon for the project promoter to find a local partner, who may or may not 
be a government entity. In most developing countries, the current trend is for government entities 
to join the project promoter in forming the project company. The reasons for this are twofold: 
i. The host governments not wanting to transfer 100% control of physical infrastructure 
services to foreign controlled private sector consortiums; 
ii.The foreign investors feeling that local participation in equity would protect the 
investment from arbitrary and unfair treatment, and would ensure local commitment 
for project success.  
 
                                                 
146 Sapte, D.W., supra note 109 at  p. 24. 
147 Id. 




The largest share of project financing normally consists of debt, which is usually 
provided by lenders who have no direct control over the management of the project. Lenders 
invest in debt, either on their own or as part of a group of banks providing syndicated loans. The 
lenders usually come into the project after the preliminary negotiations of the contract between 
the project sponsor and the government are concluded and at the stage the host government would 
be interested in examining the financial plan of the sponsor. Although the lenders do not 
participate in the initial negotiations prior to the drafting of the main contract documents for 
consideration, they play a very active role once the main negotiations begin between the 
parties.149  
 
For a party that may not have any management control over the project company except 
for interests over its project assets, the role played by the lenders during negotiations of the 
project is very significant. The lenders, in my view, hold the key to successful negotiations as it is 
the lenders who finance major protein (usually about 60% to 70%) of the project cost.150 Due to 
the financial contributions made, and in their typical role as bankers, lenders are reluctant to 
assume any risks and thus the major interest on the part of the lenders during the negotiation 
process is to ensure that risks that may affect the project are minimised to the maximum extent 
and balance risks are allocated among other parties as much as possible avoiding the lenders.  
Lenders can thus, delay the process of negotiations, as they will object to risks, which have not 
been hedged adequately by their standards. There are several guarantee structures to get around 
this, but the transaction costs associated with these are high, in both time and money.151 
 
                                                 




Lenders try to protect their investment in the project through collateral and contracts 
broadly known as the security package.152 The quality of the security package is closely linked to 
the effectiveness of the project’s risk mitigation and allocation. More risks the project reflects, 
more demanding will be the security package. As a practice in international project financing, 
debt financiers will undertake a review of all core project documents to assess the allocation of 
risks and how that allocation impacts upon their credit approval.153 
 
Due to the limited or non-recourse nature of project financing, normally, the lenders will 
have to be cautious and ensure that necessary protections are in place for their investments as the 
sponsors will not be usually liable for debt beyond the assets of the project company. 
Accordingly, they would want to ensure that the project contracts include a security package that 
would provide assurance to the lenders that their loans will be paid effectively, efficiently and as 
scheduled. A typical security package will include a mortgage over available land to the project 
and its fixed assets, sponsors commitment to the project including a share retention agreement 
and a project fund agreement, assignment of major project agreements, including construction, 
supply, and off-take contracts to the lenders.154 In addition, the security package would include 
financial covenants ensuring prudent and professional project management and assignment of 
insurance proceeds to the lenders in the event of any project calamity.155 
 
A key issue for the lenders will be the nature of the security that would be given by the 
project company to secure the repayment of debt. Where the project company defaults in 
repayment, ideally, the lenders would wish to be able to take over the project and dispose of it to 
a third party. Thus, the lenders will insist on having appropriate security interests over all project 
                                                 
152 IFC, Lessons of Experience Series No. 7, supra note 131. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 See generally, Scriven, J., Pritchard, N., Delmon J., A Contractual Guide to Major Construction Projects (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999), Ch.3. 
 72
assets and also the project contracts. In the premises, in addition to creating security in favour of 
the lenders on the project assets, the project company will also have to agree to the assign all the 
project contracts to the lenders in the event of default in re-payment. 
 
In practice, most lenders insist on direct agreements governed by the law applicable to 
the financing documents from each of the parties contracting with the project company. The main 
purpose of these direct agreements is to ensure that the project contracts will not immediately fall 
away if the project company is in default of its obligations under them. Further, to ensure that, if 
the lenders enforce their security, the project could continue either under the control of the 
lenders or, or if the lenders transfer it, under the control of a third party purchaser. 
 
Further, the law governing the financial arrangements is most likely be one chosen by the 
lenders, who will seek as far as possible to insulate them selves from the effects of local law in 
relation to financing arrangements. However, this would need clever negotiation on the part of 
lawyers representing the lenders as usually it will be necessary for the law governing some of the 
securities, for example; land, to be that of the country in which the secured assets are located.156 
 
d. Construction Contractor 
 
An infrastructure project can be negotiated between a host government that grants the 
concession, a project sponsor who is willing to accept the concession and develop the project and 
the lenders who will finance the major portion of the project cost. However, if the project is to be 
successful it is also necessary to have a qualified contractor who will undertake the construction 
of the project. Sometimes, the contractor who undertakes the construction of the project may also 
be the sponsor of the project.  




In project financing careful consideration is given to the selection of the construction 
contractor to ensure that the chosen contractor is capable of completing the construction within 
the agreed time period; within the allocated construction cost; and to satisfy the commercial 
requirements of the project.  
 
The main objective of the contractor in a project financing is thus, to limit the risk of any 
change in the cost of the project; to complete the project in time; and to provide sufficient time to 
satisfy performance guarantees. The construction contractor will be concerned with the 
underlying financing structure of the project, including, whether the sponsor has arranged 




Most infrastructure projects usually deal with sophisticated and modern technology in the 
provision of public utility services. The Operator is charged with the operation of such facility. 
Quite frequently the construction contractor and the operator of the project is a single entity, 
which constructs and operates the project. Sometimes the operator forms part of the sponsor 
group as well.  
 
The operator will be expected to sign a long term contract with the sponsor for the 
operation and maintenance of the facility. The operators tend to accept little risk in the form of 
up-front capital or expenditure. An operator simply anticipates making a profit from operating the 
infrastructure more efficiently than an equivalent government run project.157 
 
                                                 
157 Hoffman supra note 118 at p. 194. 
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The successful operation of the project facility is clearly vital to the generation of the 
cash flow necessary for the economic viability of the project. Thus, a key issue will be whether 
the operator of the facility is prepared to guarantee certain operation levels, for example, in terms 
of production or efficiency or whether it is only prepared to commit to more general operating 
obligations such as a duty to operate the facility in accordance with good industrial practices.  
 
The sort of undertaking to be obtained from the operator will usually depend on the type 
of facility to be provided by the project. If the facility is new and uses new and hither to untested 
techniques, the operator will be hesitant to give guarantees on specific levels of achievements. On 
the other hand if the project is in control of a facility previously provided by the public sector, it 
will be in the interest of the host government to insist on improved levels of achievement, as 




The suppliers range from suppliers of goods such as fuel, raw material and equipment to 
suppliers of services such as insurance, banking,159 electricity and telecommunication to the 
project. The suppliers are concerned with the objective of delivering to the project, the necessary 
goods and services in exchange for a price. The other project participants will seek firm price; 
quality; and delivery commitments with a minimum of uncertainly in the price, terms, and time of 
supply from the suppliers. Suppliers on the other hand would want to maximize profit and thus, 
may some times even form the sponsor group in order to ensure continued demand for their goods 
and services. 
 
                                                 
158 Id. 
159 The reference made to banks here is to commercial banks which will provide banking services to the project. Thus, they are different to the banks which will 
provide the necessary debt for project financing transactions. 
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g. Output Purchasers (off-takers or end-users) 
 
Infrastructure services may be purchased by a single customer (e.g. power supplied by an 
independent power producer to an electricity utility) or by many users (e.g. the users of a toll 
road). In any event, at the heart of the viability of a project is the revenue stream generated by the 
commercial operation of the facility. In the circumstances, the off-takers who enjoy the end 
product or the facility are essential for project success. 160  
 
The off-takers desire firm price and quality as the market will permit and a reliable 
source of output at an acceptable price. On the other hand the project promoters will expect a 
steady market for the out put in order to service loans and generate profits. 
 
Unless the project involves the construction and operation of a facility in which sufficient 
income returns can be projected with reasonable accuracy, for e.g. like in the case of a port 
facility with an already established clientele, the project company, its investors and lenders will 
be more comfortable in entering into an off-take contract with some state sector utility purchaser. 
For example, most power projects in developing countries include power purchase contracts 
between the project company and the government owned power supply agency. The agreed price 
and the agreed period will usually depend on the project life term specified in the project contract 
and would usually allow sufficient time for the payment of debts and equity and also for the 
return of reasonable profits to the investors.  
 
 
                                                 
160 Bond, G. and Carter, L., Financing Infrastructure Projects; Emerging Trends from I.F.C. Experience,  Discussion Paper No: 23 (Washington D.C.: IFC 
Publications, 1994) at p.  15. 
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h. Insurers and Underwriters 
 
Insurance companies and underwriters will be brought into a project to cover those risks 
that the parties accept but wish to mitigate. Lenders will wish to ensure that the insurer is of 
reputable standing and able to pay out quickly after a claim is made. From this stand-point, local 
insurers may not be as acceptable to lenders due their limited resources and exposure to complex 
project financing transactions. The lenders will wish to ensure that all insurance is maintained 
with insurers whom they have approved beforehand. In circumstances, where having local 
insurers is a legal requirement even when they do not have adequate financial standing or 
reputable claims settlement history, lenders may mitigate the risk of failure to perform by such 
insurer by requiring (if the project company has not already done so) that the risks are reinsured 
with international insurance companies of adequate calibre; and by requiring an assignment of 
such reinsurance proceeds.  
 
While it is in the best interest of lenders and investors of a project to insure the project 
against various risks, the host governments too will have an interest in ensuring sufficient 
insurance cover is obtained as project failure will have drastic impacts on its eventual ambition of 
inheriting a fully operational project. Besides, project failure will also expose the host 
government to both political and public criticism and thus, will be a discouraging feature to 
prospective future investors.  
 
Insurance companies on the other hand may be motivated in providing such insurance 
covers due t high premiums they can charge. However, as the payments involved will be huge in 
the event of covered incidents happening, there are very few local and international insurers who 
could provide sufficient cover to various risks involved in infrastructure projects. As a result the 
present trend is for insurance syndicates to collectively cover various risks involved in project 
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financing. Some times, the multilateral agencies who participate in projects as lenders would also 
provide insurance cover through their subsidiary arms.  
 
i. Project Facilitators 
 
Project facilitators are the financial analysts, lawyers, and engineers etc. who are not 
main participants in a project. However, they play a vital role during the negotiation of projects 
and also throughout their life cycle by providing various services including advice and analysis. 
Although not having any stake in the project as investors, lenders or off-takers, the facilitators are 
responsible for designing of legal, financial, and engineering structures to suit all parties, and 
thus, are very important for the project success.  
 
j. Technology Owners 
 
Although not falling within the category of the main participants in project financing, the 
technology owners too are important actors for most projects. Technology Owners are important 
because the project sponsor or the contractor will normally have an exclusive license agreement 
with the technology owner for the use of the technology and its continued availability for the 
project.161 
                                                 
161 For more details on the role of technology owner see Hoffman supra note 118 at p. 196. 
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3.3. Identification and Mitigation of Risks Associated with Project 
Financing 
 
Most of the risks associated with project financing are conceptually similar to the risks 
associated with traditional FDI. For example, commercial risks such as completion risk, credit 
risk, cost overrun risk, exchange risk, miss-management risk, and non-commercial risks such as 
environmental risk, force majeure, and political risks such as expropriation, and the change of 
government investment policy, to name a few are common to both traditional FDI and project 
financing.  
 
The main difference between traditional FDI and project financing when it concerns risks 
is the fact that unlike in project financing, in traditional FDI, the risks are manly shared only 
between the host nation and the investor, with, in most cases, the host nation providing 
undertakings and guarantees protecting the interests of the investor and thus, shouldering the 
major portion of the risks. In project financing the risks are allocated among the multitude of 
parties who participate in projects.162 
 
In project financing one of the key considerations is the assessment of which party will 
be affected by a particular element of risk, and in what way, and which party is best able to bare a 
particular risk. However, this is complicated and difficult since many project participants 
typically assume several project roles.163 Moreover, due to their diverse interests, the capacity of 
the parties to absorb project risks will be very different. The risks in the project should thus, be 
spread between the various parties; the party, which can most efficiently and cost-effectively 
control or handle it, usually assuming each risk. 
                                                 
162 See Chapter 2, Section 2.5 for a more detailed discussion on traditional FDI. 
163 For example, the construction contractor may also be one of the shareholders of the project company and/or operator. The concession granter some times may 




There are a number of ways to categorize project financing risks. If ten project financiers 
were asked to categorize project financing risks, they would in all probability produce ten 
different categorisations. The point is that categorisation itself is arbitrary and is a matter for 
jurisprudential debate; it is the actual identification, allocation and mitigation of that risk that is 
important. The following figure presents a full list of commercial and non-commercial risks 
associated with project financing: 
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All the risks shown in the figure above can be further chronologically grouped according 
to the projects life cycle, namely, the development phase, construction phase, and the operation 
phase and, risks associated with the entire life cycle of the  project.164 
 
3.3.1. Risks Associated with the Development Phase 
 
It is during the development phase that technical and environmental studies of a proposed 
project are carried out. Usually such studies may consume a period of time generally between one 
to three years.165 The funding used during this phase of the project is purely venture capital from 
the sponsors as the bankers are unlikely to provide any money during this period, mainly due to 
unawareness of the project viability.166 
 
During this period, the main actor usually is the project promoter who has been given 
permission by the host government to do the necessary feasibility studies. During this phase the 
main risk from the project promoter’s perspective is having the project proposal rejected by the 
host government or financiers. The main risk from the host government perspective is the 
selected promoter’s inability to mobilise finance. There are generally three types of risks involved 
during the development phase of a project: 
 
a. Technology Risk 
 
The Technology Risk is that a new technology proposed for a project may prove to be 
economically or structurally not feasible. Further, the laws regulating the use of some technology 
may change making such usage illegal. This is a risk borne by the project promoters through their 
                                                 
164 See generally, Beidlemen, C.R., Fletcher, D., Veshosky, D., supra note 129 at p.  49. 
165 Id.  
166 Id. 
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equity contribution. Generally, the lenders will not favour any new technology being used in the 
project since they rely on cash flows from the project to service debt, and thus, expect the project 
to be similar to other fully functional projects with proven technology and engineering.167  
 
b. Credit Risk 
 
The Credit Risk concerns the creditworthiness of the project promoter. If after the 
feasibility studies have been undertaken, the project promoter is unsuccessful in securing the 
necessary finances by way of co-financing and/or debt, then the project promoter will not be able 
to proceed with the development of the project. Generally, credit enhancement devices are used to 
improve the most severe equity and lender risks within a spectrum of identified project financing 
risks.168 These credit support devices take the form of guarantees given by the project promoter or 
other project participants to the financiers to ensure that there is no credit risk or that even if there 
is a credit risk, the promoter and or other participants would ensure protection to the financiers.  
 
The project promoter would have to convince the lenders that the project is technically 
sound and commercially viable. The lenders will undertake a thorough due diligence exercise in 
relation to the project. In addition experts will be commissioned to produce a feasibility study and 
a financial model detailing the projected costs and revenues. The initial expenses associated with 
the production of such experts report is usually the responsibility of the project promoter. Such 
costs are at risk if the project is considered to be untenable by the banking community.  
 
From the perspective of the project promoter, this risk is a commercial reality, which 
cannot be avoided. However, this risk can be mitigated or reduced to some extent if the lenders 
                                                 
167 Nevitt, K. P., Criteria for a Successful Project Financing , (London: Euromoney Publications Ltd. 1993) p. 15. 
168 See Hoffman, supra note 118 at p. 205. 
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are identified at an early stage. In such situations, sharing of information and a feasibility study 
with the lenders participation and or knowledge may limit the possibility of lenders insisting on a 
separate feasibility study at a latter stage.  
 
The lenders would usually welcome the inclusion of other financial contributors such as 
additional working capital lenders and project promoters into the project’s financing structure.169 
However, they would insist that all such other interests are clearly and comprehensively 
subordinate to their own claims on the project assets. While lenders will wish to insert specific 
provisions prohibiting the repayment of any junior debt while any senior debt is outstanding, they 
may allow carve-outs in respect of repayments made contemporaneously with a proportionate 
prepayment of senior debt. The negotiation of these subordination provisions is often time-
consuming and arduous but they are a fundamental part of the financing negotiations.170 
 
c. Bid Risk 
 
The Bid Risk concerns the successful launch of a bid for a particular project. This risk is 
shared by two groups involved in the bidding process; namely the project promoter and the 
project facilitators such as financial and other advisors who get paid for their services based on 
the success of the bid. As the relevant regulations governing the submission and consideration of 
bids can be very technical with lot of procedural requirements, parties submitting the bids will 
have to be extra cautious to ensure that all necessary requirements have been met prior to the 
submission of the bid. What is advisable is that the project promoter obtains the assistance of 
domestic experts from the host country who could advise the project promoter on the regulations, 
laws and procedures that needs to be followed in submitting the proposal.  





3.3.2. Risks Associated with the Construction Phase  
 
The construction period is very crucial for the project as any problems at this stage would 
prolong the date of completion of the project and delay the expected cash flow from the project 
causing delays in the repayment of debts. This period has a very high degree of risks for both 
investors and lenders since they have provided funds to a project which has not achieved 
completion.171 From the host government point of view, the timely completion of the project is 
important for providing the required infrastructure services. In the circumstances, the host 
governments and lenders would normally require the project promoters to submit sufficient 
financial guarantees, insurance and other undertakings to ensure that construction risks are 
adequately managed.172 
 
Construction risks are usually passed down to the construction contractor, who is often 
required to sign a fixed sum design/build construction agreement. Inclusion of a provision in the 
construction agreement that provides for liquidated damages in the event of any delay in 
completion is a common practice. In addition, completion guarantees and performance guarantees 
are normally required from the construction contractors in infrastructure development projects. 
Such guarantees normally take the form of a performance bank guarantee since the use of 
bonding companies for this proposes is not widespread among developing countries. It is 
important to note that these requirements provide an excellent opportunity for foreign contractors 
to participate in infrastructure development projects in developing countries as the local 
                                                 
171 See generally, Rendell, R.S., Niehnss, J.M., International Project Finance, in  International Financial Law: Lending, Capital Transactions and Institutions. 
Rendell R.S. (ed.) (London: Euromoney Publishes Ltd., 1983) at p. 32. 
172 See Harder, supra note  107 at  p. 39. 
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construction companies will often lack the credit standing or financial capacity to provide 
adequate guarantees to the satisfaction of the lenders.173  
 
There are three main categories of risks that may be encountered during the construction 
phase of a project: 
 
a. Completion Risk 
 
The Completion Risk is that a project may never be completed successfully or that there 
may be delays in completion. Delays may occur due to various reasons such as a failure in 
technology, cost overruns, work variations, shortage of raw materials and shortage of available 
workforce. In addition, sometimes, delays may be caused due to inefficiency of the constructor or 
the lack of commitment and supervision by the project company or due to the combination of 
both. There may be times where delays are caused due to arbitrary action taken by host 
government which affect the project completion, for example, cancellation of building permits. 
Whatever the cause may be for the delays, it should be understood that delays could be avoided 
with proper planning and by securing full commitment of the project participants towards 
completion of the project. 174  
 
The lenders to a project, and sometimes, even the host governments, will usually regard 
completion risk as the domain of the project promoter.  The project promoter would wish to pass 
risk to the construction contractor by negotiating a construction contract that is as detailed as 
possible. If there is defective or inadequate construction work, the project company will look to 
the contractor for redress. In the circumstances, it is likely that in most project financing 
                                                 
173 Ibid. p. 40. 
174 Rainier, S.E., “Project Finance: A Risk Spreading Approach to the Commercial Financing of Economic Development”, 24 Harvard International Law Journal
 
(Summer 1983), p.  158. 
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transactions, the completion risk or at least a major portion of it will eventually come to rest on 
the construction contractor. 
 
Delays in construction can be mitigated by incorporating specific clauses in the 
construction agreement that would make the contractor liable in liquidated damages for any 
delays within his control. Having penalty clauses which would encourage the contractor to 
complete the work on schedule would also help.175 “Turnkey” contracts contract with an 
experienced contractor who would provide liquidated damages if the contractor fails to 
complete and hand over the completed construction as agreed on the due date and which have 
specific performance obligations are ideal to minimise this risk. In addition, the project company 
would normally obtain business start-up and other kinds of standard insurance, and would also 
include a construction contingency in the total cost of the project, and build in some excess 
capacity to allow for technical failures that may prevent the project from reaching the required 
capacity.  
 
Delays beyond the control of the contractor, for example, delays in obtaining necessary 
approvals and licenses for the project can be avoided by requiring the host government to issue 
them in an efficient manner. Project promoters and lenders will usually insist that the host 
government or one of its line agencies acting as the concession granter should look into this 
aspect. Sometimes, project sponsors and lenders would insist that the host government provide 
guarantees to the effect that such approvals and licenses are duly issued.176 
 
 




b. Cost Overrun Risk 
 
The Cost Overrun Risk is often considered to be the most important risk and most 
common threat to project financing. It means that the project will cost more than the amount of 
funds available from debt and equity. In other words, if the costs significantly exceed the initial 
financing plan, then it is most likely that the costs will affect the project’s financial rate of 
return.177  In this situation, even the possibility of those involved in the project abandoning it 
cannot be overruled.  A cost overrun can occur due to various reasons including problems with 
start-up, in accurate engineering plans and inflation. The effects of such risks are likely to cause 
an increase in the debt services costs during the construction phase due to additional debt that 
may be required and the increased interest rates.178 
 
The usual method of avoiding this type of risk is to have fixed price turnkey contracts, 
where the risks involved in the construction phase are pushed on to the contractor. There are also 
other ways of covering cost overruns risks. One possibility is that, when there is cost overrun, the 
project sponsor and other equity participants could provide more funds through additional equity 
contributions. Inclusion of a renegotiation clause in the contract; use of stand-by-credit facility 
under which additional funds can be obtained from the original lenders; and having an escrow 





                                                 
177 See Hoffman, supra note 118 at  198. 
178 Id. 
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c. Political Risks 
 
Several scholars have claimed that there is no single universally accepted definition of 
political risk.179 On the other hand, Schmidt (1986) defines political risk precisely as "the 
application of host government policies that constrain the business operations of a given foreign 
investment". He subdivides risk into three main categories: "transfer risk", concerning risk to 
capital payments; "operational risk", with threats over local source or content; and "ownership 
control risk", highlighting possibilities of expropriation or confiscation.180  
 
Although there seem to be some disagreement among various scholars on a universal 
definition for ‘political risks” in practical terms he term encompasses a wide range of risks that 
mainly revolve around governmental action that may adversely affect the development or 
performance of the project. These include expropriation or nationalisation of project assets;181 
imposition of taxes and planning controls by the host government; mandatory government or 
local participation in project development and operation; changes in the applicable legal system 
and or regulatory regime; arbitrary revocation or amendment of any concessions or licenses 
granted to the project company; and the imposition of exchange controls by governments 
preventing foreigners from liquidating local financial assets. On a smaller scale, political risks 
also include regulatory measures taken by the host government that will have an effect on the 
work force or other property of the project company. A good example is the revocation by a host 
government of visas given to the foreign workforce of the project company.  
 
                                                 
179 Formica, S., “Political risk analysis in relation to foreign direct investment: A view from the hospitality industry”, The Tourist Review, Vol.51, No.4 (1996), pp. 
15-23; Kobrin, S.J., “Political Risk : A review and reconsideration”, Journal  of International Business Studies, Vol.10 (1979), pp. 67~80; Robock, S.H., 
“Political Risk Identification and Assessment”, Columbia Journal of World Business (July-August 1979), pp. 6-20; Sethi, P.S. and Luther, K.A.N., “Political 
Risk Analysis and Direct Foreign Investment: Some problems of definition and measurement”, California Management Review, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Winter 1986), 
pp. 57-68.  
180 Schmidt, D.A., “Analyzing Political Risks”, Business Horizons, Vol.29, No.4 (1986), pp. 43-50.  
181 Like the wave of nationalization and expropriation in Algeria, Iran, Nigeria, Kuwait, and Venezuela in the 1970’s. 
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It should be noted however that in addition to the wide range of risks mentioned above, 
the concept of political risk associated with infrastructure development projects in developing 
countries has a much broader and subtler manifestation. This is because, in addition to what has 
been mentioned above, corruption and cronyism, bureaucratic delay, lack of transparency in the 
bid process, competitive interests in the government, micromanagement of the economy, lack of 
proper dispute resolution systems, government hostility towards neighbouring countries, change 
of government and lack of confidence in the government, to name a few, makes political risks one 
of the major concerns in connection with infrastructure development of projects.  
 
Further, in addition to the risks mentioned above which revolve mainly around direct 
governmental action, it could be argued that political risks associated with infrastructure 
development projects financed with project financing techniques would also include the 
following risks which have in recent times shown signs of undermining the advancement of 
project financing for infrastructure development projects in developing countries: 
i. Decentralisation of political power in developing countries;182  
ii. Internal and/or external political instability;183 
iii. Succession of States and creation of New States;184 
iv. Wars and Invasions;185 and 
v. The sometimes conflicting interest between development needs and 
protection given to minorities and indigenous groups.186  
 
                                                 
182 This risk is dealt with in detail in Chapter 4.2. of this Thesis. 
183 These risks are  dealt with in detail in Chapter 4.3. of this Thesis 
184 This risk is dealt with in detail in Chapter 4.4. of this Thesis. 
185 This risk is dealt with in detail in Chapter 4.5. of this Thesis. 
186 This risk is dealt with in detail in Chapter  5  of this Thesis. 
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It is important to note that political risks affect not only the construction phase of a 
project. For example, an expropriation during the operational phase of a privately funded 
infrastructure project could affect the lenders expectation of repayment out of the project cash 
flow. Furthermore, as noted earlier in Section 3.3.2 of this Chapter, the nature of political risks 
associated with modern day project financing transactions is some what different to the political 
risks that were associated with more traditional FDI transactions.  
 
From the investors and lenders point of view, in order to mitigate political risks, it is 
necessary to insist that host governments establish legal safeguards to protect the investment 
projects from arbitrary decisions, especially in respect of future legislation affecting the project or 
the status of concessions, permits and licenses. Guarantees from the host government assuring 
that there will be no expropriation of the project or change in the status quo of the applicable laws 
and regulations under which the project was negotiated, are thus, very important.187  Similarly, it 
is important to obtain assurance from the host government that adequate compensation will be 
paid in the event of any adverse effect to the project due to political decisions and actions of the 
government.  
 
Offering the host government or its agencies an equity stake in the project or entering 
into a joint venture with an agency of the host government is another approach to overcome the 
political risks. In fact, in most developing countries, the host governments usually have an equity 
stake or joint venture stake in infrastructure developmental projects in order to mitigate the 
political risks. Further, taking insurance covers such as political risks insurance provided by the 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) is another measure that can be taken to mitigate 
political risks.188 Furthermore, obtaining the necessary financing for infrastructure development 
                                                 
187 See generally Harder, supra note 107 at p. 40. 
188 See Rainier, supra note 174.   
 91
projects from multilateral agencies such as the IFC and the ADB would also reduce political risk 
to a great extent as due to the fear of international criticism and withdrawal or reduction of 
development assistance, developing countries may avoid taking political actions detrimental to 
infrastructure development projects financed with project financing techniques. 
 
From the developing country perspective, it is important to understand that fear of 
political risk might distract potential investors from undertaking development projects. Further, 
the presence of political risks would also prevent necessary finances for development projects 
being obtained from the lenders. Unlike in the case of traditional loans or grants given to 
developing countries for their development needs where payback of such moneys were backed 
directly by the developing country governments, in project financing, the recovery of moneys put 
into a project by the lenders relies mainly on the success of the project and its steady revenue 
stream. In the circumstances, it is important that the developing countries take all possible 
initiatives to reduce and mitigate the political risks present in their jurisdictions, if they are to 
attract investors and lenders for development projects.189  
 
d. Environmental Risk 
 
Environmental risk in the context of project financing means risks to the main project 
participants that result from conditions relating to the environment. The parties who may be worst 
affected due to the environmental risk are the lenders and the investors, especially, if due to an 
environmental risk a project is prolonged or abandoned halfway after the investors and lenders 
have put in their moneys for the project development. Environmental risk can be characterised in 
two ways: 
 
                                                 
189 Some of the key risk mitigation measures that could be taken by the developing countries are discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5 of this Thesis. 
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i. Direct Risk: Direct environmental risks can occur when a project involves 
development activities that may cause contamination or other types of 
environmental harm to the natural resources of the host country or might 
endanger the public health of the host country. Direct environmental risks may 
also occur when environmental regulations prevailing in a host country is 
amended to introduce new environmental standards or when new environmental 
regulations are introduced which directly affect infrastructure development 
projects due to such projects not meeting the required environmental standards. 
ii.  Indirect Risk: Indirect environmental risks occur when countries tighten their 
environmental regulations and public interest groups become active and the 
pressure increases on project developers and or operators to minimize the 
environmental impact. This may increase the projects capital and operating costs 
in order to comply with environmental regulations. As a result this too can have 
adverse effects on cash flow, and consequently, in the project’s ability to service 
the debts with its revenue. 
 
From the perspective of the investors and lenders, the risk is that, when environmental 
damage occurs or the threat of environmental damage is present, the regulators of the host 
country environmental protection agencies and some times even the public or other interest 
groups may take legal actions that may adversely affect the project progress. For example, 
injunctive actions that may be obtained against a project suspected of causing environmental 
damage may delay the progress of that project, thereby affecting the expected progress and the 
cash inflow. Further, the regulators taking administrative action such as reviewing and cancelling 
licenses issued to the project developers is also a risk. 
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Environmental risk may also arise as a result of public opposition against projects viewed 
as adversely affecting living and working conditions of the people. Public opposition may stop 
projects going ahead or may significantly delay their implementation.190 Actions taken to 
overcome public opposition, even if successful, may impose tremendous costs on the projects 
significantly affecting their financial viability.  
 
It is very important therefore to assess environmental performance and management as 
part of the normal credit evaluation process. Environmental risk is therefore one of several kinds 
of risks that the main non state project participants, i.e. the lenders and the investors should take 
into account when assessing new lending or investment opportunities. The general aim should be 
to focus on environmental issues associated with project development and to increase the 
opportunities for environmentally acceptable sustainable development. 
 
From the development country perspective, it is important to ensure that proper project 
feasibility studies are carried out and the possibility of any environmental or public health risk is 
ruled out before taking a decision to invite project developers to initiate development projects and 
inviting investors and lenders to finance the development of such project. 
  
An international survey carried out by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) in 1993 provides evidence of the extent to which environmental risks have 
affected banking practices throughout the U.S., Western Europe and Southeast Asia. The survey 
which incorporates the experiences of 56 lenders from 7 countries provides the following 
findings: 
                                                 
190 The shelving by the Sri Lankan Government of the idea to develop the Port of Galle as a regional hub port and rejection of the offer to develop the same on BOT 
basis by a group of promoters led by Mot McDonald Group, in the wake of hostile objections by environmental activists, is a good example. 
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• Over one-third of the banks had experienced significant losses resulting directly 
or indirectly from environmental risks. 
• The most common sources of loss were defaulted loans, written off in preference 
to exercising rights over collateral which could have exposed lenders to the costs of 
undertaking remedial works. 
• Large numbers of financial institutions also reported losses arising from remedial 
works undertaken by the lender after foreclosure and from loans which defaulted as a 
result of environmental upgrading or costs for remedial works incurred by the borrower. 
• Smaller but significant numbers of banks testified to reduced share values and 
dividend payments, resulting from environmental violations or costs incurred by 
customers, together with increased volatility of share prices as a result of increased 
environmental risk across their equity portfolios. 191 
 
Another survey sponsored by United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), identifies 
similar trends with respect to the environmental credit risks and loss exposure of many financial 
institutions.192 
 
During project negotiations, environmental liability will attach primarily to the project 
operators. However, this can all too easily be transferred to lenders if lenders’ exercise security 
over the project as in such a case they may be obliged to assume responsibility for the 
environmental damage. In any event, even in such circumstances, where liability remains with the 
project operators, environmental damage could still impact dramatically on lenders in terms of 
increased project costs and delays. As a result, nowadays the international lenders for project 
financing transactions are extremely cautious before making a financial commitment to a project. 
                                                 
191 Bisset, D., “Managing Environmental Risk: A New Responsibility for Banks”,. Bankers Magazine (March/April 1995).  
192 UNEP,  Global Survey on Environmental Policies and Practices of the Financial Services Industry, (Nairobi: UNEP Publications, Summer 1994).   
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For example, IFC requires environmental assessment (EA)193 of proposed projects for IFC 
financing to help ensure that they are environmentally sound and sustainable. 194  
 
Proper environmental impact assessment and careful evaluation of the existing legislation 
in host countries on environmental protection would help to mitigate the environmental risks 
associated with project financing to some extent. However, although an extensive environmental 
audit can give parties to a project with some comfort, and, although proactive steps such as the 
establishment of environmental management systems can be taken, the most effective way in 
which the parties could mitigate the risk is by obtaining comprehensive insurance. Even though 
commercial insurers will seek to introduce into insurance policies a number of exclusions that 
would severely restrict their liability, insurance for environmental damage should still be a sine 
qua non for infrastructure development projects.195 
 
3.3.3. Risks Associated with the Operation Phase 
 
Once the project development phase and construction phase are successfully concluded 
an infrastructure project becomes operational. When the project becomes operational, mainly 
three parties will look to the project for benefits. The host government will look to the project for 
the expected services. The lenders will look to the project for repayment of loans and interest 
thereof. The investors (shareholders) of the project will look to the project for profits.196 Thus, the 
                                                 
193 EA is a process which’s breadth, depth, and type of analysis depend on the nature, scale, and potential environmental impact of the proposed project. EA 
evaluates a project's potential environmental risks and impacts in its area of influence, examines project alternatives, identifies ways of improving project 
selection, sitting, planning, design, and implementation by preventing, minimizing, mitigating, or compensating for adverse environmental impacts and 
enhancing positive impacts, and also includes the process of mitigating and managing adverse environmental impacts throughout project implementation. 
194 IFC database: http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/pol_EnvAssessment/$FILE/OP401_EnvironmentalAssessment.pdf 
195 Sine qua non or conditio sine qua non was originally a Latin legal term for "without which it could not be" ("but for"). It refers to an indispensable and essential 
action, condition, or ingredient. 
196 Shareholders will include the project promoter and all other parties who have made equity contributions to the project company. In some instances, the host-
government may get a golden share without any equity contribution, and this would be in addition to lease payments it would charge from a project company 
for the concession given. 
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project will have to start bringing in sufficient revenue for servicing all these needs in order to 
make the main project participants happy. Therefore, during the operation phase, the main risk is 
that the forecasted cash flow from the project operations might be lower than what was expected 
due to operational mishaps.  
 
Operational risks are general risks that may affect the cash-flow of the project by 
increasing the operating costs or affecting the project's capacity to continue to generate the 
quantity and quality of the planned output over the life of the project. Operating risks include, for 
example, the lack of experience and resources of the operator, inefficiencies in operations or 
shortages in the supply of skilled labour and, the risks relating to market rejection of the project 
output, thus affecting the expected revenue. 
 
The effect of this risk is generally lower compared to the risks associated with the 
development phase and the construction phase of a project. This is because during this phase, the 
project outlook is less uncertain and the project assets are in place.197 Further, it may be possible 
to re-finance senior bank debts in the capital markets with cheaper and less restrictive bonds.198 
Raising capital in the capital markets as a mode of refinancing is generally easier than raising 
capital initially from the capital markets. A completed construction project is likely to attract 
more players in the capital markets who would be interested in investing during its operation 
phase.  
 
Lenders are traditionally prepared to accept operating risk on the basis that debts are 
serviced by the proceeds from the project. However, this risk is sometimes passed to the end-user 
of the service provided by the project. For example, in some power generation projects, the end 
                                                 
197 State Bank of Pakistan, Banking Policy Department, “Draft Guidelines for Infrastructure Project Financing” (2004, November). 
198 Id. 
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use is the host government and the lenders would require the host government to buy the project 
output at an agreed price during the entirety of the project life.199 As long as the host government 
could recover tariff from the public, sufficient to cover the cost at which it has to buyback the 
project output from the project company there will be no loss. However, due to political and or 
economic reasons, most developing countries are compelled to provide infrastructure services to 
their public at subsidised rates. As a result, the burden of shouldering this operational risk falls on 
the shoulders of the host governments. Sometimes, the risk is covered by proceeds retention 
accounts which are aimed at controlling cash-flows by requiring the proceeds of the sale of 
project out-put to be paid into a tightly regulated proceeds account to ensure that funds are used 
for approved operating costs only. 
 
The extent to which project lenders are forced to accept operating risk depends to a large 
degree on the definition of completion of the project and the time at which any support provided 
by the project promoters fall away. Given that most completion tests require the project to be 
running at a specified level for a given period of time before a completion test is satisfied, 
complete failure of the project and consequential complete assumption of operating risk by the 
lenders is unlikely during the post-completion phase. Lenders can therefore mitigate operating 
risk by effectively delaying it through strict definition of “project completion”. 
 
The extent to which the operational risks are accepted by the lenders depends on the 
managerial competence of the project company. If the lenders have complete faith in the 
managerial capabilities of the project company, they would feel comfortable in accepting 
operational risks. Lenders will however, expect to see share retention provisions in the loan 
documentation pursuant to which the existing shareholders of the project company will be 
obliged to maintain a certain shareholding level during the operational phase.  
                                                 
199 For further information on this aspect see below under Market Risk. 
 98
 
In contrast, project sponsors will wish to see maximum flexibility so as to allow for 
divestment of their minority interests which would in turn allow for future investment by third 
parties and corresponding growth of the project company. One point that lenders should bear in 
mind is that, where project promoters or other shareholders are obliged to inject additional equity 
funds into the project company pro-rata to their shareholdings from time to time, the ability of 
such parties to divest themselves of any minority shareholding interests will mean a potential 
reduction in the obligations of those entities with regard to any injection of funds. Lenders and 
their advisers should therefore take care to avoid such a consequence by providing that the 
funding obligations will remain with the original shareholder notwithstanding any divestment of 
shares. 
 
The main concern in relation to the risk of project performance falling short of expected 
levels during the operational phase would be the lack of commitment from the project promoter. 
The best manner in which this could be mitigated would be to select a qualified and experienced 
project promoter by following an impartial and competitive selection procedure and by carefully 
considering its creditworthiness, past performance, capacity, managerial capability and 
technological know-how, before the final selection is made. To ensure continued efficient 
performance of the project, it is prudent to require technology assurance and technology transfer 
agreement from the project promoter.   
 
From the point of view of the lenders, to mitigate the operational risks, the main 
requirement is to have a strong and an experienced project promoter with a significant equity 
stake. In addition to this, several other precautions may have to be taken. Thus, the lenders would 
prefer the use of tested technologies for the project rather than the use of new. New technologies 
may receive lender approval if the obligation to repay the debt is supported by a guarantee of 
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technological performance form the project participant who owns or holds the licence for the 
technology. The lenders may also insist on performance bonds and guaranties from equipment 
suppliers to the project on quantity and quality. These guarantees may have to be assignable to 
the lenders. 
 
Obtaining the project promoters’ agreement to train local staff so that after the handover 
of the project to the host government it could continue to perform smoothly should be a 
consideration from the host government point of view. However, this requirement may be 
dispensed with contracts that do not involve a hand back provision. 
 
During the operational phase of a project, the expected revenue could be threatened due 
to the existence of one or more of the risks briefly discussed below. 
 
a. Supply Shortages 
 
This risk usually occurs when after the construction phase is completed, the project does 
not get the necessary supplies to fulfil its operational requirements. For example, if the project is 
for power generation by the use of hydropower, the absence of torrential rains would cause a 
supply shortage.  
 
The operational cost of a project which is crucial for the calculation of the cash flow 
could be affected by cost overruns in the payments for raw material and personal wages and by 
inefficient telecommunication and transportation facilities.200 This would result in the project 
being incapable of servicing the projected market and in turn failing to earn the expected revenue. 
However, this type of project risk can be effectively avoided if necessary precautions are taken. 
                                                 
200 See Hoffman, supra note 118 at pp. 200 - 201. 
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For example, measures such as long term supply contracts with the raw material suppliers and 
long term operating obligations with suppliers of facilities such as telecommunication and 




It is not uncommon for a new operation, perhaps in an emerging market environment 
unfamiliar to the project promoter, to run into managerial difficulties. The danger here is that due 
to mismanagement, the project will not be able to function efficiently to its full capacity and 
accordingly will fail to earn the expected revenue. In a worse case scenario, mismanagement 
could even lead to the project promoter or the project operator being ousted from control and the 
lenders stepping-in. In some instances it could even lead to government interventions with the 
intention of taking over the project or complete renegotiation of the project contracts. 
 
In order to mitigate this type of risk, it is necessary to obtain sustained management and 
technical assistance from an expert technical and management partner by having a management 
agreement included in the project documentation. It is common in most project financing 
transactions for infrastructure development projects for the project promoter to issue a letter of 
comfort to the creditors and the host government at very early stages of the project negotiations 
ensuring that the project company, when established, will be run efficiently in a professional and 
business like manner.  
 
c. Market Risk 
 
Inadequate demand or the reduction in demand for the services to be provided by the 
project is one of the major causes of revenue and profitability problems concerning most 
 101
infrastructure projects. For example, the successful negotiations for the development of the 
Colombo Port in Sri Lanka in 1997–1998 between a private consortium led by the P&O Ned 
Lloyd Group and the government were concluded only after all the main parties were satisfied as 
to the project viability based on a detail study of expected market growth and demand for 
container handling in the region.  
 
In the circumstances, it is clear that the quality of the market analysis, and of 
accompanying revenue and margin forecasts matter when market risk is considered by the project 
participants. However, if after completion of the development, the expected market growth is 
proved to be a mere illusion, then the project company would face the risk of not being able to 
service the debts and equity. 
 
One method adopted to alleviate this risk is to secure a market for the output through the 
conclusion of long term, price specific, sales contracts with customers, before production 
begins.201 Risks related to marketing the product or output can also be minimised by having the 
host governments agree to underwrite revenue streams by means of “take-or-pay” or “take-and-
pay” contracts backed by the full faith and credit of the government.202 These contracts usually 
take the form of long term contracts to make periodic payments, in certain minimum amounts for 
the supply of services or goods.203 
 
It should be noted that “take-or-pay” conditions are not suitable for all types of projects. 
While such arrangements may suit typical power generation or other utility production projects, 
                                                 
201 See Rainier, supra note 174 at p. 171. 
202 See Harder, supra note 107 at p. 40. 
203 The take-or-pay agreement involve a long term contract in which the purchaser agree to make periodic payments in return for a product/ service, regardless of 
whether the product/ service is delivered. In a take - and - pay agreement the purchaser only pays for the product / service when it is actually delivered. The 
distinction being that in the former, payment obligation of the purchaser is unconditional where as in the later there is no stipulation for an unconditional 
payment. 
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such arrangements cannot be employed to minimize market risk for example, in port development 
and road development projects. This is because the host government is incapable of purchasing 
the utility and redistributing it to the consumer unlike in a power project. 
 
In addition to the above, “put-options” too are employed as an instrument to protect 
lenders and investors in project financing operations. Under this option, specified parties (for e.g., 
the investors) are given the option to require another party (for e.g. the project promoter) to 
purchase certain project assets they own (for e.g., equity or debt instruments) at a special price 
and at the occurrence of certain events (for e.g. after a certain period of time). A put-option also 
gives a project company the option to sell its output at a fixed price at some point of time in the 
future. This option provides the investors with the comfort that they can recover directly from the 
project promoter, part or all of their investment under certain conditions.204 One limitation of this 
type of agreements, however, is that new project companies may have to reach a stable level of 
output before they are able to enter into them. In addition, product options in the market usually 
do not go beyond two years in maturity. Thus the options may not be feasible for longer term 
hedging in many projects.205  
 
It should be noted that market risk is difficult to hedge against unless there is a single 
buyer or small group of buyers for the output. Projects where the final end product is some thing 
which’s price may vary regularly, as is the case in the mining sector, the market is particularly 
vulnerable to changes in demand and need.  
 
Mitigation of market risk is important mainly to project promoters who have to service 
the debt obligations from the proceeds of the project output; and to the lenders, who want their 
                                                 
204 Benoit, P., Project Finance at the World Bank: An Overview of Policies and Investments, Technical Paper No. 312, (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1996), 
 p.  14.  
205 See IFC, Lessons of Experience No. 7, supra note  131 at p. 47. 
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debts serviced from the project cash flow. It is extremely important to the host governments as 
they would not wish to be burdened with unsuccessful projects which would result in public and 
political backlash in addition to putting a black mark on the investment portfolio of the country.  
 
d. Cost Increase Risk (for Consumer) 
 
Another operating risk is the risk of cost increase for the consumer. The cost to the 
consumer is usually extremely important to any government as costs need to be reasonable from 
the consumer point of view. Thus, once the rates to the public have been approved by the 
government, it will often be extremely difficult to obtain approval to increase such rates.206  
 
In most developing countries, infrastructure facilities to the people are provided on 
subsidised rates. Thus, there will be public hostility towards any price increases even if such 
increase can be justified from the lenders’ and investors’ point of view. Thus, it is important to 
agree in advance to a formula for future rate increases, taking into account the effects of inflation. 
 
Forward sales or purchase contracts are a means that could be used for hedging cost 
increase risk. A project company may wish to enter into forward contracts to stabilise the price of 
key raw materials. However, this could also have negative impacts as the project company is 
bound to loose on such forward purchase contracts if the raw material prices drop in the future. 
 
e. Foreign Exchange Risk 
 
This is a major risk that may occur during any time of the project life. However, it is most 
harmful during the operational phase, especially in the eyes of the lenders. The risk involved here 
                                                 
206 Harder, supra note 107 at p. 41. 
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is that, the value of the currency in which the project revenue is earned might depreciate in value 
against International currencies, especially against the currency with which the debts have to be 
serviced. Macroeconomic stability, the balance of payment situation, and the foreign exchange 
rate policy in the host country are therefore important factors to consider in assessing the 
currency risks. 
 
Like all other risks in project financing, the goal in foreign exchange risk management 
should be to minimize the risk and allocate it to the party who is willing and able to manage it. 
One way of minimising foreign exchange risk is by denominating everything in one currency. For 
example, the Sikap Power Sdn. Bhd. $1.5 billion gas-fired power project in Lumut, Malaysia, was 
financed entirely by Malaysian sources and all cash flows during operations, including debt 
repayment, were in Ringett. A different approach was used the Mammonal project in Colombia 
(200 MW) where the debt and equity financing was raised in the U.S. in U.S. dollars, and the 
electric revenues were also denominated in U.S. dollars.207 However, these two examples are 
probably anomalies. For example, in most international power projects, the project is built with 
finances raised in hard currency (dollars, yen, deutsche marks, pounds, francs, etc.), and then 
operated where cash flow is generated in local currency. Thus, in the event of devaluation of local 
currency, repayment of loans in foreign currency will be extremely costly. The following 
measures could be adapted to mitigate the exchange rate risk: 
 
i. Mix local currency and foreign currency loans: All projects involve local costs. Thus, the 
overall currency risk can be reduced to some extent by covering the local costs with local 
funding to any possible extent. Mixing of local and foreign funding in this way will 
ensure that the project does not rely excessively on foreign funds. 
                                                 




ii. Index output prices to the exchange rate: This method will help shield the project from 
exchange rate risk as project charges will be linked to the exchange rate applicable at the 
given time. However, this arrangement can still be very vulnerable to situations of 
dramatic changes in the exchange rate. This  vulnerability was clearly demonstrated 
during the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990’s where many host governments and 
other contracting partners of project companies expressed unwillingness to honour such 
indexing since it would have amounted to passing significant local price increasers to the 
end-user, i.e. general public. 
iii. Swap Currency: When a local currency swap market exists, local currency can readily be 
swapped with major foreign currencies to remove a project’s currency risks. However, 
unfortunately, many developing countries have no such markets. 
iv. Reserves: Can be raised from financing or from cash flow during operations. Reserves 
can be held in the country or off-shore in a special escrow account. In addition to having 
sufficient reserves, an escrow account will also help the borrower, i.e. Project Company, 
to avoid potential repatriation difficulties. 
v. Insurance: Rate protection includes derivatives (e.g. swaps and forward contracts). 
Insurance can come from private or government sources or multilateral institutions and 
can cover convertibility, availability, and repatriation, but not rate. 
vi. Guarantees: Can be sovereign, corporate, bank or by letter of credit. They can address all 
or some of foreign exchange risks. 
 
f. Interest Rate Risk 
 
The normal practice in international project financing is to grant long-term debt on 
floating (variable) interest rates. This however, is risky as the international interest rate 
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environment can change dramatically during the loan maturity period. Thus, if the interest rate 
risk is not properly hedged, financial projections for the project based on initial rate assumptions 
can be significantly affected. Thus, the project promoters who are most likely to get affected by 
varying interest rates can adopt the following measures to mitigate such risk: 
i. Negotiation of a fixed rate: Although theoretically this is a good measure, most 
commercial banks relying on short term funding sources are reluctant to lend their 
moneys on fixed interest rates for long term projects. However, clever negotiation may 
convince the commercial banks to fund the projects on a mix of floating and fixed 
interest rate loans. Some international institutions like the IFC and ADB too provide 
fixed rate financing for long term infrastructure projects. 
ii. Conversion of the interest rate: Some project promoters prefer to borrow the necessary 
funding at floating interest rates with the hope of taking advantage of any future drop in 
the interest rates. However, in such situations they are most likely to incorporate an 
interest rate conversion clause in the contract documents giving them the option to fix the 
interest rate in an environment where there is a steady rise in the rates of interest. Most 
international financial organizations that fund long term infrastructure projects have been 
accommodating such options. 
 
3.3.4. Risks Spread Across the Whole Project Cycle 
 
Some risks associated with project financing transactions are present during more than 
one phase of the project. For example, political risks and environmental risks which have been 
dealt with earlier, can be present during both construction and operation phases. In addition to 
these two risks, there are other risks that can cause problems during the entire life span of a 
project. The risk of force majeure is a good example. 
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Generally speaking, the force majeure risk is a risk where a party’s performance of 
contractual obligations will be rendered impossible by events not within the performing party’s 
reasonable expectation or control. Force majeure events could halt the project during different 
phases of its cycle and include natural and technical disasters to acts of terrorism and war.208 As 
neither the developer nor the host nation can control such risks, neither party is capable of bearing 
the risk alone. In the circumstances, such risks may be mitigated to some extent through the 
purchase of commercial insurance coverage which extend to all stages of a project and cover both 
asset loss and business interruption. However, it should be noted that such insurance covers tend 
to be very expensive. 
 
Traditionally, the force majeure risk has been treated as including both “acts of god”209 
and other unexpected events not within the control of the contracting parties. Thus for example, 
events such as terrorist attacks, war, strikes and labour unrest, events that could not be reasonable 
foreseen by the contracting parties have been part of the risk. However, as far as developing 
countries are concerned, it has become a practice in most modern day project finance contracts to 
restrict force majeure events to “Acts of God” and allocate other unforeseen risks such as those 
mentioned above to a project participant, most likely the host government. The bargaining power 
the investors and lenders have in project negotiations play a key role in such risk allocation as the 
investors who finance the equity portion and develop projects and the lenders who finance the 
major portion of the project development fund, i.e. the debt portion, would like to minimise the 
risks allocated to them.210  
                                                 
208 Ellinidis G. T., “Foreign Direct Investment in Developing and Newly Liberalized Nations”, 4. Journal of International Law and Practice (1995), p. 299 at   
pp 314 - 316. 
209 A natural event, not preventable by any human agency, such as flood, storms, or lightning. Forces of nature that no one has control over, and therefore cannot be 
held accountable. 
210 According to two key negotiators of the Sri Lankan Government ( who wished not to be named) who negotiated the Queen Elisabeth Quay (Colombo Port) BOT 
Development Project with the private sector project development consortium led by the P&O Group and the lenders which included IFC and Common Wealth 
Development Corporation (CDC), due to the desperate need of the government to attract FDI for the project, the requisition by the investors and the lenders to 
leave out events such as war, terrorism, strikes and civil strife from force  majeure events and allocate them to the government had to be tolerated. 
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Unlike the other risks involved in project financing transactions, force majeure risks are 
the ones which are most difficult to mitigate. From the developing country perspective, this is one 
of the most undesirable risks. In addition to running the risk of having to abandon projects in the 
event of any force majeure incident, many developing countries find themselves being pushed 
into accepting financial paybacks to lenders and investors even in the event of force majeure. The 
Build Operate Transfer (BOT) contract signed between the Government of Sri Lanka and the 
P&O Group led consortium to develop the Queen Elisabeth Quay of the Colombo Port, which 
was mentioned earlier in this chapter, has such a provision in the concession agreement.211 
 
Traditional methods of mitigating force majeure risks have usually involved proving the 
reliability of engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contracts, operation and 
maintenance (O&M) contracts, sovereign guarantees given by the host country governments, 
resource studies, equipment performance data and setting sufficient sinking funds to cover 
"expected" problems. However, this process can be time consuming and expensive. Further, and 
at the end of the day, just one detail can foul the entire process and send the project sponsors 
packing. 
 
However, in recent times some new (and some not so new) specialized risk mitigation 
products developed by the insurance industry have surfaced offering a variety of measures for 





                                                 
211 The final draft of the Contract was examined and studied by me in 2001 at the Department of Attorney General in Sri Lanka. 
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“Some of these unique products include: 
• Cover for Technology Risk: a new form of an old idea of providing warranty 
coverage to new technology. These products are highly individualized and 
negotiated on a specific need and financial capability basis. 
• Debt Service and Credit Enhancement: these are highly specialized contracts 
designed to transfer the risk from the lender to the insurance company balance 
sheet effectively giving the project triple "A" credit. 
• Weather Risk: insurance and weather derivatives that provide a risk levelling 
resource guarantee for any measurable force of nature. 
• Political Risk: all manners of political or cross boarder risk can be provided for 
with the most prevalent coverage being Contract Repudiation. 
• Commodity Hedges: like the commodity market itself, these products serve to 
level the risks while placing a cap on positive gains. The product allows for a pre 
set long term contract, backed by triple "A" paper. The advantage over a self 
managed commodity fund is it takes the uncertainties out of the equation. The 
various products in this class include: Fuel prices, currency exchange rates, 
market risk, transmission risk, counterparty risk, generation risk and any risk 
that comes from dependency on the future price or cost of an item.”212 
                                                 








3.4. Structure of Project financing 
 
3.4.1. Considerations for Selection of the Structure  
 
As already noted, project financing transactions usually involve several parties with 
diverse interests. For the purpose of successful completion of a project as well as for fulfilling 
their individual expectations, the participants from input suppliers to output buyers in a project 
financing transaction are united in a vertical chain through numerous contractual agreements. 
According to the Australian Contractors Association, the Melbourne City Link Project, an A$2 
billion road infrastructure project, had over 4,000 contracts and suppliers.213 This explains the 
complexity involved in a multi party project and the importance of ensuring that the contractual 
structure of an investment project financed with project financing techniques is closely knitted, 
minimising room for any delays to the project completion and operation and losses to the parties 
involved. 
 
Since project financing as a contractual arrangement involves several agreements 
between various participants, these several and different agreements provide the legal framework 
within which the whole project functions. The main legal framework of the project will also 
depend on the specific financing structure that is selected. Once the sponsor, lender, purchaser, 
suppliers and other potential participants are identified, it is possible to develop several financing 
structures for the project for consideration and selection of the most suitable by the main project 
participants, i.e. the host government, the lenders, investors and the project promoter.214 
 
                                                 
213 See the 2002 award finalists online at www.constructors.com.au 
214 For a detail discussion of this aspect see Emerson, C., supra note 137 at  p. 34. 
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In theory, the range of potential financing structures for any given project is considerable 
and can embrace the establishment of trusts (which shift ownership and consolidation 
requirements), subsidiaries, nominee or jointly owned corporations, limited or general 
partnerships and joint ventures. In practice however the variety and number of such structures 
will depend on the degree to which: 
i. Potential participants in the project are willing to commit themselves financially and 
contractually and to accept the transferred risks and obligations entailed. 
ii. Potential lenders are prepared to accept the proposed structure of the project and are 
satisfied with government assurances given concerning the continuity of the project and 
the safety of the investments made.215 
 
Once the best possible financial structure is identified, the facilitators of the project, i.e. 
the financial advisors, legal advisors, engineers etc. are called upon to appraise the credit 
worthiness of the potential share holders in the light of the guarantee structure proposed to the 
lenders. In addition, a legal review of the drafts of all the proposed contracts including, the 
contract between the project company and the lenders and the project company and the 
government will have to be undertaken.216 
 
Once the above appraisals are done to the satisfaction of the parties, the proposed project 
company formation agreements should be documented. The project company is generally a single 
purpose entity dedicated to the completion and operation of the project. According to Emerson,217 
such company formation agreements should generally contain provisions covering: 
i. The scope, objectives and time scale of the project; 
ii. The projects legal entity; 
                                                 
215 Id. at  p. 36. 
216 Id.  
217 Id. at  pp. 36 - 37. 
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iii. Ownership / share holder interests, provision for transfers from the original participants 
to new participants;218 
iv. The proposed methods of financing; 
v. The authority wielded by shareholders through the Board of Directors; 
vi. The management of the project; and 
vii. Procedure to resolve disputes. 
 
Two key elements missing from the provisions identified by Emerson as being important are the 
project deliverables with their time schedules and the agreed payment mechanism. It is important 
that the project agreements clearly identify and list the project deliverables according to the 
agreed expectations of the parties. Likewise, it is important that the agreed payment mechanism 
covering payments for investors/shareholders and the lenders are clearly identified. 
 
In a typical project financing arrangement, there are six categories of contracts. Namely: 
i. Site acquisition/Lease or Concession 
ii. Construction and completion. 
iii. Fuel and raw material supply. 
iv. Off-take (output or service sale contract). 
v. Operation and maintenance; and 
vi. Financing and equity contribution.219 
The resulting key legal and contractual relationships are shown in figure 3.5 below: 
                                                 
218  For example, in a BOT project the private developer is entitled to operate the project for a number of years before transforming the same to a public entity. See 
Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion on BOT projects. 
219 Hoffman, S. L., “The Law and Business of International Project Finance: A Resource for Governments, Sponsors, Lenders, Lawyers, and Project Participants”,  , 
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3.4.2. Project financing Structures widely used by Developing 
 Countries  
 
All models of project financing will generally include the common features described in 
the previous section. However, the selection of a specific contractual structure for an 
infrastructure development project in a developing country would depend on the following 
factors: 
i. The extent to which the developing country government is willing to entertain a public-
private partnership for infrastructure development; 
ii. The extent to which the developing country is willing to liberalise the existing policy 
concerning the provision of utility services to the public and state control of physical 
infrastructure facilities in favour of foreign investor and private sector participation in 
infrastructure development; and 
iii. The extent to which the investors and lenders are willing to commit their resources in a 
developing country. 
 
The most commonly used models of project financing in recent years by the developing 
countries are the Build Own Operate (BOO) and Build Operate Transfer (BOT) models. These 
two models involve a consortium submitting a proposal to finance, design, build, operate and 
sometimes transfer the project back to the host government after the end of the concession period.  





a. Build Own Operate (BOO) Contracts  
 
BOO is a technique which combines private finance, design and construction with private 
operation after completion of a project. Operation and ownership of the project is usually 
continued with no transfer back to the government. However, the government is usually entitled 
to a certain amount of shared revenue within a specified period.220 Thus, under the BOO scheme, 
the project remains in the hands of the private sector without any requirement of transfer to the 
host government. Thus, this is very close to the free market ideal. BOO allows the investors to 
recover its total investment, operating, and maintenance costs, plus a reasonable return by 
collecting fees and other charges from output purchasers. 
 
BOO types of contracts are mainly used to develop projects such as limited time power 
generation facilities which are not meant to be permanent fixed assets of the host country. These 
contracts (usually 10-15 years) are more like stop-gap measures to facilitate medium term 
requirements in the provision of infrastructure facilities to the people. In the circumstances, BOO 
type of contracts are not used in projects such as highways and port constructions as such projects 
would continue to exist and provide services even after the concession period is over. 
 
b. Build Operate Transfer (BOT) Contracts 
 
BOT is also a technique which combines private finance, design and construction with 
private operation after completion of a project. However, unlike in BOO, ownership of the project 
does not rest with the private entity. Only the development and operational rights of the project 
will be given to a private entity during an agreed period of time (concession period). During this 
time (usually 20-30 year concession period), the private entity is expected to recover the project 
                                                 
220  See Harder, supra note 107 at p. 36. 
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investment, operation and maintenance costs, and a reasonable profit. The project has to be 
transferred back to the host government at the expiry of the concession period. 
 
BOT contracts are mainly used for infrastructure projects which involves high investment 
cost and modern technology and are thus beyond the capacity of host countries to finance and 
develop. Such projects include, highways, ports, water sanitation facilities, and sometimes even 
hospitals and universities, which usually end up becoming a permanent fixed assets of the host 
country when the project construction and operation periods are completed.  
 
c. Other Variants of BOO/BOT 
 
It is important to note that sometimes the term ‘BOT’ itself is used generally to identify 
most of the project financing models which involve a private sector led consortium financing, 
designing, building and operating a project either for a specific period of time or permanently.221 
However, there are several other variants of BOO/BOT models that are currently in use. These 
include: BLT (Build Lease Transfer), BT (Build Transfer), BTO (Build Transfer Operate), RLO 
(Rehabilitation Lease Operate), and BOOST (Build Own Operate Subsidize Transfer).222  
 
Although the popular use of BOO/BOT and other similar models commenced in the 
1980’s, it really cannot be regarded as a new development as often stated. In contrast it should be 
identified as a reawakening of an old concept. The earliest use of the concept can be traced back 
to 1782 A.D. in France where the Perrier brothers were granted a concession similar to a BOT for 
water supply.223 Further, during the 19th century, this type of arrangements was adopted for water 
                                                 
221 Id.  
222 United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), BOT Guidelines, (Vienna: UNIDO, 1996) at  p. 3. 
223 Roth, G., The Private Provision of Public Services in Developing Countries, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). 
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supply projects in Germany, Spain and France and for privately owned ‘turnpike’ roads, similar 
to the present day toll roads in the U.S. and Britain.224  
 
The modern use of the concept came about in the 1980’s with its introduction as a 
prominent method of financing infrastructure in Turkey as a part of the government strategy to 
raise off-balance sheet financing.225 This was followed by the success in Europe in using the 
concept to finance the Euro-tunnel project.226 Since then, this type of project financing has 
become an instant hit with both developed and developing countries which look to private 
financing as a method of reducing public sector debt expenditure in infrastructure development.  
 
Today, the BOO/BOT models of project financing are true hybrids representing an 
intermediate stage between state monopolies and private enterprises. It can be conceptualised as a 
mid-point on the continuum between state monopolies and free market and which may help to 
introduce free market concepts gradually to a transitional society.227  
 
For both BOO and BOT projects and the other ‘BOT’ variants, project financing is the 
cornerstone. This means, essentially and technically speaking, the lenders look to the projects 
assets and revenue stream for repayment rather than to other sources of security such as 
government guarantees or the assets of the project sponsors. However, as already noted, in real 
life, most developing countries continue to offer payback guarantees to lenders and investors in 
order to attract their interest.  
 
 
                                                 
224 Id. 
225 See Generally Barret, M., “ Project Finance Develops New Risks”, Euromoney Magazine (October 1986) pp. 75 - 76. 
226 See Tiog, R.L.K., “Project Financing as a Competitive Strategy in Winning Overseas Jobs”, International Journal of Project Management (May 1993),  
pp.75 - 86.  
227 Levy, David, A., “BOT and Public Procurement: A Conceptual Frame Work”, 7 Indiana International and Comparative Law Review (1996) p. 95 at pp. 97 -99. 
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3.4.3. Main Contractual Arrangements in a BOO/BOT Project 
 
Although there are several contracts that are entered into between various project 
participants, the main contracts which form the backbone of a BOO/BOT projects are the  
concession contract between the host government and the project promoter; the construction 
contract between the project promoter and the construction contractor to build the project; and the 
off-take contract between the project sponsor and the host government or one of its nominated 
agencies for the out-put buy back to provide stability to the return of revenue from the project.   
 
a. Concession Contract 
 
A concession is described in the Oxford Companion to Law as the “grant by a public 
authority to a person of authority to do something, such as to work the land, extract minerals, 
operate an industry, or the like”. Under English law, a concession is essentially a contractual 
licence. This disparity in legal classification perhaps explains why there are now so many 
different labels for what is fundamentally the same form of agreement; “project agreement”, 
“development agreement”, “implementation agreement” (at least in certain respects), “franchise” 
are all largely interchangeable terms. Their use is sometimes preferred in order to avoid the 
confusion that “concession” can give rise to given its different meanings and categorisations from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Many civil law (and civil-law based) jurisdictions, including France 
and several Latin American countries, place them in legal categories of their own, often within 
the area of public administrative law, with clear statutory definitions, whereas, English law and 
other common law jurisdictions do not treat them as a separate species of contracts distinct from 
ordinary commercial agreements.228  
                                                 
228 The Channel Tunnel Concession Agreement signed in the late 1980s, was one of the first, well-known examples in the UK in recent years of a concession 
agreement for a major project. (There have since been numerous others in the PFI field.) If the agreement ever has to be litigated (at least to a judicial 
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In conceptual terms, concession agreements can be difficult to classify. One of the first 
tasks for a lawyer advising on a concession-related project would be to establish whether the local 
jurisdiction has a recognised jurisprudential concept of “concessions”.  
 
A concession agreement codifies the credit/financial structure in the legal documents to 
create what should be a watertight set of provisions acceptable to all parties to the transaction. It 
is very important that every detail is understood and negotiated so that the project has reasonable 
goals and clauses. In infrastructure development projects, it is the most important document to be 
negotiated and should be addressed at the very beginning. Several key provisions should be 
included in the concession agreement as outlined below. 
 
A concession allows the project sponsor to take control of the entire system: operations, 
maintenance, user fee collection and investment. The developer's role is to retain the right of 
control, the right to use the assets of the system, the right to collect user fees, all for a period of 
time long enough to regain costs and make a return. 
 
Under the concession agreement, the government retains ownership of the asset229 and 
ensures that the asset is maintained and used well. Additionally, the concession agreement would 
also provide that the government will act as regulator of the service sector related to the 
infrastructure facility developed under the project to oversee its performance and user fees. This 
is vital to protect users in terms of quality and quantity of the service to be provided by the 
project as well as to assure lenders and investors of adequate revenue streams to service their 
debts and investments. The level of independence such a regulatory body will have varies greatly 
                                                                                                                                                 
conclusion), it will be interesting to see what consequences flow from the differing legal classification of concessions under English and French law, given that 
both systems of law seem to apply to it. 
229 Except in the case of projects developed under the BOO scheme.  
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depending on the country, its political situation, and the associated level of risk. It is extremely 
complex and time consuming to clearly arrange a concession contract with the appropriate levels 
of risks and rewards and the requisite guarantees for all parties.  
 
Regulatory issues addressed in a concession agreement usually include:  
i. The willingness of the public to pay for services;  
ii. Whether regulations will allow the operator the freedom to setup an appropriate 
pricing strategy;  
iii. Whether and when the concession will revert back to the public sector; 
iv. The policy of competing infrastructure providers; and 
v. Whether the legal framework for awarding concessions and related issues are well 
defined.  
 
The operation period provided in the concession agreement must be long enough to pay 
off the project debt and provide a reasonable return on investment. Provisions should be made to 
enable an extension of the operating period due to reasons such as defaults by the parties in their 
obligations; force majeure events; and political risks.230 Adequate termination conditions should 
also be present along with proper compensation.231  
 
The operator may not be able to fulfil its obligation because of a host of technical factors 
(i.e. equipment performance, poor design, etc.). The concession agreement must thus address 
these factors and provide some ways to mitigate these risks without abandoning the project. The 
                                                 
230 World Bank, “Build-Operate-Transfer Arrangements: Legal, Financial, and Regulatory Issues, Toolkits for Private participation in Water and Sanitation,  
Toolkit 3 - What a Private Sector Participation Arrangement Should Cove”  (1997). Online: http://www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/water/wstoolkits/. 
231 Id. 
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implementation of an operation/maintenance manual and the use of performance bonds can 
ensure proper operation.232 
 
Concession should also include dispute settlement procedures to deal with potential 
conflicts between the parties to the contract, for example conflicts between the regulatory 
requirements and the concessionaire's financial viability. In order to resolve eventual disputes on 
a neutral stage, it is important that the concession agreement includes alternative dispute 
mechanisms (arbitration-mediation) by a neutral body outside of the host government’s legal 
system. This is important as most foreign investors, lenders and project operators are usually 
reluctant to subject themselves to the national jurisdiction of host nations. One of the key reasons 
behind this reluctance is the lack of confidence in the neutrality and effectiveness of adjudication 
by local courts of disputes between the government and foreign parties.  
 
Although the concession contract is basically a contractual arrangement between only the 
host government and the project sponsor, the lenders as the main financial contributor to projects 
(due to more debt less equity based financing mechanisms) have a significance influence in the 
finalisation of the concession contract. Lenders will usually review the clauses in the concession 
contract that affect the project's ability to generate revenues. As a first step, they will ensure that 
the facility generates the revenues and is built on time and within budget and is operated properly, 
usually by demanding the appointment of an independent engineer to review construction 
progress and operating efficiency.233  
 
The concession contract must also address default situations such as, when the borrower 
is unable to make a loan payment on time or is declared bankrupt. The contract should allow the 
                                                 
232 Id. 
233 Lenders may also be given the right to request changes in the concessionaire's contractors, including its operating contractor. This usually occurs when, in the 
lender's opinion, the contractor cannot comply with the terms of the contract and the non-compliance will substantially increase the project's cost. 
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lenders to “step-in” and assume control of the concession until the default event is remedied or a 
substitute concessionaire is appointed. The concession contract should allow the substitute to 
enter into the same contract. This gives the lender control and the ability to improve management, 
company profitability, and thus the chances of loan repayment. A more appropriate vehicle for 
step-in rights is of course a direct agreement between the lenders and the host government,234 but 
direct agreements can sometimes be extremely difficult to negotiate with governments. If any 
step-in rights are contained in the concession agreement, the lenders may be able to place at least 
some reliance on them by virtue of the strength of their security package. 
 
b. Construction Contract 
 
The construction contract assigns the project construction to a chosen contractor. This 
contract will also include provisions clearly allocating most of the construction phase risks to the 
contractor. The construction contract is typically a turn-key design and construct at a fixed price 
contract intended to reflect the back-to-back arrangements necessary to match up with the 
interdependent off-take agreement, operation and maintenance agreement, and other agreements 
constituting a BOT project. 
  
There are number of construction contract considerations peculiar to BOO/BOT projects 
as they typically involve a long construction period. The costs of delays in such construction 
contracts are always significant. It may be possible that the government would be prepared to 
accept a negotiated date for delivery of the project. It is extremely unlikely; however, that the 
government would accept any potential obligation to pay extra costs arising out of construction 
                                                 
234 An example of this is the Second Stage Bangkok Expressway project in Thailand, where the lenders step-in rights were created, and not just referred to in the 
concession agreement. However, for this to be feasible, local law will of course have to permit enforceable third-party rights to be created by contracts to which 
the third parties are not signatories. 
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delays. The Government's obligation, in relation to construction of the facility is to buy the 
product on completion (not to pay the construction cost). Likewise, the project promoter would 
not typically be in a position to make extra payment. The lenders will not usually accept this risk 
either. For these reasons, the risks associated with construction delays are borne as follows: 
i. Extension of Time: borne by the government; 
ii. Delay Costs: borne by the construction contractor. 
 
As far as the lenders are concerned, reliance is placed on the performance of the project 
as it is from the revenue earned from the project that the debts obligations towards the lenders 
will be mostly serviced. In the event of underperformance, this security may be diminished. 
Accordingly underperformance will have to be expressly catered for in the construction contract. 
Therefore the minimum performance requirements will have to be spelt out.  
 
The limitation of liability of the contractor is another consideration when finalising a 
construction contract. The need to limit a contractor's liability is not unique to BOT projects. The 
amounts involved in BOT contracts however are so large, to deserve special attention. The 
construction contractor in a BOT project is potentially exposed to damages far beyond the value 
of the construction contract. In particular, the construction contractor has potential liabilities for: 
 i. Damages to the project promoter for underperformance of the project; 
 ii. Damages to the project promoter or for delay in delivering the project; 
 iii. Damages to the project promoter in rectifying defects; 
 iv. Damages to the project promoter for consequential losses under the off-take 
agreement; the operation and maintenance agreement; and the finance agreement. 
 
 The construction contract should also provide room for termination and “step-in” rights. 
The host government and the lenders must have the ability, in the event that the project promoter 
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is in default to the point where the take-or-pay agreement and/or the finance agreements are 
terminated, to "step-in" and take over the obligations of the project promoter under the 
construction contract (and the operation and maintenance contract) to ensure continuity of the 
project, provided, however, that it is the viable option, given the circumstances. The agreements 
with the construction contractor and the operation and maintenance contractor, therefore, must 
include provisions obliging the construction contractor and the operation and maintenance 
contractor to comply with that regime. 
  
c. off-take Contract 
 
The off-take contract is normally the key revenue contract in many infrastructure 
projects. It is the agreement between the host government and or one of its agencies with the 
project promoter. It is the contract under which the former agrees to purchase from the latter the 
out-put of the project at an agreed price and volume. 
 
The critical element of the off-take agreement from the host government perspective is 
the performance warranties to be given by the project promoter. The performance warranties 
should deal with both the quantity and quality of the output. The government or its agency will 
also require the off-take agreement to detail the consequences of a failure to meet the 
performance standards, for example, provisions enabling the charge of liquidated damages and/or 
the right to call for an event of default. 
 
The viability of the project and in particular its bankability will depend upon the 
reliability of the cash flow under the off-take agreement and the host government and project 
promoter/operator  performing their respective obligations. The aim of the project promoter in 
negotiating the off-take agreement with the government is to minimize its market risk. This may, 
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to a certain extent be achieved by structuring the cash flow in two parts, namely, an availability 
fee and a usage fee. The availability fee is a fee payable by the government agency to the project 
promoter in consideration of the project promoter making the infrastructure facility available 
irrespective of actual throughput. The usage fee regulates the price per unit that the government 
will pay for the actual amount of the product supplied to it. The sponsor will want the availability 
fee to cover all or at least a substantial part of its fixed costs. The usage fee will cover the balance 
of fixed costs (if any) and the variable costs. 
 
While the project promoter will push for a high availability fee to minimize its market 
risk, it must be careful in so doing, because if all market risk is shifted to the government agency 
this may undermine the ability of the private sector to obtain tax deductions.235 The government 
agency would want to structure the transaction so that the sponsor has the maximum incentive to 
attain the pre-agreed performance standards. To do this, it would want the ability to reduce the 
tariff payable or impose liquidated damages if the performance standards are not achieved.  
 
Lenders, on the other hand, would want to restrict the ability of the government agency to 
interrupt the cash flow under the off-take agreement (especially if this could affect the sponsor's 
ability to meet repayments on the bank debt). The lenders will firstly argue that non-performance 
related defaults should not have any impact on the tariff as the government agency would in such 
circumstances still be receiving what it bargained for, namely, a high quality product. They will 
also argue that, provided, any default is being promptly rectified, the cash flow should not be 
interrupted and other remedies such as liquidated damages may be more appropriate. The obvious 
consequence of an interruption of cash flow will be that the financiers will not have a source of 
revenue through which to repay their debt. However, as stated above, the government’s ability to 
                                                 
235 See generally, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Legislative Guide on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects, (New 
York: United Nations, 2001); and UNCITRAL, Legal Guide on Drawing up International Contracts for the Construction of Industrial Works, (New York: 
United Nations, 1998). 
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reduce tariff is its principal weapon to ensure that the project promoters strives to achieve the 
performance standards.236 
 
The off-take agreement must also provide for part of the tariff stream to escalate during 
the probable long term life of the agreement. The base tariff is normally negotiated prior to the 
start of construction. The base tariff must be regularly indexed in accordance with the Consumer 
Price Index (“CPI”) or some other agreed formula to ensure that the tariff stays in line with the 
movement in costs over the life of the project. Furthermore, there must be provisions enabling the 
tariff to be adjusted in the event of unforeseen circumstances occurring. For example, the project 
promoter would require the ability to increase the tariff in the event of its costs increasing due to a 
new law or regulation that affects the costs of operating the project. The government agency 
would also want the tariff to be reduced if costs decrease due to an unforeseen event. 
 
The formula regulating the indexing of the tariff and the events entitling either party to 
seek an adjustment to the tariff will therefore be heavily negotiated. For example, the host 
government is unlikely to accept an increase to the tariff if a tax change affects the sponsor's 
return on its investment. 
 
A further issue which might impact upon the escalation of the tariff is the cost of funds. 
The finance arrangements may provide a right to the lenders to increase the costs it charges from 
the borrower if certain events occur, for example, change of law, and changes in capital adequacy 
etc. The lenders would normally like these increases to be matched by an increase in the tariff 
payable under the off-take agreement. The host government will normally resist such demands.  
 
                                                 
236 Id. 
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3.5. Key Advantages and Disadvantages of Project financing 
 
As is the case with any form of investment, in project financing too, it is critical that the 
parties identify the advantages and disadvantages associated with it. The main advantage in 
project financing, from the point of view of developing countries is the transfer of the 
responsibility of financing, constructing, maintaining and providing an infrastructure service to 
the private sector. Use of private sector financing provide a new sources of capital, which reduces 
public borrowing and direct spending and which may improve host government’s credit rating. In 
addition, this enables developing country governments to accelerate the development of projects 
that would otherwise have to wait for and compete for scarce sovereign resources. Further, 
sometimes, the governments’ not only get to transfer the responsibility of financing and providing 
infrastructure services to the private sector, but also get the benefit of inheriting a fully 
operational project after the agreed concession period is over.237 Another important factor is that 
project financing gives access to private sector technology. Furthermore, project financing allows 
the allocation to the private sector of project risk and burden that would otherwise have been 
borne by an already encumbered public sector. Finally, Public sector can measure its efficiency 
against the benchmark established by the private sector in respect of similar projects and 
associated opportunities to enhance management of infrastructure facilities. 
 
From the project promoters’ point of view, project financing is ideal when their 
creditworthiness or the borrowing power is less than adequate to take over the responsibility of 
financing and completing an infrastructure project. Further, the ability to avoid having the project 
debt reflected on their balance sheets (off balance sheet aspect) is another advantage. Project 
financing, especially, BOO/BOT projects enable the investors to have access to markets which 
were previously not liberal and/or open to them. Furthermore, project financing often provide a 
                                                 
237 For example, when a infrastructure facility is developed as a BOT project. 
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solution whereby a tailor-made financial package is developed together with a supporting security 
structure that will enable the project promoter to participate in a project which could otherwise be 
beyond their capacity. Further, Project financing allows financing on a higher debt to lower 
equity ratio (e.g. 70% - 30%) and because debt is traditionally less expensive than equity, the 
overall project cost and the tariff necessary to repay the debt and provide an acceptable return on 
equity can be less. 
 
The end users of project outputs will also find project financing arrangements much to 
their advantage as they will be the recipients of quality and up-to-date infrastructure services 
provided by technologically and managerially efficient private sector led utility providers. 
However, the strength and acceptability of this advantage will rely on the nature of the service 
provided and the tariff charged from the end users. If the end user is the host government (for 
example, the off-taker in a power project) it would have an efficient and modern power 
generation facility to its advantage. However, if the government is incapable of providing the 
generated power to its public at an affordable price, then the public perception of the advantages 
of the infrastructure facility would be different to the theoretical advantage.  
 
Although the advantages of project financing outweighs the disadvantages, if project 
financing is to work to the satisfaction of all the parties concerned, then the potential 
disadvantages too needs consideration. The degree of risks involved with regard to all project 
participants and the complex nature of the transactions involving participants with diverse 
interests, which in turn requires lengthy technical; financial; and legal analysis are the biggest 
disadvantages of project financing.238 In other words it is not a simple operation. The risk 
allocation issues between the parties and doubts concerning the project viability and financial 
                                                 
238 Sozzi, C., “Project Finance and Facilitating Telecommunication Infrastructure Development in Newly Industrialized Countries”, 12 Santa Clara Computer and 
High Technology Law Journal (1996), p. 435 at 457. 
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security result in protracted negotiations and increased costs. The documentation involved too is 
lengthy and complex.  
 
The degree of supervision that the lenders will impose on the management and operation 
of a project too can be disadvantageous from the point of view of the investors and the host 
governments. Also, the regulatory control from the host government can be a disadvantage from 
the point of view of the investors as they will desire the freedom to manage and operate a project 
without public sector interference.  
 
Untested risk allocation among the project participants in project financing, is another 
concern. As project financing methods are relatively new, no definite analysis of the successful or 
the unsuccessful nature of the risk sharing is available. Thus, the various risks that exist through 
out the projects life should be carefully identified, defined, allocated and provided for within the 
contractual package that defines the project. This process would requires highly effective 
lawyering and financial and technological know-how on behalf of all the project participants as 
clear evaluation of each party’s capacity to bear the risks and the extent of such risks is necessary. 
This process can be both time consuming and costly. 
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Chapter 4 - Changing Face of some Traditional Risks 
Associated with FDI  
 
4.1. Changes and Reasons 
 
As noted in previous chapters, during the last two decades most developing countries 
have developed a growing interest in the development of infrastructure facilities with the use new 
modes of FDI such as project financing. In other words, developing countries have advanced 
from the stage of using FDI mainly for natural resources exploitation to the stage of using project 
financing techniques for the development of infrastructure facilities such as dams, roads, ports, 
electricity, water and telecommunication facilities. In line with this transition, developing 
countries have implemented institutional and regulatory reforms essential to foster suitable 
environments for investor participation in development of infrastructure facilities previously 
tightly controlled by state monopolies. These reforms have so far been reasonably successful, as 
private sector project developers have keenly accepted the roles of both the promoter and the 
provider of infrastructure facilities.  
 
In order to ensure the future success of project financing in infrastructure development, 
developing countries as well as the other major project participants need to understand the nature 
of the risks associated with FDI when financing mechanisms such as project financing is used for 
infrastructure development. Most of the risks associated with modern day infrastructure 
development projects in developing countries are not new. They are similar to traditional risks 
associated with FDI. These risks and how they are allocated among project participants were 
briefly dealt with in the previous chapter.  
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It is important to note that whilst most of the risks associated with modern day 
infrastructure development projects look similar to the risks associated with traditional FDI, due 
to the key reasons discussed below in sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 of this Chapter, some of the risks 
have assumed a new out look. The most significant changes have occurred in connection with 
political risks. For example, the demand for political decentralisation and political autonomy in 
some developing countries have given a new dimension to the political risks associated with 
modern day infrastructure development projects, when compared to traditional FDI projects. 
These changes have occurred partly due to the nature of project financing mechanisms used in 
modern day infrastructure development projects where there is now more than one risk taker and 
partly due to the changing political as well as economic culture in the developing countries.   
 
4.1.1. How the use of Project Financing have Contributed to the 
Changes 
 
As noted in Chapter Two of this thesis, most developing countries gained independence 
during the two decades that followed the Second World War. Since gaining independence, until 
about the early 1980’s they went through a period of closed economic administration, and thus 
their economies had only limited exposure to FDI and particularly to private sector led 
development. During this period they relied mainly on direct financial aid from developed 
countries and international funding agencies such as the World Bank for their development 
activities. These funds came in as direct loans or grants for the developing countries who then 
allocated them to various development initiatives totally within their control. As such borrowings 
were guaranteed by the recipient developing countries, the developed countries or the 
international funding agencies did not have to directly bare the risks associated with any 
investment activities to which such funds were utilised.  
 
 132
Although during this period some developing countries provided foreign investors with 
access to their natural resources, there was no private sector participation in the development of 
infrastructure facilities which were under the total control of the public sector entities in 
developing countries. Concerning the concessions they had to develop natural resources, 
nationalization and expropriation of their assets became the greatest fears for the foreign 
investors. Consideration of other types of political risks such as, for example, demand for 
decentralisation or political separation hardly came into play when investment decisions were 
made during this era.239 
 
However, with the introduction of FDI methods such as project financing, infrastructure 
development initiatives in developing countries are led by the profit seeking private sector entities 
who act as equity investors and project developers. Further, international funding agencies that 
traditionally financed development needs of developing countries on the security of payback 
guarantees provided by such countries now act as lenders to development projects who seek to 
recover their loans and interest thereof from project revenues. As a result, the political risks 
associated with infrastructure development projects are no longer the sole burden of developing 
countries.  
 
Risk sharing goes to the very root of the concept of project financing. Therefore, private 
sector project developers as well as international funding agencies who are key participants in 
project financing initiatives are required to seriously consider the political risks associated with 
infrastructure development projects and participate in the sharing of such risks. Generally, the 
private sector is better at managing commercial risks and responsibilities such as those 
                                                 
239 Fatehi-Sedeh, K. and Safizadeh, H. M., “The Association Between Political Instability and Flow of Foreign Direct Investment”, Management International 
Review, Vol.29, No.4 (1989), pp.4-13.  
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associated with construction, operation, and financing. Further, in reality, the developing 
country governments, in order to attract investors in a highly competitive infrastructure 
development market, continue to offer to undertake political risks and compensate the 
investors and lenders in the event of such risks occurring. However, investors and lenders 
cannot afford to ignore political risks. This is because the credibility of the government to 
uphold contractual obligations and the willingness and ability to provide compensation 
for political risks are key issues for project finance. Although as noted above, governments 
generally agree to compensate investors for political risks, in practice, justifications for 
government actions may be cited to delay or prevent such payments. Thus, private 
investors generally assume the risks associated with dispute resolution and the ability to 
obtain compensation should the government violate the concession agreement.240  
 
In the circumstances, unlike in the past where investors were able to almost 
completely disregarded any type of political risk, except for the country risk it self,241 if 
they lacked confidence in the ability of the country in which they invested to keep up 
with its contractual obligations, in modern day infrastructure development projects, the 
investors and lenders are required to take note of, consider, and take mitigatory measures 
against various types of political risks. These include risks such as the volatility of the 
political system in developing countries and the measures taken in developing countries 
to decentralize the political administration, thus giving more powers, including the 
powers to regulate and take charge of administrating foreign investment projects. The 
situations that may result in a developing country as a result of, for example, a regional or 
                                                 
240 The issue of meeting financial obligations while disputes are resolved may be achieved through a requirement of debt service reserves, escrow, or standby 
financing. 
241 Country Risk here means a country’s ability to honour contractual obligations. 
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local government being given the power to regulate and administrate infrastructure 
development projects in its local jurisdiction, would directly affect the investors and 
lenders who have participated or who intended to participate in a development project in 
such jurisdictions. They will lack the comfort of dealing with the central government in 
such developing country and having more secured government guarantees offered by the 
central government to protect their investments.     
 
In the circumstances, the nature and the effects of the political risks of the type 
mentioned above appear to have changed in relation to modern day infrastructure 
development projects as they affect not only the host country, but other commercial and 
international project participants. In the past, central governments in developing countries 
dealt with such risks on their own, for example by taking affirmative action to deal with 
political unrest or taking military action to crush political opposition. Although such 
actions met with international criticism, as far as investment projects were concerned, 
there was no change in the risks as the risk taker continued to be the developing country 
it self, so long as it carried out its contractual obligations. The situation is not the same 
anymore as foreign investors and international lenders are now direct participants and 
stake holders in development projects and thus get directly affected due to the occurrence 
of any political risk events. Further, the way they react to and take precautions and or 
mitigatory measures against such risks is different to the way developing countries would 
deal with such risks. For example, investors and lenders would rely on political risk 
insurance against such events when the developing country governments could take 
political and/or military action to control the effects of such risk events. 
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4.1.2. How the Changing Political and Economic Culture have 
contributed to the Changes 
 
Another key factor that has contributed to the changing nature of some of the 
political risks associated with modern day infrastructure development projects is the 
changing political and economic culture in some developing countries.  
 
Compared to the number of independent countries at the time of the Second 
World War, there are many more independent countries in the world today, which could 
be grouped as the countries which gained independence from their colonial masters 
during the two decades that followed the Second World War and the countries which 
gained independence after the break-up of the former communist regimes in the 1980’s. 
As has been already noted in the previous section, the first group of countries mentioned 
above went through a period of closed economic administration and started opening up 
their economies and started adopting market based economic reforms only in the 1970s 
and the 1980’s.   
 
As noted in Chapter One of this thesis, in most developing nations more than 70% of the 
total population live in the urban areas.242 The rural communities in many developing countries 
have hardly seen any light of development during the time these countries practised closed 
economic policies as most of the economic activity was centred only in and around the capital 
city and couple of big cities. In countries where significant control of the economy is 
                                                 
242 UNCTAD, World Development Report 1996, (New York and Geneva: UNCTAD, 1996) 
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concentrated in the centre without any substantial financial and/or administrative autonomy to the 
local authorities, the distribution of the riches of the economy has not reached out side few big 
cities. As a result, most rural areas remain under-developed. For example, except for Colombo in 
Sri Lanka, Islamabad in Pakistan, and except for few affluent cities like Mumbai and Gujarat in 
India, most other districts and regions in these countries have not benefited much from FDI until 
recently.  
 
The introduction of open economic policies and transparent democracies has solved the 
problem of development not reaching the rural areas to some extent. With these developing 
countries opening their doors to foreign investors, investment has started reaching the rural areas. 
Further, the development of essential infrastructure facilities and creation of new employment has 
uplifted the lives of the rural communities. For example, the implementation of the “Expedited 
Mahaweli River Development Project” in Sri Lanka in the late 1970’s with World Bank aid, after 
the country adopted open economic policies, led to many in the rural communities finding 
employment in project work. In addition, the project provided much needed infrastructure for 
irrigation in the rural areas of the North-Central Province in Sri Lanka and was also instrumental 
in boosting the national grid and there by strengthening the power infrastructure in the country.243 
 
Whilst opening of economies has boosted development and has paved the way for the 
development to reach the under developed areas, it has also resulted in encouraging the growing 
demands for political reform in many developing countries especially by sharing of political 
power by decentralisation. The main factors behind these demands appear to be related to the 
following trends: 
 
                                                 
243 Mahaweli Authority of Sri Lanka (MASL), The Brochure on Mahaweli Program, (Colombo: MASL, 1994); Werellagama, D.R.I.B., Lessons Learned from 
Communities Displaced by the Mahaweli Multipurpose Development Project Sri Lanka, (Kandy: Department of Civil Engineering, University of Peradeniya, 
2003); and Personal Communication with the rural communities in Raja Rata area of the North Central Province of Sri Lanka. 
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i. Worldwide trend towards a realisation that development should not be a top down 
process but rather that it requires community involvement and motivation. This has 
spilled over into demands by local governments and local populations for a greater share 
of resources and decision making power to affect their own development. 
 
ii. The realisation in many countries that centralisation of the planning and allocation of 
resources has led to only limited flows of resources to the peripheral levels with much of 
the funds being drained off centrally. In some cases, at least on paper, governments are 
decentralising with the aim of improving public-sector/local government administration 
and performance and in an attempt to be less bureaucratic.  
iii. Realisation that centrally administered programs do not always provide for effective 
program delivery at the local level as they do not take into account local needs and 
characteristics.244 
 
In addition to the aforesaid demand for political reforms, in some developing countries, 
either due to lack of economic and political reform in some regions or due to the confidence 
certain regions have got because of successful economic and political reforms of self 
management, there seem to be growing tension for complete political separation from the central 
governments and for creation of new political regimes.  
 
There is no doubt that such tension would affect infrastructure development initiatives in 
developing countries and that investors and lenders who are crucial for development initiatives of 
developing countries will be discouraged to commit their resources to countries in which such 
                                                 
244 United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), “UNFPA and Government Decentralization: A Study of Country Experiences, Evaluation findings”,  Office of 
Evaluation and Findings, Issue 30 (June 2000). 
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tension is seen.245  It is important to note that since this type of tension became visible in most of 
the developing countries in which there are such demands for political reforms or complete 
political separation only during the last two or three decades, such tensions have not been 
identified as risks associated with traditional FDI.246 Further, as some of the demands for political 
reforms have received international recognition, these are not issues the developing countries 
could internally deal with any longer. As a result, investors and lenders who participate in 
infrastructure development projects in developing countries with such political tension are 
directly affected by them. 
 
In addition to above the growing interest in infrastructure development projects which 
reach beyond the national boundaries of a single developing country (such as highways and 
tunnels between landlocked countries) and the tension relating to border disputes between 
countries, especially among some of developing countries falling within the second group of 
independent countries mentioned above, have also contributed to the changing nature and effects 
of political risks that are associated with modern day infrastructure development projects when 
compared to traditional FDI. 
 
Further, events such as the unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq in early 
1990’s and the resulting damages to investment projects and, events such as the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks in New York demand another look at the political risks that are associated 
with infrastructure development projects in countries with the active participation of foreign 
investors and international lenders as, events such as those had not been seriously associated with 
traditional risks attached FDI. In fact, there is hardly any written analysis in the existing texts on 
                                                 




246 For example, the demand for political separation in the Kashmir province in India commenced in the mid 1970’s. In Sri Lanka, the demand for political 
separation by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam commenced in the early 1980’s.  
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modern day infrastructure development projects which concentrate on the analysis of risks such 
as those mentioned above and their effects on the project participants.  
  
4.1.3. The Key Political Risks that have changed their traditional 
Outlook.  
 
The key political risks which have changed their traditional outlook in recent times 
include the risk of decentralisation, risk of political instability, risk of separation of states or 
creation of new states and the risk of invasion and hostile taking of property. The changes that 
have occurred in connection with these risks and the measures to mitigate them are not areas of 
study that have been fully explored. They do not have a long recorded history of supporting data 
that acknowledges their incidence and impact, and are not a part of the usual project preparation 
working agendas of the parties involved in project development negotiations. In other words, the 
changing nature of these risks are rarely discussed and dealt with as a part of preparation for a 
project, although they can be a key impediment to investor and lender participation in 
infrastructure development in developing countries.  
 
The aforesaid political risks could affect the profitability of projects and hold back the 
development of infrastructure projects in developing countries. Thus, in-depth study of these risks 
to find ways to mitigate their effects is crucial for the future of project financing in infrastructure 
development to be successful. The following sections of this Chapter attempt to analyse the 





4.2. Risk of Decentralisation of Political Power 
 
4.2.1. Demand for Decentralisation and Levels of Decentralisation 
 
In an era where project-financing is used as the most innovative FDI method to bolster 
and stimulate unproductive and sagging economies in developing countries, one of the major 
obstacles to economic development is the growing demand for decentralisation of administration. 
Whilst, the policy-makers and economists pursue FDI and private sector participation for 
economic salvation, some others look at decentralisation of political power as the path for better 
administration of the state and improving the quality of life of the people.   
 
Although reasons for the demand for decentralisation can be spelled out with ease, 
decentralisation is not easily defined. It refers to governance processes of different forms and 
dimensions offering different levels of power transfer as shown in See Table 4.1 below: 
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Table 4.1 Different Levels of Decentralisation 
 









The dispersal of 
decision-making and 
some executive power 
from central 
administration to its 
appointees at a sub-
national level. 
A de-concentration of functions to improve 
efficiency.  Local government representatives 
are accountable to their seniors in the hierarchy 
who decide the overall allocation of 
responsibility to different tiers of government. 
There is implicit political subordination and 
prevalence for confrontation with decision-
making based on national rather than local 
preferences.  There are no mechanisms for 
downward accountability. 




A transfer of authority 
from an administrative 
service to a semi-public 
or private company. 
Responsibilities are transferred out of the 
regular bureaucratic system, but the 
accountability ultimately rests with central 
government. There is little if any downward 
accountability. 
Devolution or democratic/ 




The total or partial 
transfer of power from 
a larger to a smaller 
jurisdiction. 
Devolution imbues local governments with 
total or shared responsibility for service 
delivery, but also gives local governments a 
wider role to act as the mouthpiece for local 
interests.  The centre shifts into the role of 
adviser and supervisor. It is underpinned by the 
concept of subsidiary wherein decisions are 
made at the lowest possible level according to 
capacity as such those responsible for 
developed power have a high degree of 
political autonomy.  Accountability is mostly 
downward through mechanisms such as 
elections, consultation, referenda, and 
plebiscites.   
Deregulation   
 
 
The transfer of 
previously regulated 
activities out of the 
public service.   
Responsibilities are transferred out of the 
regular bureaucratic system. 




the transfer of 
ownership and/or 
management of 
resources from public 
sector to private 
entities, either directly 
or through parastatals.  
The role of privatisation and public private 
partnerships will clearly grow in the move 
towards sustainable development.  Public 
private partnership is likely to be the preferred 
measure for decentralisation of government 
power rather than pure privatisation.  
Sources:  Litvack et al 2000, Mayers and Bass 1999, Nickson 1998, Osmani 2000247 
                                                 
247 Litvack J, Ahmad J and Bird R., Rethinking Decentralization at the World Bank, World Bank Discussion Paper, (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1999);  
Nickson A., ‘Where is Local Government going in Latin America?: a comparative perspective’, A paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Society of 
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Of the levels of power transfer or decentralisation shown in the above table, not all levels 
threaten the progress of FDI in developing countries.  For instance, under De-concentration or 
administrative decentralisation, the central government of a state does not surrender absolute 
discretion regarding promoting FDI to a local government. As a result prospective investors will 
continue to deal with central governments concerning obtaining concessions for development and 
in securing central government undertakings to protect investments, although at sub-national level 
they will have to cooperate with local authorities in carrying out investment projects. Same is the 
case under delegation, and deregulation as the central governments are unlikely to surrender key 
responsibilities such as physical infrastructure development in countries through FDI to local 
governments. Total privatisation on the other hand is a level of power transfer where the 
governments will totally part with ownership and/or management of resources from public sector 
to private entities either permanently or for a certain fixed period of time.248    
 
Privatisation is a level of decentralisation that usually takes place pursuant to a successful 
investment negotiation. In the circumstances, decentralisation in the mode of privatisation is 
conceptually not a threat to promoting FDI, although opposition to privatisation may result in 
threatening developing country initiatives to use project financing techniques to promote 
infrastructure development. In the circumstances, the mode of decentralisation that in effect 
directly threatens FDI is political decentralisation.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Latin American Studies (1998), University of Liverpool; Osmani S., Participatory Governance, People’s Empowerment and Poverty Reduction, SEPED 
Conference Paper Series No. 7 (New York: UNDP, 2000). 
248  For example, a government concession to a private sector investor to run its telecommunication infrastructure under a BOT project for a 20 year period is a 
situation in which the government parts with its ownership and/or management of a resource for a fixed period of time. 
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4.2.2. Current Trends in Political Decentralisation 
 
Political decentralisation is an evolving political and administrative process rather than a 
particular form of organisational structure or institutional arrangement. As such, the 
characteristics of decentralisation in any particular country are dynamic and are subject to rapid 
change depending on the government in power and popular trends. Because decentralisation is 
such a new concept in many countries, it becomes a learning process and hence, structures may 
be tried and discarded as unworkable. 
 
In the cases of developing countries such as India, Nigeria, Philippines and Mexico, 
decentralisation is based on the political/legal structures (e.g. the Constitution, specific laws or 
government bills covering decentralisation) of each country. In these countries, the states or 
provinces form a federation, which generally has its own elected government with a wide range 
of fiscal and programming powers and responsibilities. In contrast, countries such as Viet Nam, 
Bolivia, Sri Lanka and Ghana are unitary states, with political sub-divisions generally at the 
departmental level or at the provincial level.249 In these countries, decentralisation often takes a 
more administrative and operational character, regulated through decrees or directives from the 
central government. In the latter group of countries, decentralisation is also defined by the extent 
to which fiscal powers have been decentralised. In most countries the federal/central authority 
represents the highest level of governance with first priority over fiscal resources. It is only when 
the federal or central authorities agree to share their resources that true decentralisation can 
proceed.250 
 
                                                 
249  See Litvack supra note 247. 
250 Id. 
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The current trend among most developing countries is to decentralise political power by 
sharing executive and administrative responsibilities with state, local or provincial governments, 
while sharing the duty of providing utility services to the public with the more efficient private 
sector. Many developing countries such as Bolivia, Ghana, India, Mexico and Viet Nam have 
adopted measures of effective power sharing between the central administration and state or 
provincial governments as the case may be, following the examples set by developed countries 
such as USA, Canada, and Switzerland in successfully sharing power between the centre and state 
or provincial governments in the distribution and allocation of investments and assets.251 For 
example, India, although having a very strict and effective central screening and monitoring 
system with regard to investments coming into the country, has allowed several state 
governments to deal directly with centre approved investors in developing infrastructure facilities. 
On the other hand there are developing countries, which are reluctant to allow the provincial or 
local governments deal directly with foreign investors. Sri Lanka is a good example. There are 
also several other developing countries which have continued to resist any move towards 
decentralisation, although the demands for decentralisation by various ethnic and political groups 
have continued to grow.252 Countries such as Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Rwanda and Kenya which have highly centralized systems of governance are good 






                                                 
251  See generally UNFPA and Government Decentralization, supra note 244.  




4.2.3. Risks to Infrastructure Development Projects due to 
Decentralisation 
 
As far as infrastructure development projects are concerned, the main obstacle 
decentralisation poses is the possibility of conflict between the central administration and the 
state, provincial or local authorities in sharing the responsibility of infrastructure development. 
Where the responsibilities of the central administration and the state, provincial or local 
authorities are not clearly defined, there bound to be conflicts of interest and administrative 
confrontations.  In addition to slowing down the progress of development activities, the lack of 
definition of functions may also cause confusion and uncertainty in the minds of investors, 
lenders and project developers. Thus, although decentralisation may be a good thing for 
developing countries, when it comes to sharing of political power, if policies are not clear and 
respective functions and powers of the administrative authorities are not clearly defined, it is 
likely that decentralisation will not compliment sustainable infrastructure development with the 
use of FDI.   
 
Another obstacle decentralisation may pose to infrastructure development projects is that, 
although decentralisation may be preferred by some politicians, and some sections of the public, 
it might find strict opposition from some end-users of infrastructure facilities developed with FDI 
mechanisms such as project financing, which may allow private sector infrastructure service 
providers to increase rates. The reason behind such opposition being, the lack of confidence the 
public might have on the regulatory and administrative ability of state, provincial or local 
government administration of such facilities. Most central governments will have the capacity to 
ensure that even after development projects are completed with foreign and/or private sector 
participation, the end product is offered to the public at affordable rates. A state, provincial or 
local government in a developing country may not have the financial or administrative capacity to 
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do this. Further, a central government will have the capacity to provide sufficient comfort to 
investors of projects, by way of securities or other risk comfort mechanisms built-into the 
contract documents relating to projects.   
 
The investors who would undertake to develop infrastructure projects may prefer to work 
with the central administration rather than with the local authorities.253 Although urban 
infrastructure needs will keep rapidly growing in a decentralised administration, obstacles faced 
by investors who participate in infrastructure development will be different and more complex 
when compared to participation in development projects under the control of central 
governments. Some of the obstacles will derive from the fact that, relevant industry decisions rest 
on state, provincial or local, making the political risk attached to the development projects 
different from those associated with the central government.  
 
In some developing countries, the absence of title right of the provincial or local 
governments to land, and other assets, may also cause problems when it concerns infrastructure 
development with project financing techniques in a decentralised administrative environment. If 
the local governments lack substantive powers in relation to land and various state assets that 
might be the focus of foreign investment, then, there bound to be conflicts when it concerns the 
control and regulation of investment projects concerning such assets. In some countries, although 
general administration may be decentralised, the ownership of major state assets including land 
remains with the central government. Sri Lanka is a classic example. Although the 13th 
amendment to the constitution that was introduced in 1987,254 established provincial councils (a 
limited decentralised system of administration), some of the key assets of the state, including state 
                                                 
253 In a survey I conducted in March 2004, in the Central Province of Sri Lanka, which is the islands most developed province after the Western Province, only 17 
out of 200 interviewed stated that they feel comfortable if the basic infrastructure services such as power, water and telecommunication comes under the full 
control of the provincial council. 22 were reluctant to choose between the central government and the provincial council. The rest confirmed that they prefer 
that the services continue to be provided by the central government. 
254 Certified on 14th November 1987. 
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land, remain under the control of the central government.255 The provincial councils do not have 
the capacity to make use of state land for any infrastructure development project without the 
concurrence of the central government. 
 
The possibility of the functions of the central and local governments often overlapping is 
another risk. Local authorities may enter into agreements with the private investors to develop 
various infrastructure projects; however, the responsibility of setting up the necessary rules for 
the provision of such services to the end-users will be in the hands of the central government. 
This may give rise to overlaps and regulatory conflicts. The problem tends to get more complex 
when different political parties are in control of the central government and the provincial or local 
governments, as has been the case in Sri Lanka, several times during the period 1990 to date. The 
following two paragraphs taken from an ADB publication provides a good summary of the 
complexities that are found in Sri Lanka concerning infrastructure development due to 
overlapping of functions and responsibilities between different governmental and provincial 
authorities: 
“Administration of urban areas is complex. At the national level, two ministries are 
responsible for providing technical support to local governments for planning, appraisal, 
procurement, management, and allocation of budgetary resources. In addition, several 
agencies are responsible for construction, operation, and maintenance of some of the 
urban services. Ministry of Provincial Councils and Local Government (MPCLG) is in 
charge of the overall provincial and local administration framework including budgeting 
and human resource development. MPCLG’s administrative and implementation capacity 
is very weak. Ministry of Urban Development, Housing and Construction is responsible for 
urban planning and development control through Urban Development Authority (UDA) 
provides technical guidelines and standards directly to other agencies under it.” 
 
“Policies are also fragmented between ministries and between the central Government, 
provincial councils, and urban local authorities. There is poor coordination of the relevant 
                                                 
255 While Land, including rights to or over land, land tenure transfer and alienation of land, land use, land settlement and land improvement was designated a 
provincial subject, thus, a subject falling under the provincial government, Appendix 2 to the amendment stipulated that “State land shall continue to vest in the 
Republic” and may be acquired, in consultation with the provinces, in respect of a reserved or a concurrent subject. Further, “Alienation or disposition of the 




institutions in the urban sector, e.g. Road Development Authority, Ceylon Electricity 
Board, Sri Lanka Telecom, and National Water Supply and Drainage Board, and there is 
total lack of planning and coordination with UDA. The ambiguous division of 
responsibilities between the center and the provinces makes it difficult to move decisively 
to improve administrative capacities at provincial and local levels. As a result, institutional 
capacities and capabilities at the urban local authority level are very limited. There is 
genuine lack of enforcement capacity especially for land management and environmental 
laws.” 256 
 
4.2.4. Conflicts between Central Governments and 
Provincial/Local Authorities  
 
The following examples provide a good insight as to the confusion that can be caused in 
relation to investment contracts when the specific roles of the central administration and the state, 
provincial, or local authorities are not properly spelled out in a decentralised system of 
administration.  
 
a. Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican States 
 
The following is a brief summary of the dispute that arose between Metalclad 
Corporation, a Delaware company, and the United Mexican States, and the finding of the ICSID 
arbitration tribunal on the issue involving the steps taken by the state government to stop an 
investment project authorised by the central administration in Mexico.257 
 
The dispute arose from the construction of a landfill in Guadalcazar in the central 
Mexican State of San Luis Potosí, by an enterprise owned and controlled by Metalclad. The 
construction was designed for the confinement of hazardous waste from the area. Approvals 
having been obtained at the federal and state level, construction of the landfill were completed in 
                                                 
256 Asian Development Bank , Sri Lanka Urban Development Sector Study, (Manila: ADB, July 2000). 
257 Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AB)/97/1. 
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March 1995. However, demonstrations that took place at the inauguration of the landfill kept it 
from opening.  
 
In November 1995, Metalclad concluded an agreement with federal environmental 
agencies setting forth the conditions under which the landfill would operate. A month later, in 
December 1995, the local municipality issued a denial of a construction permit for the landfill 
that had been requested thirteen months earlier and then challenged the agreement Metalclad had 
concluded with federal agencies and obtained a judicial injunction, which prevented the operation 
of the landfill through May 1999. 
 
At the hearing, it was argued on behalf of the United Mexican States, that local 
government actions are generally not subject to the standards of protection required from 
NAFTA258  member states towards the property and investments by other member states. It was 
argued that Article 105 of the NAFTA does not use the term “local governments” in describing 
the extent of the obligations set forth in the Agreement. According to this argument, the NAFTA 
Parties deliberately excluded the term “local governments” from Article 105 to signal a departure 
from otherwise applicable customary international law, which provides that a state is liable for 
the acts of all its political subdivisions, including local governments.  
 
 The United States argued inter alia that: 
(a) There is no general exclusion from the NAFTA standards for local government 
action. It was the U.S. belief that the Parties intended that except where specific 
                                                 
258  NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) is a trade agreement, negotiated among three federal governments, namely United States of America, Canada 
and Mexico, which came into operation on 1 January 1994. It is the first agreement ever to include services as well as goods. The full content of the NAFTA 
agreement is available online: http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/english/nafta/nafta.htm. 
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exception was made, actions of local governments would be subject to the NAFTA 
standards.  
(b) Article 105 provides that “[t]he Parties shall ensure that all necessary measures 
are taken in order to give effect to the provisions of this Agreement, including their 
observance, except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, by state and provincial 
governments.” Article 201(2), part of the NAFTA Chapter entitled “General Definitions,” 
plainly defines any reference to a state or province to include the local governments of 
that state or province. Absent any treaty language to the contrary, the natural meaning of 
these provisions, taken together, is that Article 105’s reference to states and provinces 
includes a reference to their local governments. 
(c) NAFTA, both in Chapter 11 and elsewhere in the Agreement, makes it clear that 
local government measures, including municipal measures, are subject to the NAFTA 
standards. For example, Article 1108(1) (a) (iii) specifically exempts existing local 
government measures from the reach of Articles 1102, 1103, 1106 and 1107. If the 
argument proposed by the United Mexican States at the hearing were correct, no 
exemption would be necessary because these articles would not address the actions of 
local governments at all. 
 
The Tribunal held in its award that the actions of the Mexican State and municipal 
authorities entailed a breach by Mexico of its obligation to afford Metalclad's investment 
treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment, under 
NAFTA Article 1105. By permitting the actions of the municipality, Mexico had taken measures 
tantamount to expropriation of Metalclad's investment under NAFTA Article 1110, since those 
actions "effectively and unlawfully prevented the Claimant's operation of the land-fill."  
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The Tribunal further held that, although not necessary for its finding of an expropriation, 
an Ecological Decree issued by the State Governor in September 1997, also had the effect of 
preventing the landfill's operation, and was thus also a measure tantamount to expropriation. In 
the award, the Tribunal set forth its understanding of the meaning of direct and indirect 
expropriation. The award also noted that the reference in NAFTA Article 1110 to measures 
"tantamount to" expropriation did not create a category different from direct or indirect 
expropriation.259 
 
This example clearly shows that in a decentralised system, local governments may 
sometimes act in violation of international, regional or bi-lateral treaty undertakings of the central 
government and that this would result in the central governments having to defend themselves 
against actions brought by investors or home countries of the investors under agreed contract or 
treaty terms.  
 
b. Samatha v. State of Andhra Pradesh  
 
The dispute that arose in the Andra Pradesh in India concerning a move by the state 
government to alienate lands traditionally held by various tribes to private companies is a good 
example of a situation where regional governments may take policy initiatives and action that is 
contrary to the interests of the central government. 
 
The dispute involved the issue of transfer of tribal land to corporate entities in violation 
of the Fifth Schedule to the Indian Constitution which provides protection to the Adivasi 
                                                 
259  The award gives an account of the facts on which the Tribunal found a breach of the obligation to grant fair and equitable treatment. The award thus contains 
one of the first rulings ever to apply the standard of fair and equitable treatment under a treaty governing investment matters. 
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(indigenous) people living in the Scheduled Areas.260 Samatha, a non-governmental organisation, 
filed action against the state government of Andhra Pradesh alleging inter alia that essentially the 
Fifth Schedule is a historic guarantee to indigenous people on the right over the land they live in 
and that the state government has violated this right by granting mining leases in this area to 
several non-tribal persons.  
 
The Fifth Schedule to the Indian Constitution deals with administration and control of 
areas and tribes specified in it and provides protection to the Adivasi (indigenous) people living 
in the areas specified in the schedule. The Fifth Schedule covers Tribal areas in nine states of 
India namely Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Maharashtra, Madhya 
Pradesh, Chattisgarh, Orissa and Rajasthan. The Borra reserved forest area along with its environs 
consisting of fourteen villages is the notified scheduled area in Ananthagiri Mandal of 
Visakhapatnam District of Andhra Pradesh. The aforesaid mining leases were granted in this 
scheduled area.  
 
The action later went up to the Supreme Court of India which led to a historic judgement. 
The following is a brief summary of the dispute, issues and the judgement of the Supreme Court 
that was delivered on 11.07.1997: 261 
 
Two of the main questions which arose before the Court were: whether the government 
can grant mining lease of the lands situated in scheduled area to a non-tribal; and whether the 
Borra Reserve Forest area was part of the domain of the Rajah of Jeypore and from time 
immemorial, it was a tribal area occupied by tribal villages. 
                                                 
260  This Fifth Schedule is still under threat of being amended to effect transfer of tribal lands to non-tribals and corporate bodies.  There have been several mass 
campaigns in recent times protesting against any move to amend this schedule and alleging that the very survival and culture of 80 million tribal population of 
India is under threat. 




The Court referring to several colonial statutes observed that it was clear that from the 
inception of the Colonial administration, the tribal areas were treated distinctly from other areas. 
Tribes were protected from exploitation; their rights and title to enjoy the lands in their 
occupation and their autonomy, culture and ecology were preserved; infiltration of the non-tribals 
into tribal areas was prohibited. 
 
It was further observed that, Chapter VI, Part X of the Indian Constitution deals with 
"Scheduled Tribes and Tribal Areas". Article 244 provides that the provisions of the Fifth 
Schedule shall apply to the administration and control of the Scheduled Areas and Scheduled 
Tribes in any State other than the State of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram. Part V of the 
Schedule gets attracted to its administration and control, with Paragraph (2) envisaging that 
subject to the provisions of the Schedule, the executive power of a State extends to the Scheduled 
Areas enumerated therein.  
 
In the circumstances, the Judgement declared inter alia that: 
(a) All lands leased to private mining companies in the scheduled areas are null and 
void. 
(b) Transfer of land in Scheduled Area by way of lease to non-tribals, corporation 
aggregate, etc stands prohibited. 
(c) Renewal of lease is fresh grant of lease and therefore, any transfer stands 
prohibited. 
(d) In the absence of total prohibition in some States with scheduled Areas, 
Committee of Secretaries and State Cabinet Sub committees should be constituted and 
decision taken thereafter. 
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(e) Conference of all Chief Ministers, Ministers holding the Ministry concerned and 
Prime minister, and central Ministers concerned should take a policy decision for a 
consistent scheme throughout the country in respect of tribal lands, need they be subjects 
of development.262 
 
The above example shows that certain actions that may be taken by the state or provincial 
governments to attract investors in a decentralised administrative system can sometimes violate 
the constitutional and statutory protections guaranteed by the central government to its people.  
 
c. The Confusion caused by Regional Autonomy Law (1999) of Indonesia 
 
The Regional Autonomy Law (RAL) was promulgated to pattern in the political, 
economic and social paradigm shift in Indonesia, particularly since the onset of the Asian 
financial crisis. The RAL seeks to decentralize and democratize the governance structure in the 
context of FDI; the following features of the RAL are noteworthy: 
i. The Central government is fully responsible for conduct of matters relating to foreign 
affairs, defence and security, administration of justice, religion and further, shall 
coordinate the policies on national planning and macro national development control, 
financial balance fund, state administration and state economic institutional systems, 
human resources development, natural resources utilization, strategic high technology, 
conservation and national standardization;263 
                                                 
262 Emphasis added. 
263 Article 7 of the RAL. 
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ii. Regencies and municipalities shall be responsible for the administration of the public 
works, health, education, culture, agriculture, communication, industry and trade, capital 
investment, environment, land affairs, and cooperative/manpower affairs;264 
iii. The provinces are responsible for economic activities that cross the borders of regencies 
and municipalities, and shall also assume responsibilities for all activities that cannot be 
undertaken by the respective regencies and municipalities;265 
iv. The central government shall grant principal business permits for the petroleum sector 
(oil and gas), electricity exploration, and investment in strategic high technology;266 
v. The central government may cancel regional regulations or decisions of a regional head 
that contravene public interests or higher regulations and/or other regulations.267 
 
Although RAL was passed with best intention and with the aim of facilitating good 
governance and sharing of responsibility of political as well as fiscal power with the regional 
governments, the failure to specifically and precisely separate the functions of the centre and the 
regions leads to confusion, especially concerning FDI. 
 
 For example, confusion and uncertainties prevail over investing in natural resources. 
Effectively, Article 10 of the RAL cedes the management of natural resources to the regions, but 
Government Regulation 25 No. of 2000 which was subsequently passed seems to do just the 
reverse. Article 2, paragraph 3(3) of this regulation enumerates that ‘principal business permits’ 
for oil, gas, and electricity shall be granted by the central government. 
 
                                                 
264 Article 11 of the RAL. 
265 Article 9 of the RAL. 
266 Article 2, paragraph 3 of the Govt. Reg. No.25 of 2000 
267 Article 114 of the Govt. Reg. No. 25 of 2000. 
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Further, under Article 8 of the Government Regulation No. 25 of 2000, “licensing and 
cooperation agreements of the Government with third parties, based on the Government’s 
authority prior to the determination of this Government regulation are declared valid up to 
completion of the licensing agreements”. However, as the RAL does not specifically restrict the 
rights of the regions in connection with the status of investment licenses and concessions granted 
by the central government prior to the RAL coming into force, there is confusion as to whether 
the regencies and municipalities could unilaterally annul or repudiate any of the existing 
investment licenses and concessions. Understandably, this is a paramount concern for foreign 
investors.  
 
Thus, the RAL and Government Regulation No. 25 of 2000 are causing a legal quagmire. 
On the one hand, the RAL seems rather comprehensive and generous in empowering the regions 
to take charge of various economic activities. On the other hand, Government Regulation No. 25 
of 2000 seems to divert the said powers back to the central and provincial government. 
 
The uncertainty that developed among investors after the introduction of the 'do-it-
yourself' (DIY) taxation by a provincial government in Indonesia following the aforementioned 
RAL and the Fiscal Balance Law (1999)268 is another classic example of a situation where 
decentralisation can hinder modern day development projects with the participation of foreign 
investors. 
 
                                                 
268  After over 30 years under a highly centralized national government, Indonesia decided to implement a policy of decentralization that became effective on 
January 1st 2001. The new policy of decentralization is outlined in Law No. 22, 1999 concerning “Local Government”, and Law No. 25, 1999 concerning “The 
Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and the Regions”. Law No. 22, 1999 transfers functions, personnel and assets from the central government to 
the provincial, as well as the district and the municipal governments. Law No. 22, 1999 on “Local Government” has devolved central government powers and 
responsibilities to local governments in all government administrative sectors except for security and defense, foreign policy, monetary and fiscal matters, 
justice, and religious affairs. This law is quite unusual since almost all powers and responsibilities are ceded to local governments without conditions and 
limitations. Consequently, local governments have to reform their internal structures to accommodate the huge increase in responsibility that has been passed on 
from the central government. 
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The provincial and district level DIY revenue-raising started in 1999, when regional 
governments began to claim their share of past revenue payments never transferred from 
Jakarta.269 In November 1999, members of the South Sulawesi Provincial Assembly (DPRD) 
demanded that the central government pay Rp. 6 billion (then nearly US$ 900,000) in outstanding 
royalties from the PT Inco Nickel Mine.270  
 
The central government was accused by newly assertive local governments of delaying 
payments and helping itself to more than its share of royalties, leaving the producing areas poor 
and underdeveloped. Local authorities tired of waiting for the central government to pay started 
imposing new taxes on companies operating in their areas in order to prove their areas were 
economically viable.271  
 
This practice became so widespread that in June 2000, the Regional Autonomy Minister, 
Ryaas Rasyid, was moved to complain about the impact on Indonesia's investment climate. He 
reported that Singapore had added several provinces and districts in Indonesia to its negative 
investment list and that at least 13 foreign oil companies had stopped operating in Indonesia due 
to the levies demanded by local officials.272 
 
4.2.5. Measures for Mitigating Risks due to Decentralisation  
 
It goes without saying that deregulation by the central governments and efforts initiated 
at attracting private sector investment are important for developing the political and economic 
stability of countries. However, one should not forget that once decentralisation is done, the local 
                                                 
269 Down to Earth, Foreign Investment and Regional Autonomy, Vol. No. 46 (August 2000). 
270 Ibid. 
271 Ibid. 
272 Jakarta Post, 20 June 2000. 
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or provincial governments are responsible for the majority of the utility services that may require 
foreign investment. If the local governments are to meet this challenge, then following key 
measures could be suggested as those that may have to be taken to ensure that they are competent 
to take over the dual role of utility provider and regulator: 
i. Preparing future visions of the infrastructure sector based on an understanding that 
foreign and private sector investors would play a role; 
ii. Meeting the needs of the foreign and private sector investors and developing relationships 
between investors and local governments by the central governments actively 
participating in development initiatives taken by local governments. This could be done 
by the central governments playing the role of a facilitator; 
iii. Harmonising the local laws with those of the central government and ensuring that the 
room for conflict is minimised; 
iv. Improving the credit rating of the local government to the extent that necessary financial 
securities could be given to the investors on request; 
v. Assistance from the central government concerning the recruitment of qualified 
personnel;  
vi. Establishment of an effective policy and a plan of action for attracting foreign and private 
sector investors;  
vii. Establishment of a mechanism for information exchange with foreign and private sector 
investors; and 
viii. The development of support facilities which complement infrastructure development 
activities in local jurisdictions in order to facilitate and encourage investors to deal with 
local governments. 
 
 Usually, in order to avoid or minimize the risks attached to large-scale long-term 
infrastructure development projects, investors need assurance from the host governments about 
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economic stability of the country, in addition to various other concessions and pay-back 
guarantees. The local governments may not be capable of giving such assurance or security to 
investors. As a result, the investors may not be keen to see the political power in a country where 
they have already invested going through a process of decentralisation. 
 
In the circumstances, in order to reduce risks and remove obstacles for infrastructure 
development in a decentralised political culture, central governments will have to take the 
initiative to ensure that the regulatory framework will specify the functions of the central and 
local authorities clearly and precisely. In countries where the power to grant concessions, 
licences, or even the power to enter into management contracts over national assets vests with the 
local governments, contract credibility and flexibility will have to be improved. This may be done 
through the enactment of new legislation or amendment of existing legislation that will establish 
the procedures and rules to be followed to ensure that there will be no overlap and conflicting 
interests.  
 
The central governments will also need to address the issue of investor concerns with 
regard to the adequacy of local government guarantees for the investment projects. If the central 
governments decide to provide adequate guarantees to the investors by themselves, then issues 
such as, to what extent the central government should exercise control over a development project 
within the jurisdiction of a local authority will need to be addressed. 
 
 Decentralisation may be a solution to growing political demand for political autonomy 
and devolution in some developing countries. However, due to reasons discussed above, it may 
not be the best solution for much needed economic development. The World Bank in its report in 
2000 titled, “Quality of Growth” emphasizes the importance of public governance as the keystone 
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of a country’s development.273 In other words, good governance appears to be a key condition for 
attracting FDI. For instance, Lehmann argues that a country like India could increase its share of 
US affiliates’ physical investment by 50% if it were to eliminate all political uncertainty.274 
 
Decentralisation of political power can be an important vehicle in modernizing the public 
sector in developing countries and in ensuring that the riches of the state and the basic utility 
services provided to the people reaches the majority of the people without being limited to those 
who live in big cities. However, in order for decentralization to be effective, the risks of excessive 
fragmentation of service supply and of overspending and corruption should be minimized.  
 
Developing countries which are decentralizing their political power or those who intend 
to do so in future should ensure that decentralization initiatives would not hinder the integrity of 
the national fiscal consolidation strategy, and weaken the quality and cost-efficiency of public 
services. Although some sections of the people may at a given time support the notion of political 
decentralization, if in a decentralized administrative structure, the public services are going to be 
more costly and less efficient than when they were provided under the central administration, 
they may be stiff opposition to the transfer of utility service provision duties to local authorities 
from the central government. To avoid these outcomes, developing countries should try to take 
steps to amalgamate small municipalities for the provision of public services as this would enable 
them to avoid over fragmentation public service supply. The developing countries could also 
consider joint provision of services, i.e. the central administration and the local administration 
sharing the duty of providing public services to the people within the jurisdiction of a 
decentralized administrative area. However, this may require additional fiscal rules to ensure 
better coherence between central and sub-central fiscal policies.  
                                                 
273 World Bank, The Quality of Growth (Oxford University Press, New York (2000)). 






Developing countries should also realize that intensified efforts at transfer to regional 
partners (designation of counterpart staff, training in project management) will enable them to 
overcome risks of decentralization. Thus, gradual decentralization instead of expedited 
decentralization would enable reliable project management by the local governments in a 
decentralized administrative structure. 
 
The main issue that stems from the move towards political decentralisation that concerns 
FDI for infrastructure development is the lack of interest on the part of the private sector and 
foreign investors to work with regional or local governments. In the premises, in instances where 
decentralisation is put into motion in a country, simultaneous steps will have to be taken to ensure 
that present and future investors of economic development activities of that country will not be 
discouraged with the new political development. Thus, as noted above, the main initiative to be 
taken will be to build confidence among investors that the local or regional governments are 
capable of stepping into the role of concession granter and regulator of investment projects. 
 
4.3. The Risk of Political Instability 
 
Political instability is another key risk that can undermine the advancement of project 
financing and private sector led development initiatives in developing countries. Not only will it 
discourage prospective foreign investors from coming into a country, sometimes, it may also 
influence the investors to abandon projects that have already been undertaken. Abandonment of 
ongoing projects can be either voluntary or forced. It may be voluntary, if due to fear of 
instability in the country or the region the investors pull out of a country. The abandonment may 
be forced, if it is the result of direct action taken by the perpetrators of political instability. 
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Whatever may be the cause, such abandonment is likely to put breaks on the progress of a 
country’s economy.  
 
According to couple of Interviews and surveys that have been conducted with executives 
of MNCs in the 1960’s and in the 1970’s, political instability is regarded as one of the most 
important factors in foreign investment decision making. In particular, the executives who have 
been interviewed have cited the stability of the host government and the attitude of the host 
government towards foreign investment as the most important considerations in the investment 
decision making.275  
 
Although political instability is not a new risk, as far as FDI mechanisms such as project 
financing are concerned, it has assumed a new outlook. In traditional FDI, international financing 
agencies which funded development projects in developing countries were some times willing to 
write-off investments or make various concessions to provide comfort to developing countries 
when projects became failures. However, in project financing, the capital investments are not 
made by international financing agencies. They are made by project developers who are usually 
profit oriented MNCs. They will not be willing to take the risk of loosing their investments or 
sacrificing their targeted profits. In the circumstances, they will always look at the possibilities of 
passing any risk based on political instability to the host country.  
 
As noted in Chapter Two, international financing agencies have changed their role in 
connection with infrastructure development in most developing countries. From being capital 
providers to investment projects, they have become lenders who provide money for investment 
projects developed and managed with private sector participation. Thus, money lent by them will 
                                                 
275 Aharoni, Y., The Foreign Investment Decision Process, (Boston, Harvard University Press 1966); Schollhammer, H., Locational Strategies of Multinational  
Firms ( Los Angeles,  Pepperdine University, 1974).  
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be directly tied to projects due to the “non-recourse” or “limited recourse” nature of project 
financing as was discussed in detail in Chapter Three. In the circumstances, even international 
financing agencies acting as lenders would be reluctant to lend money to investment projects in 
countries in which there is political instability, unless, at the minimum, they can ensure that the 
host country is contractually tied to bear any project risk emanating from political instability. 
 
4.3.1. Risks due to Internal Political Instability 
 
A favourable investment climate is based on many factors that make investing in a 
country more profitable and less risky than in another country. Political stability is one of the 
most important of these factors. Investors and lenders in project financing would be discouraged 
by the threat of political upheaval, and by the prospect of a new regime that might change its 
policy towards investors, for example, by imposing punitive taxes or by expropriating capital 
assets. Falling into the vicious circle of political instability can seriously impede efforts to boost 
economic development and reduce poverty. It is a cyclical cycle, in which poor areas are often in 
turmoil, making them less appealing to investment, which in turns makes them even poorer and 
even more apt for turmoil.  Capital very quickly leaves nations thought to be unstable.  The effect 
of even a hint of instability is usually not ignored by investors.276  
 
Unlike in the old days when countries could rely on international funding agencies to 
finance both social as well as physical infrastructure development needs, in the current 
environment it is the private sector that has taken the lead in physical infrastructure development 
due to the growing use of project financing. In this environment, internal political instability 
                                                 
276 For a good example as to how shaky foreign investment can be, one need only look at the United States. In 1995, after House Speaker Newt Gingrich threatened 
to default on the United States’ debt (in a political effort to force President Clinton to balance the budget on republican terms), in the course of a single day, the 
interest rate on US government bonds rose from 6.46 to 6.55%, while the exchange rate fell from 102.7 to 99.0 yen.  If the United States, a stable economy and 
political unit is that susceptible to capital flight, the risk is obviously greater for the developing nations.  
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could be one major factor that would result in some developing countries not benefiting from 
private sector led development initiatives.  
 
The countries that have suffered most from lack of investment due to political instability 
are in Africa and in Asia. As the following examples show, Somalia and Sierra Leone are two 
African countries that have not been able to attract any significant foreign investments during the 
last two decades due to internal political instability. Indonesia and Sri Lanka are two good Asian 
examples of countries that have lost many opportunities of attracting foreign investment due to 




During the Siyaad Barre regime from 1969-1991, Somalia had a fairly functioning state 
apparatus. It deteriorated over time, however, as Siyaad used his power to repress opponents and 
enrich his own clan, the Darood.277 After frequent challenges from other clans, riots broke out in 
1989-1991, which led to a collapse of the State and fleeing of Siyaad. The army dissolved into 
competing groups loyal to deferent clan-tribal leaders. Being armed during the cold war, Somalia 
still had lots of weapons that the deferent clans could use to fight each other. Both political 
instability and social waste increased after 1991.278 Due to the volatile state of the economy and 
long history of political instability there have not been any significant investment projects in 
Somalia.  
                                                 
277 See generally Braathen E, M. Bøås, and G. Sæther (ed), Ethnicity Kills? The Politics of War, Peace and Ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa (London: Macmillan, 
2000). 
278 See generally, Collier, P., and Hoeer, A., Greed and Grievance in Civil War, Policy Research Working Paper 2355. (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2000).  
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b. Sierra Leone 
 
In Sierra Leone, multiparty democracy was disrupted by a rebellion lead by the 
Revolutionary United Front of Valentine Strasser, a movement of exiles. Strasser’s coup in 1992 
was met by revolts of the Revolutionary United Front and civil war broke out two years later. 
Although with the participation of the United Nations, the situation has been now defused, the 
country is yet to attract any significant investments as scars of political instability can still be 
seen.279 
 
The situation in Rwanda and Burundi in the last forty years is also tragic. Due to internal 
power struggles and communal violence, these two countries have also failed to attract any 
foreign investment during the last decade.280 
 
c. Indonesia  
 
In Indonesia, the cities of Jakarta and Medan were struck by a number of bombings in 
1998 and 1999. The Jakarta Stock Exchange, diplomatic facilities and Indonesian government 
buildings were targeted. A massive bombing campaign struck churches throughout Indonesia on 
Christmas Eve in 1999, leaving 16 dead and over one hundred injured. Further, in the midst of all 
this, East Timor voted for independence from Indonesia in an August 30, 1999 referendum and 
was subsequently successful in establishing an independent nation in May 2002, under the 
patronage of the United Nations’ Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). 
Although stability returned to the territory following the arrival of international forces, crime and 
                                                 
279 Id. 
280 See generally, Mehlum, H. and Moene, K.,  ‘Contested Power and Political Instability’, Paper presented at the Berkeley University (October 2000), Online: 
http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/macarthur/inequality/papers/MoeneContested.pdf 
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lawlessness remain a major problem.281 As a result, there was a drop in the foreign investment 
during the period 1999- 2003 when compared to the period in the 1980’s when the economy in 
Indonesia was booming along with the other “tiger economies”.282 However, signs of 
improvement have been observed in recent times, starting around 2003.283 
 
d. Sri Lanka  
 
In Sri Lanka more than 60,000 people have been killed in the fighting, while 
approximately another 800,000 people, mostly members of the ethnic Tamil community have 
been displaced during the last two decades due to the conflict between the Government of Sri 
Lanka controlled by the majority Singhalese community and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam 
(LTTE), a group representing the ethnic Tamils and fighting for a separate nation within the 
boundaries of the present day Sri Lanka.  
 
The war effort has drained the government treasury and raised inflation to nearly 20 per 
cent by 2001.284 The strife has discouraged foreign investment, and the FDI plunged to USD 80m 
in the year 2001 from a record USD 231m in 2000, after a major LTTE attack on the country's 
only international airport.285  The Government and the LTTE signed a ceasefire agreement in 
February 2002, and are currently negotiating a peaceful settlement brokered by the Norwegian 
Government since June 2003. Since the ceasefire agreement in February 2002, things have 
improved and the inflation rate fell under 9% in 2003.  The FDI figures also have improved since 
the ceasefire agreement. In 2004, Sri Lanka recorded USD 234 million in FDI.286 
                                                 
281 The American Indonesian Chamber of Commerce, ‘Investment Climate Statement’ (2001), Online: http://www.aiccusa.org. 
282 The East Asian countries of Malaysia, The Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore are generally identified as the “Tiger Economies”. 
283 Source: Indonesia’s Investment Coordinating Board, Online: http://www.bkpm.go.id/en/ 
284 Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report  2002 (Colombo: Central Bank, 2002) 
285 Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka (various publications).  
286 Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report, 2005. 
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The above examples show how as a result of civil strife, civil wars and political unrest, 
the mentioned countries failed to attract sufficient foreign investment in the recent past. In 
addition to the causes mentioned, internal political instability may also be caused due to various 
disagreements that may exist between different political parties in a country, although such 
disagreements may not lead to armed conflicts. For example, disagreements between a ruling 
political party and opposition parties may lead to situations where the opposition parties may 
openly accuse the ruling party of being corrupt and pledge to overturn, among other things, 
foreign investment projects that have been already negotiated. Whether or not such corrupt 
practices have taken place, there is no doubt that allegations and counter allegations about such 
practices would send unfavourable signals to investors. No investor would like to invest in an 
environment in which a country’s leading opposition political parties openly pledge to overturn 
investment projects started by their political opponents. A good example of this situation 
concerns a project that has been a hot topic in Sri Lanka lately, namely the sale of controlling 
share of the national air career, i.e. Air Lanka, to Emirates, which was a competing airline in the 
region.287  
 
4.3.2. Risks due to External Political Instability  
 
Many factors could contribute towards external political instability. For example, 
traditional rivalry between two or more neighbouring countries or incompatible and competing 
trade, economic or military policies among countries could contribute to strained relations among 
                                                 
287 Emirates in 1998 bought 40 percent of Sri Lankan Airlines for US $ 70 million with an initial payment of US $ 45 million. It enjoyed a concession to pay the 
balance in 30 months. The United National Party, which was the main opposition in the Parliament at the time, made allegations that the contract between 
Emirates and Sri Lankan Air is detrimental to the interests on Sri Lanka and that the agreement has been reached through the use of corrupt practices. The UNP 
also promised that when they come to power, the Government would review the agreement with Emirates to ascertain whether they enjoy a monopoly in the 
region and whether the contract has been the result of any corrupt practices. The UNP came into power in 2001, and as promised, appointed a special 
commission to review the contract documents. However, before the expiry of their full term of office, a fresh election called by the President, H.E. Mrs. 
Chandrika Kumaranatunga was held in 2004 and the results sent the UNP back to the opposition folds. 
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them and making the external political environment of the countries having such strained 
relations unstable.   
 
As pointed out in Chapter two, FDI is no longer the case of a single foreign investor 
investing in a country where the country’s political instability might pose a threat to the investor. 
For example, project financing involves several actors and at times infrastructure projects 
developed with project financing techniques are not restricted to a single jurisdiction.288 As a 
result, cross border movement of services, goods, labour and assets is not uncommon in modern 
day infrastructure development projects. Further, with the current trends of globalisation of 
international trade and investment and the creation of common markets, the future of project 
financing lies not in the investment of a single country but in cross-border or regional investment 
projects. Although cross-border or regional infrastructure projects could be more complex due to 
cultural and political differences between countries, most developing countries would benefit 
from such projects. For example, projects such as building of highway networks connecting 
countries; building channels to facilitate sea and water based transport infrastructure; and 
development of energy based infrastructure projects could contribute towards national as well as 
regional development. In the circumstances, external political instability could adversely affect 
infrastructure development projects.  
 
However, such projects are likely to raise several interesting issues as, the concessions to 
develop the projects will have to be given by two or more countries, and the investors and lenders 
                                                 
288 The proposed tunnel project connecting the Argentine San Juan province and Chile's Region IV is a good example as both Argentina and Chile will actively 
participate in the development of the project. Currently the two countries are joined by the Agua Negra border pass, which is located 4,000 meters up in the 
Andes mountain range. Unfortunately Agua Negra is not able to stay open year-round, as the tunnel will, due to dangerous conditions during wintertime. The 
new tunnel would span 14 kilometers and would ensure easy transportation between Argentina and Chile in their central-north regions. At a projected cost of 
$250 million, the tunnel will most likely be financed via concession and will also include a dual-purpose access tunnel for use in maintenance and as an 
emergency exit. The tunnel's construction is expected to begin before the end of 2005. (Source: Latin Trade - http://www.latintrade.com) 
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will have to deal with the issue of such project being subjected to two or more jurisdictions289 and 
therefore the need to deal with regulators in more than one country over the same project. In the 
circumstances, political instability in neighbouring countries or in the region could adversely 
affect cross-border or regional investment projects.  
 
The following case studies show the adverse impact external political instability has on 
infrastructure development projects and the complexity of issues that needs consideration. 
 
a. Gabcicovo-Nagymaros Case 
 
The Gabcicovo-Nagymaros project relating to a water reservoir between Hungary and 
present day Slovakia dates back to 1963. It was at this time the idea of a joint Hungarian- 
Czechoslovak project of the Gabcicovo-Nagymaros barrage system was first considered by both 
Governments.290 However, no steps to implement the project were taken until 1977. 
 
 The case arose out of the signature, on 16 September 1977, by the Hungarian People's 
Republic and the Czechoslovak People's Republic (The names of the two contracting States have 
varied over the years and hence hereinafter they will be referred to as Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia), of a treaty "concerning the construction and operation of the Gabcicovo-
Nagymaros System of Locks" (the "1977 Treaty").291  
 
                                                 
289  In addition to the national jurisdictions of the two countries, the project may also end up being subject to local and provincial laws of the Southern State of 
Tamil Nadu in India and the Northern Province of Sri Lanka.  
290 Slovakia was a part of Czechoslovakia at this time. After the vent popularly known today as the “Velvet Divorce” in 1993, Slovakia and Czechoslovakia went 
separate ways. 
291 Case concerning the Gabcicovo-Nagymaros Project, Decided by the ICJ on 25 September 1997 (General List No. 92) – Full text of the judgment is available 
online: http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ihs/ihsjudgement/ihs_ijudgment_970925.html) 
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The 1977 Treaty provided for the construction and operation of a System of Locks by the 
parties as a "joint investment". According to its Preamble, the barrage system was designed to 
attain "the broad utilization of the natural resources of the Bratislava-Budapest section of the 
Danube River292 for the development of water resources, energy, transport, agriculture and other 
sectors of the national economy of the Contracting Parties". The joint investment was thus, 
essentially aimed at the production of hydroelectricity, the improvement of navigation on the 
relevant section of the Danube and the protection of the areas along the banks against flooding. 
At the same time, by the terms of the Treaty, the contracting parties undertook to ensure that the 
quality of water in the Danube was not impaired as a result of the Project and that, compliance 
with the obligations for the protection of nature arising in connection with the construction and 
operation of the System of Locks would be observed.  
 
Following the conclusion of the 1977 Treaty, work on the Project started in 1978. 
However, since the commencement of work, the economic, political and environmental positions 
within both countries changed dramatically. In particular, the Project became a source of 
increasing apprehension for Hungary. Doubts as to the economic viability and the environmental 
impact of the project surfaced leading to public criticism and political opposition. Consequently, 
in the October of 1989, Hungary, responding to domestic pressure, abandoned its works at 
Nagymaros.  
 
A series of negotiations between Hungary and Czechoslovakia ensued. Czechoslovakia, 
frustrated by the lack of progress in the negotiations, decided to proceed and develop its own 
solution to the problem. This initiative which later became known as 'Variant C' (the ‘provisional 
                                                 
292 The Danube is the second longest river in Europe, flowing along or across the borders of nine countries in its 2,860-kilometre course from the Black Forest 
eastwards to the Black Sea. For 142 kilometres, it forms the boundary between Slovakia and Hungary. The sector with which this case is concerned is a stretch 
of approximately 200 kilometres, between Bratislava in Slovakia and Budapest in Hungary.  
 
 171
solution'), entailed the unilateral diversion of the waters of the Danube by Czechoslovakia in 
order to put the Gabcicovo dam into operation. This simply exacerbated the situation and led to 
Hungary terminating the 1977 Treaty on May 15th 1992. By October, Czechoslovakia had 
completed the closure of the Danube. 
 
Irreconcilable differences pushed the parties firstly towards trilateral negotiations with 
the EC (now “EU”) in 1992 and then, by Special Agreement, to a judicial determination at the 
ICJ. The Court was asked to decide inter alia whether:  
1. Hungary was entitled to unilaterally suspend and later abandon the works on the 
Nagymaros and Gabcikovo parts of the project to which it was attributed responsibility 
under the terms of the 1977 Treaty; and 
2. The Czech and Slovak Republics were entitled to proceed with the 'provisional 
solution' in November 1991 and to put this system into operation in October 1992. 
 
The most crucial argument raised by Hungary in defence of its right to suspend and 
terminate the 1977 Treaty was that, Czechoslovakia’s operation of Variant C had given rise to a 
permanent state of ecological necessity. Hungary claimed, inter alia, that Variant C would 
seriously damage the water quality of the Danube, would result in the extinction of fluvial fauna 
and flora in the area causing considerable danger to the inhabiting wildlife. From these 
‘predictions', formulated from a variety of scientific studies, Hungary claimed that a ‘state of 
necessity' existed in 1989 thus justifying its suspension and subsequent termination of the 1977 
Treaty. 
 
The ICJ in its discussion, accepted that there did indeed exist a defence of ‘state of 
necessity' which, in the correct circumstances, would preclude the responsibility of wrongful acts. 
In support of this view, the Court referred to the work of the International Law Commission 
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(ILC), which had in its Draft Articles on the International Responsibility of States, upheld the 
notion of ‘state of necessity' as a ground for precluding responsibility.  
 
However, it should be noted that under these Draft Articles, a ‘state of necessity' may 
only be invoked if the criteria in Article 33 (Article 25 of the draft articles on Responsibility of 
States for internationally wrongful acts adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-
third session (2001)) are satisfied. This Article provides that: 
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the 
wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obligation of 
that State unless the act: 
(a) Is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a 
grave and imminent peril; and 
(b) Does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States 
towards which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a 
whole. 
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding 
wrongfulness if: 
(a) The international obligation in question excludes the possibility of 
invoking necessity; or 
(b) The State has contributed to the situation of necessity. 
 
In considering whether Hungary had satisfied these conditions, the ICJ acknowledged 
Hungary's concerns in connection with the environment. The Court accepted that environmental 
concerns may constitute an ‘essential interest'. However, while accepting that a ‘state of necessity' 
defence did exist within the confines of customary international law and that Hungary's concerns 
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for the environment constituted an ‘essential interest', the ICJ was not persuaded that the danger 
was certain and imminent. In highlighting the distinction between ‘perceived' peril as opposed to 
actual and imminent peril, the Court indicated the crucial role that uncertainty has to play within 
this specific area of international environmental law. The Court observed that, clearly possible 
peril will not suffice; it must be immediate. It was noted that in a futile attempt to establish 
immediacy, Hungary inadvertently overlooked the alternative means that were available to 
prevent the environmental damage. 
 
In finding that Czechoslovakia had no right to put into operation Variant C and that, 
Hungary did not have the right to suspend and subsequently terminate the 1977 Treaty; the ICJ 
did not proclaim a victor in the Gabcikovo case. Instead, it ruled that the parties should begin 
afresh a new process of negotiations to determine how best to implement the joint plan and 
achieve the original objectives.  
 
In ruling that Hungary and Czechoslovakia were under a legal obligation to co-operate, 
the Court stated that such negotiations should determine in what way the multiple objectives of 
the 1977 Treaty could be best realized. Thus, the Court simply set and defined the fundamental 
legal parameters that the negotiations should take place within. 
 
The above example is useful to understand the plight of the project participants if almost 
a decade after committing to invest in a transnational project and, after a series of stoppages due 
to conflicts between the two host nations, if the two nations decide to renegotiate the project.  
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b. The Caspian Sea Region 
 
The Caspian Sea region, including the Sea and the States surrounding it is important to 
world energy markets because of its potential to become a major oil and natural gas exporter. The 
region is thought to hold the world's third largest oil and natural gas reserves behind the Middle 
East and Russia. However, several factors threaten to complicate the region's potential. These 
include disagreement over new export routes, border disputes between the littoral States, and the 
lack of adequate export infrastructure.293 
 
Many of the proposed export routes pass through areas where conflicts remain 
unresolved. Although new oil and natural gas export pipelines offer the hope of longer-term 
prosperity, the region's numerous flashpoints and ongoing instability have caused energy 
companies and potential investors to think twice before investing in the construction of proposed 
pipelines.294  
 
Most of these conflicts are in the Transcaucasus part of the Caspian region, where, 
conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh between Georgia and the Chechen Republic of Southern Russia 
have hindered the development of export routes westward from the Caspian Sea, affecting most 
countries in the region. On the east side of the Caspian, the unstable situation in Afghanistan 
following decades of war, fundamentalist governance, and present volatile political situation after 
the fall of the Taliban, has stifled the development of export routes to the southeast. Furthermore, 
the threat of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia, especially in Uzbekistan, has stalled any 
new export pipelines involving that country.295 The threat of war between Pakistan and India 
serves as a further deterrent to Caspian export pipelines running southeast, either via Iran or 
                                                 




Afghanistan. In addition the questions surrounding the legal status of the Caspian Sea following 
the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 has hindered development of the Sea's mineral resources.296  
 
c. Western Balkan States 
 
While there has been some improvement during the last couple of years in the amount of 
foreign capital flowing into the Western Balkans, political instability in the former constituent 
republics and the provinces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), continues to 
hinder urgently needed FDI.297  
 
In the year 2000, it was estimated that only around US$ 1.2 billion, was invested in the 
entire region. Of that sum, the US$ 898 million invested in Croatia was three times larger than the 
combined investments made in Serbia and Montenegro, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(Macedonia), and Bosnia-Herzegovina together.298 Moreover, in these cases investments were 
concentrated on several large projects, rather than a range of small investments that would 
indicate wider confidence. For example, Macedonia's biggest investment came from the sale of 
51 per cent of Macedonian Telecom to MATAV, the Hungarian telecommunication company. 
Similarly, a large percentage of Serb Telecom had been sold to an Italian company and the Greek 
state telecommunications firm, OTE.299 
 
There are several of problems and concerns over promoting FDI in the Western Balkans. 
Any hope of preventing a resurgence of fresh fighting between the Serbs, Croats and Muslims of 
                                                 
296 The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to the independence of three new countries bordering the Caspian, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. These 
three countries and Iran and Russia have been so far unable to agree on a legal framework governing the use and development of the Sea's oil and natural gas 
reserves, Online: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/casplaw.html.  
297 Civilitas Research, Regional Business Integration in the Western Balkans (May 2002). Civilitas Research is a website providing precisely tailored information, 




Bosnia requires the strong and continuing presence of an international peacekeeping force. At the 
same time the 'marriage of convenience' between Serbia and Montenegro continues with no clear 
answers as to what will happen at the end of the mandated three-year period of partnership that 
will come to an end in late 2005.300 Similarly, there are uncertainties about the future status of 
Kosovo. Similar concerns also exist with regard to Vojvodina, albeit to a far lesser degree. 
Although the NATO peacekeeping mission in FYR Macedonia has explicitly denied rumours of 
another offensive by the National Liberation Army (NLA), the separatist Albanian movement, it 
is evident that the Slav-Macedonians and Albanians of the country still deeply distrust each 
other.301 
 
Given this range of issues, it is hardly any surprise that many foreign investors, although 
encouraged by action taken by countries in the region to open their economies and invite foreign 
investment, remain cautious about committing to invest in the region. However, a positive factor 
to be observed in this region is that, commercial ties are being supplemented by political ties and 
economic integration initiatives. After a decade of deadly conflict and destruction following the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, its constituent parts are slowly starting to restore the broken business 
bonds and lost markets.  
 
Furthermore, according to the Memorandum of Understanding on Trade Liberalisation 
and Facilitation signed under the auspices of the Stability Pact by the end of year 2002, a network 
of twenty-one bilateral Free Trade Agreements have been negotiated among the countries of the 
Western Balkans and the rest of South East Europe. This network targets the creation of an 
                                                 
300 An EU brokered agreement (“Belgrade Agreement”) was signed between Serbia and Montenegro in March 2002 establishing new political relations between the 
two former Yugoslav Republics. The agreement provides for two semi-independent states. Upon the finalization of a constitutional charter, the two states are to 
share common defenses and foreign policies, but have separate economies, currencies and customs practices. The agreement is to stay effective for three years, 
at which point either party is entitled to hold a referendum on independence. See, Institute of European Affairs, “Balkan Update” (2002), Issue No. 3, 
November 2002, 
301 Source: Civilitasresearch.com. See supra  note  297. 
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economic area of 55 million consumers.302 Several of these agreements have been implemented 
since the beginning of 2003.303 Hopefully, this will attract more FDI to the region. However, the 
success of these new trading arrangements will depend upon whether the governments of the 
countries involved will actually put the required agreements into force. 
 
d. Sethusamudram Shipping Channel Project 
 
This ambitious shipping canal project has been on the drawing board for over fourteen 
decades and is billed as India’s Suez. The idea for a canal at India’s southern tip originated during 
the 1860’s when the country was under the British colonial rule. During the last fourteen decades, 
14 committees, nine of which were set up by the British, have examined and shelved the project 
for various reasons.304 Finally, it has started showing signs of becoming a reality since year 2004, 
as the Governments of India and Sri Lanka have started holding a series of negotiations on the 
project.  
 
According to the proponents of the project, if the project becomes a reality, it is expected 
to cost approximately US$ 550 million and will cut through a chain of islands between India and 
Sri Lanka, reducing the transit time between India’s east and west coasts and cutting shipping 
costs as well as the government’s fuel-import bill.305 The canal is expected to be 167 km long and 
300 meters wide and would cut the distance between India’s east and west coasts by 424 nautical 
miles, saving ships a 30 hour southern detour. If the negotiations between the two countries are 
successful, and the project becomes a reality, it is expected to be functional in 2008.306  
                                                 
302  Bogoevski, J., Chairman, Special Co-coordinator of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe Nations, Presentation made before the International Forum on 
Trade Facilitation (Geneva, May 2002). 
303  Wijkman, P. M., A Free Trade Area in South Eastern Europe? Prospects and Problems, Research Paper (Tirana: Albanian Centre for International Trade, 2003). 






Although the Sri Lankan Government appears to have given the initial consent to the 
project as it would not want to upset its more powerful neighbour, the project has run into 
opposition from some key politicians and environmentalists in Sri Lanka. The basis for the 
political opposition is the fear that ships travelling between India’s east and west coasts which 
have to circumnavigate Sri Lanka and other large vessels passing the region would bypass the 
Colombo  Port; i.e., Sri Lanka’s hub-port which brings in the highest foreign income to the 
country. The Sri Lankan Government has assured the opponents that if the project poses adverse 
effects to the country, it would take steps to safeguard the countries interests including, bringing 
legal action before the International Court of Justice.307 However, the opponents to the project in 
Sri Lanka argue that prevention is better than cure. The environmentalists oppose the project on 
the basis that the digging of the seabed will endanger over 400 species, including sea turtles, 
whales and corals. Further, some have expressed concern that the dredging of the seabed may 
affect the flow of currents, water temperature, marine life, and the livelihood of fishermen. 
 
Given this background, if the Government of India decides to move forward with the 
project and to raise the financing for the project by using project financing techniques, steps will 
have to be taken by the project participants to ensure that the external political instability would 
not cause any obstacles to the project.      
 
e. South Africa 
 
South Africa is a regional super power. However, political concerns in Zimbabwe, civil 
wars in neighbouring countries (for example, Angola, and Congo) have been threatening its 
investment prospects during the last two decades. South Africa’s plight that can be called a “bad 
                                                 
307 Id. 
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neighbourhood” syndrome is likely to cause problems even for the prospective future investment 
projects unless there is some stability in the region.308 
 
4.3.3. Measures for Mitigating Risks due to Political Instability  
  
Political instability in many developing countries add an element of hazard to any long 
term development project as stability can be ensured only so long as governments remain in 
power, captive markets or monopolies are left in place, and consumer remain satisfied with the 
project out-put and the price there of.309 Even events such as termination or material alteration of 
a permit or license for a project, imposition of new taxes, or currency exchange restriction could 
have serious implications for the success of an infrastructure project. Thus, developing countries 
need to take steps to ensure that investors and lenders have confidence in the political stability of 
the country and that their capital or debt investments will not be at any undue risk. 
 
The developing countries will have to satisfy the prospective investors and lenders that 
legislative measures will be taken to ensure that political changeovers will not affect investment 
projects. Steps will have to be taken to ensure transparency in the procurement process in 
infrastructure development projects, so that room for political opposition and criticism will be 
minimised. Having an investment law in place which cannot be amended without the due process 
of majority parliamentary approval would definitely give comfort to investors and lenders. 
Similarly, getting all political parties in the host country to be represented in some reasonable 
manner in the procurement process for investment projects would ensure that even if a ruling 
political party is ousted from power, a new government might find it difficult to undermine an 
investment project approved by the former regime, since their own representatives have been 
                                                 
308 African Business, “Jo’burg catches Zim flue”, June 2000. 
309 See Harder, supra note 107 at  p. 41. 
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involved in the procurement process. Unfortunately, none of the developing countries have so far 
taken such initiatives. 
 
Further, not only that the political instability in a country will matter, the key actors in 
project financing should be concerned about the political stability in the geographic region in 
which host countries are situated. Furthermore, they should also be concerned about the bilateral 
and multilateral relationships between countries as external political instability emanating from 
strained relations between countries could affect the development initiatives undertaken in 
developing countries with the use of project financing techniques. 
 
The most effective measure for minimising the risks due to external political instability 
would be the promotion of regional cooperation among countries. This would be an achievable 
task however, only when the countries are in good economic and political relationship with each 
other. For example, Promoting regional cooperation between India and Pakistan or between Syria 
and Lebanon for the benefit of infrastructure development in the respective regions would be a 
Herculean task given the current status of political conflict between these countries.  
 
The lack of realisation among the developing countries that infrastructure development in 
one country could be used to boost the development of the entire region is one of the main 
contributing factors towards lack of cooperation between developing countries. The fact that none 
of the regional integration movements started by the developing nations in South Asia and Africa 
have so far been successful compared to regional groups such as the EU, NAFTA and the 
ASEAN, supports this argument.310 Thus, the developing countries should be encouraged to take 
a regional as well as a global view concerning their development strategies. Further, they should 
                                                 
310  Gunawansa, Asanga, ‘Regional Integration in South Asia: Prospects and Challenges’ (1996), Research Thesis submitted in support of LL.M in International 
Economic Law, United Kingdom: University of Warwick. 
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be encouraged to recognize the importance of regional and global dimension in their economic 
development planning.  
 
4.4. Risks due to Succession of States and Creation of New States  
 
4.4.1. Nature of the Risk 
 
Generally speaking, the break-up of a state can be characterized as either a continuation 
or dissolution. In the case of a continuation, a sub-entity (some times more than one sub-entity) 
breaks away from the predecessor state and forms an independent state. When this happens, what 
remains of the predecessor state is referred to as a continuator state.311 It generally retains the 
rights and obligations of the predecessor state. In the case of dissolution, the predecessor state 
dissolves into a number of successor states with none of them being considered the continuator 
state.312    
 
Although the division of a unitary state into more than one independent political unit is 
not a new political concept, in recent times, there has been an increasing demand, especially in 
several developing countries in Asia, Africa and the former communist block for political 
autonomy and self-governance of certain regions. These demands are being made by various 
ethnic and/or political groups on grounds, including ethnic and religious discrimination. In fact, 
some of these demands have met with success and as a result, several new countries have joined 
the international community. The break-up of the former Soviet Union and the break-up of the 
                                                 
311 The establishment of East Timor is a good example of this situation where Indonesia remained the continuator state.   
312 The case of SFRY is a good example where it ceased to exist and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia emerged as successor states. 
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former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and, the resulting emergence of 
several newly independent countries in the early 1990s could be cited as an example.313 
 
With the emergence of new states, both the newly established regimes as well as the 
international community in general are confronted with the many problems of state succession as 
there is no customary international law that could be applied to different types of succession. 
Further, any existing international law in this area has not been codified successfully.314 In the 
absence of established international legal principle, the manner in which the international 
community actually behaves in matters of state succession varies according to the circumstances 
of each individual case.315 In other words, a new state can be created by the succession of an old 
state or the separation of an existing state into two or more distinct political and legal regimes. 
While the political relevance of the recognition of new states is beyond doubt, the rules of law 
that apply to this aspect of public international law remain uncertain. As a result, succession or 
separation of states could pose many complex problems in relation to FDI and in particular, in 
relation to infrastructure development projects in the former regimes. 
 
Due to the presence of several parties with diverse interests in modern day infrastructure 
development projects, developing countries as well as investors, lenders, and other key project 
participants need to consider critically, the effects of a cessation or division of a unitary state. For 
example, the effectiveness of the obligations and undertakings of a government over a project 
which subsequently falls within the jurisdiction of a newly created state should be considered if 
                                                 
313 like  for instance, in the case of SFRY, the emergence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia. 
314 Shihata, F. I. Ibrahim , ‘Matters of State Succession in the Practice of the World Bank’, Development and International Cooperation, Vol. XII, No. 23, December 
1996, p. 7. 
315 Mrak, M., Apportionment and Succession of External Debts: The case of the SFR Yugoslavia, (September 1998).  
  Online: www4.worldbank.org/legal/legen/legen_state.html 
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the presence of such risk is visible at the time the project negotiations are done and investment 
decisions are made.  
 
Some would argue that the risk of cessation of states is not entirely a new as the existing 
public international law covers this aspect. I would argue that the existing public international law 
on this issue is not fully tested and that it does not comprehensively cover the rights and liabilities 
of every party to an investment contract in the event of cessation of the political power in a host 
country. For example, although it is accepted that a successor state would automatically inherit 
the assets as well as obligations of the old state,316 the position is not very clear with regard to the 
status of new states created over part of a territory previously under the jurisdiction of a different 
state. Likewise, the position with regard to the obligations of a new state during the period 
between its creation and its acceptance to the international community is also not clear.  
 
4.4.2. Current International Legal Position on State Succession 
 
The integration of a new state into the international community does not take place 
automatically, but through co-optation; that is, by individual and collective recognition on the 
part of the already existing states.317 Recognition of a new state is an act that confers a status; as a 
result of recognition, the recognised entity acquires the legal status of a state under international 
law. In this sense, a new state is not born, but chosen as a subject of international law. By the 
procedure of recognition, the existing states exercise their prerogative to determine in advance 
whether the newcomer, in their judgment, is able and willing to carry out all its obligations as a 
                                                 
316 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debt. UN Doc. A/CONF. 114/14 (7. April 1983), Article 36. 
317 Hillgruber, C., “The Admission of New States to the International Community”, 9 European Journal of International Law No. 3 (1998), 
p. 
491 at 509. 
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subject of international law, whether it will be a reliable member of the international 
community.318  
 
On admission as a member of the United Nations, the new state then becomes part of the 
globally organised community of states by way of co-optation. After the decision has been taken 
to admit a state to the United Nations, its statehood cannot be called into question with the effect 
of contesting the validity of mutual rights and obligations arising from co-membership.319 
 
The constitutive and legally operative effect of the recognition of new states is clearly 
illustrated by state practice with regard to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Right from the beginning Bosnia-
Herzegovina did not constitute a functioning national body. Its recognised government only 
controlled a very small part of the national territory. However, international recognition of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992 conferred on it the status of a state under international law by 
way of a legal fiction.320  
 
If a new state fails to get international recognition, even though it might have all other 
features of a state, i.e. state population, state territory and an effective government, it may lack 
legitimacy when it comes to international transactions. Sometimes, even its national actions may 
warrant the intervention of the international community that might even include the use of 
force.321  For example, Rhodesia underwent a period of self-existence without international 
recognition during which time both the various acts performed by the government were not 
recognised by the international community as actions of legitimate nations. In fact the 
                                                 
318 Id. 
319 Etat, R.B., “(Creation, Succession, Competences), Genese et Disparition de L’Etat a L’Epoque Contemporatne”, 38 AFDI (1992) 153 at p. 163. 
320 See Hillgruber, supra note 317.  
321 Id. 
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international community did not recognize Rhodesia as an independent state and continued to 
regard the United Kingdom as internationally responsible and accountable.322 
 
International non-recognition sometimes might even result in a new state ceasing to exist. 
The case of Biafra offers a very good example. 
 
The Case of Biafra 
 
In the mid-1960s economic and political instability and ethnic friction characterised 
Nigerian public life. In the mostly Hausa north, resentment against the more prosperous, educated 
Igbo minority erupted into violence. In September 1966, some 10,000 to 30,000 Igbo people were 
massacred in the Northern Region, and perhaps 1,000,000 fled as refugees to the Igbo-dominated 
east.323 The Non-Igbos was then expelled from the Eastern Region. Attempts by representatives 
of all regions to come to an agreement were unsuccessful. On May 30, 1967, the head of the 
Eastern Region, Lieutenant Colonel (later General) Odumegwu Ojukwu, with the authorisation of 
a consultative assembly, declared the region a sovereign and independent republic under the name 
of Biafra.324 General Yakubu Gowon, the leader of the federal government, refused to recognize 
Biafra’s secession. Biafra made several unsuccessful representations to the United Nations and its 
neighbouring countries seeking international recognition as an independent state. Biafra ceased to 
exist as an independent state in January 1970.325 
                                                 
322  By regarding and treating the independence of the homelands Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei as invalid under international law, the United 
Nations continued to consider these entities as integral parts of the state territory of the Republic of South Africa, to which the prohibition of intervention and 
the use of force applied. See supra note 244. 
323  Online://www.onwar.com/aced/data/bravo/biafra1967.htm 
324  Id. 
325  Id. 
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4.4.3. Powers of the New State after Succession 
 
As Jennings remarks, the law of state succession “is a subject which presents such a rich 
diversity of practice as to give some plausibility to a surprisingly varied range of theoretical 
analysis and doctrine”.326 The succession of states theory asserts that all possessions and territory 
held by a state are automatically transferred to the state which succeeds it. For example, if the 
Government of Singapore is overthrown, and replaced by the newly formed Kingdom of X, all of 
the previously controlled territory, weapons, and wealth of the former Singapore Government 
would fall under the control of the Government of the new kingdom. One recent example is what 
happened when the USSR dissolved in 1991. The Russian Federation was named the successor of 
USSR and acquired the USSR's seat as a permanent member of the United Nations Security 
Council. This logic has been frequently used in the past by revolutionary Governments such as 
Cuba and the former Soviet Union to assert authority over the assets, powers and rights of the 
former regime. 
 
In general, the theory that is followed by the world community is that, a new government 
might be distasteful to others but pragmatically it must be recognized if it de facto controls the 
territory. However, there are several fairly recent examples where this theory has not been put 
into strict practice: 
i. When the Democratic Kampuchea regime of Pol Pot was militarily displaced by the 
Vietnamese-backed People's Republic of Cambodia, the United Nations seat continued to 
be held by Democratic Kampuchea for many years. 
ii. The Taliban State (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) in Afghanistan became the de facto 
government of nearly all of the country; but the Northern Alliance was still recognized by 
many nations and retained the United Nations seat. 
                                                 
326  Jennings, I. “General Course on Principles of International Law” , 121 RdC (1967)  p. 437 
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Given that there exists a vast amount of literature on the subject of state succession;327 the 
matter has been considered extensively by the International Law Commission;328 and further that 
two international conventions on the law of state succession have been adopted329 it is surprising 
that there is no agreed theoretical structure of state succession.330 
 
The lack of common agreement on some of the central issues in the law of state 
succession has become particularly evident in the wake of the territorial/ political changes in 
Central and Eastern Europe,331 particularly following the `dissolution' of the USSR,332 SFRY,333 
and Czechoslovakia,334 and the unification of Germany.335 It remains unclear, for example, 
                                                 
327  Some of the most prominent works are O'Connell, D., State Succession in Municipal and International Law, Vols. I and II, (Cambridge: University Press 
(1968); Feilchenfeld, E., Public Debts and State Succession (New York: Macmillan, 1931); Keith, A.,  The Theory of State Succession with Special Reference 
to English and Colonial Law (London: Waterlow & Sons, 1907); Udokang, O., Succession of New States to International Treaties (New York: Oceania Press, 
1972); Hershey, A., “The Succession of States”, 5 AJIL 285 (1911); and Jenks, W., “State Succession in Respect of Law Making Treaties”, 29 BYbIL   (1952), 
p. 105 
328 The problem of state succession was placed on the ILC's agenda at its first session in 1949, following the recommendation of Lauterpacht in his survey (UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/1/Rev.1, 10 Feb. 1949), 1 Yearbook ILC (1949) 53, UN Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1949. 
329 Vienna Convention on State Succession in Respect of Treaties, 17 ILM (1978) 1488; Vienna Convention on State Succession in Respect of Property, Archives 
and Debts, 1983, 22 ILM (1983) p. 306. 
330  The ILC commented, for example, that `[a] close examination of State practice afforded no convincing evidence of any general doctrine by reference to which 
the various problems of succession in respect of treaties could find their appropriate solution'. Yearbook ILC (1974 - II, part I), at 168, para. 51. Castrén remarks 
similarly that: `The elucidation of this question is rendered difficult by the absence of general international treaties and in view of the great instability in the 
practice observed by different States in different periods. It is, therefore, not surprising to find that differences of opinion, even with regard to certain 
fundamental aspects of the problem, prevail in the doctrine of the law of nations.' See Castrén, E., “Obligations of States Arising from the Dismemberment of 
Another State”, 13 ZaöRV
 
(1951) 753. 
331 See, Shaw, M., “State Succession Revisited”, 6 Finn.Y.I.L. (1995), p. 34; Schachter, O., “State Succession: The Once and Future Law”, 33 Va. J. Int'l L. (1993), 
p.253; Martins, M.A., “An Alternative Approach to the International Law of State Succession”, 44 Syr.L.R. (1993), p.1019; Lloyd, D.O., “Succession, 
Secession, and State Membership in the United Nations”, 26 N.Y.U.J.I.L.P. (1994), p.761; Scharf, P., “Musical Chairs: The Dissolution of States and 
Membership in the United Nations”, 28 Cornell Int'l L.J. (1995), p. 29; Williams, P.R., “State Succession and the International Financial Institutions: Political 
Criteria v. Protection of Outstanding Financial Obligations”, 43 ICLQ (1994), p. 776. 
332 See, for example, Koskenniemi, M., and Lehto, M., “La succession d'Etats dans l'ex-URSS, en ce qui concern particulièrement les relations avec la Finlande”, 
38 AFDI (1992), p.179; Love, L., “International Agreement Obligations after the Soviet Union's Break-up: Current United States Practice and its Consistency 
with International Law”, 13 Van.J.T.L. (1993), p. 413; Müllerso R., “New Developments in the Former USSR and Yugoslavia”, 33 Va. J. Int'l L. (1993), p. 
299; Williams, P.R., “The Treaty Obligations of the Successor States of the Former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia: Do They Continue in 
Force?” (1994), 23 Denv. J.I.L.P. 1; Bunn, G., and Rhinelander, J., “The Arms Control Obligations of the Former Soviet Union” (1993), 33 Va. J. Int'l L. 323; 
Beato, M., “Newly Independent and Separating States' Succession to Treaties: Considerations on the Hybrid Dependency of the Republics of the Former Soviet 
Union”, 9 Am.U.J.I.L.P. (1994), p.  525. 
333  See, for example, Williams, supra; and Beato, supra. 
334  See, for example, Malenovsky, J., “Problèmes Juridiques Liés à la Partition de la Tchécoslovaquie” , 39 AFDI (1993) p.05. 
335  See, for example, Randelzhofer, A., “German Unification: Constitutional and International Implications” (1991), 13 Mich. J. Int'l L. 122; Oeter, S., “German 
Unification and State Succession” (1991), 5 ZaöRV 349, at 352-3; and Tomuschat, C., “A United Germany within the European Community” (1990), CMLR p. 
415. 
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whether and to what extent the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) remains 
bound by the treaties of the former Yugoslavia.336 337 
 
Unlike many other areas of law, the law of state succession benefits little from 
codification.338 In its conventional form, the law of state succession is ultimately self-regarding - 
the question whether a new state is bound by particular conventional norms of succession is 
contingent upon a recognition that it has, indeed, succeeded to those norms. This point was not 
lost on the ILC which, when drafting articles on state succession to treaties, admitted that the 
adoption and general ratification of a relevant treaty would itself do little to resolve legal 
difficulties.339 
 
4.4.4. Status of Investment Contracts and Succession of States 
 
Since the succession of states in most cases brings into existence a new state, a 
convention on the law of succession in respect of treaties would for example may not be binding 
on the successor state unless and until it takes steps to become a party to that convention. Even 
then, the convention would not be binding upon it in respect of any act done before the date on 
which it became a party to the convention.340 Likewise, other states would not be bound by the 
convention in relation to the new sate until the latter had become a party. The problem here is 
that, even assuming widespread ratification of the Vienna Conventions, in most cases those states 
                                                 
336  The `Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties' of 1996 described the FRY as the `predecessor state' whose treaty 
obligations remained unaffected by the secession of the various Yugoslav republics. UN Doc. ST/LEG/8, paragraphs. 297-8 (1996). The US, Germany and 
Guinea all objected to these paragraphs (UN Docs. S/1996/251; S/1996/263; S/1996/260) and an errata was issued. 
337 Craven, Mathew C.R., “The problem of state succession and the identity of states under international law”, European Journal of International Law (2001),  
Online: http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol9/No1/art5-02.html#P87_33237. 
338  See O'Connell, supra note 327 at pp. 729-733. 
339 Yearbook ILC (1974, II, pt. i) at 170, para. 62. This point is further bolstered by the principle of non-retroactivity embodied in Article 7. 
340  Id. 
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specifically affected will, ex hypothesis, not have ratified the Convention nor will there 
necessarily be any evidence of `extensive' and `uniform' practice. 
 
Some argue that newly emergent states would be automatically bound by the terms of a 
general international law of succession. The traditional justification for this lies in the supposition 
that, in seeking entry into the international legal community, new states impliedly accept the 
terms of existing general international law.341 Leaving aside the question-begging nature of such 
resort to `tacit' consent (it clearly not being the same as consent to the creation of a legal norm), it 
may be argued that there is a big difference between the acceptance of obligations where there is 
evidence of an existing general practice and on the other hand and, the acceptance of rules whose 
application is directed specifically and exclusively to new states as they emerge onto the 
international plane, on the other.342 The point is that, new states do not enter into a legal 
community in which the rules of succession govern the relations between states on a day-to-day 
basis but, are rather subjected to the application of a particular conditional set of rules that lays 
down the legal circumstances that are to accompany their `birth'. This is not to say that the 
creation of rules of this type is an impossibility, but rather that their justification cannot be based 
upon the traditional processes of tacit consent, acquiescence or estoppel.343 
 
In this background, an important issue that needs consideration is the issue concerning 
the future of foreign investment contracts when state succession occurs. The question will arise as 
to whether which state (the old state or the newly independent and or autonomous state) is 
responsible for investment contracts entered into before the separation for development projects 
coming within the area controlled by the new regime.  
                                                 
341  See, for example, Westlake, J. International Law, (Cambridge: University Press, 1895) at 49; and Oppenheim, L., International Law: A Treatise, (2nd. ed.), 
(London: Longmans, 1910) p. 18. 
342  See Craven, supra note 337. 
343  Id. 
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As far as infrastructure projects developed with project financing techniques are 
concerned, state succession is a risk that the main project participants’ should take into serious 
consideration. For example, if an investor invests on a long term power project in the northern 
province of Sri Lanka, or in the troubled Kashmir province of India, where ethnic groups are 
fighting for the creation of separate states, the issues that necessarily stem from the situation in 
the event of cessation of political power of the host country over the disputed area are whether: 
i. the project participants anticipated such risks; 
ii. such risk could be allocated to any project participant;  
iii. the new autonomous regime is bound to honour an investment agreement to which it was 
not a party; and 
iv. the old regime will be held responsible for project guarantees it had given over a project 
now under the control of a new regime. 
 
 In this regard it is important to note that under existing international law, state 
debt obligations are generally divided into “national debt”, i.e., debt contracted in the 
general interest by the national government of a state and “localized debt”, i.e., debt 
contracted by the national government of a state for identifiable projects in a specific 
region; and “local debts”, i.e., debts of local governments.344  An alternative classification 
of state debts distinguishes between “allocated” debt, where final beneficiaries are from a 
clearly identifiable part of the state and “non-allocated” debt, meaning those debts used 
for the state’s general purposes.  
 
The International law on state succession in the area of state debts is governed by 
both the 1983 Vienna Convention and the legal practices experienced through cases in 
individual countries. The Vienna Convention draws no distinction between cases of 
                                                 
344 Shaw, M.N., The Succession Revisited, FYBIL, 1994, p. 93 and the ILC Report, ILC Yearbook, part 2, 1981, p. 74. 
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continuation and dissolution or between “allocated and non-allocated” debt.345 It therefore 
does not provide much guidance with respect to these issues. Further, although the Vienna 
Convention provides a definition of state debts, i.e. that state debts mean “any financial 
obligation of a predecessor State arising in conformity with international law towards another 
State, an international organization or any other subject of international law”346 this definition 
does not cover debts owed to private creditors and thus, does not offer protection to non-state 
actors such as investors. 
 
Thus, succession of states and separation of states is an issue that all project participants 
in project financing transactions will have to take into consideration. Although in the past, 
separation of a state has not caused any major investment concerns, the risk is not some thing that 
could be ignored any longer. In the past, investors have been either lucky to pull out before the 
risk became a reality347 or there was no major investment project that fell into the hands of a new 
regime. However, the future may not be so bright. A good example can be drawn from the current 
political crisis in Sri Lanka. 
 
The case of Sri Lanka 
 
In Sri Lanka, things have returned to near normalcy since the Government and the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE) signed a cease-fire agreement in February 2002. Since 
then, the Government has taken several initiatives towards developing the north and the eastern 
provinces of Sri Lanka. These initiatives include a proposal to build a bridge across the Polk 
                                                 
345 Williams, R. Paul, “State Succession and the International Financial Institutions: Political Criteria v. Protection of Outstanding Financial Obligations”, 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 43 (October 1994), p. 787. 
346 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debt. UN Doc. A/CONF. 114/14 (7. April 1983), Article 36. 




Straight connecting the South of India and the North of Sri Lanka, and the building of a coal 
power plant in the eastern province of Sri Lanka with the use of FDI.  
 
Both Sri Lankan and foreign political observers have repeatedly sated that the two parties 
are long way off from establishing permanent peace in the country. Although, after the 
destruction caused to the country by the Tsunami in December 2004, with greatest difficulty, the 
two parties reached an agreement concerning the sharing of foreign aid for reconstruction and 
rehabilitation, the relationship between the two parties hit a new low since the assassination of the 
Sri Lankan Foreign Minister in July 2005. The Government has come out strongly blaming the 
LTTE for the killing, an allegation strongly denied by the LTTE. Thus, the risk of political 
division in Sri Lanka is very much alive.   
 
Given this background, if the Government proceeds with the planned Indo-Lanka bridge 
project and the power project in the Eastern Province, and eventually, if these areas fall under the 
total control of the LTTE, and like East Timor if the area is recognised as a independent and 
autonomous state by the international community, then the destiny of the investment project will 
be unpredictable. In such situation, whether the foreign investors and lenders could hold the 
Government of Sri Lanka responsible for any obligations under the contracts even when the 
Government had effectively lost control over the project areas is an issue that needs 
consideration.  The other important issue to consider is whether the new regime would be obliged 
to assume control and honour the investment agreement to which it was not a party. These are 
matters that should be taken into consideration in making future investment decisions in relation 
to countries or regions that pose such risks. 
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4.4.5. Measures for Mitigating Risks due to Succession or 
Creation of States 
 
The most favoured solution to the demand for political separation is to bring about a 
political and mediated settlement that promotes political decentralisation in lieu of political 
separation. Although initiatives to mediate such settlements will be in the best interest of the 
countries concerned, it is important to consider and address what implications would arise in the 
event of eventual separation of a country into two or more autonomous units.  
 
As far as foreign investors are concerned, it would no longer be sufficient to undertake 
only a study of projects environmental and economic viability before investment decisions are 
made. Investors will also have to carefully consider the political stability of the country as well as 
the region before investment decisions are made. 
 
In the circumstances, the developing countries will have take steps to ensure that political 
instability would not hamper their development initiatives and, be willing to offer legislative and 
regulatory protection, and financial guarantees, to investors to boost their confidence, if 
investment projects in politically volatile areas are to be promoted. However, if the risk of 
political division is so imminent, then the countries should take precautions. Inviting the political, 
ethnic or religious groups campaigning for political separation to enter into a mutually acceptable 
agreement to allow the infrastructure development in the conflict region would be a prudent 
measure. This may prevent such parties from subsequently trying to disown any responsibility 
towards investment projects. The aforesaid post-tsunami agreement reached between the 
Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE is a good example. 
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4.5. The Risks of War and Foreign Invasions  
 
4.5.1. Nature of the Risk 
 
The risk of war has always been a factor that is given a great deal of consideration before 
undertaking any major investment project. For some developing countries, due to volatile 
political relationships with neighbours, the risk of war has been one of the major reasons for 
failing to attract sufficient FDI for development. War is not a new risk and over the years various 
war risk insurance mechanisms have been developed to pay compensation to the affected parties 
in the event of war. However, in recent times, a war related incident that has sent investors, 
project developers and host nations back to the drawing board is the risk of invasion. The 
invasion of Kuwait by the Iraqi forces in 1990, which subjected the infrastructure facilities in 
Kuwait to massive destruction and caused serious and sometimes irreparable damage to 
contractual relations between parties in international investment contracts, is a classic example. 
 
 Although, traditionally, effects of war on contracts were treated as force majeure events, 
thus, excluding liability from all parties involved in an investment contract, over the years the 
scope of the principle of force majeure has been trimmed giving it a very narrow meaning as far 
as international investment contracts are concerned. Nowadays, in most infrastructure 
development contracts, disruption of contractual obligations due to war situations is no longer 
covered by a force majeure clause. Instead, expensive underwriting arrangements are used by the 
contracting parties against such risks.  
 
Although, various underwriting schemes are now available to provide cover to war 
related risks, the insurers face the uphill task of having to compensate for massive destructions 
caused by the hostile acts if the type of war risk related damage and destruction that is covered if 
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ever occurs.348 Due to this reason, although various underwriting arrangements to cover war 
related risks are freely available, the premiums the parties seeking such insurance have to pay are 
very high.  
 
As far as modern day infrastructure development projects in developing countries are 
concerned, as the financing and project development structures, especially when a mechanism 
such as project financing is used, are structured to ensure that the investors and lenders take 
minimum risk in the event of destruction of property or disruption of a project due to war or 
invasion related events, the burden of shouldering the risk, i.e. the weight of destruction and or 
disruption is likely to fall heavily on the host governments.  
 
As noted in chapter three above, it is a well known fact that MNCs would not commit to 
investments in developing economies without a relatively stable revenue stream. Investors need 
to be assured of payment, whether from government, consumers or donors. It is usually the 
capacity of a project to generate adequate local revenue that determines the ability of investors to 
find the finance needed for the development of a project. This is especially the case with project 
financing transactions where projects are financed off-balance sheet.  
 
In the circumstances, for investors, an investment is more attractive if it is less risky. This 
means that developing countries need to compete with ach other to provide a less risky 
investment environment for investors in order to attract them. As a result, developing countries 
which have a less stable security environment compared to others, in other words, developing 
countries which are facing the risk of war or invasion will most definitely find it difficult to 
attract foreign investors for their development projects unless the investors are provided with 
                                                 
348  According to the records of the United Nations Compensation Commission that was established by the Security Council to assess claims for losses arising as a 
direct result of the Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait during the period 1990 – 1991, claims of non-Kuwaiti corporations related to construction and 
engineering, excluding those involved in the oil sector, alone was a total of approximately US$10 billion (http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/claims/e_claims.htm). 
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sufficient guarantees to ensure that in the event of any risk incident happening, any losses to the 
investors would be comprehensively compensated by the host government. 
 
Although, theoretically speaking one could argue that risk sharing in project financing 
demands that the risks should lie with the party best able to manage them, in practice, this is not 
the case when it concerns certain risks such as war risks associated with developing countries. 
Even if a developing country is unlikely to be the instigator of any hostile action that would lead 
to a war or an invasion and, is likely to be incapable of absorbing any related risks, due to their 
desperation to attract foreign investors for much needed development projects, they are likely to 
be under pressure to provide investment payback guarantees to the investors. 
 
For example with take-or-pay contracts which are widely used in infrastructure projects 
in developing countries  all such risks usually lie with the governments even though it is far from 
clear that the governments have much control over the risk events.349  However, if governments 
do not shoulder the burden of carrying these risks, their infrastructure development needs would 
suffer.  
 
In some instances, the host governments may even have to agree, to compensate the 
investors and payback the lenders even when the war situation was not instigated by the host 
country. For example, the Colombo Port, Queen Elisabeth Quay development contract which was 
mentioned in chapter three has such a provision.350 This type of arrangement is usually arrived at 
not due to the free will of the host state in assuming such risk but, due to most developing 
countries lacking any forceful bargaining power when negotiating international investment 
                                                 
349 See Chapter 3.4.3. 
350  The Contract Structure that was finalized in 1999 includes the main concession (BOT) contract in which specific provision has been included at the insistence 
of the lenders and the investors to ensure that the Government of Sri Lanka is responsible for compensating the investors and paying back the lenders in the 
event of project interruption or termination due to war, terrorism, insurgency or other like event.  
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contracts. Several key negotiators appointed by the Government of Sri Lanka to negotiate the 
Colombo Port, Queen Elisabeth Quay development project with the P&O Group led consortium 
and the IFC led team of lenders confirmed this fact.351 In the circumstances, it could be argued 
that Risk allocation is the result of bargaining and negotiation rather than the ability of parties to 
manage the risks. 
 
Further, although comprehensive insurance mechanisms to cover war and invasion 
related risks are available for foreign investors through various underwriting arrangements, due to 
high premiums that need to be paid to obtain them, foreign investors are in the habit of passing 
the whole or substantial part of the risk to developing countries by pressurising the developing 
countries to provide government guarantees and contractual undertakings to fully compensate the 
investors in the event of occurrence of such risks. It is doubtful whether most developing 
countries have the capacity to absorb such risks.  
 
4.5.2. Inadequacy of Current Risk Underwriting Measures to 
Protect Developing Countries 
 
Foreign investors could take out risk insurance including war risk insurance for their 
operations in developing countries. Such insurance is provided by Export Credit Agencies in 
several developed countries for investors from their countries who invest in projects outside. In 
addition, such insurance facilities are also available through the World Bank Group.  
 
                                                 
351  Interviews with Mano Nanayakkara and Chanaka De Silva who were members of the Cabinet Appointed Negotiation Committee for negotiating the Colombo 
Port, Queen Elisabeth Quay Development Project in May 2003. 
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One of the largest providers of such risk insurance to developing countries is the World 
Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).352 MIGA’s mandate is to provide 
investment insurance and investment promotion to developing countries. According to MIGA 
records, from 1990-2000 it has issued 473 “Guarantees” totalling $7.1 billion and these 
guarantees have helped facilitate $36 billion in FDI to some of the highest risk countries.353 A 
good example of an export credit agency that provides such insurance to investors is the U.S. 
Governments’ Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC).354 In 2004 alone, OPIC provided 
political risk insurance for 72 projects in 42 countries, including infrastructure projects in 
Afghanistan, construction in Iraq, hotels in Uzbekistan, energy investments in Botswana, silver 
mining in Bolivia, and telecommunications in Brazil.355 
 
 
 Although agencies such as those aforementioned provide insurance facilities for foreign 
investors against risks to their investments in developing countries, it is a misnomer if someone 
holds the view that such insurance coverage removes the risk burden from developing countries. 
This is because, the cost of insurance premiums the investors have to pay are usually added to the 
cost of the tender price submitted for infrastructure development projects. Thus, the cost is 
ultimately passed through to the end user or to the developing country government depending on 
who pays for the services provided by the project once it is developed.  
 
Further, even when in the event of risk occurrence, the investor is paid under the terms of 
the insurance by the export credit agency or MIGA as the case may be, the amount so paid is 
                                                 
352 The World Bank established MIGA in 1987 to encourage the flows of FDI to developing countries by mitigating perceived political risks that are causing 
investors to hesitate. The agency does this by providing political risk insurance to protect investments in developing countries against the risks of transfer 
restriction, expropriation, breach of contract, and war and civil disturbance. As of year 2000, MIGA has 167 member countries of which 144 are developing 
countries. Source: www.miga.org 
353 West, G. T. and Tarazona, Ethel I., Investment Insurance and Development Impact: Evaluating MIGA’s Experience (Washington D.C.: World Bank Group, 
2001). 
354 The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), which began operations in 1971 was established to facilitate private investment by U.S. investors in 
developing countries and countries with emerging markets. 
355 Overseas Private Investment Corporation, OPIC Annual Report 2004 ( New York: Overseas Privative Investment Corporation). 
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eventually becomes part of the national debt of the developing country.356 For example, In 2001, 
the Government of Indonesia had to agree to pay OPIC US$ 260 million on account of a payout 
made by OPIC to the US firm, Mid American Holdings, following the suspension of two 
geothermal power projects owned by American firm CalEnergy by the Indonesian Government.357 
Similarly, In June 2000 MIGA made its first ever payout on a claim for political risk 
insurance, a payment of US$15million to Enron on account of a power project that was 
cancelled by the Indonesian Government. Afterwards, MIGA insisted that the Indonesian 
Government had to reimburse the payment. As an incentive, MIGA refused to issue any 
more coverage for business in Indonesia until the money was paid.  Once the 
Government had agreed to repayment terms, after lengthy negotiations, MIGA 
announced that it was prepared to provide insurance coverage for investors in Indonesia 
again.358The above examples clearly show that even though insurance mechanisms have 
been developed to protect investments made in developing countries against risks such as 
wars and invasions, such measures do not provide sufficient protection to the developing 
countries except for providing a platform to attract investors. If the risk events eventually 
occur affecting an investment project covered by such insurance, the burden of bearing 
the cost of payments made to the investors eventually fall on the developing countries as 
they will have to compensate the insurers.   
                                                 
356 See for example, Export Credits Guarantee Department, United Kingdom, “Review of the Year and Annual Report and Resource Accounts for 2001/02”, p.25. 
Online: http://www.ecgd.gov.uk/ecgdannualreport0102.pdf 
357 Jakarta Post, “IMF Urged to Testify in Favor of Pertamina at U.S. Courts”( June 5, 2002) 
358 FT Energy Newsletters - Power in Asia, “Indonesia/Finance: MIGA Restores Risk Guarantees (March 6, 2001). 
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4.5.3. Measures for Mitigating War and Invasion Related Risks 
 
As pointed out earlier, taking insurance cover as protection over this type risks will be 
extremely expensive and might severely burden fiscal capacity of many developing countries if 
eventually they have to shoulder the burden of the risks. In the circumstances, the most effective 
measure to provide protection to developing countries over such risks would be to strengthen the 
international legal regime that would cause the instigator of war or the invader to compensate for 
the damages resulting as a result of war or invasion. So far, the trend has been to put international 
political pressure on the wrong doer to withdraw its forces and pay compensation to the victim 
state for loss of life as well as loss of property, and that failing, to use military pressure on the 
hostile nation.  
 
Such political or military actions are usually taken pursuant to Security Council 
resolutions of the United Nations. The resolution passed by the United Nations against the 
Government of Iraq following the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq359 and the economic 
embargos introduced by the United Nations against the Government of Iraq are good examples.360 
Further, during the last three decades there has been couple of instances where international 
forums have been set up for settlement of disputes and various claims arising out warlike 
situations. The Iran-US Claims Tribunal and the United Nations Compensation Commission 
(UNCC) are two good examples. These types of forums have provided some means for investors 
and others who suffered losses to be compensated without burdening the host countries who were 
not responsible for the damage.  
 
                                                 
359  UN Security Council resolution No. 687 of 1991, Online: http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres0687.htm 
360  Following resolutions 687 against Iraq, the United Nations Compensation Commission was set up to evaluate compensation issues arising out of the invasion 
and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq, and to make recommendations to the Governing Council of the United Nations as to appropriate compensation. 
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However, international forums such as the UNCC or Iran-US Compensation Tribunal 
may not be able to always provide comfort against risks such as wars and invasion or resulting 
hostile taking of property, as they are temporary institutions created to serve a specific purpose.  
Further, not at every instance of invasion or hostile action by one state against the other has the 
international community been active in establishing mechanisms for dispute resolution and 
compensation for damages to infrastructure. The existing situation in the occupied territories of 
Palestine is a good example where due to repeated shelling and air strikes by Israel various 
infrastructure facilities in areas inhabited by the Palestinians and under the control of the 
Palestinian Authority have been severely damaged or destroyed.361 362 
 
In the circumstances, developing countries should campaign for more proactive measures 
by the United Nations and international funding agencies such as the World Bank to develop 
measures for protecting the investments in developing countries against risks such as wars 
invasions. In addition, they should also persuade the current entities that provide insurance 
coverage to investors to encourage them to invest in developing countries to provide more 
concessions for the developing countries by reducing the burden on them to ultimately shoulder 
the total risk relating to events such as wars and invasions. Measures such as concessionary pay 
back mechanisms and reduction of the amount of pay back amounts could be suggested as 
possible measures for reducing the risk burden placed on developing countries. 
 
                                                 
361  Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was established by 
United Nations General Assembly resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, UNRWA is a relief and human development agency, providing education, 
healthcare, social services and emergency aid to over four million refugees living in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab 
republic. Providing compensation for losses suffered by Palestine refugees or investors in Israeli occupied areas is out side its mandate.  
362 To get a general idea of the type of military operations and the resulting damage see: United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the 
Near East (UNRWA), Gaza Field assessment of IDF Operation Days of Penitence (October 20, 2004). 




Chapter 5 - Social and Judicial Obstacles to the Use of FDI for  
     Infrastructure Development  
 
5.1. Social Obstacles: Nature of the Problem 
 
In modern day infrastructure development projects, the interface between the public and 
private sectors is an area of great opportunity and innovation. It is now recognised that much can 
be achieved with private finance in strategic industries. However, infrastructure projects are 
highly visible and necessarily involve public interest. Thus, they are open to public scrutiny. As a 
result, various social and judicial obstacles spring up which sometimes constrain the development 
of infrastructure facilities with FDI mechanisms such as project financing which involve private 
sector participation in strategic industries. These obstacles make public private partnership 
towards infrastructure development somewhat difficult.   
 
With the steady growth of private sector participation in the provision of basic 
infrastructure facilities, one of the main obstacles countries face in introducing reforms is the 
public rejection of new initiatives. It is understood that the private sectors project promoters will 
not be willing to extend the same concessions given to the public by governments. Unlike the 
public sector, for the private sector utility providers, the ultimate attraction in participation in 
infrastructure development is profit making and access to previously state dominated consumer 
markets.  
 
The main argument put forward by the proponents of infrastructure development with 
FDI mechanisms such as project financing is that private sector investment and management is 
necessary due to public sector failure in financing development and in the efficient provision of 
infrastructure services. Although generally speaking, there is substantial truth in this argument, it 
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should be noted that in some countries there are a number of stunning success stories of public 
sector infrastructure services. East Asia is a good example as in many fields the public sector 
provision of infrastructure services has been quite satisfactory. According to the World Bank 
Report (1998): "(t)he technical performance of East Asian utilities and fields most suitable for 
early privatisation like telecommunications - has been satisfactory".  It is also important to note 
that a lot of the industrialised countries, notably France and Germany, had no private investment 
in crucial infrastructure facilities until recently. It was only in as recent as 1995, that private 
sector was allowed to participate in telecommunication in both France and Germany. France also 
had no private sector involvement in its power sector till recently. Germany had no private 
involvement in transport. Another industrialized country, Japan, even at present, has very little 
private sector involvement in transport and none in water and sewerage.363  
 
One of the main argument of those who oppose private sector investment in infrastructure 
services is that public sector can provide utility services efficiently and at a profit with more 
effective and efficient management.364 They argue that utilities in a lot of developing countries 
have not just been satisfactory in terms of their performance, they have also made money and that 
they have been profitable; but a lot of them are currently being privatised for other reasons such 
as corrupt practices, international pressure and inefficient governance.365  
 
Both the aforementioned arguments hold merit. However, in Chapters two of this thesis it 
was pointed out that current trend among the developing countries is to attract foreign investment 
                                                 
363  World Bank Report 1998, (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1998) 
364  Bish Robert L., “Improving Productivity in the Government Sector: The Role of Contracting Out in Responses to Economic Change”, David Laidler (ed.), Vol. 
27 of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986) p. 217; Borcherding 
T. E., Pommerehne, W., and Schneider, F., "Comparing the Efficiency of Private and Public provision: The Evidence from Five Countries”, Nationalokonomie, 
Journal of Economics, Supplement 2, Springer-Verlag
 
(1982), pp. 127-156; and also see generally, Hike, J., Competition in Government Financed Services, 
(New York: Quorum Books, 1992); Bird, R.M., Central-local Fiscal Relations and the Provision of Urban Public Services, (Canberra: The Australian National 
University, Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations, 1980); Savas E.S., Privatizing the Public Sector, (Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House, 
1982); Hatry, H., A Review of Private Approaches for Delivery of Public Services, (Washington D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1983). 
365 Id. 
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for the development of their infrastructure needs due to various reasons. These reasons include, 
the inability of public finances to cater to the growing demand for infrastructure development and 
the need the developing countries have to utilise limited home grown finances to the development 
of social infrastructure such as health and education.366  
 
The biggest problem developing countries face in attracting foreign investors for project 
development is the public wariness to accepting changes. As already noted, physical 
infrastructure services have in the past been provided to the public in many developing countries 
either free or at substantially subsidised rates. However, when foreign investors coming into the 
scene it results in rates and taxes charged for infrastructure services being increased as unlike the 
public sector utility providers, the main attraction of private sector investors to invest in a project 
is profit. Thus, the likelihood of loosing the benefits in the form of subsidised rates offered by the 
public sector is one of the main grounds for public and sometimes political opposition to private 
sector led development of infrastructure facilities. In addition, corrupt practices by government 
officials on the one hand and by investors and project developers on the other in connection with 
development of infrastructure projects; the fear of losing traditional homelands; and the adverse 
effects on the cultural heritage are among other grounds on which usually social and political 
objections to private sector led development activities are formulated.  
 
Social and political opposition to private sector involvement in development, more often 
than not, end up in costly and time consuming litigation. Although none would argue that such 
court intervention is not justified in situations where allegations made by the applicants are 
reasonable, there are instances in which court actions have been either too harsh or contrary to the 
larger interest of nations. In other words, there is the risk that, the courts in developing countries 
may some times try to give justice to certain affected parties without proper evaluation of the 
                                                 
366 See Chapter 2.4. 
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development needs of the country. In other words, justice will be given to those who seek it 
compromising the larger interest of the nation.  
 
5.2. Main Social Objections 
 
Based on information gathered during interviews with several public sector officials, 
members of the public selected at random and two key NGOs operating in Sri Lanka and 
Malaysia, the popular social objections to private sector led infrastructure development could be 
summarised as follows: 
i. Private sector participation in infrastructure development may not be the appropriate 
answer in many situations and could compound problems of lack of accountability and 
transparency to the public rather than resolve them; 
ii. It may make certain public goods and services inaccessible to the poor and it could 
further distort in equality of opportunity; 
iii. It could lead to mass unemployment of labour; 
iv. The weakening of its role in the provision of basic infrastructure services in a country 
could reduce rather than enhance a government's ability to enact and enforce effective 
regulation of the market in the interests of the poor and disadvantaged;  
v. Privatisation of essential infrastructure services will force the governments to remove 
public subsidies, thus burdening the utility users with additional cost; 
vi. Corrupt practices on the part of the governments and public sector officials in connection 
with granting of concessions to private sector developers and in regulating infrastructure 
services; 
vii. The decisions to promote and locate private sector led investment projects in certain areas 
may be led by political instead of economic reasons; 
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viii. Violation of human rights and compromising the traditions, ethnic and cultural rights of 
the people due to profit driven infrastructure development.367 
 
None of the above social objections to infrastructure development with FDI are unduly 
motivated. The world has witnessed plenty of failed investment projects in developing countries 
which have ended up in creating investment white elephants, i.e. investment projects with 
negative social surplus. The evidence relating to such projects would show that one or more of 
that above social concerns have been overlooked by the host governments as well as other main 
project participants.   
 
5.2.1. Case Studies 
 
The following case studies show the difficulties faced by developing country 
governments in striking a balance between sometimes conflicting interests of promoting FDI for 
infrastructure development and giving due consideration to the public concerns. 
 
a. The Bakun Hydroelectric Project in Malaysia 
 
I. What and where is it? 
 
The Bakun Hydroelectric Project (BHEP) comprises of construction of a 2,400MW 
hydroelectric dam; the transmission of its electricity; and the building of related infrastructure 
including access roads. The Bakun project is one of the largest privatised projects in Malaysia. 
The dam is being built on the Balui River, some 37 kilometres upstream of Belaga in Sarawak, 
                                                 
367  Based on the interviews conducted with: several public sector employees including Legal Officers attached to the Department of the Attorney General in Sri 
Lanka and the Board of Investment in Sri Lanka, members of the public selected at random from the village of Eppawela in Sri Lanka during a Field Research;  
the Environmental Foundation of Sri Lanka, a public interest law firm dealing with environmental issues; and the Friends of The Earth Organization, Malaysia.  
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Malaysia.368 Estimates of the amount of electricity Bakun will actually generate vary 
considerably, but the present official figure is that it would operate at an average output of  
1,770 MW. At least 70% of this will be transmitted to Peninsular Malaysia, across some  
1,500 km of overland wires and three or four 650 km long undersea cables.369 
 
The Bakun dam is a 205-metre-high Concrete Face Rock-fill Dam (CFRD), with a length 
of crest of 740 metres, a base width of 560 metres and a crest width of 12 metres. This makes it 
one of the highest rock-fill dams in the world.370 It is estimated to flood 69,640 hectares of land, 
an area bigger than Singapore.371 This area is presently being clear-cut. Its catchment area is over 
1.5 million hectares of mainly primary forest, though some 16% of Sarawak's total log production 
currently comes out of this area. 51% of the land of the reservoir area is Native Customary Land, 
meaning it is legally owned by the indigenous communities.372 
 
It was originally claimed that the dam would be ready by 2003. However, the project is 
currently under review for its economic viability and the Government of Malaysia has 
acknowledged that it needs restructuring. As of May 2005, only 25.3 % of the project had been 
completed.373 
 
II. Who is building it? 
 
 Its implementation has been given to a Malaysian company, Ekran Berhad, without 
tender and apparently without proper cost evaluation. The major construction contract has been 
given to a consortium led by the Swedish-Swiss company Asea Brown Boveri (ABB) and Brazil's 
                                                 
368 Sarawak is part of the island of Borneo. 
369 Friends of the Earth Organization, The Bakun Hydroelectric Project – Malaysia, Briefing Sheet (Friends of the Earth Ltd. 1996). 
370 Id. 
371 World Wildlife Federation, “Borneo: Treasure Island at Risk”, WWF Germany, Frankfurt am Main (June 2005). 
372 Allison, T., “Malaysia's Bakun Project: Build and be Damned”, Asia Times, 28 October 2000.  
373 Reuters, 31 May 2005. 
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CBPO and including South Korea's Hyundai. Engineering consultants from Germany (Lahmeyer) 
and the US (Harza) have helped with feasibility studies, dam design and overall project 
supervision.374 Although designated as a 'privatised' project, due to difficulties encountered in 
finding the necessary monies from the international markets have resulted in heavy direct 
Malaysian Government involvement in the financing of the project. The exact capital-debt ratio 
of the project has not been released to the media.375 
 
III. Why is it being built? 
 
In the words of the former President Mahathir, "Bakun will not only provide the cheapest 
source of energy but will also serve as a catalyst to the country's industrialisation programme".376 
As well as supplying electricity (mainly to Peninsular Malaysia), other benefits from the Bakun 
project claimed by the Government include: 
i. Generating employment and valuable spin-off industries for Sarawak, which will add 3% 
to that state's growth per year; 
ii. Bringing the indigenous peoples 'into the mainstream of development' through 
resettlement; 
iii. Providing much-needed infrastructure to a remote part of Sarawak, which will become a 
valuable tourist destination. 
 
 
                                                 
374 Spires, C., "Public Participation in the Environmental Impact Assessment for the Bakun Hydroelectric Project, Sarawak, East Malaysia in the period from 
September 1993 to June 1995" (University of London, Wye College, October 1995);  Insan, “Power Play: Why the Bakun Hydroelectric Project is Damned” 
(Kuala Lumpur: Insan, 1996); Aliran Monthly, "Bakun Dam: Test of Sincerity", Vol. 14 (5) (1994);  Aliran Monthly, "The Bakun Judgment: Hope And Then 
Despair", Vol. 16(1) (1996); and Delphi International, "Bakun: High Dam: High Risk?" (July 8 1996). 
375 Far Eastern Economic Review, "Bakun Dammed: Surprise Court Ruling sours Mahathir's Dream",  (July 4, 1996). 
376   Source: A briefing by the Friends of the Earth Organisation on Bakun Hydroelectric Project, Malaysia (1996). 
    Online: http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/briefings/bakun_hydroelectric_project.html 
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IV. Who is affected? 
 
The project requires the forced relocation of between 9,000 to 10,000 indigenous people, 
mainly of the Kayan, Kenyah, Kajang, Ukit and Penan ethnic groups. In addition the expected 
changes in the water quality and river flow patterns is likely to affect thousands of people living 
downstream of the dam on the Rajang River, the longest river in Malaysia.377 
 
V. The reasons behind the objections 
 
The project is opposed to by many in the indigenous communities, together with 
opposition political parties, a coalition of over 40 Malaysian NGOs, other NGOs and individuals. 
They attack the project on just about every ground. Its necessity and viability are called into 
question and the cost of its social and environmental impact is deemed unacceptable.378 
 
Critics argue that, there is no need for Bakun's electricity as there is a current surplus in 
Malaysia.379 Further that, Malaysia has an excellent opportunity to frame future power-generating 
projects in a properly construed, efficient and environmentally conscious National Energy Policy. 
It is argued that the construction of Bakun is detrimental to such a policy.380 
 
Critics also point out that Bakun's electricity will be neither the cheapest nor the cleanest. 
They argue that the cost of Bakun's electricity will be the most expensive in Malaysia's history, 
and will almost certainly necessitate electricity price rises, meaning the Malaysian consumers and 
investors will bear the cost.381 In the view of those opposed to the Bakun project, the building of a 
dam designed to supply Peninsular Malaysia with electricity in a remote part of Sarawak is highly 
                                                 
377 Id. 
378 Id. 




controversial. Amongst other things, it means the project will rely on the transmission of 
electricity via long overland and undersea cables whose security and viability may be vulnerable 
and whose environmental impact is incalculable. 
 
In addition to above, the viability of the project is challenged on a number of other issues. 
There is the perception that the official projections of Bakun's electricity output are wildly 
optimistic.382 The project is based on a number of assumptions regarding, for example, efficiency 
of the dam, rainfall, stream flow, sedimentation rates, likelihood of earthquakes, maintenance 
costs, speed of construction, and downstream effects; the miscalculation of any one of which 
would throw the viability of the project into doubt.383 Similarly, projections of the costs and time 
anticipated to complete the project are, in the light of experience of other large dams around the 
world, likely to be overrun, to degrees, which could destroy the economic justification of the 
project.384 
 
The planning of the dam has been conducted with no public accessibility to vital 
feasibility studies, no process of public feedback on a highly controversial and subverted 
Environmental Impact Assessment process which was described by the mainstream press as 'an 
abuse' and 'a farce', and extremely limited consultation procedures with the indigenous peoples 
who have had little idea of what will happen to them.385  
 
On an application made by the parties objecting to the project, the High Court of 
Malaysia found that the Malaysian Government, together with Ekran and the Sarawak State 
Government had subverted the basic rights of the indigenous peoples to comment on the EIA 
                                                 
382 Supra note 371. 
383 Id. 
384 Id. 
385 World Commission on Dams, Resettlement of Indigenous Peoples – final Report, December 1999, (Cape Town, 1999). 
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before approval, a ruling that was dismissed by the authorities as 'technical'. The Court of Appeal 
in Malaysia later revised the High Court decision in 1997.386 
 
The environmental and social impacts of the project are heavily downplayed by the 
authorities. There is also a risk to the safety and livelihoods of the people living downstream due 
to possible sudden releases from the reservoir and the potential of a dam failure, and there are 
many people in Malaysia who say the project should once again be scrapped, this time for 
good.387 
 
VI. Conflict of interests  
 
From what is set out above it is clear that the Bakun project faced public and political 
criticism on several grounds, most of them being based on reasonable concerns. Serious questions 
have been raised concerning the viability of the Project, from economic, ecological, technical, 
social and cultural perspectives. In particular, the dam design has not adequately addressed the 
dangers of overtopping, sedimentation and reservoir-induced seismicity, nor has the Government 
demonstrated the economic viability of the project.  
 
Although, faced with aforesaid opposition, the Government of Malaysia has given the 
green light for the project to proceed. In order to ensure that future objections to the project will 
be minimal, feasibility studies and reports commissioned by the Government on the Bakun 
project have been classified under the Official Secrets Act,388 meaning that it is a criminal offence 
                                                 
386 Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar & Anor v Kajing Tubek & 2 others, [1997] 3 AMR 2521. 
387 The Bakun project was first proposed in the 1980s as part of a series of dams to exploit the hydroelectric potential of Sarawak's rivers. A concerted campaign 
against it by local indigenous communities, together with its high costs (financial, social and environmental) led to the project being cancelled in 1990. 
However, in September 1993, the project was revived. 
388 Malaysia's Official Secrets Act (OSA) of 1972, based on the British OSA of 1911 is a broadly-worded law which carries a maximum penalty of life 
imprisonment, as well as significant lesser penalties for the actions associated with the wrongful collection, possession or communication of official 
information. 
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for anyone to even have, let alone use, the information contained therein. The project proponents 
have refused to meet critics in any open discussion.389 Thus the issue is whether the project is 
really worth it given the immense public opposition to it, and the prejudice that will be caused to 
the indigenous community who will be displaced as a result of the project. 
 
From the available evidence it appears that amidst reasonable and just public objections 
the project has been forced on the people. Although such initiatives may not be challenged in 
some oppressive jurisdictions, what is important to note is that developing countries which have 
fair democracies may not be able to ignore the public outcry against such projects and force them 
on the people.  
 
b. The Eppawala Phosphate Mining Project in Sri Lank  
 
I. What and where is it? 
 
The Geological Survey department of Sri Lanka in 1971 discovered a rock phosphate 
deposition of nearly 25 million metric tons in the north central province of Sri Lanka. Following a 
proposal to grant a concession to a private sector company with foreign participation to explore 
the possibility of digging the deposits for commercial production, an agreement with "Sarabhumi 
Resources (Pvt.) Limited", a company with a ninety per cent foreign shareholding, and IMC 
Agrico of the USA, the worlds largest producer of fertiliser and the reputed Japanese company 
Tomen Corporation was negotiated under a project approved by the Board of Investment of Sri 
Lanka (BOI). The project envisaged the exploitation of the known rock phosphate reserves at 
                                                 
389 See supra note 372. 
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Eppawala over a thirty-year period, in a high intensity mining operation that its detractors 
claimed would devastate the local environment.390  
 
Under the proposed agreement, IMC Agrico of USA (which is a partnership between 
Freeport-McMoran and IMC Incorporated), and Tomen Corporation of Japan were to  combine in 
a joint venture with the local corporation, Lanka Phosphate Ltd., to exploit the apatite mine. The 
project company was estimated to manufacture 600,000 metric tons of fertiliser per annum, of 
which 400,000 metric tons was to be exported.391  
 
According to the concession agreement, the mine was to cover an area of 56 sq 
kilometres. The processing plant was to be built in Trincomalee, which is one of the world's most 
unique natural harbours and a prime destination for tourists in peacetime in Sri Lanka. Four 
hundred and fifty acres of land with a beach front for a jetty and terminal building was earmarked 
in Trincomalee for the processing plant, a phosphorous acid plant, a sulphur acid plant, a 
granulation plant and a support facility.392 A further 350 more acres set apart for tourist 
development was to be kept on hold until a feasibility study indicated whether the project 
company would need more land.393  
 
According to experts, the reserves are estimated by experts to last for a minimum of 200 
years and a maximum of 1,000 years, and if exploited only for local use, Sri Lanka will not have 
to import phosphate fertiliser for many years in the future.394  
 
                                                 
390 The Island, “S.C. Judgment Vindicates Eppawela Objectors” ( June 11, 2000). 
391 Id. 
392 Wanigasundara M., “Resistance Grows to Sri Lanka/TNCs Mining Deal”, Third World Resurgence No. 93, (May, 1998). 
 
 Online: http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/deal-cn.htm 
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394 Id.  
 214
II. The anticipated benefits from the project 
 
The Government has spelt out the following financial benefits from the project: 
i. It is expected to bring in approximately US$ 477 million in total economic benefits per 
year. 
ii. The project company will supply high-grade fertiliser to the farmer at around 50% of the 
normal imported price.  
iii. Government will earn approximately US$37 million from the royalty payable on rock 
phosphate which will be 5.5% of the Morocco International price; and 
iv. In addition, the Government will earn approximately US$74 million in taxes, despite the 
tax holiday, under a special arrangement; dividends from the 10% free equity for Lanka 
Phosphate Ltd amounting to approximately US$70 million; from the defence levy 
approximately US$1.3 million; and earnings from the Sri Lanka Ports Authority for 
services rendered approximately US$137 million.395  
 
III. The reasons behind the objections 
 
According to certain public views and several of the NGO’s campaigning against the 
project, the mining will destroy some 26 villages in the country's north-central province. The 
proposed joint venture to mine apatite will not only cause irreparable social and ecological 
damage, but also rapidly deplete the country of a valuable natural resource and contribute little in 
'value-added' to the economy. According to Mr. Hemantha Vithanage, an environmental scientist 
of the Environmental Foundation of Sri Lanka, a public interest law firm dealing in 
environmental issues “within the project area in Eppawala, six schools, many homes, government 
buildings and infrastructure, temples, 23 new and old reservoirs for irrigation, 5 km of a newly-
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constructed irrigation channel, 100 km of small irrigation channels, two small towns, 26 villages, 
and rich agricultural land would be destroyed”.396  
 
At present Sri Lanka imports 80,000 - 120,000 metric tons of single super phosphate and 
30,000 - 40,000 metric tons of triple super phosphate per annum. These requirements, says Prof. 
Illeperuma, can be met by a plant manufacturing 150,000 metric tons of phosphate fertiliser, 
costing around US$ 21 million.397 According to him, the IMC Agrico project would cost US$ 425 
million, plus rapid there would be exhaustion of the reserves and great environmental and 
sociological damage.398 
 
The project has been opposed also on the ground that the translational companies selected 
to invest and develop it have a bad track record. According to reports coming out of three 
countries, Freeport McMoRan has a bad reputation in relation to human rights and environmental 
violations.399  These reports allege that, in Florida, where IMC Agrico runs a massive mining 
operation, over 200,000 acres have been strip mined leaving irreversible scars and damage on the 
landscape. Further, the pits, craters and gullies fill up during rain and have become flourishing 
breeding places for mosquitoes. Furthermore, over 20 stacks of phosphogypsum, a radioactive 
waste, have been piled up in Florida with no known means of disposal. In addition, Freeport 
McMoRan has also been cited for dumping radioactive gypsum, which according to the US 
Environmental Protection Agency contains radium, which breaks down into radon, which is 
carcinogenic, into the Mississippi River in Louisiana.400  
 
                                                 
396 Views expressed during an interview held with a team of lawyers headed by Mr. Hemantha Withanage, of The Environmental Foundation of Sri Lanka,  
 July 12, 2004.   
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399 See Wanigasundera, supra  note 392.   
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Mr. Vithanage points out that there are reported incidents of human rights violations by 
Freeport McMoRan in New Guinea and a US$ 6 million lawsuit for dumping 130,000 tons of 
toxic mining waste into local rivers.401 The indigenous peoples of Irian Jaya in Indonesia have 
been protesting against the dumping of waste into rivers and streams and the seizure of their lands 
for mining. He also cites from a report from April 1995 by the Australian Council for Overseas 
Aid, which accuses Freeport McMoRan of having a hand in the disappearance of 22 civilians in 
Irian Jaya.402 403 
 
IV. The decision to proceed 
 
The decision to proceed with the project was shelved in 1999 due to public outrage and 
objections from both academic and political circles. The then Opposition party in Parliament, the 
United National Party, publicly announced that the project would be cancelled when they come 
into power. The United National Party was in power briefly during the period 2003-2004, and is 
now out of power and the Political Alliance of President Chandrika Bandaranayake that has held 
the parliament since August 2004 has not taken any initiatives to resurrect the project. Thus, it 
will be interesting to see whether the promise to permanently shelve the project would be kept, or 
whether public objections will be ignored and the project will be given the green light in the 
future. 
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In addition to the above two case studies, several examples could be cited to show how  
various development initiatives of developing country governments end up becoming investment 
white elephants as a result of failing to give due consideration to viability of projects and various 
public concerns regarding projects. 
 
a. Activities of INDECO 
 
Nothing is as depressing in a developing economy as the presence of white elephants. 
Some classic examples come from the activities of INDECO, the Industrial Development 
Corporation of Zambia which undertook projects on political considerations although the 
feasibility studies concluded that the projects would be uneconomic.404  
 
The locations of the Livingstone Motor Assemblers, Kapiri Glass Products and Mansa 
Batteries, all subsidiaries of INDECO, were decided on the basis of providing employment 
outside the main urban areas. These and similar projects ran into difficulties for various reasons, 
partly because, being located in up-country centres, they were situated faraway from the main 
markets. Multi-million dollar brick factories were set up under official directive in the rural areas 
at Kalalushi and Nega Nega, but transporting the bricks long distances to the construction sites 
raised their costs to uneconomic levels, with the result that the construction industry switched to 
the use of concrete blocks. Because of the declining demand for its products, the brick works at 
Nega Nega was forced to close down in 1979 and the factory at Kalalushi incurred large losses. 
 
                                                 
404. Tangri, R., The Politics of Patronage in Africa, (Oxford: James Currey Ltd., 1999) pp. 15-30. 
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Moreover, projects such as the Chinese maize mill at Chingola were started without any 
feasibility study being undertaken; the decision was a purely political one, which led to the 
already planned and evaluated maize mill in Kitwe being abandoned. Directives were also issued 
regarding the location of projects.405 
 
Referring to above Zambian industrial projects, Tangri (1999) suggests “not only are 
white elephants built, but they are built when they are understood to be white elephants and even 
worse, they crowd out socially desirable projects. Thus, it is not just that politicians are bad at 
picking winners, they actually pick known losers.”406 
 
b. White elephants of Burundi 
 
The case study evidence shows that the locations of public projects are sometimes 
determined by the desire of politicians to redistribute to their own geographically based groups. 
For example, in Burundi by the early 1970s the Government was controlled by a faction of 
Tutsi’s from Bururi province. Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2002), document that as a consequence 
huge amounts of resources were targeted at Bururi including schools, roads, and public sector 
investments. For instance, even though Tutsi’s represented only about 14% of the population, 
60% of the managers of public corporations were Bururi Tutsis.407 
                                                 
405. Robinson, James A. and Ragnar, T., “White Elephants”, 89 Journal of Public Economics (2005), pp. 197– 210 
406. Supra note 404 at  p. 30 
407. Nkurunziza, J.D., Ngaruko, F., Explaining Growth in Burundi: 1960–2000, Working Paper, (Oxford:  Oxford University Centre for the Study of African 
Economies, 2002) at pp. 19-23. 
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c. White elephants of Kenya 
 
The political nature of the creation and location of white elephants suggests that when 
political power changes, old investment projects ought to be terminated and new ones begun. In 
general terms this is the message of Barkan and Chege (1989).408 They divide the provinces of 
Kenya into the Kenyatta political base and the Moi political base, each containing 33% of the 
population. While expenditures on road construction under Kenyatta grossly favoured the 
Kenyatta provinces, when Moi came to power expenditures shifted away from Kenyatta toward 
Moi provinces. Within one year (1980) the share going to the Kenyatta base decreased from 44% 
to 28% of the total, while the share going to the Moi base increased from 32% to 38% of the total. 
In 1986, six years after, the Kenytta base received 16% of the total, while the Moi base received 
67%.409  
 
5.3. Judicial Obstacles: Nature of the Problem 
 
According to Arnab Kumar Hazra, a Fellow of the Rajiv Gandhi Institute for 
Contemporary Studies in New Delhi, India, “A balanced, swift, affordable, and fair justice 
delivery system, besides promoting law and order, aids in the development of markets, investment 
(including FDI), economic growth and, therefore, in poverty reduction”.410 According to Kamal 
Hossain, a prominent Bangladeshi lawyer and the Chairman of the Advisory Board of the Non-
Governmental Organisation, Transparency International, a fair judicial system is a “precondition” 
                                                 
408. Barkan, J., Chege, M., “Decentralizing the State: district focus and the politics of reallocation in Kenya”,  27 The Journal of Modern African Studies
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pp. 431– 453. 
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410 Van Zant, E., “Paying for Justice”, ADB Review (May 2005).  
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to improving governance and thus, economic and social development.411 As a World Bank 
publication (1999) concluded:  
“The massive move by developing and transition countries toward market economies 
necessitated the adoption of strategies for the encouragement of private investment, 
domestic and foreign. Naturally, there was a general realization that such an objective 
could not be achieved without modifying and, sometimes, completely overhauling the legal 
and institutional framework and firmly establishing the rule of law, thereby creating the 
necessary climate of stability and predictability.” 412 
 
Speaking at an International Development Bank (IDB) organized a meeting between 
Spanish investors and Latin American government officials in Madrid in January 2004, José 
María Álvarez-Pallete, the executive president of Telefónica Latinoamérica stated that: “investors 
should be able to count on a stable judicial environment, a regulatory context that ensures an 
adequate return on investment, and commercial accords that do not discriminate based on the 
national origin of a company.”413 
 
The above views are generally shared by academics as well as main participants in 
project financing such as investors, lenders, project developers as well as host countries. 
However, unfortunately, not every developing country has a judicial system that is conducive to 
foreign and or private sector investment. 
 
According to John Hewko414 Implicit in this “general realization” is the premise that the 
foreign investor is a passive spectator of the reform process, hesitant to enter the fray until a 
modification or overhaul of the legal system has occurred. Based on this assumption, 
governments, multilateral institutions, development agencies, and various non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) have expended considerable resources in initiating, encouraging, and 
                                                 
411 Id. 
412 See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Initiatives in Legal and Judicial Reform, (Washington D.C.: IBRD, December, 1999) pp. 1–2. 
413 Quesada, C.,  “What can Latin America do to rekindle the interest of Spanish investors?”, IDB America (Magazine of the Inter-American Development Bank) 
(July 3, 2005).  
414 A visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is a partner in the law firm of Baker & McKenzie. 
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funding a myriad of legal and judicial reform programs throughout the transitional and 
developing world. These actions have been taken in the belief that legal reform and the 
establishment of the rule of law could be accomplished in relatively short order and in the hope 
that, once the reform process was complete, FDI would begin to flow.415 
 
Most foreign investors, when faced with attractive business opportunities, are prepared to 
accept the fact that in general terms, the legislation and legal systems in 
countries are inadequate, and that the laws pertinent to their concerns are no doubt far from ideal. 
However, once their investments are made, a short laundry list of specific complaints usually 
arises, which if rectified, would greatly facilitate the success and continued viability of their 
investment.416 As a result, according to John Hewko “the legislative reform efforts should 
emphasis on details (not general concepts) and on determining the specific and often mundane 
changes that need to occur for existing legislation to function within the cultural, political, and 
economic realities of the host countries while still answering the needs of the foreign 
investors”.417 
 
In most infrastructure development contracts, parties readily agree for neutral jurisdiction 
for dispute settlement. Most contracts include alternative dispute resolution clauses that provide 
for international arbitration and sometimes, also for other innovative alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) measures such as mediation, negotiation, executive decision making and mini trial to 
avoid laws delays in developing countries and to ensure that disputes between the host countries 
and project investors, lenders and other key project participants could be resolved outside national 
courts. 
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However, these measures have not been always successful in providing a settlement to 
the disputants without jeopardising the continuity of the investment project. The main reason for 
such failure has been the obvious disregard to contract provisions by local project partners who 
have sued the foreign investors in local courts, sometimes even obtaining injunctive relief and 
thus disrupting the project activity for several months or even years. In some countries, local 
courts have repeatedly ignored contract provisions willingly agreed between parties and have 
ignored the obligation of local partners to submit to international arbitration and honour 
international arbitral awards.  
 
Further, in some instances, even when the disputing parties have agreed to submit to an 
agreed neutral jurisdiction and ADR, for example, international arbitration, to bring a dispute to a 
settlement, local courts intervene in preventing the enforcement of dispute settlement decisions 
reached between the parties by following the agreed mode of settlement. Such interventions 
usually take place when the successful party at the dispute settlement attempt to enforce arbitral 
decisions within the jurisdiction of host countries. Most of the time courts refuse enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards on the grounds that such enforcement is “against the public policy” of the 
host country.  
 
When courts decide to intervene in the enforcement of arbitral awards, the starting point 
is the New York Convention, which in Article V.2 (b) states: 
"Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent 
 authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that: 
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 (b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the 
 public policy of that country."418  
 
It refers to "the public policy of that country". Thus, indicating that the intent of the 
drafters of the Convention was not to seek overtly to attempt to harmonize public policy or to 
establish a common international practice. Several conventions that followed have followed the 
same approach. For example, the 1975 Panama Convention makes reference to the "public policy 
of that State".419 The 1979 Montevideo Convention goes further: it requires that the award be 
"manifestly contrary to the principles and laws of the public policy ['orden publico'] of the 
exequatur State" (Art 2(h)).420  
 
The 1965 Washington (ICSID) Convention does not expressly refer to "public policy". 
Article 52 sets out various grounds for annulment, which include: corruption on the part of a 
member of the tribunal; serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; and failure to 
state the reasons on which the award is based. The first two of these would generally fall within 
the scope of domestic and international public policy.421  
 
Although, public policy as an exception to enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
is sometimes used by local courts there is a conflicting issue, which the lawmakers and 
the courts must resolve, namely, the tension between not wishing to authorize 
enforcement of awards which contravene domestic laws and values (public policy); and 
the desire to respect the finality of foreign awards which is important to ensure that the 
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developing countries provide a stable and predictable environment for foreign investors 
in order to attract them development projects.  
 
One of the worst things that can happen in most developing countries due to judicial 
interventions as far as infrastructure development projects are concerned is the granting of a “stay 
order” or an “interim injunction” which may then continue to operate till the conclusion of a long 
court trial. Such preventive orders will jeopardise the continuity of an investment project causing 
time loss and heavy costs for every participant involved in the project. More often than not public 
objection and/or an environmental concern by various interest groups may be formulated on 
baseless allegations. However, when the judicial authorities come to such conclusions, i.e. that 
the allegations were baseless; the damages caused to the investment project will be severe and 
some times irreparable.  
 
It should be said however, that not in every instance and in every developing country, the 
risk of undue judicial intervention is present. For example, in some instances, the courts in 
developing countries have been extremely careful in analysing the cases brought before them by 
parties objecting to development projects, in order to ensure that whilst giving them justice, the 
development initiatives are not unduly disrupted. As shown in the next section of this chapter, the 
litigation concerning the Eppawala project in Sri Lanka is a good example. 
 
Numerous examples could be cited to support the points made above regarding the nature 
of the judicial obstacles to infrastructure development in developing countries with private sector 
participation. For the purposes of this thesis, in the following section, two recent legal actions will 





a. The PIATCO Case (Philippines) 
 
The decision given by the Court of Appeal of the Philippines in the above case is a good 
example where the existence of an arbitration clause that obligated the parties to submit all 
disputes between them for international arbitration was ignored by the petitioners who were state 
representatives, despite the request by the investor to submit all disputes to arbitration. The case 
also serves as a good example to show how the courts in certain developing countries may make 
decisions undermining the obligations given in investment agreements. 
 
The facts of these cases which were relevant to the issue concerning the arbitration clause 
are as follows: 
Sometime in 1993, six business leaders consisting of John Gokongwei, Andrew 
Gotianun, Henry Sy, Sr., Lucio Tan, George Ty and Alfonso Yuchengco met with then President 
Fidel V. Ramos to explore the possibility of investing in the construction and operation of a new 
international airport terminal.  To signify their commitment to pursue the project, they formed the 
Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) which was registered with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) on September 15, 1993.422 
 
In October 1994, AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government for the 
development of NAIA International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) under a build-
operate-and-transfer (BOT) arrangement pursuant to RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 (the 
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“BOT Law”).423 In December 1994, the Department of Transportation and Communications 
(DOTC) issued Dept. Order No. 94-832 constituting the Prequalification Bids and Awards 
Committee (PBAC) for the implementation of the NAIA IPT III project. In June 1996, DOTC 
and Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) caused the publication in two daily 
newspapers of an invitation for competitive or comparative proposals on AEDC’s unsolicited 
proposal in accordance with Sec. 4-A of RA 6957, as amended.424  
 
The Bid Documents issued by the PBAC provided among others that the proponent must 
have adequate capability to sustain the financing requirement for the detailed engineering, design, 
construction, operation, and maintenance phases of the project.  The proponent would be 
evaluated based on its ability to provide a minimum amount of equity to the project, and its 
capacity to secure external financing for the project.425 
 
In September 1996, the consortium composed of People’s Air Cargo and Warehousing 
Co., Inc. (Paircargo), Phil. Air and Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS) and Security Bank Corp. 
(Security Bank) (collectively, Paircargo Consortium) submitted their competitive proposal to the 
PBAC.426 
 
On September 26, 1996, AEDC informed the PBAC in writing of its reservations as 
regards the Paircargo Consortium, which included: 
a. The lack of corporate approvals and financial capability of PAIRCARGO; 
b. The lack of corporate approvals and financial capability of PAGS; 
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c. The prohibition imposed by RA 337, as amended (the General Banking Act) on the 
amount that Security Bank could legally invest in the project; 
d. The inclusion of Siemens as a contractor of the PAIRCARGO Joint Venture, for 
prequalification purposes; and 
e. The appointment of Lufthansa as the facility operator, in view of the Philippine 
requirement in the operation of a public utility.427 
 
The PBAC gave its reply on October 2, 1996, informing AEDC that it had considered the 
issues raised by the latter and that, based on the documents submitted by Paircargo and the 
established prequalification criteria, the PBAC had found that the challenger, Paircargo, had pre-
qualified to undertake the project.428   
 
Both proponents offered to build the NAIA Passenger Terminal III for at least $350 
million at no cost to the Government and to pay the Government:  5% share in gross revenues for 
the first five years of operation, 7.5% share in gross revenues for the next ten years of operation, 
and 10% share in gross revenues for the last ten years of operation, in accordance with the Bid 
Documents.429  However, in addition to the foregoing, AEDC offered to pay the Government a 
total of P135 million as guaranteed payment for 27 years while Paircargo Consortium offered to 
pay the Government a total of P17.75 billion for the same period. Thus, the PBAC formally 
informed AEDC that it had accepted the price proposal submitted by the Paircargo Consortium, 
and gave AEDC 30 working days or until November 28, 1996 within which to match the said bid, 
otherwise, the project would be awarded to Paircargo.430 
 






As AEDC failed to match the proposal within the 30-day period, then DOTC Secretary 
Amado Lagdameo, on December 11, 1996, issued a notice to Paircargo Consortium regarding 
AEDC’s failure to match the proposal. In February 1997, Paircargo Consortium incorporated into 
PIATCO.431  
 
On July 12, 1997, the Government, signed the “Concession Agreement for the BOT 
Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III” (1997 
Concession Agreement) with PIATCO.432  The Government granted PIATCO the franchise to 
operate and maintain the said terminal during the concession period and to collect the fees, rentals 
and other charges in accordance with the rates or schedules stipulated in the 1997 Concession 
Agreement.  The Agreement provided that the concession period shall be for twenty-five (25) 
years commencing from the in-service date, and may be renewed at the option of the Government 
for a period not exceeding twenty-five (25) years.  At the end of the concession period, PIATCO 
shall transfer the development facility to MIAA.433 
 
Between November 1998 and June 2001, the agreement between the parties was 
amended and supplemented several times, making substantive changes to the original concession 
agreement. These changes included amendments to Sec. 1.11 pertaining to the definition of 
“certificate of completion”; Sec. 3.02 (a) dealing with the exclusivity of the franchise given to the 
Concessionaire; Sec. 4.04 concerning the assignment by Concessionaire of its interest in the 
Development Facility; Sec. 5.10 with respect to the temporary take-over of operations; Sec. 5.16 
pertaining to the taxes, duties and other imposts that may be levied on the Concessionaire;  Sec. 
6.03 as regards the periodic adjustment of public utility fees and charges; the entire Article VIII 
concerning the provisions on the termination of the contract; and Sec. 10.02 providing for the 





venue of the arbitration proceedings.434 The supplements to the contract contained provisions 
concerning time extensions, incremental and consequential costs and losses consequent to the 
existence of such structures; and some additional obligations on the part of PIATCO. 
 
Meanwhile, the MIAA which is charged with the maintenance and operation of the NAIA 
Terminals I and II had existing concession contracts with various service providers to offer 
international airline airport services, such as in-flight catering, passenger handling, ramp and 
ground support, aircraft maintenance and provisions, cargo handling and warehousing, and other 
services, to several international airlines at the NAIA.435   
 
On September 17, 2002, the workers of the international airline service providers filed 
before the Court a petition for prohibition to enjoin the enforcement of the aforesaid agreements 
claiming that they stand to lose their employment upon the implementation of the questioned 
agreements. On October 15, 2002, the service providers, joining the cause of the petitioning 
workers, filed a motion for intervention and a petition-in-intervention. On October 24, 2002, 
Congressmen Salacnib Baterina, Clavel Martinez and Constantino Jaraula filed a similar petition 
with this Court.436   
 
On December 11, 2002, another group of Congressmen moved to intervene in the case as 
Respondents-Intervenors.  They filed their Comment-In-Intervention defending the validity of the 
assailed agreements and praying for the dismissal of the petitions.437 
 






During the time the case was pending, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, on November 
29, 2002, in her speech at the 2002 Golden Shell Export Awards at Malacañang Palace stated that 
she will not “honour (PIATCO) contracts which the Executive Branch’s legal offices have 
concluded (as) null and void.”438 
 
Respondent PIATCO filed its submissions to the petitions on November 7 and 27, 2002. 
In their response, in addition to the material defences, PIATCO raised several procedural 
objections to the case including the availability of provision for arbitration.439 
 
The Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel 
filed their respective submissions on behalf of the public respondents. In their consolidated 
memorandum, the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the Government Corporate 
Counsel prayed that the petitions be given due course and that judgment be rendered declaring the 
1997 Concession Agreement, the ARCA and the Supplements thereto void for being contrary to 
the Constitution, the BOT Law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.440 
 
On March 6, 2003, respondent PIATCO informed the Court that on March 4, 2003 it 
commenced arbitration proceedings before the International Chamber of Commerce, International 
Court of Arbitration (ICC) by filing a Request for Arbitration with the Secretariat of the ICC 
against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines acting through the DOTC and 
MIAA.441 
 






Considering the procedural issue concerning arbitration, the court held that the arbitration 
step taken by PIATCO will not oust the Court of its jurisdiction over the case. The court held that 
the petitioners in the case who have presented legitimate interests in the resolution of the 
controversy are not parties to the PIATCO Contracts. Accordingly, they cannot be bound by the 
arbitration clause and hence, cannot be compelled to submit to arbitration proceedings. Further, 
the Court held that, a speedy and decisive resolution of all the critical issues in the present 
controversy, including those raised by petitioners, cannot be made before an arbitral tribunal. The 
object of arbitration is precisely to allow an expeditious determination of a dispute. This objective 
would not be met if the Court was to allow the parties to settle the cases by arbitration as there 
were certain issues involving non-parties to the PIATCO Contracts which the arbitral tribunal 
would not be equipped to resolve.442 
 
In arriving at the above finding, the court noted that in the case of Del Monte 
Corporation-USA, 443 even after finding that the arbitration clause in the Distributorship 
Agreement in question is valid and the dispute between the parties is arbitrable, the Court 
affirmed the trial court’s decision denying petitioner’s Motion to Suspend Proceedings pursuant 
to the arbitration clause under the contract. In so ruling, the Court held that as contracts produce 
legal effect between the parties, their assigns and heirs, only the parties to the Distributorship 
Agreement are bound by its terms, including the arbitration clause stipulated therein. The Court 
ruled that arbitration proceedings could be called for but only with respect to the parties to the 
contract in question.444  
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Although the finding of the court on this procedural issue could be technically justified in 
the light of the reasons given, as far as the petitioners who played no role in the concession 
agreement are concerned, one could argue that the court erred in its finding by ignoring the 
applicability of the arbitration clause to the state representatives who became petitioners by 
intervention. This argument is further strengthened by the fact that court went on to finally decide 
in sum, that in view of the absence of the requisite financial capacity of the Paircargo 
Consortium, predecessor of respondent PIATCO, the award by the PBAC of the contract for the 
construction, operation and maintenance of the NAIA IPT III is null and void. Further, 
considering that the 1997 Concession Agreement contains material and substantial amendments, 
which amendments had the effect of converting the 1997 Concession Agreement into an entirely 
different agreement from the contract bided upon, the court held that the 1997 Concession 
Agreement is similarly null and void for being contrary to public policy.  It could be argued that 
although the arbitration clause in the concession agreement did not bind for example the workers 
of the international airline service providers, it should have bound the solicitor general and the 
other state representatives who petitioned for an order that the concession agreement is null and 
void following the change of policy with the change of the regime. 
 
Outside parties such as environmental concern groups and public interest groups too have 
on many occasions for both valid and invalid reasons engineered the intervention of local judicial 
institutions to disrupt the continuity of investment projects. The Eppawela case in Sri Lanka and 
the Narmada case in India which are discussed in detail in the next chapter provide good 
examples of how judicial intervention can slow the progress of development projects.445 
 
 
                                                 
445 See Chapter 7, Sections A.1.c and B.4.a. 
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b. Bulankulama v. Min. of Industrial Development (Eppawala case)  
 
The Eppawala case is a good example of a case in which the local court in a developing 
country, i.e. Sri Lanka, has been extremely cautious in analysing the facts presented to it and has 
been successful in awarding relief to the affected litigants whilst ensuring that its decision would 
not unduly disrupt the development initiatives taken by the Government. Some of the key 
arguments considered by the Supreme Court and its reasoning in this case are discussed below: 
 
The case was filed by six owners of agricultural land and the Viharadhipathi (Head 
Priest) of the Galkanda Purana Viharaya (A Buddhist Temple at Galkanda in the North Central 
Province of Sri Lanka) (the “Petitioners”), all within the exploration area of the project called 
Eppawala in the Anuradhapura District in the North Central Province of Sri Lanka. The 
Petitioners’ claimed that they were in danger of losing their lands and livelihood as a result of this 
government-sanctioned project which, they said was not for a public purpose but for the 
enrichment of a private company. Further, the Petitioners’ claimed that about 2,600 families or 
12,000 persons, including themselves, are likely to be permanently displaced from their homes 
and lands.446 In addition, the petitioners claimed that the project was being entered into in a 
manner that circumvented the environmental laws of Sri Lanka and that clauses in the agreement 
binding the Government to assist the investment company to obtain all necessary approvals meant 
that any environmental impact assessment conducted thereafter (in which they as citizens were 
entitled to participate) was likely to be biased and not conducted in good faith. The petitioners 
accordingly claimed an imminent infringement of their rights under Article 12(1) of the 1978 
Constitution - right to equality before the law and equal protection of the law - and Articles 
14(1)(g) and (h) - right to choose their place of residence and carry on their livelihood.447 
                                                 




One of the handicaps faced by the Petitioners’ was that they were only in possession of 
unsigned copies of the documents relevant to prove their case and were not even aware whether 
those documents had subsequently been signed and/or amended by the contracting parties. As 
part of their prayer the petitioners asked for disclosure of the documents pending the hearing. In a 
significant ruling at the leave to proceed stage, the Supreme Court issued an order that the 
Mineral Investment Agreement, if signed, should be produced to Court within one week.448 When 
the document was produced before court, it turned out that the agreements were in fact not 
signed. However, the respondents admitted that the copies filed by the petitioners represented the 
final drafts which had been agreed between the contracting parties and initialled by the 
Government. 
 
In place of the detailed environmental impact assessment (EIA) procedure laid down in 
the National Environmental Act (NEA)449 and the Regulations made there under, the proposed 
Mineral Investment Agreement provided for the project company to conduct its own "feasibility 
study" with the aid of a qualified foreign consultant selected by the company. It was the Secretary 
to the Ministry of Industries and not the Central Environmental Authority (CEA) (as permitted 
under the NEA) who could decide whether to give the go ahead to the project following such 
study. Further, according to the proposed agreement, there was no provision for public 
participation as was mandatory under the EIA process under the NEA. In the event of the 
Secretary’s refusal to give approval, the company was able to take the Government to 
international arbitration in London.450 
 
Concerning this proposed contractual arrangement, the Court held that: 
                                                 
448 Id. 
449 National Environmental Act, No.47 of 1980 (as amended by Environmental Act No. 56 of 1988) 
450 Supra note 446. 
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 "What was being attempted by the proposed agreement was to substitute a procedure for that 
laid down by law. It was assumed that by a contractual arrangement between the executive 
branch of government and the company, the laws of the country could be avoided. That is an 
obviously erroneous assumption for no organ of government, no person whomsoever, is above the 
law."451  
 
  The Court was also severely critical of confidentiality clauses in the proposed agreement 
that would serve to keep information on the project out of reach of the people. Such clauses were, 
in its view, an "attempt to quell, appease, abate or even, under the guise of a binding contract, to 
legally put down or extinguish public protests".452 
 
The respondents (including the State) argued inter alia that the Petitioners lacked legal 
standing to bring this case before court and argued that the State enjoyed the status of trusteeship 
over all natural resources of the State and was therefore entitled to take development decisions 
involving such resources in the larger interest of the nation. Rejecting this argument, the Court 
pointed out that Constitution places a shared responsibility on the State and its citizens to 
safeguard the natural environment.453  
 
Concerning the question of infringement of the rights of the seven petitioners, the Court 
held that, it needed to be viewed in the context of the rights guaranteed: to them not only within 
the category of "all persons" as referred to, for instance, in Article 12(1) of the constitution, but 
"in particular as members of the citizenry of Sri Lanka".454 Justice Amarasinghe, who delivered 
the judgement, went on to opine that: 
 “International standard setting instruments have clearly recognized the principle of inter-
generational equity. It has been stated that humankind bears a solemn responsibility to protect 
and improve the environment for present and future generations. (Principle 1, Stockholm 
Declaration). The natural resources of the earth including the air, water, land flora and fauna 
must be safeguarded for the benefit of present and future generations. (Principle 2, Stockholm 






Declaration). The non-renewable resources of the earth must be employed in such a way as to 
guard against their future exhaustion and to ensure that benefits from such employment are 
shared by all humankind (Principle 5, Stockholm Declaration) The right to development must be 
fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future 
generations. (Principle 3, Rio De Janeiro Declaration). These inter-generational principles in my 
view, should be regarded as axiomatic in the decision making process in relation to matters 
concerning the natural resources and the environment of Sri Lanka in general, and particularly 
in the case before us.”455 
 
A clause in the proposed Agreement that drew particular adverse comment from the 
Court was the provision for relocation of occupants of land affected by the project. Under that 
clause it was the company that would determine when relocation was necessary. Although the 
company was nominally committed to bear the cost of such relocation, the Government was 
committed to "use its best efforts to facilitate the relocation of any inhabitants of such land as 
requested by the company in a manner which does not create an undue financial burden on the 
company or delay the company’s development and operation of the mining area." As the Court 
put it, this clause showed "not only that the petitioners and others may be affected but that if they 
are, the paramount consideration will be the interests of the company rather than those of the 
occupants of the affected areas".456 
 
The petitioners had made it clear, and the Court accepted, that they had no objection to 
the sustainable development of the Eppawala mineral deposits, and that they were not asking the 
Government to "sit back and do nothing" as alleged by the respondents. Thus, after analyzing the 
concept of sustainable development as contained in the international Stockholm and Rio de 
Janeiro Declarations on the environment, the Court opined that: 
"The human development paradigm needs to be placed within the context of our finite 
environment, so as to ensure the future sustainability of the mineral resources and of the water 
and soil conservation ecosystems of the Eppawala region, and of the North Central Province and 
Sri Lanka in general. Due account must also be taken of our un-renewable cultural heritage. 
Decisions with regard to the nature and scale of activity require the most anxious consideration 
from the point of view of safeguarding the health and safety of the people, naturally including the 




petitioners, ensuring the viability of their occupations, and protecting the rights of future 
generations of Sri Lankans." 
 
In its final judgment, arrived at after lengthy arguments and written submissions by the 
contesting parties, the Supreme Court Bench headed by Justice A. R. B. Amerasinghe, with 
Justices Wadugodapitiya and D. P. S. Gunasekera in agreement, held that the petitioners had 
established an imminent infringement of their fundamental rights. The Court noted that several 
scientists had pointed out the economic risks involved in entering into the Eppawala project 
without further studies into the extent of the reserves of rock phosphate actually available. In 
directing the Government that before proceeding any further with the project, it should carryout a 
comprehensive feasibility study in consultation with the local scientists, the Court remarked that 
such a study ought to have been done before the negotiating committee appointed by the 
President to conduct the final round of negotiations in 1997 recommended the signing of the 
proposed agreement.457 
 
As part of its order, the Court also issued a direction that after such studies were 
completed and the results published, any project proponent must obtain approval from the CEA 
"according to law including the decisions of the superior courts of record of Sri Lanka".458 
 
The judgment also set out several guidelines to be followed by the CEA. Most notable is 
the requirement that the CEA in its decision making should take note of the principles set out in 
the Stockholm and Rio Declarations. In particular the Court stressed the importance of the 
"precautionary principle" recognized in the latter, namely that where there is a threat of serious or 




irreversible damage to the environment, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as an 
excuse for postponing preventive measures.459 
 
The Court also drew attention to the "polluter pays" principle, namely, that the cost of 
environmental damage should be borne by the party that causes the harm and not be allowed to 
fall on the general community, "to be paid through reduced environmental quality or increased 
taxation in order to mitigate the environmentally degrading effects of a project". Stressing the 
need for strict compliance with the EIA procedure including the provisions for public 
participation before project approval is granted, Amarasinghe J. stated that: 
 "I should like to remind the persons concerned, and especially the Central Environmental 
Authority, that an environmental impact assessment exercise can identify the potential 
threats of a proposed activity or project, and that this information can then be used to 
modify the proposed activity in order to take these threats into account."460 
 
The Court noted that in this instance, the "salutary provisions" of the environmental laws 
had not been complied with. The alternative project approval procedure provided in the Mineral 
Investment Agreement was an "attempt to contract out of the obligation to comply with the 
law".461 
 
This judgment ought to be read carefully by the authorities in Sri Lanka who deals with 
development projects and investor promotions, especially the BOI of Sri Lanka, which threw its 
full weight behind this flawed project and the apparent attempts to bypass the relevant laws. This 
is important, if in future, a decision is taken to proceed with the project. In addition, the Court’s 
directions should be studied with care by the Central Environmental Authority of Sri Lanka 
which was content to remain passive while its statutory powers were bypassed or disregarded in 
setting up a project of enormous environmental consequences. 






In terms of development initiatives, environmental jurisprudence, and public law in 
general, the above judgment broke new ground in Sri Lanka. It is comparable to landmark 
decisions such as the Kamal Nath case in India462 and the Oposa case in the Philippines463 where 
the respective Courts showed that they were willing, in the public interest, to review decisions of 
the Executive regarding the management of natural resources, if the mismanagement of such 
resources was likely to interfere with the rights of present and future generations. 
 
5.4. Measures for Reducing Social and Judicial Obstacles 
  
5.4.1. Social Reforms 
 
Shortages, service problems and price increases of infrastructure services in countries 
with privatized utilities have provoked furious complaints from the public. In many countries, 
foreign companies are being portrayed as outright villains. Changing governments have 
responded to public frustration by imposing rate freezes and unilaterally changing contract terms 
and conditions much to the dissatisfaction of the investors. 
 
Infrastructure investments tend to be particularly sensitive to shifts in public opinion. 
When private companies who own or manage infrastructure facilities in developing countries 
increase the price of rates charged from the end users in their attempt to recover investments and 
earn profits, the host governments are likely to feel the public backlash. The situation becomes 
even more complicated in countries where the “culture of payment” for services is still immature 
                                                 
462 M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Natha (1977) ISCC 388. 
463 33 ILM 173 (1994) 
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or where the system for regulating rate increases is unstable or incapable of withstanding political 
pressures during an economic crisis. 
 
One of the best methods of minimising the risk of public opposition would be to educate 
the public of the advantages of allowing private sector and foreign investor participation in 
development of infrastructure. Whilst educating the public of the advance technology and 
efficient management the private sector and foreign investors would bring into provision of 
infrastructure facilities, the public also need to be educated of the certain sacrifices that have to be 
made, for example, increased pricing or acquisition of private land by the government for 
development needs. The public will have to be persuaded that these sacrifices are worth making 
in the larger interest of the nation. As noted by the preparatory committee for the World Summit 
on Sustainable Development, education at all levels is a key to sustainable development. 
Educating people for sustainable development does not mean the mere addition of environmental 
protection to a school curriculum; it involves the promotion of a balance among economic goals, 
social needs and ecological responsibility.464  
 
Steps will also have to be taken to wipe out corrupt practices in the procurement process 
of development projects. Steps also need to be taken to maintain transparency throughout the life 
cycle of development projects. As the end user or the ultimate beneficiary of every infrastructure 
project will be the public, the governments will need to ensure that no projects are promoted and 
given the green light to proceed at the expense of national interest.  
 
Governments should thus take specific actions in the future to defend their infrastructure 
development policies when faced with opposition. One method that could be adopted is to ensure 
                                                 
464 Commission on Sustainable Development (acting as the preparatory committee for the World Summit on Sustainable Development), Implementing Agenda 21, 
Second preparatory session (28 January - 8 February 2002), E/CN.17/2002/PC.2/.  
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that specially appointed teams comprising of members of all political groups representing the 
country’s legislature screens development projects. This will indeed minimize the room for 
criticism of development projects by political parties who are not in control of the county’s 
legislative and executive bodies purely in order to gain political mileage.   
 
The conflict of interest between public concerns and development needs of countries is 
an important issue the host countries, investors and other participants in project financing will 
need to address. Winning over public opinion will not be difficult if the parties involved in a 
project to which public criticism has been expressed, act in a transparent manner and without any 
corrupt practices.  
It may not be possible for the developing countries to implement above initiatives by 
them selves. Thus the investors as well as the international development agencies may have to 
support the social reform initiatives taken by developing countries.  As noted by Hewko (2003): 
 “If legislative and institutional reform is a goal to attract FDI, considerably more 
attention needs to be paid by the international development community to the precise 
concerns of foreign investors and their advisers. Foreign investors place their own 
resources at risk and spend considerable funds on lawyers and accountants to identify the 
specific dangers and problems relating to their investments. As a result, foreign investors 
and their advisers, much more so than a development guru flying in for a weekend of 
diagnostic analysis, are best suited for identifying exactly the changes needed in the 
legislative framework to address foreign investors’ concerns and thus to facilitate FDI”.465 
 
5.4.2. Judicial Reforms 
 
A legal and judicial system that includes consistent and modern legislation, effective and 
efficient courts, and regulatory institutions that interpret and enforce the laws in a fair and 
transparent manner is a desirable and laudable goal and, all things being equal, a country with 
such an ideal system will attract more FDI than one that does not.466  
                                                 




There is a substantive body of empirical evidence that demonstrates the importance of 
legal and judicial reform in achieving a high rate of economic growth.467The argument is that 
weak or nonexistent laws and judicial institutions not only create a bias against new firms 
that have no means by which to persuade clients of their reliability, but also a bias in 
favour of simple over more complex transactions, since it is unlikely that legal remedies 
can be invoked in cases of non-fulfilment of contracts.468 
 
As far as infrastructure development projects are concerned, foreign investors will 
generally prefer a country in which the legal system is developed, fair, open, and transparent to 
one in which the rule of law is absent. On the other hand an impartial judicial system is also 
necessary to advance equality and allow a voice for the poor, thereby making a fair and 
functioning legal system an element of a comprehensive developmental framework. 
 
However, the existence of such a pristine system or the degree to which it is absent is 
often not the decisive factor in attracting foreign investment. The most important factor in 
attracting FDI remains the existence of actual business opportunities. Nevertheless, it is an 
accepted fact that a legal environment that is conducive to foreign investment helps developing 
countries to attract more investors. 
 
In the circumstances, host governments in developing countries should take initiatives to 
establish an investment friendly legal environment in their jurisdictions. This should not be done 
by compromising the rights of their nationals or at the cost of violating the national laws and or 
                                                 
467 Barro, R.J., “Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 106:407 (1991), p.43; Havrylyshyn, O. and Ron van Rooden, 
“Institutions Matter in Transition, But So Do Policies”, Working Paper 00/70 (Washington, D.C: International Monetary Fund, 2000); Campos, N.F. “Context 
Is Everything: Measuring Institutional Change in Transition Economies”, Policy Research Working Paper 2269, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2000) 
468 Posner, R.A., “Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development”, Research Observer 13(1):1–11 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1998). 
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policy regimes, but rather, by identifying the national development goals and thereafter by 
providing a legal environment in which those goals could be pursued. 
 
In the circumstances, the developing country governments should take two key 
initiatives: 1) the establishment of an investment friendly legal regime;469 and 2) the education of 
the local law makers and judges on the importance of investment initiatives to the development of 
the nation and the sensitiveness of such projects being put on hold by bad court orders.  
 
However, this does not in any way mean that the power of courts to interfere in the in the 
larger interest of the public and the nation should be curtailed if sufficient evidence of imminent 
danger to the environment or public life is available. What needs to be done is on the one hand 
while maintaining transparency on all investment projects so that room for misinformation is 
minimised, on the other hand to introduce a judicial mechanism that can be swiftly put into 
motion by the public or other interest groups who wants to question any initiatives or effects 
involving an investment project. Identifying and or creating special courts that can swiftly deal 
with such issues may be a good solution, as this will allow a competent court to deal with 
disputes in relation to an investment project promptly, without being burdened by the heavy work 
load of other existing disputes. 
 
                                                 
469 Some countries like Philippines and Vietnam have already introduced specific investment laws to deal with most aspects of infrastructure investment. 
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Chapter 6 - Infrastructure Development and Protecting the 
Rights of Indigenous People  
 
6.1. Nature of the Problem 
 
Investment decisions in developing countries are too often made with scant regard for 
their potential effect on human rights. While environmental and social impact assessments are 
now an entrenched and necessary reality, foreign investors are often not required by developing 
country governments to study a project's potential effect on human rights in the host 
communities. Consequently, human rights violations resulting from foreign direct investment are 
often addressed only after they have occurred and after the damage is done. As a result, many 
development projects in developing countries have been abandoned or cancelled. Thus, for future 
progress of infrastructure development with FDI, it is important that the parties concerned give 
careful consideration to issues relating to human rights violations resulting from development 
activities. Understanding these issues would enable host countries as well as investors to promote 
sustainable development whilst ensuring that the interests of the local communities are not 
compromised. 
 
In recent times, most acute violations resulting from development activities in developing 
countries had been of the rights of indigenous communities. As socioeconomic development 
takes place many development initiatives are extending farther into geographically remote areas 
often considered the traditional homelands of indigenous peoples; these areas offer resources such 
as forests, minerals, and hydropower potential. Roads, dams, power transmission lines, and other 
infrastructure development projects similarly are extending into the traditional areas of 
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indigenous peoples.470 In parallel with physical and economic development, dominant and 
mainstream populations and cultures also are extending into the traditional areas of indigenous 
peoples. 
 
Protection of indigenous peoples from development or maintenance of a status quo for 
indigenous peoples should not be a development objective. At the same time, it is not uncommon 
that interests of indigenous peoples differ from those of the mainstream and that development 
policies and approaches addressing the interests of dominant and mainstream communities’ 
conflict with the interests of indigenous peoples.471 What may be in the broad national interest 
may not be in the specific interests of indigenous peoples, and thus, development emerging from 
dominant and mainstream community-oriented initiatives may arrive in forms not consistent with 
indigenous peoples' interests or concerns.472  
 
Development, as it most often is pursued is intended to meet national goals and the 
interests of dominant and mainstream societies. Reducing poverty and improving the quality of 
life of people in general most often are the primary objectives of development.473 However, it is 
not always the case that poverty reduction and improvement in the quality of life realised from 
development extend equally to all segments of society or that, improvement reaches each segment 
of society. Moreover, in mainstream-oriented economic development policies, indigenous 
peoples’ communities may bear a disproportionate burden of the negative social, economic, and 
environmental effects that such development projects may bring, without realising commensurate 
benefits.474 
 
                                                 
470 Asian Development Bank, The Bank’s Policy on Indigenous Peoples, April 1998. 
471 Id.  
472 Id. 
473 World Bank, “Entering the 21st Century”, World Development Report 1999/2000. 
474 See supra note 468. 
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Development viewed from the mainstream often is measured in terms of economic 
advancement or gain and improvement in quality of life, and most often places emphasis on 
economic growth.475 From the development perspective of indigenous peoples, in addition to 
economic advancement, there may also be concern for social, cultural, environmental, and 
community aspects of development.476 Indigenous peoples sometimes view the principles and 
efforts of mainstream development as inappropriate or unsustainable, and as an intrusion into 
traditional ways of life.477 The physical intrusions of development interventions into the 
traditional domains of indigenous peoples and social intrusions into indigenous cultures can be 
viewed by indigenous peoples as a violation of rights to land and rights associated with the 
maintenance of culture. 
 
As discussed in the previous chapters, developing countries rely on FDI for their ever-
growing development needs. Most infrastructure development projects, be it a development of a 
highway, a water resource or power generation, would involve the granting of long term 
concessions on land and/or other natural resources of the host country to the parties investing in 
the project. Initiating development projects and granting of concessions to investors will often 
require the acquisition of lands and other natural resources held by individuals or groups by the 
state.  
 
Most developing countries have introduced fair mechanisms for acquisition of private 
land for development projects. Usually, a reasonable compensation package and an offer of 
relocation satisfy most individuals or corporate entities who are required to give up their land and 
other resources to the state for development projects. However, acquisition of land and other 
resources owned or occupied by indigenous peoples is not as easy. Monitory compensation or 
                                                 
475 Id. 
476World Bank, Revised Draft Operational Policy/Bank Procedures (op/bp 4.10), Indigenous Peoples (14 April 2005).   
477 See supra note 468. 
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relocation might not always be adequate compensation for taking over traditional homelands of 
indigenous peoples where they and before them their forefathers have lived and enjoyed right of 
life from time immemorial.  
 
The protests by indigenous peoples and legal actions that may be filed seeking redress 
and protection of their rights over land might cause long delays to infrastructure projects, causing 
grave and irreparable damage to the host governments as well as investors. What governments 
and investors fear most concerning indigenous people as far as infrastructure development 
projects are concerned is the risk facing legal actions seeking injunctive relief to prevent the 
development of projects.  Usually, there are two principles relating to the granting of injunctive 
relief to restrain development projects when allegations are made that native titles of indigenous 
people are being compromised.478 The first is whether there is a serious issue to be tried. This 
would require the indigenous people alleging the violation of their rights to put forward some 
satisfactory evidence as to the existence of their native customary title to the lands in issue. The 
second is the "balance of convenience" issue where the indigenous people should show that the 
balance of convenience favour the granting of an injunction to prevent a development project 
from proceeding with its work. 
 
 In considering the said issues, the courts would weigh the alleged prejudice to the native 
title claimants if a project is developed as against the prejudice to the government479 and or the 
investor if the project is suspended. The difference can best be illustrated by contrasting a "grass 
roots" exploration program with an established mining operation. It is conceivable that the 
implementation of a grass roots exploration program on ground which may have native title and 
                                                 
478 This is in addition to other pre-conditions such as whether injunction is necessary or futile, whether an alternative remedy available, whether damages alone 
serves as an appropriate remedy, requirement of actionable wrong or prima facie case, which the courts in most common law jurisdictions as well as civil law 
jurisdictions consider before granting injunctive relief. 
479 In some jurisdictions injunctive relief against the government is barred by statute. For example, see Section 24 of the Interpretation Ordinance (Chapter 2) of Sri 
Lanka. In such situation, the only remedy available to the complainants may be compensation for their losses.  
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which has not yet been disturbed would be stayed by courts. The courts would most likely take 
the view that the prejudice to the indigenous people from having the ground disturbed is greater 
than the prejudice to the project company if the ground remains undisturbed for the present. 
However, in contrast, an injunction may not be issued to restrain mining operations once a mining 
project has been constructed with substantial amounts of capital invested in it, on the basis that 
native title exists over the land used for the project. The courts may consider that the ground 
would already be so disturbed that any additional disturbance could not be said to prejudice the 
indigenous communities, but there would be great prejudice to the project company if the project 
operations are stayed.  
 
Given the above background, the aim of this chapter is to show how the indigenous rights 
come into conflict with the development activities. Case studies from the Philippines, Malaysia 
and Indonesia will be used emphasis how the rights of the indigenous people are affected and 
how the ensuing legal battles with the governments and the investors result in delays and 
inconveniences to the project proponents.  Proposals will be made on various approaches that 
could be taken by developing countries, investors and also by international organizations to 
ensure that development activities could be carried out without compromising the rights of 
indigenous peoples.  
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6.2. Indigenous People 
 
There is no universal and unambiguous definition of the concept of 'indigenous peoples', 
but there are a number of criteria by which indigenous peoples can be identified 
and characterised. The most widespread approaches are those proposed in the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No.169480 and in the 1986 Martinéz Cobo Report to the 
UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination of Minorities.481  
 
The ILO Convention No. 169 states that a people are considered indigenous either 
because they are descendants of those who lived in the area before colonisation; or because they 
have maintained their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions since colonisation 
and the establishment of new states.482 Furthermore, the ILO Convention states that, self-
identification is crucial for indigenous peoples. This criterion has for example been applied in a 
land-claims agreement between the Canadian Government and the Inuit of the Northwest 
Territories.483 
 
According to the Martinéz Cobo Report to the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of 
Discrimination of Minorities, indigenous peoples may be identified as follows: 
“Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical 
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their 
territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now 
prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant 
sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future 
generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their 
                                                 
480 ILO, Convention (No. 169) concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries. Adopted on 27 June 1989 by the General Conference of the 
International Labour Organization at its seventy-sixth session. Entry into force on 5 September 1991. 
481 See the ‘Study of the Problem of 
 
Discrimination against Indigenous Populations’
 
submitted to the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination 
and the Protection of Minorities by Special Rapporteur, Mr. Martinez Cobo, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7 (1986). 
482 Supra note 480. 
483 Id. 
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continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, 
social institutions and legal systems.” 
 
“This historical continuity may consist of the continuation, for an extended period 
reaching into the present, of one or more of the following factors: 
- Occupation of ancestral lands, or at least of part of them; 
- Common ancestry with the original occupants of these lands; 
- Culture in general, or in specific manifestations (such as religion, 
living under a tribal system, membership of an indigenous community, 
dress, means of livelihood, lifestyle, etc.); 
- Language (whether used as the only language, as mother-tongue, as 
the habitual means of communication at home or in the family, or as 
the main, preferred, habitual, general or normal language); 
- Residence in certain parts of the country, or in certain regions of the 
world.” 484 485 
 
Thus, Indigenous people in any country are the off springs and heirs of the peoples who 
have first inhabited and cared for the land long before any central government was established. At 
least 350 million people worldwide are considered to be indigenous. Most of them live in remote 
areas in the world.486 Indigenous peoples are divided into at least 5000 peoples ranging from the 
forest peoples of the Amazon to the tribal peoples of India and from the Inuit of the Arctic to the 
Aborigines in Australia. Very often they inhabit lands that are rich in minerals and natural 
resources.487   
 
                                                 
484 Supra note 481. 
485 Before 1969 the problems of indigenous populations have not been on the agenda of the Commission on Human Rights or of the Sub-Commission on Prevention 
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, although a number of studies undertaken by Special Rapporteurs of the Sub-Commission on various 
discrimination issues indirectly benefited indigenous peoples. In 1969 the Sub-Commission had before it a report of the Special Rapporteur on the Study on 
Racial Discrimination in the Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Spheres. It included a chapter on measures taken in connection with the protection of 
indigenous peoples. This started a process of discussion in the Sub-Commission and in the Commission on Human Rights. In 1970 the Sub-Commission 
recommended that a comprehensive study be made of the problem of discrimination against indigenous populations. The recommendation passed the 
Commission and was finally taken up by the Economic and Social Council. The Council adopted resolution 1589 (L) of 21 May, 1971, in which it authorized 
the preparation of such a study. in 1971 Mr. Jose Martinez Cobo was appointed Special Rapporteur for the study on the problem of discrimination against 
indigenous populations. The study which was finally completed between 1981 and 1984, starts with a working definition of “indigenous populations” and 
covers a wide range of issues, such as indigenous identity, culture and legal systems, health and medical care, housing, education, language etc. (see supra note 
481). 
486 For a Map on the spread of indigenous people in the globe, see the following website: http://www.ifg.org/programs/indig/IFGmap.pdf  
487 Source: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. Online:http://www.iwgia.org/sw155.asp 
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There has been a dynamic evolution of nation-states during the last four hundred years. 
This process has produced over 190 States in the global community.488 This emergence of nation-
states as a dominant political reality has pushed aside empires, kingdoms and indigenous tribes to 
set new rules for the organisation of human political, economic and social affairs. Where there 
were empires, nation-states have been formed. Where there were kingdoms, nation-states have 
been established. Where indigenous tribes had lived for thousands of years, nation-states have 
been created.489  
 
While empires collapsed and kingdoms either assumed the character of nation-states or 
dissolved, thousands of indigenous tribal groups have been absorbed into nation-states, often 
against their will or without their knowledge. This has resulted in indigenous groups in many 
countries having to go along with the policies of the State that has assumed control over them 
without their consent. This brings to light the interesting issue concerning the status whole 
populations of indigenous peoples who had neither chosen to join a nation-state nor to lose their 
separate and distinct political identity.490  
 
Until recently, in most countries, the indigenous groups were neglected. Their political, 
economic and cultural rights were under the control of nation-states. They were suppressed and 
exploited to the benefit of the nation-state or in the larger interest of the majority. Legal or 
                                                 
488 As of November 2005 there are 191 member countries of the United Nations. The figure is likely to be increased by one if in the near future Serbia and 
Montenegro decide to end their current partner-state existence and claim recognition as separate States.  
489 See generally, Ryser, R. C., Concept Paper: Finding a Place for Indigenous Peoples in the family of Nations (Olympia: Center for World Indigenous Studies, 
1980). 
490 Many indigenous tribal groups have assumed the character of nation-states (particularly in Asia, Africa and the Middle East) by having political control over the 
nation-state. However, there are many other indigenous tribal groups who are surrounded by nation-states, but yet have no  influence or control in the national 
government. The indigenous communities such as the Veddhas in Sri Lanka and the Bedouins in the Arab states are good examples.  
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political recourse were hardly offered to the indigenous tribal group to determine their own future 
or govern themselves except at the whim of the controlling nation-state.491  
 
6.3. Rights of the Indigenous People 
 
All peoples in the world are said to possess, without qualification, the right to self-
determination.492 They are inherently free to act and decide as a matter of principle on questions 
concerning their civil and human rights. In short, any grouping of people may choose a form of 
government and one day, in time; choose to associate with any other government.493 They may 
also choose to remain independent. The principle of self-determination is specified in the Charter 
of the United Nations and it is given further expression in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948).494  Also supportive of this notion is the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (1966).495 Self-determination is also expressed in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966).496 The Universal Declaration provides a common 
standard for the human rights of all peoples and all nations, and proclaims the importance of 
traditional, political, and civil rights, as well as basic economic social and cultural rights. The 
                                                 
491 There are some exceptions however, to this general practice of non-reorganization of the rights of self determination of indigenous groups. For example, in the 
island territories of Palau, Yap, Truk, Ponape, Kosrae and Marshal (North Pacific Ocean), the tribal populations have successfully negotiated a status of free 
association with the United States. By virtue of a bi-lateral compact with the U.S. Government, the indigenous peoples of these islands are guaranteed internal 
self-government and the full right to carry out their own relations with other peoples without U.S. interference. The compact (for five years) places the military 
defense of the islands under the authority of the United States. The free associate status permits the indigenous peoples to express their political will within the 
global community without interference from the state with which they have associated. Another example is the Basque peoples of Northern Spain who have 
achieved home-rule in three provinces.   
492 A corollary to this principle of political self-determination can be found in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 
(United Nations General Assembly resolution 1514), which provides that peoples (can) "freely determine their political status." This assertion also appears in 
the International Covenant on Human Rights and in the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among 
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (United Nations General Assembly resolution 2625). 
493 Gray, A., The Indigenous Movement in Asia, Indigenous Peoples of Asia, (Michigan: Ann Arbor Association for Asian Studies, 1995) pp. 35-42. 
494 Adopted and proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948. Online: http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html 
495 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by the United Nations, General Assembly
 
resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966. Entry into 
force 3 January 1976,. Available online: http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm. 
496 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966. Entry into force 23 March 
1976, in accordance with Article 49 . Available online: http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm. 
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Covenant spells out civil and political rights and guiding principles based on the Universal 
Declaration. 
 
The 1957 International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No. 107 was one of the 
first international instruments in specific support of indigenous peoples.497 It addressed the right 
of indigenous peoples to pursue material well being and spiritual development. ILO Convention 
No. 107 was followed in 1989 by ILO Convention 169.498  This Convention presented the 
fundamental concept that the way of life of indigenous and tribal peoples should and will survive, 
as well as the view that indigenous and tribal peoples and their traditional organisations should be 
closely involved in the planning and implementation of development projects that affect them. As 
the most comprehensive and most current international legal instrument to address issues vital to 
indigenous and tribal peoples, Convention No. 169 includes articles that deal with consultation 
and participation, social security and health, human development, and the environment.499  
 
The indigenous peoples rights to participate meaningfully in natural resource 
management that affects their rights is also recognised in several international declarations and 
conventions including the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,500 the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,501 the ILO Convention 
169, Agenda 21,502 the OAS Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,503 the UN Draft 
                                                 
497  Convention on Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries (1957). 
498 Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (1989). 
499 To date, Convention No. 169 has been ratified by only a few countries, and significantly so far by none of the developing countries in the Asian and Pacific 
Region. 
500 Agenda 21, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, and the Statement of principles for the Sustainable Management of Forests were adopted by 
more than 178 Governments at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 3 to 14 June 1992. 
501 Adopted and opened for signature and ratification by General Assembly resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965. Came into force on 4 January 1969. 
502 Adopted on 27 June 1989 by the General Conference of the International Labour Organization at its seventy-sixth session. Came into force on 5 September 1991.  
503  OEA/Ser/L/V/II.95 Doc. 6, Feb. 26, 1997. 
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Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,504 and the UN Convention on Biological 
Diversity.505  
 
Included in these various conventions and declarations are the recognition of indigenous 
land rights, traditional resource management, equal rights to participate in public affairs, the need 
to protect indigenous lands from environmental threats, and the need to achieve prior informed 
consent of indigenous peoples before making decisions affecting their rights and interests. 
 
Agenda 21 adopted by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED) in 1992, recognizes the actual and potential contribution of indigenous and tribal 
peoples to sustainable development.506 The 1992 Convention on Biodiversity calls on contracting 
parties to respect traditional indigenous knowledge with regard to the preservation of biodiversity 
and its sustainable use.507 The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action emerging from the 
1993 World Conference on Human Rights recognizes the dignity and unique cultural 
contributions of indigenous peoples, and strongly reaffirms the commitment of the international 
community to the economic, social, and cultural well-being of indigenous peoples and their 
enjoyment of the fruits of sustainable development.508 
 
In addition, the Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP) established by the 
UN in 1982 completed its work on a "Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples" in 
                                                 
504  U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1 (1994). 
505 The Convention on Biological Diversity was negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).  It was opened for signature 
at the June 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) and entered into force on 29 December 1993. Signed by 150 governments, the 
Convention is dedicated to promoting sustainable development. The Convention is available online: http://www.biodiv.org/doc/legal/cbd-en.pdf 
506 Agenda 21 is a comprehensive plan of action to be taken globally, nationally and locally by organizations of the United Nations System, Governments, and 
Major Groups in every area in which human impacts on the environment. Agenda 21, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, and the Statement 
of principles for the Sustainable Management of Forests were adopted by more than 178 Governments at the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janerio, Brazil, 3 -
 
14 June, 1992. 
   Available online: http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/agenda21toc.htm 
507 See supra note 505. 
508 UNHCR, Fact Sheet No.9 (Rev.1), The Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Online: http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs9.htm 
 255
1993.509 This Draft Declaration, developed with the direct participation of indigenous people is 
currently under consideration within the United Nations. It addresses issues such as the right to 
participation, the right of indigenous peoples to direct their own development, the right of 
indigenous peoples to determine and develop priorities and strategies for the development or use 
of ancestral territories and resources, and the right to self-determination.510 It represents one of 
the most important developments in the promotion and protection of the basic rights and 
fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples. It consists of 19 preamble paragraphs and 45 
articles that covers rights and freedoms including the preservation and development of ethnic and 
cultural characteristics and distinct identities; protection against genocide and ethnocide; rights 
related ownership, possession or use of indigenous lands and natural resources; maintenance of 
traditional economic structures and ways of life, including hunting, fishing, herding, gathering, 
timber-sawing and cultivation; environmental protection; participation in the political, economic 
and social life of the countries concerned, in particular in matters which may affect indigenous 
peoples’ lives and destinies; self-determination; self-government or autonomy in matters relating 
to indigenous peoples' internal and local affairs; and the honouring of treaties and agreements 
concluded with indigenous peoples.511  
 
In 1995, the Commission on Human Rights established its own working group to 
examine the draft declaration.512 Since its establishment, the working group on the draft 
declaration has held two sessions. At its first session, in November-December 1995, the group 
considered the draft declaration adopted by the Sub-Commission and held a general debate on the 
text section by section in order to identify where there was general consensus and which articles 
                                                 
509 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56, (28 October, 1994) 
510 The emerging concern for indigenous peoples prompted the United Nations to declare 1993 as the International Year of the World's Indigenous Peoples and the 
decade from December 1994 as the Indigenous Peoples Decade. 
 
 511 See Supra note 507. 
512 See supra note 508. 
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would require greater deliberation.513 At the second session, in October-November 1996, articles 
dealing with similar themes or having some other relationship with each other were re-clustered 
for the purposes of discussion and in order to hear proposals.514 No changes have yet been made 
to the draft declaration adopted by the Sub-Commission, which remains the basis for the work of 
the inter-sessional working group. When the Commission on Human Rights completes its work, 
the Draft Declaration is expected to be submitted to the UN General Assembly for final adoption.  
 
As of March 1997, 15 organisations of indigenous peoples have consultative status with 
the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Consultative status entitles them to 
attend and contribute to a wide range of international and intergovernmental conferences.515  It is 
likely that these organisations will put significant amount of pressure on the ECOSOC for 
recognition and up-liftment of indigenous rights.  
 
In addition to the aforesaid initiatives taken by the international community to recognise 
and promote indigenous rights, the indigenous movement also got a boost in the mid 1970’s from 
the foundation of international indigenous organisations such as the International Indian Treaty 
Council (IITC)516 and the World Council of Indigenous People (WCIP).517  These organisations 
have been effective in bringing the indigenous affairs to the international agenda.   
 
                                                 
513 See E/CN.4/1996/84. 
514 See E/CN.4/1997/102. 
515 These organisations are: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Asociación Kunas Unidos por Nabguana, Four Directions Council, Grand Council of 
the Crees (of Quebec), Indian Council of South America, Indian Law Resource Centre, Indigenous World Association, International Indian Treaty Council, 
International Organization of Indigenous Resource Development, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, National Aboriginal and Islander Legal Services Secretariat, 
National Indian Youth Council, Saami Council, Sejekto Cultural Association of Costa Rica, and World Council of Indigenous Peoples (Source: Fact Sheet No.9 
(Rev.1), The Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights). 
516 The IITC was founded in 1974 at a gathering by the American Indian Movement in Standing Rock, South Dakota attended by more than 5000 representatives of 
98 Indigenous Nations. In 1977, the IITC became the first organization of Indigenous Peoples to be reorganized as a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) 
with Consultative Status to the United Nations Economic and Social Council. 
517 WCIP is a non-governmental organization created in 1975. Its goal is to promote the pacific co-existence between indigenous or autochthonous people, the 
national governments and other members of society by developing and supporting different projects. 
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The people of the Philippine Cordillera, the first Asians to take part in the international 
indigenous movement, were the first indigenous group to carry out a successful campaign against 
a development project that affected their rights, namely the building of the Chico River Dam in 
1981-1982. 518 519 Since then, there have been growing concerns for indigenous rights in the 
international arena. Increased publicity focused on the continuing disrespect for indigenous 
human rights and the destruction of the indigenous peoples' environment, together with the 
national governments' inability to deal with the situation has largely contributed towards this 
growing world focus on indigenous people and their rights.520 However, despite the international 
recognition of equality of people and their right to self determination, various indigenous groups 
in the world continue to face an uphill task in preserving their identity and enjoying their rights. 
 
6.4. Risks to Development Projects Resulting from Violation of 
Indigenous Peoples Rights 
 
As a result of the growing global concerns for human rights and protecting indigenous 
communities which were discussed in the previous section, there has been an increased 
formalisation of the legal rights of indigenous peoples during the last two decades. New and 
revised indigenous laws have been passed, legal challenges raised and, new, yet weak institutions 
formed to protect indigenous rights.521  This movement has been complimented by several 
international organizations who, having  realised the necessity of applying policies, programs and 
                                                 
518 The Chico River is the longest and most elaborate river system in the Cordillcra mountain ranges in Northern Luzon. The indigenous people who occupy 
neighbouring lands belong to the Kalinga and Bontoc tribal groups. The lands in question are the ancestral properties of these communities and are considered 
sacred. In 1981 the tribal people fiercely resisted military led engineers who tried to construct the Chico River dam in the northern Philippines. They were able 
to prevent the acquisition of their lands after a guerrilla war that cost hundreds of lives.  
519 See generally, Ghee, L.T., and Valancia, M., Conflict over Natural Resources in South-East Asia and the Pacific, (Tokyo: United Nations University Press 1990), 
Chapter 6. 
520 See generally, Kastrup, J.P., “The Internationalization of Indigenous Rights from the Environmental and Human Rights Perspective”, 32 Texas International 
Law Journal (1997)  p. 97 at 102 . 
521 See generally, Anaya,  S. J.,  Indigenous Peoples in International Law, (Oxford: University Press, 2000). 
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specific rules concerning indigenous peoples and their protection in some countries, have taken 
the initiative put  such policy frameworks in place.  
 
As noted in the previous section of this thesis, since in 1957, the ILO adopted the 
Convention No. 107 of 1957 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Populations to be applied to 
indigenous and tribal populations in independent countries and aimed at protecting these peoples 
against abuses522 several other key international organizations have adopted policies on protecting 
the indigenous communities from being sidelined or their rights being compromised as a result of 
development initiatives taken by the States in which they live.523 The World Bank, for example, 
first adopted a policy on indigenous peoples in the early 1990’s as a result of the dismal 
experience of projects in Latin America. The World Bank now seeks to apply its current policy 
on indigenous peoples to all investment projects in which it participates.524  In 1998 the EU 
adopted the 'Council Resolution on Indigenous Peoples within the Framework of the 
Development Cooperation of the Community and Members States', which provides the main 
guidelines for support to indigenous peoples.525 ADB adopted its policy on indigenous people in 
1998. The ADB's Operations Manual of 2004 describes the bank’s policy and procedures in 
addressing indigenous peoples’ issues in ADB funded projects.526 It provides inter alia that: 
“Reducing poverty and improving the quality of life of all people in Asia is ADB's 
overarching objective. Poverty is defined by ADB as "a deprivation of essential assets and 
opportunities to which every human is entitled". The poor may be denied access to assets 
because they belong to an ethnic minority or a community considered socially inferior. 
Therefore, poverty reduction and improvement in the quality of life realized from 
development must be extended equitably and reach each segment of society, including 
indigenous peoples.”527 
                                                 
522 See supra note 497. 
523 In 1989, a revised Convention - Convention No. 169 on Indigenous Peoples was adopted by the ILO in the light of changes in the position of indigenous and 
tribal populations and of greater understanding of their position by governments, employers and workers. 
524 On May 10, 2005, the World Bank Executive Directors approved a revised policy on Indigenous Peoples. The updated policy, as reflected in the OP/BP 4.10, 
Indigenous Peoples, replaces the earlier policy (Operational Directive 4.20, Indigenous Peoples, dated September 1991). OP/BP 4.10 applies to all investment 
projects for which a Project Concept Review takes place on or after July 1, 2005.  
525 The resolution is available online: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/human_rights/ip/ 
526Available online: http://www.adb.org/Documents/Policies/Indigenous_Peoples/default.asp 
527 Paragraph 5 of the Operations Manual issued on 13 May 2004. Available online: http://www.adb.org/Documents/Manuals/Operations/OMF03_13may04.pdf 
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The other international organizations that have adopted similar policies on protecting the 
indigenous people in the light of development activities which may result in them being sidelined 
or their rights being compromised include, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) 
which’s policy on indigenous peoples is entitled 'Strategy for Indigenous Development'528; the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), which’s policy on indigenous peoples is entitled 
"UNDP and Indigenous Peoples: A Practice Note on Engagement"529; the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which’s Universal Declaration on 
Cultural Diversity adopted in 2001 is of relevance to indigenous peoples.530 In addition, there is 
the World Conservation Union’s (IUCN) policy agenda for indigenous peoples and conservation 
which is very broad and is guided by the resolutions of the World Conservation Congress (WCC) 
and by specific international agreements, Inter governmental organisations and UN agencies. In 
particular, the Unit's work in these areas is guided by the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD), the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).531 
 
In addition to the aforementioned policy frameworks put in place by international 
organizations, several development agencies linked with developed countries that provide 
substantial development aid to developing countries too have adopted policies to ensure the 
protection of indigenous communities. Examples of such agencies include the Norwegian Agency 
for Development Cooperation (NORAD) which’s policy on indigenous peoples is 
entitled 'Guidelines for Norway's Efforts to Strengthen Support for Indigenous Peoples in 
                                                 
528 Available on line: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=691275 
529 Available online: www.undp.org/cso/policies/doc/IPPolicyEnglish 
530 Available online: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001271/127160m.pdf 
531 For further information see: http://www.iucn.org/themes/pbia/themes/indigenous/whatwedo.htm 
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Development Cooperation'532 and the Danish International Development Assistance (DANIDA), 
which in 2004 developed its 'Strategy for Danish Support to Indigenous People'.533 
 
As a result of the continuing development of the movement towards recognising 
indigenous peoples rights noted above, in the years to come, most developing countries are likely 
to pass new legislations or amend existing legislations in order to cater to the demand of 
recognition of the rights of indigenous people. However, in countries where efficient and 
effective mechanism have not been put in place to ensure that the rights of indigenous people are 
not unfairly compromised in favour of infrastructure development needs, there bound to be 
conflicts between the indigenous groups on one hand and the governments and investors on the 
other. Some of these conflicts may lead to prolonged legal battles between the parties causing 
severe economic losses to host countries as well as investors. Sometimes, the conflicts could 
continue to consume local and national resources long after the investment projects have been 
stopped and the foreign investors have left. A good example is the conflict concerning the 
uranium mining in Navajo, where the damages done in the 1940’s were drawn out for over fifty 
years until in 1990 statutory provision was made to provide compensation for the native Indians 
who were victims of severe respiratory and other illnesses due to exposure to uranium.534   
 
In the circumstances, it could be argued that the risks of infrastructure projects being 
disrupted, delayed or even cancelled due to conflicting interests of indigenous people is matter 
that needs serious consideration by developing country governments as well as other key project 
participants. The following case studies emphasize the key issues discussed above and look at 
                                                 
532 Available online: http://www.norad.no/default.asp?V_ITEM_ID=1632 
533 Available online:http://www.um.dk/Publikationer/Danida/English/DanishDevelopmentCooperation/StrategyforDanishSupport/strategyforDanishSupport.pdf 
534 In 1990 a law was passed known as the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act of 1990 (RECA). The law required $100,000 in "compassion payments" to 
uranium miners diagnosed with cancer or other respiratory ailments. To qualify for compensation, a miner had to prove that s/he had worked in the mines and 
was now suffering from one of the diseases on the compensation list. For more details, please see http://www.umich.edu/~snre492/sdancy.html 
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several development projects from the perspectives of affected groups as well as host countries 
and foreign investors. 
 
6.4.1. Case Studies  
 
a. The Case of the Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines 
 
  I. The Affected People  
 
The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of the Philippines535 defines indigenous people and 
indigenous communities as a group of people or homogeneous societies identified by self-
ascription and ascription by others, who have continuously lived as organised community on 
communally bounded and defined territory and, who have, under claims of ownership since time 
immemorial, occupied, possessed and, utilised such territories, sharing common bonds of 
language, customs, traditions and, other distinctive cultural traits or, who have through resistance 
to political, social and cultural inroads of colonisation, non-indigenous religions and cultures, 
became historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos.536  
 
The indigenous peoples in the Philippines today number about 7.5 million. This is about 
16% of the total population of the country.537 Historically, these peoples resisted colonisation by 
the Spaniards for three centuries from the 16th to the 18th century and were able to maintain their 
indigenous lifestyles and cultural practices. Indigenous peoples in the Philippines share 
distinctive traits that set them apart from the Filipino mainstream.  They are non-Christians.538  
They live in less accessible, marginal, mostly upland areas.  They have a system of self-
                                                 
535 Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997. 
536 Section 3(h). 
537 Source: Cordillera Peoples' Alliance (CPA). Praymer Maipanggep iti Nainsigudan nga Umili wenno Indigenous Peoples.  
538 Id. 
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government not dependent upon the laws of the central administration of the Republic of the 
Philippines.  They follow ways of life and customs that are perceived as different from those of 
the rest of the population.539 The Philippines’ indigenous cultural communities can be classified 
into seven major groupings. These are the Igorots of the Cordillera, the tribes of Caraballo and 
Cagayan Valley, the Negritos or Agta, the Mangyan, the people of Palawan, the Lumad of 
Mindanao and the Moro people. Within each major group are smaller but distinct sub- groupings 
of indigenous people.540 
 
  II. Customary Land Rights of the Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines    
 
Ancient Filipinos settled in communities situated near water systems. Their life revolved 
around fishing and farming. The property regime then was community based, with usufruct 
regulating and determining land and resource use. Land was the central element of the existence 
of indigenous peoples' in the Philippines. This is a trait that can be seen even today among the 
Filipino indigenous communities.541 There is no traditional concept of permanent, individual, land 
ownership.  For example, as noted by the Supreme Court of the Philippines in the case of  
Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa v. Sec. of Environment and Natural Resources, et al. among the 
tribal people of Igorots, ownership of land more accurately applies to the tribal right to use the 
land or to territorial control.542  The people are the secondary owners or stewards of the land and 
that if a member of the tribe ceases to work, he loses his claim of ownership, and the land reverts 
to the beings of the spirit world who are its true and primary owners.543 Under the concept of 
                                                 
539 MacDonald, C., ‘Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines:  Between Segregation and Integration, Indigenous Peoples of Asia’, in Gray, A., The Indigenous 
Movement in Asia, Indigenous Peoples of Asia (Michigan: Ann Arbor Association for Asian Studies, 1995) p.  345. 
540 Carino, Jacqueline K.,
 
Dams, Indigenous People and Vulnerable Ethic Minorities: A Case Study on the Ibaloy People and the Agno River Basin, Province of 
Benguet, Philippines, Contributing Paper Prepared for Thematic Review I.2: Dams, Indigenous People and Vulnerable Ethnic Minorities, World Commission 
on Dams (December 1999). 
541 Id. 
542 Decided on  6 December  2000. the judgment is available online: http://www.elaw.org/resources/text.asp?id=236 
543 Gatmaytan, D. B., “Ancestral Domain Recognition in the Philippines:  Trends in Jurisprudence and Legislation”, 5 Phil. Nat. Res. L.J. No. 1 (1992), pp. 47-48. 
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"trusteeship," the right to possess the land does not only belong to the present generation but the 
future ones as well.544 
 
Customary law on land rests on the traditional belief that no one owns the land except the 
gods and spirits, and that those who work the land are its mere stewards.545 Customary law has a 
strong preference for communal ownership, which could either be ownership by a group of 
individuals or families who are related by blood or by marriage, or ownership by residents of the 
same locality who may not be related by blood or marriage.546  Thus, it is correct to say that land 
titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples' economic and social system. The concept of 
individual land ownership under the civil law is alien to them. 
 
Spanish colonialism in the 16th century, imposed the Regalian Doctrine, enunciated 
under the Laws of the Indies when Ferdinand Magellan first colonised Philippines in 1521 and 
declared that all land in the Philippine archipelago belonged to the King of Spain. This was the 
beginning of the rule by Regalian Doctrine in Philippines that declared all public lands as 
property of the State, represented by the King of Spain. Accordingly, the Barangay (village) 
based ownership of land and natural resources were supplanted with jura regalia, placing the 
entire Philippine archipelago under the Spanish Crown.547 
 
                                                 
544 Id. 
545 Bennagen, Ponciano L., “Indigenous Attitudes Toward Land and Natural Resources of Tribal Filipinos”, 31 National Council of Churches in the Philippines 
Newsletter
 





546 Gatmaytan, supra note 543 at p. 99. 
547 The "Regalian Doctrine" or jura regalia is a Western legal concept that was first introduced by the Spaniards into the country through the Laws of the Indies and 
the Royal Cedulas.  The Laws of the Indies, i.e., more specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, set the policy 
of the Spanish Crown with respect to the Philippine Islands. 
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The 1893 Mortgage Law (Ley Hipotecaria) and the 1894 Maura Law reinforced 
Regalianism.548 With the latter, the Spanish Crown claimed all untitled lands, thus declaring 
nearly two–thirds of the Philippine land area as public forestlands.549 The Regalian Doctrine was 
formalised with a passage of the Maura Law in the year 1894, which required that all lands 
owned privately be registered with the Government and that titles would serve as the proof of 
private ownership of land in order to be excluded from the public domain.550 However, since the 
forefathers of present day indigenous people of the Philippines were not subjugated and were at 
that time outside the control of Spanish colonial rule, they did not bother to apply for titles. Their 
lands were thus considered by the State as public lands and open for use by the State despite 
having been occupied and used by these people continuously for many years. 
 
In 1896-97, a group of Filipinos led by Emilio Aguinaldo fought a war for independence, 
which ended in a truce.551 In early 1898 the armed struggle resumed, and soon the Filipinos 
controlled most Spanish centres. In June 1898 Aguinaldo proclaimed the Republic of the 
Philippines and in December 1898, the U.S. and Spain signed a treaty and Spain sold Guam, 
Puerto Rico and the Philippines.552 
 
The victory of the Philippine war of independence was however, aborted when 
Regalianism passed from the Spanish to the Americans under the 1898 Treaty of Paris when 
Spain ceded to the US Government “all rights, interests, and claims over the national territory of 
                                                 
548 The Mortgage Law sought to register and tax lands pursuant to the Royal Decree of 1880.  The Royal Decree of 1894, or the "Maura Law," was partly an 
amendment of the Mortgage Law as well as the Laws of the Indies, as already amended by previous orders and decrees. This was the last Spanish land law 
promulgated in the Philippines.  It required the "adjustment" or registration of all agricultural lands, otherwise the lands shall revert to the state. 
549 The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims.  The law sought to register and tax lands 
pursuant to the Royal Decree of 1880.  The Royal Decree of 1894, or the "Maura Law," was partly an amendment of the Mortgage Law as well as the Laws of 
the Indies, as already amended by previous orders and decrees. This was the last Spanish land law promulgated in the Philippines.  It required the "adjustment" 
or registration of all agricultural lands, otherwise the lands shall revert to the state. See generally, Carino, Jacqueline K, supra note 540. 
550 Carino, supra note 540.  
551 Ileto, R. C., "Philippine Wars and the Politics of Memory", POSITIONS: East Asia Cultures Critique (Spring 2005), pp. 215-235. 
552 Id. 
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the Philippine islands”.553 Under the American rule, the idea that all land belonged to the State 
except for those with Torrens titles554 was affirmed through the passage of the First Public Land 
Act of 1902.555  
 
The continuation of the Regalian Doctrine was seen even after the independence of the 
Philippines. The Regalian doctrine was enshrined in the 1935 Constitution.556  One of the fixed 
and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalisation and 
conservation of the natural resources of the country. State ownership of natural resources was 
seen as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of the State's power to control their 
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilisation.557 
 
The 1935 Constitution, in Section 1 of Article XIII on "Conservation and Utilisation of 
Natural Resources," provided as follows: 
"All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, 
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural 
resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, 
development, or utilisation shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations 
or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, 
subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of 
the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception 
of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for 
the exploitation, development, or utilisation of any of the natural resources shall be 
granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, 
                                                 
553 Commissioners from the United States and Spain met in Paris on October 1, 1898 to produce a treaty that would bring an end to the war after six months of 
hostilities. The American peace commission consisted of William R. Day, Senator Cushman K. Davis, Senator William P. Frye, Senator George Gray, and the 
Honourable Whitelaw Reid. The Spanish commission was headed by Don Eugenio Montero Rios, the President of the Senate. Jules Cambon, a French 
diplomat, also negotiated on Spain's behalf. U.S. ultimately paid Spain 20 million dollars for possession of the Philippines. The treaty was signed on December 
10, 1898. 
554 The principles and procedure of the Torrens system of registration was formulated by Sir Robert Torrens, who patterned it after the Merchant Shipping Acts in 
South Australia.  The Torrens system requires that the Government Issue an official certificate of title attesting to the fact that the person named is the owner of 
the property described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or the law warrants or reserves. 
555 In 1903, the United States colonial government, through the Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act. Act No. 926 was superseded 
in 1919 by Act 2874, the second Public Land Act. It was more comprehensive in scope but limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and 
Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. Act 2874 was amended in 1936 by Commonwealth Act No. 141.  The 
Commonwealth Act No. 141 remains the present Public Land Law and it is essentially the same as Act 2874.  The main difference between the two relates to 
the transitory provisions on the rights of American citizens and corporations during the Commonwealth period at par with Filipino citizens and corporations. 
556 Aruego, J. (1937), The Framing of the Philippine Constitution (Manila University 1936), p. 592  
557 Id. at pp.  600-601. 
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water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in 
which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant." 
 
The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV on the 
"National Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation," and provided that: 
"All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, 
all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the 
Philippines belong to the State.  With the exception of agricultural, industrial or 
commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources 
shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploration, 
development, exploitation, or utilisation of any of the natural resources shall be granted 
for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, 
except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other 
than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure 
and the limit of the grant." 
 
The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII on 
"National Economy and Patrimony," and provided that: 
"All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, 
all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and 
other natural resources are owned by the State.  With the exception of agricultural lands, 
all other natural resources shall not be alienated.  The exploration, development and 
utilisation of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.  
The State may directly undertake such activities or it may enter into co-production, joint 
venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or 
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens.  Such 
agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more 
than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law.  In 
cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than 
the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.” 
 
To simply state, the above constitutional provisions provided that all lands of the public 
domain as well as all natural resources enumerated therein, whether on public or private land, 
belong to the State, thus effectively undermining the rights of the indigenous peoples. 
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  III. State Recognition of the Land Rights of the Indigenous People  
 
The 1987 Philippine Constitution formally recognised the existence of indigenous 
cultural communities and indigenous peoples for the first time and declared as a State policy the 
promotion of their rights within the framework of national unity and development.558 
 
In 1997, in order to address the centuries-old neglect of the Philippine indigenous 
peoples, the Tenth Congress of the Philippines, passed and approved R.A. No. 8371, the 
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997.559  The IPRA amalgamated the Philippine 
category of indigenous cultural communities (ICCs) with the international category of indigenous 
peoples (IPs)560 and was heavily influenced by both the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
Convention 169561 and the United Nations (UN) Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples.562  The IPRA introduced radical concepts into the Philippine legal system that appeared 
to collide with settled constitutional and jural precepts on State ownership of land and other 
natural resources.  It is likely that the IPRA was enacted by Congress not only to fulfil the 
constitutional mandate of protecting the indigenous cultural communities' right to their ancestral 
land but, more importantly, to correct a grave historical injustice to our indigenous people. 
 
The IPRA grants the ICCs/IPs several rights over their ancestral domains and ancestral 
lands.  Section 7 (a) defines the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over their ancestral domains 
which covers (a) lands, (b) bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by the ICCs/IPs, 
                                                 
558 Section 22, Article II, 1987 Constitution. 
559 The law was a consolidation of two Bills - Senate Bill No. 1728 and House Bill No. 9125. Senate Bill No. 1728 was a consolidation of four proposed measures 
referred to the Committees on Cultural Communities, Environment and Natural Resources, Ways and Means, as well as Finance. It sought to recognize the right 
of indigenous people to own and possess their ancestral land. The House Bill No. 9125 was based on the policy of preservation as mandated in the Constitution 
and emphasized that the rights vested in indigenous people to their land prior to the establishment of the Spanish and American regimes. 
560 Interpellation of Senator Flavier on S.B. No. 1728, Deliberation on Second Reading, November 20, 1996, p. 20. 
561 Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, adopted on June 27, 1989. The Convention is based on the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
and many other international instruments on the prevention of discrimination. ILO Convention No. 169 revised the "Convention Concerning the Protection and 
Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries" (ILO No. 107) passed on June 26, 1957.   
562 International Labour Organization, Guide to R.A. 8371, Coalition for IPs Rights and Ancestral Domains (Geneva: ILO, 1999), p. 3.  
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(c) sacred places, (d) traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and (e) all improvements made by 
them at any time within the domains. The right of ownership includes the following rights: (1) the 
right to develop lands and natural resources; (b) the right to stay in the territories; (c) the right to 
resettlement in case of displacement; (d) the right to regulate the entry of migrants; (e) the right to 
safe and clean air and water; (f) the right to claim parts of the ancestral domains as reservations; 
and (g) the right to resolve conflict in accordance with customary laws. 
 
Section 8 governs their rights to ancestral lands. Unlike ownership over the ancestral 
domains, it gives the ICCs/IPs also the right to transfer the land or property rights to members of 
the same ICCs/IPs or non-members thereof.  This is in keeping with the option given to ICCs/IPs 
to secure a Torrens title over the ancestral lands, but not to domains. 
 
Although the aforesaid sections of the IPRA appear at least prima facie to recognize the 
rights of the ICCs/IPs to ancestral lands and ancestral domains, the Act also  provide in Section 3 
that “ancestral domains” are all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland 
waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or 
possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually 
since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted as a consequence of 
government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private 
individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural 
welfare.563 Further, it provides that “ancestral lands” are those occupied, possessed and utilised by 
individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by 
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional 
group ownership, continuously, to the present except when interrupted as a consequence of 
                                                 
563 Sec. 3 (a) of the IPRA. 
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government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private 
individuals/corporations.564 
 
Furthermore, Section 56 of the IPRA which deals with existing property right regimes 
provide that the property rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon 
effectively by the Act shall be recognised and respected. Thus, the right of indigenous peoples to 
their ancestral domains and lands and natural resources found therein is in fact limited by section 
56 of IPRA. In the circumstances, exploitation of ancestral lands of the indigenous people 
continues even at present. For example, the mining companies licensed by the Government under 
the 1995 Mining Act continue to operate in these domains despite opposition by indigenous 
communities and organisations.565 
 
Thus, the IPRA recognizes the possibility of the discontinuation of the rights of the 
ICCs/IPs on their ancestral lands and domains as a consequence government projects and other 
voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations. Section 7 of 
the IPRA however, provides some comfort to the ICCs/IPs concerning such discontinuation of 
their rights over ancestral domains by providing that the ICCs/IPs have a right to an informed and 
intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any project, government or 
private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair 
compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project; and the right to 
effective measures by the Government to prevent any interference with, alienation and 
encroachment upon these rights.566 No such provision is made in  
Section 8 concerning ancestral lands. 
                                                 
564 Sec. 3 (b) of the IPRA. 
565 See generally, United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNHCHR), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms of Indigenous People, E/CN.4/2003/90/Add.3 (GENVA: UNHCHR , March 5, 2003). 
566 Sec. 7(b) of the IPRA. 
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Thus, it is clear that the right of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains and their right to 
develop lands and natural resources within the ancestral domains as guaranteed by the IPRA does 
not necessarily deprive the State of ownership over the natural resources and control and 
supervision in their development and exploitation. Thus, the IPRA does not undermine the 
Regalian doctrine on the ownership, management and utilisation of natural resources as declared 
in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines.  
 
Although, it was Section 3 of the IPRA that first statutorily recognised the concept of 
native title to land of the indigenous communities, this concept came to limelight in the case of 
Cariño v. Insular Government in 1909.567  The case established that the concept of private land 
title enjoyed by the indigenous communities survived irrespective of any royal grant from the 
State giving legal title to land. The facts of the case are discussed below.   
 
  IV. Cariño v. Insular Government 
 
In 1903, Don Mateo Cariño, an Ibaloi tribe member, sought to register with the Land 
Registration Court, 146 hectares of land in Baguio Municipality in the Benguet Province.  He 
alleged that this land had been possessed and occupied by his ancestors since time immemorial 
and that he inherited the land in accordance with Igorot custom.  He tried to have the land 
adjusted under the Spanish land laws. However, he had no document issued by the Spanish 
Crown, as it was the policy of the Spanish colonial rulers not to issue title of land to any tribal 
members.  
 
                                                 
567 41 Phil. 935 (1909), 212 U.S. 449, 53 L.Ed. 594 
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In 1901, Cariño obtained a possessory title to the land under the Spanish Mortgage 
Law.568 The North American Colonial Government, however, ignored his possessory title and 
built a public road on the land prompting him to seek a Torrens title to his property in the Land 
Registration Court.  While his petition was pending, a U.S. military reservation was proclaimed 
over his land and shortly thereafter, a military detachment was detailed on the property with 
orders to keep cattle and trespassers, including Cariño, off the land. 
 
In 1904, the Land Registration Court granted Cariño's application for absolute ownership 
to the land.  Both the Government of the Philippines and the U.S. Government appealed to the 
C.F.I. of Benguet and was able to obtain a reversal of the decision of the land registration court 
and a dismissal of Cariño's application. Later, the Philippine Supreme Court affirmed the decision 
of the C.F.I.569 Cariño, and then took the case to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
 
In a unanimous decision written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held inter alia that: 
"It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal theory that all 
lands were held from the Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of conquering nations 
toward people not recognised as entitled to the treatment accorded to those in the same 
zone of civilisation with themselves.  It is true, also, that in legal theory, sovereignty is 
absolute, and that, as against foreign nations, the United States may assert, as Spain 
asserted, absolute power.  But it does not follow that, as against the inhabitants of the 
Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain had such power.  When theory is left on 
one side, sovereignty is a question of strength, and may vary in degree.  How far a new 
sovereign shall insist upon the theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the past, 
and how far it shall recognize actual facts, are matters for it to decide.”570 
 
"The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white race in the 
United States.  Whatever consideration may have been shown to the North American 
Indians, the dominant purpose of the whites in America was to occupy land.  It is obvious 
that, however stated, the reason for our taking over the Philippines was different.  No one, 
we suppose, would deny that, so far as consistent with paramount necessities, our first 
                                                 
568 Maura Law or the Royal Decree of Feb. 13, 1894. 
569 7 Phil. 132 [1906]. 
570 Cariño v. Insular Government, supra note 567, at p. 939. 
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object in the internal administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives, not to 
exploit their country for private gain.  By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, chapter 1369, 
section 12 (32 Statutes at Large, 691), all the property and rights acquired there by the 
United States are to be administered 'for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.'  It is 
reasonable to suppose that the attitude thus assumed by the United States with regard to 
what was unquestionably its own is also its attitude in deciding what it will claim for its 
own. The same statute made a bill of rights, embodying the safeguards of the Constitution, 
and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all.  It provides that 'no law shall be 
enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws.' In the 
light of the declaration that we have quoted from section 12, it is hard to believe that the 
United States was ready to declare in the next breath that "any person" did not embrace 
the inhabitants of Benguet, or that it meant by "property" only that which had become such 
by ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the inhabitants never had heard, and 
that it proposed to treat as public land what they, by native custom and by long 
association,-- of the profoundest factors in human thought, regarded as their own."571 
 
The Court held further that: 
"[E]very presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like the present.  
It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or 
memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it 
will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and 
never to have been public land.  Certainly in a case like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity 
in the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt."572 
 
The court thus laid down the presumption of a certain title held (1) as far back as 
testimony or memory went and, (2) under a claim of private ownership.  Land held by this title is 
presumed to "never have been public land." Thus, the court ruled in favour of Cariño and ordered 
the registration of the 148 hectares in Baguio Municipality in his name.573 
 
As recognised by the IPRA and in the case of Cariño v. Insular Government, The right of 
ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is held under the indigenous 
concept of ownership.  This concept maintains the view that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs 
private but community property.  It is private simply because it is not part of the public domain.  
                                                 
571 Id. at p. 940. 
572 Id. at p. 941. 
573 Certificate of Title No. 2 covering the 148 hectares of Baguio Municipality was issued not in the name of Cariño who died on June 6, 1908, but to his lawyers 
John Hausserman and Charles Cohn and his attorney-in-fact Metcalf Clarke.  Hausserman, Cohn and Clarke sold the land to the U.S. Government in a Deed of 
Quitclaim-Richel B. Langit, Igorot Descendants Claim Rights to Camp John Hay, Manila Times, 12th January 1998 at 1. 
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But its private character ends there.  The ancestral domain is owned in common by the ICCs/IPs 
and not by one particular person.574   
 
Thus, the communal rights to the land are held not only by the present possessors of the 
land but extend to all generations of the ICCs/IPs, past, present and future, to the domain. This is 
the reason why the ancestral domain must be kept within the ICCs/IPs them selves.  The domain 
cannot be transferred, sold or conveyed to other persons.  It belongs to the ICCs/IPs as a 
community. However, it should be noted that, despite the above referenced victory in the 
Supreme Court of America, the Carino family of the Ibaloy tribe in Baguio-Benguet (Luzon) is 
still awaiting the restitution of its ancestral domain claim almost after hundred years since the 
conclusion of the legal action.575 
 
  V. The Continuing Violation of Indigenous Rights  
 
The issue is whether the provisions of the IPRA provides necessary protection over 
ancestral property to the indigenous community in the Philippines given that, the provisions in the 
IPRA are necessarily undermined by the primary statutory law of the islands, i.e. the constitution. 
Despite the judicial and later statutory recognition of the rights of indigenous people to their 
community lands, the various lacunas in the law which were discussed above have provided 
ample room for the continuation of the violation of rights of the indigenous people.  
 
For example, in Cordillera, the homeland of the Igorots, large dams have been 
constructed along the Agno river, namely the Ambuklao dam built from 1952-56 and the Binga 
Dam in 1956-60, the two dams submerging in total an area of 650 hectares of precious farmlands 
                                                 
574 Sec. 55, IPRA provides: “Subject to Section 56 hereof, areas within the ancestral domains, whether delineated or not, shall be presumed to be communally held:  
provided, that communal rights under this Act shall not be construed as co-ownership as provided in Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the New Civil 
Code.” 
575 See supra note 565. 
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and displacing approximately 300 Ibaloi families. 576 To date, the victims of dam construction are 
not yet fully compensated from the destruction of their land and properties.577 Ambuklao dam is 
now un-operational due to siltation problem of 18 kilometres long, but the dam continues to 
submerge more rice fields and croplands in Bokod, Benguet.578 Binga is likewise heavily silted, 
and its partial operation is dependent on the continuing dredging work of the reservoir.579  
 
  VI. San Roque Dam Project 
 
The latest threat to the land and livelihoods of the Ibaloi people comes from Southeast 
Asia’s largest private hydropower project, namely the San Roque Dam Project, which is  being 
built by US independent power producer Sithe Energies and the Japanese Marubeni Corporation. 
The US$ 1.19 billion, 345 MW San Roque Project is being celebrated by the hydropower 
industry as a major success story in private sector financing.580 No other private hydro project of 
its size has been able to secure the necessary financing, particularly in high-risk, economically 
embattled Southeast Asia. 
 
If and when completed, San Roque would be the tallest dam at 200 meters in Asia and 
will provide power to the burgeoning mining, agribusiness, export industry and tourism centres 
planned for North-western Luzon.581  The Government also claims that the project will irrigate 
87,000 hectares of farmland, reduce the perennial flooding of at least 16 downstream towns 
                                                 
576 Carling, J., Chairperson, Cordillera Peoples Alliance-Philippines, ‘Indigenous Peoples, the Environment and Human Rights in the Philippines: the Cordillera 
Experience’ (October 2001). Online: http://www.asiasource.org/asip/carling.cfm/#peoples  
577 Id. 
578 Carling, J., Indigenous Peoples, the Environment and Human Rights in the Philippines: the Cordillera Experience, Asia Social Issues Program (October 2001). 
Online: http://www.asiasource.org/asip/carling.cfm 
579 Id. 
580 San Roque is one of 22 large dams planned for the Cordillera region, and is the first one to be built in the region as part of a wide-ranging development plan of 
former President Fidel Ramos. The dam site is located on the Agno River in Pangasinan Province, but reservoir inundation will occur in Itogon Province, home 
of the Ibaloi people. 
581 International Rivers Network, World Rivers Review (April 1999). 
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during the rainy season and provide clean water for communities in Northern Luzon.582 Yet, for 
the Ibaloi some of whom have already been displaced once before by upstream hydropower 
projects there is little to rejoice about.  
 
In 1997 the National Power Corporation (NPC) of Philippines gave the San Roque Power 
Corporation (SRPC) the rights to build, operate and maintain the project as a BOT concession for 
a period of 25 years. The SRPC is owned by a Japanese trading company, Marubeni (41%); Sithe 
Philippines Holdings, Ltd, a subsidiary of US energy company Sithe Energies, Inc. (51%); and a 
Japanese utility company, Kansai Electric (7.5%). In April 1998, US construction company 
Raytheon won a US$ 700 million sub-contract to design and build the facility. Preparation of the 
site began in 1998, and construction is slated for completion in 2004.583 
 
According to the project authorities’ say 49% of the total cost of US$ 1.9 billion will go 
to the power component of the project, 9.7% to the water quality and maintenance system; and 
1% to flood control.584 In October 1998, the Export-Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM) approved a 
US$ 302 million loan to the private sector developers to finance the power component of the 
project. Funding for the non-power components was financed by a US$ 400 million loan the 
Government of the Philippines negotiated with JEXIM. Other financing is expected to come from 
a consortium of Japanese commercial banks and equity provided by the project sponsors.585 
 
The project is being challenged by the affected indigenous people and several other 
groups supporting their cause on several grounds. The main ground being that, approximately 700 






families are required to relocate before the project is completed.586 It is also said that the  
San Roque Dam will adversely affect the livelihood sources of around 20,000 people of Itogon, 
Benguet. Further, it is estimated that about 100 hectares of productive rice fields will be 
submerged by the reservoir.587  
 
An independent report claim that, homes, terraced rice fields, orchards, pasture lands, 
gardens and burial grounds of the Ibalois close to the Agno River would eventually be inundated 
by the rising waters.588 The Government claims however, that only three households will be 
affected in this area, yet independent studies show that at least 343 households will be impacted 
by the reservoir.589 Furthermore, while the Government claims that the project will control the 
occurrence of floods on the Agno River, the project’s Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
admits, “the reservoir is vulnerable to mismanagement with respect to flood routing.” The EIA 
states that this may result in “catastrophic flooding” in some downstream areas.590 
 
Going by the aforesaid report, this project that is being funded by the Japan Bank for 
International Cooperation (JBIC) under an onerous Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) is bound to 
cause environmental disasters such as massive flooding in the upstream and lower stream of the 
project site. Further, according to the said report, the project is likely to create a big reservoir 
containing toxic mine waste that would result in water pollution and possible destruction of the 
dam itself should a sufficiently strong earthquake occur.591  
 
                                                 
586  Id.  
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The project is also be criticised on the ground of its high cost. The Power Purchase 
Agreement (PPA) requires that the developer San Roque Power Corporation (SRPC) is granted a 
payment of US$ 400 million during the construction period in addition to guaranteeing purchase 
of all electricity produced.592 Further, it requires the Government to guarantees "Capacity Fee" 
and "Operating Fee" payments, even if electricity is not generated for lack of water, at a 
minimum value in the first 12 years equivalent to US$ 10 million per month.593 Thus, it is clear 
that the cost of power from San Roque is hugely inflated and that the SRPC stands to gain 
massive profits from the project, whether or not it successfully produces power. A review, 
conducted by Dr. Wayne White of Foresight Associates in the USA, supports the above 
criticism.594 It shows that the National Power Corporation (NPC) will be paying SRPC between 
13 to 21 pesos (US$ 0.32 to 0.51) per kilowatt hour of electricity purchased and that NPC has 
agreed to pay over 400 million pesos (US$ 10 million) per month to the SRPC regardless of 
whether there is sufficient water available to generate power.595 
 
The San Roque project, although a type of BOT arrangement, does not meet the typical 
description of project financing, and therefore is not subject to market forces which would attest 
to its economic viability. The developer is not taking the financial risk for the project. Under the 
PPA, a substantial amount of risk is borne by the Government, not the developer. Thus, the non-
recourse or limited recourse nature of the project financing is not present. The advance payment 
by the Government to the SRPC of US$ 400 million directly pays for a large portion of the 
construction cost. Earnings are not exclusively from fees earned from project performance, but 
rather from the funding for San Roque which include the contribution by the Government of  
                                                 
592 Imhof, A., “San Roque Dam Power Purchase Agreement a Bad Deal”, World Rivers Review (June 2000). 
593 Id. 
594 Dr. White, W. C., A Review of the Power Purchase Agreement Between the Republic of the Philippines National Power Corporation and a Consortium 
Constituting the San Roque Power Corporation Concerning the Construction and Operation of the San Roque Multipurpose Project (Foresight Associates,  
2000)  The review is available online: http://www.irn.org/programs/sanroque/000504.report.html. 
595 Id. 
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US$ 400 million, as well as electrical tariffs and capital recovery payments in amounts set in the 
contract.596 
 
Further, despite private sector participation, the project is a public subsidised construction 
contract that will also further compensate the developer during project life even in the event of 
low generation and/or absence of a market for the produced power. Not only does the private 
sector participation not demonstrate economic viability, the reliance on subsidy and the non-
market based rates suggest that the project is not economically feasible in its own right.597 
 
In addition to the San Roque Dam, it is said that in the Cordillera region, at least two 
more large dams will start construction upon the investment of foreign companies. These are the 
Agbulu Dam (365 megawatts) in Kabugao, Apayao and, the Matuno Dam (250 megawatts) in the 
border of Asipulo, Ifugao and Ambaguio, Nueva Vizcaya. A feasibility study of the National 
Power Corporation (NPC) has shown a potential generation of 4,259 MW from the damming of 
the said Cordillera Rivers. If no measures are taken to address the effects such development might 
have on the indigenous communities, it is likely that these developments too will adversely affect 
the indigenous people in the Philippines.  
 
In his report submitted to the Commission on Human Rights in March 2003, Mr. Rodolfo 
Stavenhagen, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
of indigenous people, sites several more cases involving violation of or attempted violation of the 
                                                 
596 Id. 
597 Article 8.5 of the agreement provides that "NPC will be required to pay the full amount of the capacity fees....whether or not any energy is dispatched" if the 
reason for the downtime is "insufficiency of water." Appendix B of this review calculates the fees due per month even if no power is generated, under the terms 
and formulas given in the Eight Schedule of the PPA. The result is a payment equivalent to US$10 million, over $ 400 million Pesos, per month. 
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rights of indigenous people in the Philippines in the light of various development projects.598 
Some of these cases are as follows: 
i. The rejection by the Kankaney people in Bakun Benguet (Luzon) of a proposed 
mini-hydro project involving the construction of a tunnel passing under their 
territory, to which they did not give their prior consent and which they believe 
will adversely affect them by diverting river water needed for their traditional 
agricultural activities. 
ii. The eviction in early 1990s around 67 T’Boli families of Sitio Datal Bonlangan 
in Mindanao from their ancestral domain by a private company, which took over 
their land under a Government-approved contract to fell trees in the forest and 
turn it into a coffee plantation. While eventually some of the evicted families 
returned to their village, the community is still claiming access to its land and 
resolution of the long-standing conflict. 
iii. In the Baguio City area an area known as Happy Hollow, a part of the old John 
Hay American military camp is being designed to become a tourist destination. 
Nine Ibaloy clans demand that 250 hectares of their ancestral domain be 
segregated from the location of the proposed tourist destination as they wish to 
keep full control of their traditional land rather than accept a Government plan to 
subdivide it into individual home lots. 
iv. For over 10 years 256 Tagbanua families on Calauit Island (Palawan, Visayas) 
have been reclaiming their ancestral lands, which by presidential decree were 
turned into a sanctuary of African animals. The families had to suffer relocation 
under stress and duress. In 1995, they even appealed to the United Nations 
                                                 
598 See supra note 565 at pp. 14 – 15. 
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Centre for Human Rights. Except for a letter of acknowledgement, the 
complainants have not received any relief. 
v. The Subanon tribe of Zamboanga peninsula (Mindanao) have been forced over 
several decades to migrate into the mountains and forests, pushed by an 
increasing number of settlers from other areas and Government approved 
development projects, including commercial tree plantations on the Subanon’s 
ancient lands, the conversion of forests into pastures, and mining. The resistance 
of the Subanon led to serious conflict, violence and human rights violations of 
the indigenous communities involving the Philippine Army, which led to 
attempts at negotiating the differences between the parties. At the present time, 
the Subanon people demand the full recognition of their ancestral land rights that 
will allow them to contribute to the process of defining a development that is 
people-centred. 
vi. There have also been reports of displacement of indigenous peoples in San Luis, 
Bukidnon. The Manobo people, ancestral owners of tracts of land in San Luis, 
have reported that their land has been forcibly converted into large-scale 
agribusiness ventures, whose ownership was ultimately transferred to non-
indigenous lowlanders. They have been reclaiming their traditional land through 
legal means since the 1980s, but to no avail. 
vii. In Surigao del Norte, one of the provinces of the Caraga region, numerous 
families have been displaced from their homes and fields, and their agricultural 
lands were destroyed as a result of open-pit mining operations in Taganito and 
Tinabigan. Thirty families of the Mamanwa tribe are still living under a concrete 
bridge, exposed to the harsh climate and the pollution. Despite their appeal to 
NCIP, their demands were not met. 
 
 281
According to the Philippine’s National Power Corporation’s power development 
program, the Philippines Government is planning to implement several hydro power dam projects 
in the coming years. The projects planned to commence during 2004-2005 are listed in the 
following table.599 Most of these dam sites are located within indigenous peoples’ territories. 
Thus, it is likely that the indigenous community will protest and may even initiate legal action to 
prevent the projects from proceeding forward if the projects are likely to affect their native lands. 
In the premises it is clear that in the Philippines, the battle between indigenous rights and the 
development needs will continue for sometime.  
 
Table 6.1 Hydro Power Projects Planned for 2004-2005 in the Philippines 
 
Project Capacity Year Location 
Pasil B/C 42 MW 2004-2005 
Apayao 
Batong Buhay, Kalinga- 
 
Amburayan 93 MW 2004 Kapangan, Benguet 
San Roque 390 MW 2005 San Manuel, Pangasinan  
Kalayaan 3/4 300 MW 2005 Bay, Laguna 
Kanan B1 112 MW 2005 Infanta, Quezon 
Villasiga 29 MW 2005 Panay, Antique 
Bulanog Batang 150 MW 2004 Talakag, Bukidnon 
Pulangi 300 MW 2005 P. Roxas, North Cotabato 
Pugo D/B/A 44 MW 2005 Jabonga, Agusan 
 
                                                 




b. The Case of the Indigenous Peoples of Sarawak, Malaysia  
 
  I. The Affected People  
 
In Malaysia, there are numerous groups of indigenous peoples. They form approximately 
2.1 million or 10.2% of the total population.600  They are not a homogenous group. There are at 
least 95 subgroups, each with their own distinct language and culture.601 However, they are all 
marginalised socio-economically and culturally. Sarawak region in Malaysia is the home for 
majority of these indigenous peoples. Several groups, namely, the Kayan, Kenyah, Kajang, Ukit 
and Penan ethnic groups are living in this region.602  
 
  II. The rights of the Indigenous People of Sarawak  
 
There are three laws governing the indigenous people's rights to their land, namely, the 
Land Code,603 the Forest Ordinance604 and, the native customary rights (NCR Law).605 Under the 
Sarawak Land Code, lands are classified as follows: 
i. Mixed Zone Land (8%) - is the most valuable land and may be purchased, sold or 
owned by any race in Sarawak;  
ii. Natives Area Land (7%) - land formerly held by the natives under Customary 
Right to which titles have been granted to claimants;  
iii. Native Customary Land (22%);  
                                                 
600 United Nations Development Programme, “Malaysia Achieving the country Development Goals” (2005). 
   Available online: http://www.epu.jpm.my/New%20Folder/publication/UNDP1.pdf)  
601 Id. 
602 In Sarawak there are 26 different ethnic groups making up 70% of the state's 1.7 million inhabitants (Source: Sarawak State Government Website - 
http://www.sarawak.gov.my/contents/population/population.shtml). The total land area of Sarawak is 12.3m hectares which is roughly 2.3 times the size of 
Holland. 
603 Sarawak Land Code of 1958. 
405 Sarawak Forest Policy and Forests Ordinance of 1953. 
605 For more details on the native customary rights please see, The European Commission - United Nations Development Program, ‘Small Grants Programme for 
Operations to Promote Tropical Forests (EC UNDP SGP PTF), Country Guideline Paper 2004-2007- Malaysia. 
   Available online: http://www.sgpptf.org/docs/CGPMalaysia.pdf 
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iv. Reserved Land (16%); and  
v. Interior Area Land (47%).  
 
Under the Sarawak Land Code, the land in which native customary rights (NCR) had 
lawfully been created prior to 1st January 1958 is termed Native Customary Land (NCL), thus, 
recognising the concept of customary title to lands occupied by the indigenous groups. However, 
Section 5(3) of the Land Code states that "any native customary rights may be extinguished by 
direction issued by the Minister" for "public purposes" or to facilitate alienation of land that under 
Section 15A must be for the purpose of any undertaking that would, in the opinion of the 
Minister, be for the benefit of the State. In the premises, in effect, as of 1958, NCL became a part 
of State land, and native customary title became something that is easily disposable. In other 
words, the indigenous people lost bona fide control over their land.  
 
  III. The Bakum Hydroelectric (Dam) Project  
 
The Government of Malaysia implemented a hydroelectric project for the building of a 
dam in the Sarawak region, namely, the Bakum Dam Project, which comprises of the 
construction of a 2,400 MW hydroelectric dam, the transmission of its electricity and, the 
building of related infrastructure including, access roads.606 The dam is being built on the Balui 
River, some 37 kilometres upstream of Belaga in Sarawak.607  
 
Although the Government has claimed that the dam is needed to meet the growing 
demand for electricity in Malaysia, the critics argue that most of the growth in demand for 
electricity is not in the region of Sarawak in east Malaysia where the dam is being built, but in the 
                                                 
606 Friends of the Earth Organization, supra note 369. 
607 Id. 
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peninsular, and thus, the land rights of the indigenous communities of Sarawak should not be 
compromised.608  
 
The project is strongly opposed by the indigenous communities of Sarawak. In addition, 
the opposition Democratic Action Party (DAP), the Coalition of Concerned NGOs on Bakun 
(Gabungan), a coalition of over 40 Malaysian NGOs, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the 
Environmental Protection Society of Malaysia (EPSM) are key organisations which oppose the 
project.609   
 
The opposition to the project is based on several grounds. The basis for the strongest 
challenge is the expected forced relocation of approximately 10,000 indigenous people, mainly of 
the Kayan, Kenyah, Kajang, Ukit and Penan ethnic groups. Some of the other key criticisms have 
been already discussed in Chapter five of this thesis.610 
 
  IV. Kajing Tubek & Others v. Ekran Bhd & Four Others 
 
The various allegations levelled against the Bakun Dam Project led to the famous legal 
action against the project, namely, the case of Kajing Tubek & Others v. Ekran Bhd & Four 
Others 611 (popularly known as the Bakun Dam case). In this case, hearing an application made by 
the party opposed to the project, the High Court of Malaysia found that the Malaysian 
Government, together with Ekran and the Sarawak State Government had subverted the rights of 
the indigenous peoples by denying them the opportunity to comment on the environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) of the project before granting approval. However, this ruling was dismissed by 
                                                 
608 See Allison, T., supra note 372. Also see, Chapter 5.2.1 of this Thesis for further  details on the project. 
609 Friends of the Earth Organization, supra note 369. 
610 See Chapter 5.2.1. 
611 Kajing Tubek & Ors v. Ekran Bhd & 4 Ors [1996] 2 AMR 2441 
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the authorities as 'technical'. The Court of Appeal in Malaysia later revised the High Court 
decision in 1997.612 The facts of the case are as follows: 
 
The plaintiffs (natives affected by this project), who were residents of longhouses in the 
Belaga district in Sarawak applied for a declaration that the project developer, Ekran Bhd must 
comply with Section 34A of the Environmental Quality Act (EQA)613 and the guidelines made 
there under before carrying out any construction work.  
 
The project developer was required under the EQA and the Natural Resources and 
Environment (Amendment) Ordinance of Sarawak614 to submit EIA reports detailing the possible 
impacts and the mitigating measures. The Natural Resources and Environment Board (NREB) of 
Sarawak and the Department of Environment, Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment, 
were the responsible authorities for approving the EIA reports and in ensuring that the project 
promoter complied with any mitigation measures as stipulated in the EIA reports under the 
Natural Resources and Environment (Amendment) Ordinance. The plaintiffs alleged that, 
although the EIA was published, not only did it specifically exclude assessment of the impact on 
the communities, but the assessment of the project generally was full of omissions, mistakes and 
questionable assumptions.  
 
The plaintiffs argued further that, in matters relating to land development, the attention 
should be focused on Section 34A of the EQA, under which the Environmental Quality 
(Prescribed Activities) (EIA) Order 1987 was made. It was argued that the Act required any 
person intending to carry out any “prescribed activity” must submit an environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) report to the Director General of Environmental Quality (DGEQ) and that the 
                                                 
612 Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar & Anor v Kajing Tubek & 2 others. [1997] 3 AMR 2521. 
613 Environmental Quality Act of 1974. 
614 Natural Resources and Environment (Amendment) Ordinance, 1993. 
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report must be in accordance with the guidelines prescribed by the DGEQ and shall contain “an 
assessment of the impact” such activity will have on the environment and the “proposed 
measures” to be taken to prevent, reduce, or control any adverse impact.615 The DGEQ had the 
power either to approve the report with or without conditions or, to reject it. No prescribed 
activity could be carried out until the EIA report had been approved. Any person who contravenes 
this section was guilty of an offence punishable by fine and/or imprisonment.616 
 
The plaintiffs’ applied for declarations that the Environmental Quality (Prescribed 
Activities) (Environmental Impact Assessment) (Amendment) Order 1995 (“Amendment 
Order”), a delegated legislation made under the EQA which sought to exclude dams from this 
federal law was invalid as it was done retrospectively. They argued that they were entitled to a 
copy of the environment impact assessment (“EIA”) report on the project and, for this reason, 
they had been deprived of an opportunity to make representations in respect of the impact which 
the project would have upon the environment before the decision to implement the project was 
made. The plaintiffs’ contended that the project would adversely affect their longhouses; destroy 
their ancestral sites as well as the lands and forests from which they obtained shelter, livelihood, 
food and, medicine.617 
 
Granting the declaration, the High Court Judge, James Foong J, held that “the guidelines 
become a subsidiary piece of legislation when published by the Director-General”. The learned 
Judge held that public participation in the form of obtaining a copy of the EIA report, 
commenting thereto and making representation is “explicitly provided and in fact 
                                                 
615 Section 34(2), Environmental Quality Act 1974. 
616 Id. 
617 The Federal EIA laws applied throughout Malaysia until 1 September 1994. Effective that date, they do not so apply in Sarawak State for a range of activities 
now governed by the Sarawak EIA Order 1994, to which the Federal Government concurred by gazetting the EIA Amendment Order 1995 which with 
retrospective effect “disprescribed” from the ambit of the section 34A of the EQA  those activities governed by the Sarawak EIA Order 1994. Under the 
Sarawak provisions public participation is not mandatory and is only a privilege accorded by the project proponents and that too, only at the Detailed EIA stage. 
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encouraged”.618 Further, it was held that this procedure must be complied with before the Review 
Panel makes its recommendations to the DGEQ, who in turn must take into consideration these 
recommendations before arriving at a decision. The Judge added that the compliance with the 
procedure “is mandatory” and any decision of the DGEQ made contrary to this procedure “should 
be rejected”.619 
 
However, on appeal, the Court of Appeal overturned the decision on the grounds that 
respondents had no locus standi to move the court for the declaratory relief. The Court of Appeal 
also held that constitutionally, as the development involved land and river within the State of 
Sarawak, the expression ‘environment’ by reason of item 2(a) of List II and item 13 of List IIIA 
of Schedule 9 to the Federal Constitution would lie wholly within the legislative and 
constitutional province of the State of Sarawak. Therefore, it was held that the State of Sarawak 
possessed exclusive jurisdiction to exclude the operation of the federal law, that is, the 
Amendment Order. The court also ruled that, even though the complaints advanced by the 
respondents amounted to deprivation of their lives under Article 5(1) of the Federal Constitution, 
such deprivation was in accordance with the law, that is, the Land Code (Sarawak Cap 81) and 
therefore, they had suffered no injury and there was thus, no necessity for a remedy.620  
 
The court also held that the 1987 Order,621 for constitutional reasons, did not apply to 
Sarawak. The relevant statute regulating the use of the environment relative to the Bakun project 
is the Natural Resources Ordinance of Sarawak. As the EQA does not apply to the Bakun project, 
the Court of Appeal held that the respondents’ (the plaintiffs at the High Court) did not have any 
vested interest under the Act and therefore no ability to bring any suit under the Act. In the 
                                                 
618  Kajing Tubek & Ors v. Ekran Bhd & 4 Ors [1996] 2 AMR 2441. 
619 Id. 
620 Id. 
621 Environmental Quality (Prescribed Activities) (EIA) Order 1987. 
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circumstances, the Court of Appeal also held that there was no requirement under the law for the 
respondents to be supplied with a copy of the EIA report. The Court said that the right to the 
report on payment of the cost of the report is a conditional right which must be exercised by the 
person concerned, which was not done in this case.622  
 
Interestingly, in a latter case, Gopal Sri Ram JCA stated that “it is now settled beyond 
argument in our jurisdiction that deprivation of livelihood may amount to deprivation of life itself 
and that state action which produces such a consequence may be impugned on well-established 
grounds”.623 Going by this decision, the respondents in the Bakun Dam Case could not have been 
denied the legal standing to sue if their fundamental rights under Article 5(1) have been infringed. 
However, the court held that the main reason for denying the respondents locus standi in Bakun 
Dam case was because a substantial number of persons whose rights were also affected by the 
Bakun project were not before the court.  
 
Surprisingly, the decision in the Bakun Dam case and the above decision of Gopal Sri 
Ram JCA seem to contradict an earlier decision in Jok Jau Evong & Ors v Marabong Lumber 
Sdn Bhd & Or., where it was held that three members of the Kayang community were entitled to 
initiate a representative action despite half of the Kayan community disagreeing with the filing of 
the suit.624 This in effect means that the legal principles relating to some members of an ethnic or 
an indigenous community initiating legal action to protect their rights in the absence of consensus 
among the entire affected group is not well established. Further, it shows that many can either 
wilfully or through apathy stultify the action taken by the more vigilant or alert members of the 
community.625  
                                                 
622 Id. 
623 Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Anor v Adong bin Kuwau & Ors [1998] 2 MLJ 158, 164. 
624 Jok Jau Evong & Ors v Marabong Lumber Sdn Bhd & Ors [1990] 3 MLJ 427. 
625 Nijar, G.S., “The Bakun Dam Case: A Critique”, 3 MLJ (1997), ccxix. 
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  V. Continuing Violation of the Rights of the People of Sarawak  
 
From what is set out above and what was discussed earlier in Chapter 5.2.1, it is clear that 
the Bakun project faced public and political criticism on several grounds and that, serious 
questions had been raised concerning the viability of the Project from economic, ecological, 
technical, social and, cultural perspectives. Despite these objections to the project, the 
Government of Malaysia has given the green light for the project to continue. Further, in order to 
ensure that future objections to the project will be minimal, feasibility studies and reports 
commissioned by the Government on the Bakun project have been classified under the Official 
Secrets Act, meaning that it is now a criminal offence for anyone to even have, let alone use, the 
information contained therein.626 
 
 The indigenous communities affected by the Bakun project have failed to receive any 
meaningful redress from the courts as is evident from the Bakun Dam case. Given the various 
human, environmental, as well as economic concerns, it is highly doubtful that the Bakun Dam 
project could be classified as project contributing to sustainable development. There are 
allegations that as a result of the project, the rights of the indigenous communities continue to be 
violated. This might result in future conflicts and more legal actions. Thus, it is important that the 
State as well as the investors give serious consideration to the pleas of the affected people. 
Unfortunately, such action does not seem to be forthcoming. The following are some examples of 
continuing violation of the rights of indigenous peoples in Sarawak: 
i. Acquisition of Land for Bakun Dam: According to the Bakun Region People's 
Committee (BRPC) three main issues arising from the Bakun Hydro-Electric 
Project have so far not been fully resolved. In relation to resettlement matters, 
                                                 
626 See supra note 388. 
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they are unhappy with the size of the land and the area of the resettlement area as 
it will not be able to support their means of survival. It appears that the offer may 
be as low as 3 acres per family, lower than the earlier offer of 7 acres and 
significantly lower than the demanded size of 30 acres per family. The terms and 
demands that the indigenous peoples have submitted to the Government through 
the Bakun Development Committee have not yet elicited any response. Full 
resettlement details have not been disclosed resulting in worry over the 
uncertainties of the future.627 
ii. Encroachment of land by loggers and the abuse of police power in Ulu Baram: 
Indigenous peoples from Ulu Baram allege that indiscriminate logging by 
Government authorized developers since 1987 in their native lands is destroying 
their livelihood.628 
iii.    Encroachment of land for oil palm plantation at Bukit Limau: Around 35 
families with an estimated population of 300 people involving 500 hectares of 
land are affected by the oil palm plantation scheme managed by Bukit Limau 
Estate. Like their neighbours at Sungai Nat, the villagers have been there since 
the rule of Rajah Brooke when their NCR land was first recognised. Their land 
has been encroached upon for some years, first by the Land Custody and 
Development Authority (LCDA), without their knowledge, and secondly since 
1992 through land clearance for plantations.629 
iv. Opening of Rumah Umping land for an oil palm plantation: The residents of 
Rumah Umping are still demanding recognition of their NCR Land. They have 
been resisting efforts by the LCDA to open their customary land for an oil palm 
                                                 
627 Sources: Sahabat Alam Malaysia Press Releases, 3 July 2001, A Letter from Bakun Region People's Committee to the Deputy Prime Minister; The World 
Rainforest Movement. Online: http://www.wrm.org; and  International Rivers Network (www.irn.org) 
628 Source: Aliran Kesedaran Negara (“ALIRAN”.) (National Consciousness Movement). Online: http://www.aliran.com.  ALIRAN is a reform movement 
dedicated to Justice, Freedom, and Solidarity and is listed on the roster of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. 
629 Id. 
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plantation scheme since 1992. They have been alleging that their land was being 
taken by the LCDA without their permission.630  
 
c. The Case of the Indigenous Amungme People of Irian Jaya  
 
  I. Historical Aspects 
 
Indonesia, the fifth largest country in the world was discovered by the Dutch at the end of 
the sixteenth century. Starting early 1600s Indonesia was dominated by the Dutch East Indies 
Company, a private concern, for nearly 200 years. In 1798, authority over Indonesia was 
transferred to the Netherlands. The Dutch retained dominion over the country until 1941, at which 
time the Japanese moved in during the course of World War II. By 1945 Japan was defeated in 
Indonesia and Achmed Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta rose to become the President and the Vice 
President of the newly independent Indonesia. However, within a month of the Sukarno/Hatta 
proclamation of independence, British army units began landing in Jakarta to help Dutch restore 
its colonial rule. After four years of fighting, in 1949, the Dutch officially ceded sovereignty back 
to Indonesia with the exception of one key area, namely, Irian Jaya (Dutch New Guinea, or West 
Irian,631 as the Indonesians previously called it).632 Unlike rest of Indonesia which achieved 
independence in 1949, West Irian remained a Dutch colony until 1962.  
 
In 1962, the United Nations (UN) voted to cede West Irian fully to Indonesia with the 
provision that, by 1969, the people of West Irian should be granted an opportunity to vote 
whether to remain with or secede from Indonesia.633 Under the international agreement between 
                                                 
630 Id. 
631 Sometimes also referred to as West Papua. 
632 Source: Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka). Online: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/papua.htm 
633 United Nations, The United Nations in West Papua – An Unprecedented Story , UN pamphlet, (New York: United Nations Press, 1963); United Nations, ‘Report 
of the Secretary-General regarding the act of self-determination in West Irian tabled at the UN General Assembly dated 6 November 1969’ (Ref: A-7723). 
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the Netherlands and Indonesia brokered by the UN and the US in 1962 (the New York 
Agreement), the UN was under an obligation to 'advise, assist and participate' in an 'act of self-
determination in accordance with international practice.634  
 
In 1968, a UN team arrived in West Irian to help Indonesia prepare for the promised act 
of self determination.635 However, in January 1969, the Indonesian Government declaring that a 
referendum was impractical because the people were too 'primitive', selected 1,026 West Irians to 
act as representatives of the population for special vote on self-determination.636 Rather than 
protest, the UN chose to co-operate. Unsurprisingly, given the level of intimidation, the West 
Irian representatives unanimously declared their love for Indonesia and their desire to join the 
Republic.637 In November 1969, the UN General Assembly, with opposition from a small number 
of African countries, voted to 'take note' of a UN report of the West Irian declaration of loyalty, 
and with that, recognising the legitimacy of Indonesian control over the West Irian people.638  
 
  II. The Affected People and their Opposition to Indonesian Control 
 
Irian Jaya as the Indonesian Government has re-named it is the territory on the western 
half of the island of New Guinea. Irian Jaya is mainly populated by native tribes such as the 
Danis and the Amungme. The indigenous people of Irian Jaya are different both, racially and 
ethnically from the majority of Indonesians. They are Melanesian and share cultural similarities 
with Papua New Guinea and other Melanesian areas while most Indonesians are Malay.  
 
                                                 
634 Id. 
635 Id.  
636 PJ Kuyper, P.J., and Kapteyn, P.J.G., “A Colonial Power as Champion of Self-Determination: Netherlands State Practice in the period 1945-1975”, in 
International Law in the Netherlands Van Panhys, H. F. et al. (ed.), (Sydney: Oceania Publications Inc., 1980), Vol III Ch 3; Poulgrain, G., ‘Outside Indonesia - 
An international perspective on the 1962 New York Agreement and the Indonesian Claim to Netherlands New Guinea’ (Brisbane: Queensland University of 
Technology, 2000). 
637 Id. 
638 See supra note 633. 
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Opposition to Indonesian control has existed in Irian Jaya since 1963.639 This opposition 
takes two forms:  those in favour of a federation with Papua New Guinea, and those who prefer 
independence as West Papua or "West Melanesia".640  The indigenous community accuses the 
Indonesian Government of implementing a policy of "transmigration" which translates as 
colonisation and planned re-settlement of Indonesian migrants in Irian Jaya.641 Other 
infringements blamed on the Government include wide array of human rights abuses.  
 
  III. Violation of Rights of the Indigenous Peoples of Irian Jaya  
 
The issues concerning violation of the rights of indigenous people of Irian Jaya involve 
indigenous land, human rights and environmental protection. According to the allegations, the 
responsibility lies primarily with Government of Indonesia, Freeport McMoran Copper and Gold 
(Freeport); a New Orleans based trans-national mining conglomerate and, the United States 
Government.642 The root cause is foreign direct investment in production and export of copper 
and gold.  
 
Freeport first entered Indonesia in 1959 following a meeting between Freeport Director 
and top engineer Forbes Wilson and Jan Van Gruisen, the then Managing Director of the East 
Borneo Company, a mining concern. Gruisen had by then just stumbled upon a report first made 
in 1936 regarding a mountain called the "Ertsberg" ("Copper Mountain") in Dutch New Guinea, 
by Jean Jacques Dozy.643 Dozy reported a mountain heavy with copper ore. Following Wilson 
informing Freeport's New York headquarters of the information contained in the report 
concerning the copper mountain and asking for permission and money to make a joint exploration 
                                                 
639 Free Papua Movement, Statement concerning the right of self-determination of the West Papuan people to the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Fifth 
Session (Geneva, August 1987) 
640 Id. 
641 Id. 
642 Klare, M. T., Resource Wars, The New Landscape of Global Conflict, (Metropolitan/Owl Books 2001), p.195. 
643 Pease, L., JFK, Indonesia, CIA & Freeport Sulphur, Probe, Vol. 3, No. 3 (March-April, 1996) and Vol. 3, No. 4 (May-June, 1996). 
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effort with the East Borneo Company, a contract was signed on February 1, 1960.644 This was 
followed by Freeport, subsequently signing a contract with the Indonesian Government in 1967 to 
mine for copper in 10,000 hectares of land belonging to the indigenous Amungme people. It is 
alleged that over time Freeport's control has extended over three times as much land.645  
 
In West Papua near the town of Timika, Freeport now operates the world's largest gold 
mine and the third largest copper mine.  With the construction of a new city for its employees 
Freeport had taken over an additional 25,000 hectares of land from the Amungme people.646 
Further, Freeport recently opened a new mine at Grasberg just two kilometres from the Timika 
site.  Resting on 2.6 million hectares of land acquired from Indonesia in 1991, "the new mine will 
increase output to 900 million pounds of copper and 1.1 million ounces of gold, making it the 
world's single biggest mining operation".647 
 
As the new York based journalist Eyal Press says “Freeport is simply following the 
standard Third World development model “developing a glamorous satellite city with complete 
facilities and a five-star Sheraton Hotel that will only widen the gap between the local people, 
who have nothing, and the Freeport staff, who have access to resources and facilities.  Only 15 
percent of the roughly 14,000 people Freeport employs in the area are locals, and most of them 
occupy the lowest-level jobs."648 
 
PT Freeport Indonesia, the subsidiary that operates the Grasberg copper and gold mine, 
has been accused of environmental abuse, especially the dumping of 130,000 tons of waste rock 





648 The Nation, July 31 / August 7 (1995), p. 125. 
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(known as tailings) a day into local rivers as a means of disposal.649 Grasberg has also become 
notorious for the human rights abuses committed by the thousands of soldiers on the site who are 
allegedly there to protect the mine from disgruntled locals, whose home the company has dug up 
or on which it dumps the tailings.650  
 
It is alleged that at 13,500 feet in the Jayawijaya Range of New Guinea, the Grasberg 
copper and gold mine is from an engineering standpoint, in a notoriously difficult place to 
mine.651  Further, it is alleged that, already the company has hewn 400 feet off this structure, a 
sacred mountain to the Amungme people, and when it leaves in 40 years' time, it is expected to 
have created a 1,500-foot crater.652  
 
The indigenous people and environmental groups accuse Freeport's mines of uprooting 
natives and washing pollutants into rivers.653 Freeport is also accused by many for not having any 
policy of commitment or royalty distribution to the local community.654  Apart from the problems 
faced by the Amungme, it is alleged that the downstream community, a tribe known as the 
Komoro, has a lot to complain about, with the death of a substantial tract of rainforest in the 
lowlands below the mine where the tailings have been dumped.655 It is alleged that the company 
had admitted that 30 square kilometres of forest is currently dead and over the life of the mine, it 
expects the destruction to spread to at least 130 square kilometres.656  
 
                                                 












Another allegation levelled against Freeport is that, for decades the indigenous people of 
Irian Jaya have been suffering blatant human rights abuses (imprisonment, torture, extrajudicial 
executions and "disappearances") at the hands of the Indonesian military aided by Freeport.657  A 
1995 study published by the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (AC F OA) describes a six-
month reign of terror around Freeport’s operations in which 37 Irianese civilians had been killed 
by Indonesian military personnel operating in the area of the mine.658 Far Eastern Economic 
Review, reported in December 1997 that Freeport McMoRan Copper & Gold is known “as the 
most maverick American multinational in the world today”.659 
 
The main question that could be asked in connection with the Freeport’s involvement in 
Irian Jaya is that, what are the rights for locals when a trans-national mining company enters an 
area of disputed nationality and over a number a decades extracts billions of dollars worth of 
copper and gold while re-investing almost nothing in the local economy. Although Freeport has 
continuously denied any involvement with the alleged violations of human rights of the 
indigenous peoples in Irian Jaya, one aspect that raises concerns regarding the company’s 
activities in Indonesia is the fact that currently the company has no political risk insurance against 
risks such as nationalisation, having lost policies with the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA) and the US Government’s Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) 
during the period 1996 -1998.660 Freeport McMoRan Copper & Gold’s version is that it no longer 
requires insurance “against political risks such as civil wars or nationalisation”. The unofficial 
                                                 
657 See supra note 648. 
658 Chatterjee, P., “The Mining Menace of Freeport-McMoRan”, The Multinational Monitor (April 1996). 
659 McBeth, J., “Bull’s Eye”, Far Eastern Economic Review, (December 4, 1997). 
660 In response to the US Federal Government Overseas Private Investment Corporation's cancellation in October 1995 of PT Freeport's political risk insurance on 
environmental grounds, the parent company, Freeport McMoRan, launched an expensive lobbying and legal campaign against OPIC's decision. It enlisted 
former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger (a director of Freeport McMoRan), and former CIA director, James Woolsey, as formidable apologists. 
Kissinger and others sought to intimidate other OPIC customers, threatened to lobby the US Congress to cut OPIC funding, and even tried (unsuccessfully) to 
pressure the US government to cut its funding to the environmental organization, WALHI, which had been the first Indonesian NGO to raise public concern 
about the environmental impact of the mine. Louisiana politicians, Democrat Senator John Breaux and Republican Representative Billy Tauzin - who had each 
received major campaign contributions from Freeport McMoRan - were amongst the most vocal critics of OPIC. With the cost to OPIC of the dispute estimated 
at between $100,000 and $200,000 a month in legal fees, the agency subsequently reinstated the insurance for a limited period of six months, in exchange for a 
commitment by the company to set up a $100-million trust fund to remediate the site when the mine is closed
 
(see supra note 649). 
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version however, is that the insurance was cancelled to avert the scrutiny and conditions that the 
Bank and US Government had required in return for their guarantee. It is also alleged that the 
company terminated its contract with MIGA on the eve of an investigation into the mine by 
MIGA.661 This goes to show the extent to which the company has gone to cover it tracks and 
avoid issues regarding the conduct of its affairs being raised by the US Government and MIGA. 
 
In the Indonesian context, laws established by the Government guarantee the investors 
safety in their activities and make operating companies privy to a number of special rights which 
are designed to facilitate profitable outcomes (Mining Law No. 11 of 1967 and its regulations, 
supported by the Foreign Investment Law No. 1 of 1967 and Domestic Investment Law No. 6 of 
1968 and its implementing regulations).662 These special rights, combined with the full support of 
the State and its security apparatus means that the potential for human rights violations 
perpetrated by the company or State is high in relation to the communities living around their 
operations.663  
 
Tensions with indigenous people in Irian Jaya concerning the Freeport McMoRan mining 
concession near Timila, has led to the crackdown by Government security forces on several 
occasions, resulting in the deaths of civilians and other violent human rights abuses. In 1977, the 
Amungme people filed a claim for compensation for their lost land which the Indonesian 
Government promptly rejected.  A spokesman for the Free Papua Movement (OPM) summarises 
the situation as follows: "since Freeport signed contracts in 1967, it has regarded this land as not 
                                                 
661 Kennedy, D., with Chatterjee, P., and Moody, R., Risky Business, The Grasberg Gold Mine, Berkeley, USA: Project Underground (1998). 
Online: http://www.moles.org. 
662 Ballard, Dr. C., Human Rights and the Mining Industry in Indonesia: A Baseline Study, (Canberra: International Institute for Environment and Development, 
2001).  
663 The 1967 Foreign Capital Investment Law opened the door to foreign investment in minerals and in 1967, Freeport Sulphur signed the first Contract of Work 
(COW) with the Indonesian government to mine copper in West Irian. Indonesia’s mining Contracts of Work essentially designate foreign firms as contractors 
working for the government and paying corporate income tax on profits in addition to royalties and other taxes. A second ‘generation’ of COWs, signed on 
slightly less generous terms than the Freeport contract saw fifteen foreign mining enterprises initiate exploration in Indonesia between 1968 and 1971, including 
INCO, which developed a nickel mine at Soroako in Sulawesi. During seven different COW generations, 268 contracts had been issued, of which only 12 have 
achieved production status. 
 298
belonging to our people... the Indonesian constitution considers it state land and any complaints 
made by the Amungme people (are seen by the company) as terrorist action."664  
 
Freeport’s parent company, Freeport McMoRan Copper & Gold (hereinafter Freeport 
McMoRan) is facing two major lawsuits in Louisiana State and the Federal Court about the 
human rights issues surrounding the Grasberg Mine.665 Freeport has been cited by the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency “for emitting the largest amount of toxic chemicals of any 
company." Further, allegations have been made that over hundreds of people have been extra-
judicially executed by the Indonesian military over the past 15 years with the knowledge and aid 
of Freeport. There are also allegations of torture and murder of members of the indigenous 
community living near Freeport's mines.666  
 
  IV. Legal Action against the Grasberg Copper and Gold Mine Project   
 
A member of the indigenous community of Irian Jaya, Tom Beanal, instituted legal 
action in 1996 challenging the continuing violations of indigenous human rights and 
environmental pollution by Freeport in Irian Jaya.667 Beanal, a resident of Tamika, was the leader 
of the Amungme Tribal Council of Lambaga Adat Suki Amungme. The action was filed in the 
Federal District Court in the Eastern District of Louisiana for alleged violations of international 
law.668  
 
                                                 
664 Statement of the Hon. Eni F. H. Faleomavaega at the United States House of Representatives, September 30, 1999.  
 Online: http://www.house.gov/apps/list/speech/as00_faleomavaega/stmteasttimor.html 
. 
665 State of Louisiana, Yosefa Alomang v. Freeport McMoRan Inc, and Freeport McMoRan Copper & Gold, Inc., Case No. 2002-C – 0864.  
666 Id. 
667 Tom Beanal Et. Al. vs. Freeport –McMoran, Inc. & Freeport –McMoran Copper and Gold, Inc. 
668 Beanal invoked jurisdiction under (1) 28 U.S.C. § 1332, (2) the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, and (3) the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, sec. 1, 
et seq. , 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note. 
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In his first amended complaint, Beanal alleged inter alia that Freeport is engaged in 
environmental abuses, human rights violations, and cultural genocide by destroying the 
Amungme's habitat and religious symbols, thus, forcing the Amungme to relocate. He asserted 
specifically that Freeport's private security forces acted in concert with the Republic to violate 
international human rights. Freeport moved to dismiss Beanal's claims under Federal Rules Civil 
Procedure 12(b) (6). The District Court in April 1997 issued a thorough forty-nine page Opinion 
and Ordered dismissing Beanal's claims without prejudice and with leave to amend.669 In the said 
order, pursuant to Rule 12(e) of the Federal Civil Procedure, the District Court instructed Beanal 
to amend his complaint to state more specifically his claims of genocide and individual human 
rights violations.  
 
In August 1997, the District Court granted Freeport's motion to strike Beanal's second 
amended complaint on the basis that Beanal inappropriately attempted to add third parties. At the 
motion to strike hearing, the court again instructed Beanal to plead facts sufficient to support his 
allegations of genocide and individual human rights violations. In March 1998, the District Court 
granted Freeport's motion to strike Beanal's third amended complaint and dismissed his claims 
with prejudice.670  
 
Beanal appealed from the District Court's rulings. The Court of Appeal affirmed the 
District Court ruling after review of each of the arguments made by Beanal alleging violation of 
international law by the defendants.671 The Court of Appeals findings on each of the arguments 
are summarised below: 
 
                                                 
669 See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran , 969 F.Supp. 362 (E.D.La. 1997). 
670 The District Court dismissed Beanal's claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 12(b)(6). 
671 United States Court of Appeal, 5th Circuit Case No. 98-30235. The full text of the judgment is available at : http://laws.findlaw.com/5th/9830235cv0.html 
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Beanal claimed that Freeport engaged in conduct that violated the Alien Tort Statute.672 
He argued that under §1350, the District Courts  have original jurisdiction of any civil action by 
an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.673 However, Beanal did not claim that Freeport violated a United States Treaty. Thus, the 
issue before the court was whether Beanal had pleaded claims upon which relief can be granted 
for violations under international law. The Court concluded that it is only required to determine 
whether the pleadings on their face state a claim upon which relief can be granted and that 
Beanal's allegations under the ATS can be divided into three categories:(1) individual human 
rights violations; (2) environmental torts; and (3) genocide and cultural genocide. The court 
addressed each issue as follows:  
 
(I) Individual Human Rights Violations  
 
Beanal had claimed that Freeport was engaged in the following conduct; (1) surveillance; 
(2) mental torture; (3) death threats; and (4) house arrest, thereby violating the rights of the 
indigenous people of Irian Jaya. Freeport argued that Beanal's allegations fail to give adequate 
notice under the federal pleading requirements. Also, Freeport claimed that Beanal had failed to 
plead the requisite state action to support his claims under the ATS. The District Court found that 
Beanal merely made nominal changes to his third amended complaint in an attempt to comply 
with its order to provide a more definite statement of what had happened to him individually.  
 
After reviewing Beanal's pleadings de novo, the Court of Appeal agreed with the District 
Court's ruling that Beanal's complaint merely makes conclusiory allegations and that Beanal's 
claims are devoid of names, dates, locations, times or any facts that would put Freeport on notice 
                                                 
672 The "ATS" or "§1350". 
673 §1350 confers subject matter jurisdiction when the following conditions are met; (1) an alien sues, (2) for a tort, (3) that was committed in violation of the "law 
of nations" or a treaty of the United States. See Kadic v. Karadzic , 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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as to what conduct supports the nature of his claims. Furthermore, after comparing Beanal's third 
amended complaint with his second, the court agreed with the District Court's observation that, 
Beanal had made a superficial effort to personalise his complaint in order to comply with the 
court's order.  
 
Although Beanal argued that the District Court inappropriately subjected his complaint to 
a heightened pleading standard, the Court of Appeal held that, nonetheless, the notice 
requirements under Rule 8 require more than bare bone allegations that a wrong has occurred. 
The Court of Appeal also affirmed the District Court's dismissal of Beanal's claims of individual 
human rights violations under the ATS on the ground that his complaint failed to provide 
adequate factual specificity as to what had happened to him individually the ATS.674  
 
(II) Environmental Torts and Abuses  
 
Beanal argued that Freeport through its mining activities engaged in environmental 
abuses, which violated international law. Specifically, Beanal alleged in his third amended 
complaint that Freeport', in connection with its Grasberg operations, deposits approximately 
100,000 tons of tailings per day in the Aghwagaon, Otomona and Akjwa Rivers and that the said 
tailings divert the natural flow of the rivers and have rendered the natural waterways of the 
plaintiff unusable for traditional uses including bathing and drinking.  
 
Further, it was alleged that Freeport, in connection with its Grasberg operations had 
diverted the aforesaid rivers greatly increasing the likelihood of future flooding in Timika. It was 
also alleged that the Grasberg mining operations had caused or will cause through the course of 
its operations, 3 billion tons of "overburden" to be dumped into the upper Wanagon and Carstensz 
                                                 
674 See supra note 667. 
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creating the likely risk of massive landslides directly injurious to the plaintiff. It was alleged that 
the said "overburden" creates acid rock damage resulting in “acid streams” and rendering the 
Lake Wanagon an "acid lake", extremely high in copper concentrations. Beanal and the amicus 
referred the court to several sources of international environmental law to show that the alleged 
environmental abuses caused by Freeport's mining activities are cognizable under international 
law. Chiefly among these were the Principles of International Environmental Law I: Frameworks, 
Standards and Implementation 183-18675 and the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, June 13, 1992.676 
 
Freeport argued that Beanal's allegations of environmental torts were not cognizable 
under the "law of nations" because Beanal failed to show that Freeport's mining activities violate 
any universally accepted environmental standards or norms. Furthermore, Freeport argued that it 
would be improper for a United States tribunal to evaluate another county's environmental 
practices and policies.  
 
The Court of Appeal held that "[i]t is only where the nations of the world have 
demonstrated that the wrong is of mutual and not merely several, concern, by means of express 
international accords, that a wrong generally recognised becomes an international law violation 
in the meaning of the [ATS]."677. Thus, the ATS "applies only to shockingly egregious violations 
of universally recognised principles of international law."678  The Court further held that, Beanal 
failed to show that these treaties and agreements enjoy universal acceptance in the international 
community. “Although the United States has articulable standards embodied in federal statutory 
                                                 
675 See generally, Sands, P.(ed.), Principles of International Environmental Law I: Frameworks, Standards and Implementation, (Cambridge: University Press, 1995) 
pp. 183-18. 
676 United Nations, ‘Rio Declaration’ (1992), U..N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/5 rev.1. 
677 Referring to Kadic v. Karadzic , 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995). 
678 Referring to Zapata v. Quinn , 707 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1983)(per curiam).. 
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law to address environmental violations domestically,679 nonetheless, federal courts should 
exercise extreme caution when adjudicating environmental claims under international law to 
ensure that environmental policies of the United States do not displace environmental policies of 
other governments. Furthermore, the Court noted that the argument to abstain from interfering in 
a sovereign's environmental practices carries persuasive force especially when the alleged 
environmental torts and abuses occur within the sovereign's borders and do not affect 
neighbouring countries.” Accordingly, the Court of Appeal held that the District Court did not err 
when it concluded that Beanal failed to show in his pleadings that Freeport's mining activities 
constitute environmental torts or abuses under international law.680  
 
(III) Genocide and Cultural Genocide  
 
Beanal claimed that Freeport engaged in acts of genocide and cultural genocide. In 
particular, in his first amended complaint, Beanal alleged that Freeport's mining operations 
caused the Amungme people to be displaced and relocated to other areas of the country. He also 
alleged that Freeport's mining activities destroyed the Amungme's habitat. As such, Beanal 
asserted that Freeport purposely engaged in activity to destroy the Amungme's cultural and social 
framework.  
 
Freeport attacked Beanal's allegations claiming that cultural genocide is not recognised as 
a discrete violation of international law. The District Court relying chiefly on the express 
language of Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (the "Convention on Genocide"), concluded that cultural genocide 
was not recognised by the international community as a violation of international law. The 
                                                 
679 See, The National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.) and The Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.C. § 1532) 
680 See supra note 667. 
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District Court then instructed Beanal to amend his complaint to allege genocide. Specifically, the 
Court instructed Beanal to allege facts that would demonstrate that "he [was] the victim of acts 
committed with the intent to destroy the people of the Amungme tribe . . . ." Consequently, the 
District Court found that Beanal's third Amended Complaint failed to comply with its express 
instructions.  
 
The Court of Appeal observed that Beanal’s third amended complaint revealed that his 
claim of genocide suffered from the same pleading defects that plagued his other claims of 
individual human rights violations. The Court concluded that Beanal's complaint is saturated with 
conclusory allegations devoid of any underlying facts to support his claim of genocide.  
 
Further, the Court held that, although Benal had alleged cultural genocide, the claim 
failed to identify and establish conduct on the part of Freeport that would constitute an act of 
cultural genocide, and as such it would be problematic to apply these vague and declaratory 
international documents to Beanal's claim because they are devoid of discernable means to define 
or identify conduct that constitutes a violation of international law. The Court also held that, 
Beanal had not demonstrated that cultural genocide has achieved universal acceptance as a 
discrete violation of international law and thus it would be imprudent for a United States tribunal 
to declare an amorphous cause of action under international law that has failed to garner universal 
acceptance.681  
 
  V. The Legal Action filed by Walhi against Freeport 
 
The environmental group, WALHI's (Friends of the Earth-Indonesia) case against 
Freeport was launched in 2000, after a rockslide in May 2000 at the Wanagon Dam where, 
                                                 
681 Id. 
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Freeport disposes overburden and waste rock from its Grasberg mine in Irian Jaya. The collapse 
triggered a tide of water, sludge and overburden to cascade into Wanagon Valley and caused 
flooding in Banti village several kilometres downstream from the dam. As a result, four 
construction workers were swept away and killed.682 A Freeport's press releases blamed the 
incident on high rainfall. The company claimed that the accident did not pose any risk to human 
health or have an impact on the environment. However, Indonesia's environmental protection 
agency, Bapedal, reported that the company had used the lake to dump and neutralise acid slag 
and that, at the time of the incident, the sediment in the lake contained toxic and dangerous 
material.683 
 
On August 28th 2001, the South Jakarta District Court declared Freeport guilty of 
violating Indonesian Environmental Law (No. 23, 1997). The company was ordered to reform its 
waste management systems. The Court held that Freeport had deliberately concealed information 
and had given false and inaccurate explanations, thereby misleading the public. The Court 
therefore ordered Freeport to minimise the risk of more rockslides at Wanagon. It also ordered the 
company to reduce its production of toxic waste so that it fulfils water quality standards.684  
 
WALHI demanded that the company be penalised by issuing public apologies through 
the national and international media, but this was rejected by the Court. At present appeals filed 
by both WALAHI (against the order dismissing the application for an order against the company, 
requiring the company to issue a public apology) and by Freeport (challenging the judgement 
declaring the company guilty of violating Indonesian environmental law) are pending before the 
Indonesian Supreme Court.685 
                                                 
682 Down to Earth, “Court orders Freeport to clean up its act”, Vol. 51 (November 2001). Online: www.gn.apc.org/dte/51Frp.htm 
683 Id. 
684 Source: WALHI Press Release 11/Oct/03; see also WALHI website: www.walhi.or.id 
685 Source : Jakarta Post, Thursday, August 30, 2001; Down To earth, No. 51, November 2001. 
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  VI. The Current Situation in Irian Jaya  
 
Although, the aforementioned legal action by Walhi produced an encouraging result for 
the indigenous people in Irian Jaya, as far as the environment in which they live is concerned, 
according some experts, the worst is yet to come.686 It has been pointed out that through a 
chemical weathering process by which sulphites in the tailings are exposed to air and water, the 
so-called Ajkwa Deposition Area (the area surrounded by the massive corporate-made levees 
resulting from the Freeport operations) could become a perpetual pollution machine, slowly 
leaching sulphuric acid into the ecosystem. Acid mine drainage has already been recorded within 
the main waste-rock dump, and is likely to accelerate.687 It is alleged that the potential effects of 
acid mine drainage are devastating and capable of destroying the ecology of entire river systems, 
both by raising acidity to dangerous levels and by releasing dissolved heavy metals into the river 
system.688 Thus, if no preventive measures are taken, it is likely that the indigenous community 
living in Irian Jaya will continue to suffer due to the mining activities carried out by Freeport with 
the blessings of the Government of Indonesia.  
 
As far as human rights violations affecting the indigenous community are concerned, the 
available evidence shows that there has been no improvement despite various representations 
made by the affected groups of people and even the international community. For example, 
according to the report of Maurice Glélé-Ahanhanzo, Special Rapporteur to the Commission on 
Human Rights on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related 
intolerance, the situation of the indigenous people of Irian Jaya had not improved even by the late 
                                                 




1990s.689 His report in 1997 confirms of widespread abuses ongoing within the context of an 
oppressive military presence and that there is continuing environmental damage and the cultural 
subordination of indigenous people in the face of the massive exploitation of resources by 
powerful multinational corporations including Freeport.690 Further, the report points out that 
multinationals carrying out mining operations are being given the local people's land and that as a 
result, all aspects of the locals’ lives have been altered and they are forcibly resettled. It also 
makes the point that the politics, culture, economy, education and work opportunities are 
Indonesian, imposed from Jakarta; and, the Freeport Mines Company controls the economy of 
Irian Jaya.691 However, these allegations are vehemently denied by the Government of Indonesia. 
For example, in its reply to the Commission on Human Rights, the Government stated that the 
allegations of human rights violations in Irian Jaya were half truths and uncorroborated and 
therefore the allegation that the people in Irian Jaya are tortured, arbitrarily detained and extra 
judicially executed is totally unacceptable.692 
 
6.4.2. Measures for Protecting Indigenous Rights whilst 
Promoting Infrastructure Development  
 
As noted in the previous sections of this chapter, protecting the rights of indigenous 
people can be a hard task for developing country governments, given the need to balance the 
increasing development needs with the interests of the indigenous communities. Even though in 
democratic societies, governments have to undertake development projects for the benefit of the 
                                                 
689 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Report by Mr. Maurice Glélé-Ahanhanzo, Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial 
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights 
resolution 1996/21 on 16 January 1997 (E/CN.4/1997/71) . 
690 Id. 
691 Id. 
692 Id. (Referring to the Reply from the Government of Indonesia by letter dated 20 October 1996). 
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majority, making certain sacrifices in the larger interest of the nation, development projects can 
no longer be undertaken neglecting the rights of indigenous communities.  
 
In the circumstances, both governments and investors should take precautions to ensure 
that their project development activities do not unduly undermine the rights of the indigenous 
people. Doing this would be of mutual benefit to both the host governments and the investors as it 
could help avoid the risk of their development projects being challenged by indigenous 
communities which can sometimes result in long drawn out legal battles. The international 
community too could help this process by taking measures to help ensure that development 
initiatives do not compromise the rights of indigenous peoples. 
 
a. Initiatives that could be taken by Developing Countries 
 
As noted earlier in this Chapter, most common cause for objection by indigenous peoples 
to development projects is the acquisition of their traditional homelands for development 
purposes. In every jurisdiction, it is likely that some form of legislative mechanism exists for the 
acquisition of land in the name of development.  
 
It is a well-established principle of law, both internationally and nationally in most 
countries that rights must entail remedies, especially where property rights are concerned. For 
example under Article 1, Protocol 1 of the European Conventions for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the government taking of property must be accompanied by 
some payment of compensation.693 Similarly, Article 21 (2) of the American Convention on 
                                                 
693 European Conventions for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 4.XI.1950. 
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Human Rights, it is provided that “[n]o one shall be deprived of his property except upon 
payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest”.694  
 
However, a key issue concerning the lands of indigenous peoples is that, in many 
countries there is no legal recognition of their title to traditional homelands. For example, as was 
held in the famous Australian case of Mabo,695 which paved the way for the enactment of the 
Australian Native Titles Act of 1993 (NTA), the source of native title to land is common law. In 
common law, no recognition of native title by legislation is sometimes required and its source lies 
in connection with the land and this connection must accord with traditional laws and customs. 
Native title usually does not amount to ownership of the land, but the natives are entitled to 
possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of the land “as against the whole world” subject only 
to the power of Parliament to extinguish that title.  
  
In the circumstances, it is important that developing country governments amend their 
existing laws or pass new laws to ensure that compensation for acquisition of land does not cover 
only title but, also possession, at least when it concerns indigenous peoples. As far as such 
national legislation that provides for award of compensation to indigenous peoples is concerned, 
The NTA of Australia is a good example. The NTA enables natives to seek compensation not 
only for property takeovers initiated by the government after the coming into operation of the 
Act, but also for property takeovers before the Act came into operation.696  
 
Dr Whipple, the Foundation Professor in Valuation and Land Economy at Curtin 
University, Australia, who has written a number of articles on compensation for take over of 
                                                 
694 The American Convention on Human Rights was signed at the Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights, San Josi, Costa Rica, 22 November 
1969. 
695 Mabo v Queensland (1992) 175 CLR 1. 
696 See Sections 20 – 23, Native Titles Act of  1994. 
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indigenous lands, draws a distinction between the ‘material’ aspects of native title and the 
‘spiritual’ aspects of native title.697  He says that the material aspects include things like fishing 
and hunting rights and other incidents of native title which can be equated to incidents of ordinary 
land tenure. Such material aspects can be valued in the same way that similar interests existing in 
a Western land tenure system are valued.  
 
However, putting a value on spiritual rights to native lands is not so easy, although it 
could be argues that “something more” should be added to the compensation package to cover 
spiritual rights when native lands are acquired for development purposes. The “something more” 
argument relates to the ‘spiritual’ aspects of native title. Dr. Whipple recognizes that the spiritual 
attachment which indigenous people may have to land cannot be measured by traditional 
methods. He argues that the courts must therefore develop methods of valuing the spiritual 
aspects of native title.698 The value of the spiritual aspects of native title can then be added to the 
value of the material aspects of native title and the total can be the measure of compensation for 
native title.699 However, Dr. Whipple makes no suggestions on how the spiritual aspects of native 
title should be valued. However, the important thing to note is that he, at least, suggests an 
important factor to be considered when adequate compensation for acquired lands of indigenous 
communities is being considered.   
 
Considering risks that pop up in connection with infrastructure development projects 
when the rights of indigenous communities are affected, the following legislative, judicial, policy 
and administrative measures can be suggested as further measures that could be taken by 
developing countries to avoid such risks: 
                                                 




i. Adopt or continue to apply, in concert with indigenous people, constitutional, 
administrative, legislative and judicial measures to promote, protect and ensure the 
enjoyment of their human rights and fundamental freedoms on the basis of equality, non-
discrimination and full and free participation in all areas of society, in particular in 
matters affecting their interests. 
ii. Honour, respect and observe the treaties and agreements concerning indigenous peoples. 
iii. Give full and appropriate consideration to the recommendations produced by indigenous 
peoples in their own forums. 
iv. Make regular assessments of the progress achieved in overcoming discrimination and 
prejudice. 
v. Consult the indigenous communities in the process of decision-making concerning 
policies and measures that directly affect them. 
vi. When implementing investment projects, cooperation with indigenous peoples to 
stimulate their access to economic activities and increase their level of employment, 
through the establishment, acquisition or expansion by indigenous peoples of enterprises, 
and the implementation of measures such as training, the provision of technical assistance 
and credit facilities. 
vii. Carry out special projects through appropriate channels and in collaboration with 
indigenous peoples to support their initiatives at the community level and to facilitate the 
exchange of information and technical know-how between indigenous peoples and 
experts in these areas. 
viii. Enhance policies and measures to reduce income and wealth inequalities and to take 
appropriate steps to promote and protect economic, social and cultural rights on a non-
discriminatory basis. 
ix. Promotion of understanding among society at large of the importance of special measures 
to overcome disadvantages faced by indigenous peoples. 
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x. Promote better knowledge of, and respect for, indigenous cultures and heritage among the 
majority communities. 
xi.  Keep the international organizations and foreign investors who finance development 
projects informed of the indigenous peoples, their customary rights and cultures and 
heritage if any development project is to be located in areas occupied by the indigenous 
communities. 
 
Some of the above measures that could be taken by countries have already been 
recognised by various international forums as necessary measures to ensure the protection of the 
rights of indigenous peoples and for striking a balance between protecting such rights and 
promoting economic development through foreign direct investment.700  
 
b. Measures that could be taken by Investors 
 
In modern day FDI, as noted in Chapter 2 of this thesis, most investors are large 
MNCs.701 The UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities noted that, “While it is clear that transnational corporate activity has the potential to 
aid economic development in developing states, the activities and working methods of TNCs are 
oriented towards maximizing profit rather than promoting equality and improving human well-
being”.702 The sub-commission noted that foreign direct investment by MNCs can negatively 
interfere with a number of human rights, including: “the right of peoples to self-determination 
and to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources; the right to development; 
                                                 
700 For example see: Draft of the Inter-American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 19 September 1995,Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, Commission on Human Rights (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1 (1994));Proposed American Declaration on The Rights of indigenous Peoples (Approved 
by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on February 26,1997, at its 133rd session, 95th regular session);The International Cancun Declaration of 
Indigenous Peoples (5th WTO Ministerial Conference - Cancun, Quintana Roo, Mexico, 12 September 2003). 
701 Sometimes also referred to in this thesis as TNCs (Transnational Corporations). 
702 ECOSOC, The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Relationship between the Enjoyment of Human Rights, in particular, International 
Labour and Trade Union rights, and the Working Methods and Activities of Transnational Corporations, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/11 (1995), Para 91.  
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the right of everyone to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and 
his family and the continuous improvement of living conditions…”703  
 
Under international human rights law, states have an obligation to respect and ensure the 
respect for human rights within their territorial jurisdiction. However, the same cannot be said of 
MNCs as in the past the popular perception has been that they are under no legal obligation, 
saving any corporate ethics they may have, to respect human rights. In a study that explores the 
governance gap with respect to the accountability for human rights abuses of corporations 
operating trans-nationally in conflict zones, Gagnon, Macklin and Simons conclude that neither 
international human rights law nor general international law clearly impose “direct obligations on 
MNCs to respect and ensure respect for human rights within their sphere of influence.704 Nor is 
there an “international legal duty on home states to ensure that their corporate nationals are not 
complicit in, or perpetrators of, violations of international human rights and humanitarian law in 
host state jurisdictions.”705 
 
During the last decade however, a growing consensus among individuals and 
organisations seem to have developed that MNCs too should be accountable for violations of 
international human rights related to their business activities.706 Academics, NGOs and 
international organizations have begun to address the question of whether MNCs have obligations 
under international or domestic law to respect and ensure respect for human rights in their 
                                                 
703 Id. Para 89.  
704 See for example, Gagnon, G., Macklin, A., and Simons, P., Deconstructing Engagement; (Social Science and Humanities Research Council and Law 
Commission of Canada, 2003);  at pp. 54-55; and McCorquodale, R., “Human Rights and Global Business”, in Bottomley, S. and Kinley, D., (ed.) Commercial 
Law and Human Rights, (Burlington: Aldershot, 2001) 89 at pp. 92-97.  
705 Id. at pp. 55-58; Also note that under the Draft Articles on State Responsibility of the International Law Commission, there is no apparent obligation incumbent 
on a home state to take steps to prevent the effects of the extraterritorial activities of corporate nationals. See Crawford, J., The International Law Commission’s 
Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries, (Cambridge: University Press, 2002) at  pp. 91-121.  
706 Muchlinski, P.T.,  “Human Rights and Multinationals: Is There a Problem?”, 77 International Affairs (2001) p.31 at pp. 31-32; see also, Ratner, S.R., 
“Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility”, 111 Yale L. J. (2001), p.443 at pp. 446-448. 
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extraterritorial activities.707 In particular, there appears to be an emerging consensus that MNCs 
are bound by fundamental norms of international law that prohibit, among other things, abuses 
such as forced labour, slavery, genocide, torture and crimes against humanity,708 and that 
investors that transgress these principles might be criminally prosecuted in any State under the 
principle of universal jurisdiction and officers and employees of corporations may be subject to 
prosecution as individuals in the International Criminal Court (ICC).709  
 
However, it is important to note that the ICC does not currently have jurisdiction to 
prosecute corporations, and to date no companies have been criminally prosecuted in domestic 
courts for such abuses. In the circumstances, it is clear that, unlike in the case of governments, 
there is no clear obligation on the part of the investors to respect the rights of indigenous 
communities and to ensure that investment activities do not violate the rights of indigenous 
communities.  
 
The UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights has recently 
adopted the “Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights."710 These norms are the product of a four-year drafting 
and multi-stakeholder consultation exercise by the Sub-Commission Working Group on 
Transnational Corporations. They provide a comprehensive set of principles that address, among 
other things, the human rights and labour rights concerns related to MNC activities. The 
                                                 
707 Ramasastry, A., “Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon, An Examination of Forced Labour Cases and Their Impact on the Liability of 
Multinational Corporations”, 20 Berkeley J. Int’l L. (2002), p. 91; Clapham, A., and Jerbi, S., “Categories of Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Abuses”, 
24 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev (2001), p. 339; Kamminga, M.T., and Zia-Zarifi, S., “Liability of Multinational Corporations under International Law: An 
Introduction”,  in Kamminga, M. T. and Zia-Zarifi, S., (ed.), Liability of Multinational Corporations under International Law, (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International) at pp. 1-15.  
708 See Kamminga and Zia-Zarifi, supra note 707at  p. 8. 
709 See Ramasastry, supra note 707 at pp. 153-156. 
710 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003), Approved on August 13, 2003, by U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 
resolution 2003/16, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/L.11 at 52 (2003). 
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principles are drawn from a variety of binding international treaties and drafted in mandatory 
language, and a separate document provides interpretive commentary.  
 
The said norms recognize that the primary responsibility to respect and ensure respect for 
human rights lies with States.711 However, they also state that MNCs have an “obligation to 
promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of, and protect human rights recognized 
in international as well as national law, including the rights and interests of indigenous peoples 
and other vulnerable groups” within their sphere of activity and influence.712 These principles 
include: a prohibition on the commission of, complicity in, or benefiting from, violations of 
international humanitarian law and fundamental human rights;713 provisions on the hiring and 
conduct of public and private security forces; 714 the obligation to respect both “economic, social 
and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights and contribute to their realization” and to 
“refrain from actions which obstruct or impede the realization of those rights.715 They require 
MNCs “to respect the principle of free, prior, and informed consent of the indigenous peoples and 
communities,” and prohibit both forced displacement of such communities and the deprivation of 
their means of subsistence.716 In addition, the norms recommend that States establish “the 
necessary legal and administrative framework for ensuring that norms and other relevant national 
and international laws are implemented” by MNCs.717 
 
It is important that the developing country governments ensure that the investors, who 
wished to participate in development activities in their countries, undertake to adopt, respect and 
                                                 
711 ECOSOC, ‘Commentary on the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’ 
(2003), UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2 (2003), Article 1.  
712 Id.   
713 Ibid. Article 3.  
714 Ibid. Article 4.  
715 Ibid. Article 12. 
716 Ibid. Article 10, Para. c 
717 Ibid. Article 17.  
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follow the above norms and responsibilities. This can be done by the developing country 
governments introducing them to their investment policies and ensuring that adequate measures 
are built into the contract documents to ensure that the investors follow them.  
 
Thus, from the investor perspective, it is important that they play no role in violating 
indigenous rights. In addition to financial losses that may be caused due to long delays in project 
completions or due to overall project failures that may result from legal actions and protests by 
indigenous communities, bad reputation gained by violating the rights of indigenous communities 
may result in lack of access to investment opportunities in some developing countries. This may 
be caused by developing countries and or international funding agencies blacklisting investors.718 
Thus, steps should be taken to ensure that project viability studies look beyond economic viability 
and examine also areas such as the rights of indigenous communities and environmental impact.  
 
One of the main allegations against foreign investors in connection with infrastructure 
development projects in developing countries is that they give minimal consideration to the best 
interest of the host country, its environment, and the various groups of people in the host country 
that may be adversely affected, due to the project. Although many investors and multinational 
funding agencies disagree with this criticism and sometimes boast of their impressive 
environmental policies and business ethics to ensure fair play, there is plenty of evidence to show 
that such policies exists only on paper and are not put into practice. 
 
                                                 
718 For example, the World Bank in July 2004 blacklisted its first multinational with the debarring of Canadian engineering firm Acres International from new 
contracts for three years. The blacklisting came as a response to the company being found guilty by the High Court of Lesotho, for having engaged in corrupt 
activities to influence the Lesotho Highlands development authority, which was responsible for the multibillion-dollar Lesotho Highlands water project. Source: 
The Hindu   24 July 2004. 
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A good example is the attitude of JEXIM towards the San Roque dam Project in the 
Philippines.719 JEXIM’s environmental guidelines state that people resettled by projects it funds 
must have given their consent. On this basis, it is alleged that at the beginning JEXIM reportedly 
held off any loan disbursements until it was satisfied that the project would conform to its 
environmental and indigenous peoples’ criteria. However, given that the project started 
construction in May 1998, despite heavy protests by the indigenous community in the 
Philippines, who alleged that they are being displaced due to the project and no proper 
compensation package has been offered to them, and that the project is scheduled for commercial 
operation by the end of the year 2004, it appears that JEXIM’s support for the project violates its 
own guidelines.720  
 
The investors should realise that, in the long run, for infrastructure development projects 
to provide a win-win stage for all participants, including the investors, the projects have to 
contribute to the sustainable development of countries. Investment white elephants or failed 
projects would be dangerous for the reputation of the investors and might result on many 
investment opportunities being shut to them. In the circumstances, investors too should take the 
initiative to follow guidelines such as those adopted by the UN Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights.  
 
Even in instances, where, certain developing country governments may wish to give 
various concessions undermining the rights of indigenous communities to induce investors to 
invest in what appear to be profitable projects, the investors should insist on co-operation with 
local communities, keeping in mind the distinctive needs of different communities as well as their 
                                                 
719 San Roque is one of 22 large dams planned for the Cordillera region, and is the first one to be built in the region as part of a wide-ranging development plan of 
former President Fidel Ramos. The dam site is located on the Agno River in Pangasinan Province, but reservoir inundation will occur in Itogon Province, home 
of the Ibaloi people. 
720 World Rivers Review, April 1999.  
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cultural diversity. Further, they should refrain from seeking or accepting exemptions from host 
country regulatory requirements in areas such as human rights, environment and labour.  
 
c. What the International Community can do 
 
As already noted in this Chapter, since the 1960’s the voice of the indigenous peoples in 
the world have been gaining momentum. Since the beginning of the 1960’s International 
organizations such as the WB, ADB, HRC, and the ILO have been active, passing various 
declarations and promoting certain internationally acceptable norms to protect the rights of 
indigenous people in order to ensure that their rights are not compromised in the face of 
development. NGO’s too have played a very active role in promoting the indigenous peoples 
rights and in pressurising governments and investors to adopt various measures to ensure that the 
indigenous peoples are protected. So far, these initiatives have been considerably successful.  
 
Key international lending and development financing organizations such as the WB and 
the ADB have adopted policies on indigenous peoples and have started applying these  policies to 
all investment projects in which they participate, thus putting pressure on developing country 
governments as well as investors to taking note of the importance of protecting the rights of 
indigenous communities. For example, the ADB in its Operation Manual on Indigenous People721 
provides inter alia that:  
Since ADB recognizes the potential vulnerability of indigenous peoples in 
development processes, development interventions that will affect indigenous 
peoples should ensure that they have opportunities to participate in and benefit 
equally from the interventions.722  
 
 
                                                 
721 ADB, Operation Manual  on Indigenous People, (Manila: ADB, 21 September 2000), Section 53. 
722 Id. Para 6. 
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It provides further that: 
ADB’s interventions affecting indigenous peoples should (i) be consistent with the 
needs and aspirations of affected indigenous peoples; (ii) be compatible in 
substance and structure with affected indigenous peoples’ cultures and social and 
economic institutions; (iii) be conceived, planned, and implemented with the 
informed participation of affected communities; (iv) be equitable in terms of 
development efforts and impact; and (v) not impose the negative effects of 
development on indigenous peoples without appropriate and acceptable 
compensation.723 
 
The ILO Convention 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries724 expressly states that governments have the "responsibility for developing, with the 
participation of the peoples concerned, co-ordinated and systematic action to protect the rights of 
these peoples and to guarantee respect for their integrity." These measures include ensuring that 
indigenous peoples benefit from the rights and opportunities of national laws, promoting the full 
realisation of social, economic and cultural rights with respect to their social and cultural identity; 
and assisting indigenous peoples to eliminate socio-economic gaps in a manner compatible with 
their aspirations and ways of life. Indigenous peoples shall enjoy, without discrimination, the full 
measure of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
 
Other international conventions also reference the responsibility of governments. For 
example the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)725 expressly recognizes the rights of 
indigenous peoples to customary uses of their lands, and to the traditional knowledge associated 
with those uses. Similarly, the UN’s International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
                                                 
723 Ibid. Para 7. 
724 Adopted on 27 June 1989 by the General Conference of the International Labour Organization at its seventy-sixth session. Date of entry into force: 5 September 
1991. 
725 The CBD was negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). It was opened for signature at the June 1992 UN 
conference on Environment and Development and entered into force on 29 December 1993. More than 170 countries have  become parties to the CBD since it 
was opened for signature.  
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Racial Discrimination (CERD) 726 also refers to the responsibilities of governments to condemn 
and eliminate racial discrimination.  
 
As noted in Chapter 1, Modern day infrastructure development projects are so vast that 
developing country governments or foreign investors cannot most of the time finance them on 
their own or even in partnership. Thus, in addition to developing countries giving concessions and 
some times limited capital, and investors putting substantial capital, most investment projects are 
financed with heavy debt and less equity. Thus, international financing agencies such as the WB 
and the ADB have a tremendous opportunity to put pressure on developing country governments 
and investors to ensure that development projects do not under mine and compromise the rights 
of indigenous people. If they strictly apply their policies and ensure that projects which are purely 
profit driven, and not leading towards sustainable development are not financed by them that 
would help control the violation of the rights of indigenous people under the pretext of 
development to some extent. 
 
Thus, the international entities such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank 
should take the initiative to further strengthen their policies concerning development activities in 
regions occupied by indigenous communities. The NGOs and other pressure groups should 
continue their good work by identifying problem areas and drawing the international attention 
towards protecting the indigenous communities and need for sustainable development in lieu of 
profit driven ill planed development activities. 
 
United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s recent appointment of Professor John 
Ruggie as Special Representative on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and 
                                                 
726 Adopted and opened for signature and ratification by General Assembly resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965, and entered into force on 4 January 1969. 
As of 2 November 2003, 148 countries have become signatories. 
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other business enterprises can be viewed as a key step taken towards suggesting mechanisms for 
future control of abuse of human rights including the rights of indigenous communities by the 
large MNCs who invest in developing countries. The mandate includes identifying and clarifying 
standards of corporate responsibility and accountability with regard to human rights. An interim 
report presenting views and recommendations for consideration by the Commission on Human 
Rights is due at its sixty-second session in 2006 and a final report in 2007. The creation of this 
mandate was requested by the United Nations Commission for Human Rights in its resolution 
2005/69 and approved by the Economic and Social Council on 25 July 2005.727 
                                                 
727 UN Press Release No. SG/A/934 of 28.7.2005. 
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Chapter 7 - Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
7.1. Summary of Findings 
 
As already noted in this thesis, project financing has entered the mainstream of 
investment in developing countries as the preferred mode of FDI for development. It has 
gained new impetus in the dynamic environment created by increasing globalisation and 
sophistication in the financial markets on the one hand and, by political and regulatory 
reforms in countries which have opened infrastructure sectors to the private sector, on the 
other.  
 
During the last decade, the volume of investment flows related to project 
financing has expanded dramatically, although there has been an overall reduction of 
investment flows to developing countries due to the financial crisis and various risks 
associated with them, including, political instability, war, and terrorism. For example, the 
financial crisis that started in East Asia in 1997 and then gradually spread to other areas 
in the globe brought about a significant pause in the upward movement of FDI until the 
early part of 2000. The crisis dampened the investment opportunities in several countries 
causing the investors, host governments and project sponsors to rethink financial and 
economic viability of project proposals, and the need to re-evaluate risks involved. 
However, these problems created by the financial crisis can be regarded as a blessing in 
disguise to some extent as they have made all project participants rethink the pros and 
cons of project financing. One significant lesson from the crisis has been the 
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understanding of the need for exercising grater care in structuring projects and assessing 
their risks.  
 
The growth in project financing has been ably supported by increased competitiveness in 
the financial markets with financiers reducing funding costs and providing more innovative and 
long term financial options. During the last five years or so, the financial markets have become 
more relaxed towards entertaining long term and limited or non-recourse financing. Bonds, 
syndicated loans and private placements have offered new hope for finding necessary finances for 
the development needs of countries. The growing use of securitization techniques also has 
increased the liquidity and attractiveness of lending for projects to a wider range of investors. The 
regulatory and policy reforms undertaken by developing countries have boosted investor 
confidence in pumping finances to non traditional sectors such as infrastructure development 
which were less than two decades ago, thought to be the primary duty of the public sector. The 
ever growing interest in risk minimization and innovative methods of risk mitigation, discussed in 
Chapters three and four of this thesis have helped boost the confidence of project participants 
giving reliable hope of project success.  
 
However, despite these initiatives, in some developing countries, projects continue to be 
developed without proper risk assessment, mitigation, and allocation. As analyzed in the several 
case studies dealt with in this thesis728 it is clear that such projects are sometimes developed 
intentionally ignoring the risk implications they might have on the environment and society. More 
often than not, ulterior motives of profit driven project developers and/or corrupt practices of 
politicians and policy makers are behind such decisions. There is no doubt that such projects, 
although they might bring short term financial gains, would not contribute towards sustainable 
                                                 
728 See Chapters 5 and 6. 
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development of countries.729 With the consumers of utilities provided by such projects, 
environmentalists, human rights activists and the affected members of the public (including 
indigenous communities who are often at the receiving end of badly planned development 
projects) learning to fight back and challenge the governments and project developers who in 
their view are engaged in development projects that do not or are unlikely to contribute to 
sustainable development, it is likely that the future will witness developing countries as well as 
project developers being more cautious in their approach to developing infrastructure projects.  
 
Despite the various problems and issues identified with FDI for infrastructure 
development, more particularly with project financing techniques, development of infrastructure 
projects is likely to continue to attract foreign investment in the years to come. This is because, 
given the precarious finances of the developing countries and their inability to keep up with the 
growing demand for modernized and increased infrastructure facilities and, the growing interest 
among investors to explore new and hitherto inaccessible markets, project financing seems to be 
the most acceptable mode of FDI for both developing countries and investors. Further, despite the 
various flaws that have been noted during  its short existence, no better alternative to project 
financing for developing infrastructure projects in developing countries have yet been found.  
 
What is important from the developing country perspective is to ensure that project 
financing contributes to sustainable development. This is important from the investor perspective 
too as their contribution to sustainable development would open doors for more long-term 
business opportunities in countries in which they have already invested as well as in new 
countries which would want to attract investors who have been successful with development 
projects, elsewhere. From the perspective of international financing agencies, it is important that 
FDI mechanisms such as project financing contributes to sustainable development as active 
                                                 
729 See Chapter 1.4.3 of this thesis for an explanation concerning the use of the term “sustainable development” in the context of this thesis. 
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private sector participation in sustainable development would reduce their burden and the level of 
participation in physical infrastructure development activities. This would in turn allow them to 
focus their attention and more active financial support on the social infrastructure development in 
developing countries. Further, at bilateral and regional level too, there could be benefits to 
countries from sustainable development of neighbouring countries. For example, a landlocked 
developing country may benefit from the development of an advance road network or a regional 
hub port in its neighbour.   
 
In the circumstances, project financing for development of infrastructure can be a win-
win option for developing countries, investors, lenders, other project participants and also, for the 
neighbouring countries. However, in order to ensure that the future of project financing would be 
bright and it would help developing countries to achieve sustainable development, certain 
initiatives will have to be taken by developing countries, both at country level and at bilateral and 
regional levels. In addition, certain initiatives will have to be taken by the investors and the 
lenders, especially the international financing agencies.  
  
7.2. Initiatives that could be taken by Developing Countries 
 
Investors would be more comfortable in investing in developing countries in which 
project financing techniques have been successfully employed and in which, the economic and 
policy environment is transparent. Further, they would prefer investment destinations where the 
legality of contracts is being honoured. In the circumstances, a sound policy framework with 
regard to foreign investments, sound infrastructure of support services such as banking, licensing, 
transport, customs clearance, investor exemptions and also a sound dispute settlement mechanism 
with a hierarchy of judicial authority and a system of law that recognises basic international 
norms on investments and trade are basic necessities for attracting FDI for infrastructure 
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development. Developing countries hoping to gain maximum advantage of project financing 
techniques will have to thus, ensure that these basic necessities are visibly present in their 
jurisdictions.  
 
The success of project financing largely depends on good and efficient risk management. 
For projects in which the risks have been identified, clarified, and appropriately mitigated up 
front, private financiers are frequently willing to provide significant funds and to bare project 
specific commercial risks. Thus, proper project evaluation is necessary for investor confidence. 
However, a point to remember is that not all aspects of risk can be managed contractually. The 
most important thing for potential participants to bear in mind is that they need to fully 
understand what they are getting into. All projects involve some element of risks, and the best 
way to minimize them is to do extensive research beforehand.  
 
The current trend in most developing countries is to take a rather lethargic approach 
towards promoting foreign investments by merely identifying sectors for investment promotions. 
This alone will not attract investors into countries, as the developing countries cannot expect the 
investors or project promoters to identify projects, carryout substantive feasibility studies 
covering all aspects including financial viability, environmental risks, social and political risks 
and then make representations to the developing country governments to initiate development 
projects. Thus, the developing countries will have to take the initial initiative in project 
identification and doing the preliminary feasibility studies before marketing project for 
investment. This would enable developing countries to identify appropriate projects that could in 
fact contribute to their national development. Thus, the so called one-stop investor facility centres 
found in most developing countries (for example, the Board of Investments in India and the 
Board of Investment in Sri Lanka) will have to play a more significant role in the future with 
regard to attracting investors. They will have to collaborate with the relevant line ministries or 
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other public entities in connection with national development plans to ensure to the greatest 
extent possible, projects that are marketed to attract foreign investment have been properly 
assessed for risks and the likelihood of any unexpected risks such as for example, social or 
political objections to projects occurring, the prevention of which is mostly under the control of 
the host countries, is remote. 
 
In the past project financing has been used mainly to attract international financing for 
infrastructure development projects. However, with the growing popularity of project financing, 
and the understanding of the need to hedge currency rate fluctuation risks, as most projects 
generate income in vulnerable local currency to pay up debt in foreign currency, domestic 
financial markets will have to play an effective role in future project financing. Local funding can 
help mitigate the significant interest rate and foreign currency risk that most projects face. 
However, in order for this to happen, local financial markets will have to have some depth. The 
insurance funds, provident funds and other such funds that hold public funds on long term basis 
may have to be encouraged to invest in infrastructure projects. At present, in most developing 
countries, the managers of such funds are rather lethargic when it comes to investing in non-
traditional sectors. Developed countries like England, USA and Singapore to name a few have 
good schemes where public pension and provident funds are invested in long-term commercial 
projects. Developing countries should learn from them. In addition, it is also necessary to develop 
internal bond and equity markets in developing countries so that project developers will have 
more local options in raising necessary finances for projects. Developing country governments 
will have to help meet these prerequisites by encouraging the broadening and expanding of local 
financial markets and liberalizing the control and management of funds held by the public sector.  
 
Ensuring the participation of local investors in infrastructure development projects is 
important for another reason. After the Asian financial crisis, foreign investors were hesitant to 
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fund development projects in developing countries and as a result the developing countries found 
it difficult to place total reliance on foreign funding for development projects. In order to have a 
natural hedge against any currency crisis, parties to developing infrastructure projects are likely to 
seek more domestic financing. Thus, developing countries needing investments for infrastructure 
development will have to promote the local players to come up with substantial local equity and 
credit for necessary project developments. In the premises it could be predicted that in future, the 
local currency component in the usual 70:30 or 60:40 debt: equity ratios of project financing 
transactions might increase substantially. 
 
It is also important that the developing countries take initiatives to ensure that steps taken 
to attract foreign investors for development activities would not result in local investors being 
marginalized. This is important, as foreign investors who invest in infrastructure projects in 
developing countries are unlikely to stay beyond their concessions. Their motive is usually to 
develop the project, recover costs, make profits and get out. As most infrastructure projects 
involve long term operational or concession periods (for example 20 to 30 years), developing 
country governments should have suitable successors to fill in the vacuums created by outgoing 
foreign investors. As, in most developing countries, project financing mechanisms go hand in 
hand with deregulation initiatives of governments, after 20-30 year concession periods, 
developing countries are unlikely to have technologically and market qualified successors in the 
public sector to takeover infrastructure projects developed by foreign investors. Thus, the most 
suitable candidates could be found among the local investors. In the circumstances, it is important 
that developing countries introduce mechanisms to facilitate local investor participation in 
infrastructure development projects from the outset or, if not, at least develop a system by which 
shares in the projects gradually transfer to local investors before the concession period given to 




A further initiative that should be taken by developing countries is the 
introduction and implementation of necessary reforms to improve the institutional 
framework that supports investment, finance and risk-taking. They need to generate a 
reduction in overall risks associated with development projects in their respective 
jurisdictions by making markets more efficient and complete. This will promote 
investment, productivity and growth. While the political and regulatory risks can not be 
altogether eliminated, there is a need to minimize them in the interest of sustainable 
development. As suggested in Chapters 5 and 6, ensuring the collective participation of 
the various political and social groups in developing countries in a forum that would 
decide development policies and approve development projects is one initiative that 
could be taken. For example, in order to ensure that political opposition to development 
projects is mitigated, it is prudent to have advisory bodies in place with representatives 
from the government, members from the opposition parties in Parliament, NGOs, 
religious and indigenous groups, representatives of industrial sectors and the members of 
the general public. Such bodies could then be instrumental in the recommendation of new 
investment policies or suggesting necessary improvements to investment policies already 
in place to the developing country governments and, in addition, vet the viability of 
investment projects before they are initiated by the government. Such initiatives however, 
should not be misunderstood with the legislative decision making in the Parliament where 
the majority vote would determine the final adoption of policies. 
 
There is no doubt that globalization has resulted in large increase in FDI. Greater 
inflow of FDI has, in turn, bolstered deeper integration of world economies. Though there 
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are some serious potential drawbacks of FDI, developing countries are not in a position to 
turn back from FDI. This is a reality. But, what they can and should do is to try to 
minimize its negative effects. They should look at ways to make FDI more meaningful. 
One option might be to encourage investment in certain specific sectors. For example, 
developing countries such as Sri Lanka, where certain public utility services such as 
water and power supply have always been provided by the State at subsidized rates, and 
where the people are stringently opposed to any form of privatization or foreign investor 
participation in such sectors, could concentrate more on using FDI for less controversial 
sectors such as highways, ports, airports and, export processing zones. This does not 
mean that development of infrastructure services such as water and power should not be 
opened for FDI. To the contrary, what is suggested is that the political and public 
opponents to such development are gradually educated and informed of the benefits of 
such development before making drastic decisions to transfer public utilities to the 
private sector. 
 
7.3. Initiatives for International Organizations 
 
In some quarters, an opinion has been expressed that international organizations such as 
the World Bank should expand their role in project financing to become saviours at distress rather 
than being mere financial participants.730  The basis of this argument is that, traditionally entities 
such as the World Bank have been interested in economic development of developing countries 
without concentrating too much on the profitability to such institutions. This trend however, has 
changed over the years with the increasing interest of the institutions to finance private sector led 
                                                 
730 See generally, Martin B., In the Public Interest? Privatisation and Public Sector Reform, (London: Zed Books, 1993); Richardson R. and Haralz, J., Moving to 
the Market: the World Bank in Transition, Overseas Development Council. Policy Essay No. 17., (Washington D.C.: ODC, 1994) 
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development. Thus, in the near future it may not be too surprising to see international financial 
organizations taking a step backwards and re-identifying their role. If such reformation takes 
place, in future, while continuing to support private sector led development activities, the 
international financial organizations may also be in a position to provide comfort to project 
participants in crisis situations such as the Asian financial crisis. 
 
International organizations should also re-consider their current policies towards 
developing countries as over the years some agencies seem to have lost focus on their 
real purpose. For example, the IFC's mission statement is "to promote private sector 
investment in developing countries, which will reduce poverty and improve peoples' 
lives". Without doubt, the IFC certainly has done much to achieve the first part of its 
mission statement. However, it would be interesting to find out whether it has in fact 
substantially achieved the second part of its mission. The IFC, in fact, often appears to be 
driven by a deal-making mentality similar to that of private sector banks.731 The 
Corporation's annual report and other publications use the IFC's profit (net income) as the 
main yardstick of success, with other information about its achievements presented in a 
vague, somewhat haphazard way.732 How the IFC decides that the projects it backs could 
not have been undertaken on a purely private basis is unclear and often dubious. 
 
Further, despite various strategy and policy restatements over the years, the IFC still 
appears to operate without any clear methodology for estimating or evaluating development 
impacts. Moreover, the IFC has no mechanism in its project cycle to articulate the intended 
                                                 
731 Friends of the Earth Organisation, ‘Dubious Development: How the World Bank's Private Arm Fails the Poor and the Environment’ (September 2000). 
  Online: http://www.foe.org. 
732 Id. 
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development impact of a given project. 733 Without such a mechanism, the IFC is unable to factor 
development effectiveness into either project design or implementation.734 Thus, on the evidence 
available outside the institution it is hard to conclude that it has a clear approach to selecting 
projects that will maximize benefits for poor people and the environment. 
 
Investors, in addition to doing their own due diligence concerning investment prospects 
in developing countries, often rely on information disseminated by the international financial 
institutions, including in the context of their routine surveillance of countries and during policy 
discussions pertaining to economic programs supported by the IMF and the World Bank. A 
number of investors, especially those engaged in the infrastructure and utilities sectors, work 
closely with the World Bank Group, including the IFC, Foreign Investment Advisory Services 
(FIAS), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), in securing financing for 
various projects in developing countries. In the circumstances, it is important that these 
international agencies which may have better access to policy makers and information in 
developing countries take the initiative to undertake periodic risk assessment in developing 
countries and have a scheme to grade or classify countries according to the risks involved. 
 
 Further, given their experience in directly investing and actively participating in 
development activities in developing countries, the investors would appreciate the role of 
international organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank in surveillance and program 
support for country policies. In particular, the IMF’s lead role in assisting countries in near-crisis 
and crisis situations provides a degree of comfort to investors in maintaining and continuing a 
presence in developing countries. Thus, agencies such as the IMF and the World Bank should 
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734 Mavrotas G., Multilateral Development Banks and Private Sector Financing The Case of IFC, Discussion Paper No. 2002/118 (United Nations University,  
World Institute for Development Economics Research, December 2002).  
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make even greater efforts to discuss with investors, risks and vulnerabilities associated with doing 
business in developing countries and provide opportunities to gain a greater understanding of 
their policies, for example, IMF stabilization and reform policies, in developing countries.735 
 
 Further, a more regular and in-depth assessments of the investment climate in 
developing countries, including in the context of the IMF’s Article IV consultation 
discussions736 and the World Bank’s economic and sectoral work, could be useful in 
enabling investors make informed judgments about investment opportunities and 
associated risks. Furthermore, focusing the policy dialogues with member countries on 
issues relating to the investment regimes including the legal and regulatory frameworks, 
business environment, and tax systems would help the policy makers in developing 
countries to appreciate the role of equity capital in promoting sustainable growth and 
facilitate the prioritization of necessary structural reforms. Further, regular assessment of 
investment climate issues would promote FDI in developing countries and help reduce 
vulnerabilities by facilitating better risk management by investors.  
 
 The world has already witnessed the failed attempt by the OECD to negotiate a 
Multilateral Investment Agreement (MAI). The attempt to negotiate an international instrument 
dealing with investment related measures at the WTO too failed although it was included in the 
agenda of the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the WTO in Cancun, Mexico, due to opposition 
                                                 
735 The fundamental difference is this: the Bank is primarily a development institution; the IMF is a cooperative institution that seeks to maintain an orderly system 
of payments and receipts between nations. Each has a different purpose, a distinct structure, receives its funding from different sources, assists different 
categories of members, and strives to achieve distinct goals through methods peculiar to itself. For further information regarding the different functions of the 
two organs, please see: Driscoll, David D., The IMF and the World Bank How Do They Differ? (International Monetary Fund August 9, 1996). 
 
  Available online: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/differ/differ.htm 
736 Under Article IV of the IMF's Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the economy, 
collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a 
report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board. At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chairman of the Board, 
summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the authorities. 
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from the developing countries. At Cancun a new bloc of developing countries emerged, called the 
G20 group, led by a number of large nations across a range of regions - Brazil, India, China, 
Argentina, South Africa, Nigeria and Indonesia.737 They opposed any decisions being made on the 
so-called Singapore issues, namely, investment, competition, trade facilitation and transparency 
in government procurement.738 The G20 group were opposed to having any international 
investment related instruments in place which would reduce the development options of 
developing countries and require them  to give equal treatment to both foreign investment and 
local investment and restrict the rights of developing country governments to limit foreign 
investment in particular industries, or to require foreign investors to transfer skills and 
technology, use local products or develop relationships with local firms or place any of these 
conditions in government purchasing contracts. The meeting eventually came to a dramatic end 
without any agreement on 14 September 2003, leaving negotiations in a deadlock.739 In the 
circumstances, the international organizations should take the initiative to encourage the member 
countries that push for such international agreements to ensure that, in future, special 
consideration is given to the needs and interests of the developing countries.  
 
 There is a capacity deficiency in some developing countries to professionally 
package, aggressively market and successfully negotiate investment opportunities. This is 
another area in which the international organizations such as the World Bank, ADB and, 
other development agencies could come to the assistance of developing countries. They 
                                                 
737 It also includes Bolivia, Chile, Cuba, Egypt, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, the Philippines, Thailand, Venezuela, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. The group also had the 
support of over 70 other developing countries. 
738 Even prior to the commencement of the Cancun meeting, Delegates from 16 developing nations Led by then Malaysian Trade Minister Rafidah Aziz, held a 
press conference to announce an agreement reached between them in advance to the meeting. They announced their opposition to any decision to launch 
negotiations on the Singapore issues at Cancun insisting that the Singapore issues should be referred back to the WTO in Geneva for further discussion and 
clarification before any decision could be taken to launch negotiations on the issues. They stressed on the lack of clarity about how new investment rules might 
impact upon domestic policies. Source: World Development Movement, Online: http://www.wdm.org.uk. 
739 Source: Australian Fair Trade and Investment Network (AFTINET), ‘The Cancun WTO Meeting’ (March 2004). Online: http://www.aftinet.org.au 
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can act as specialist advisors on developing investment ideas, marketing them and 
successfully negotiating investment contracts avoiding any arbitrary deals. In addition, 
they could also facilitate project administration and management training so that 
developing countries could develop skills and expertise for future use in relation to 
development of infrastructure projects. 
 
7.4. Bilateral and Regional Initiatives 
 
 It was noted in Chapter two that with the growing interest among developing 
countries for regional integration, the future might witness many cross-border and regional 
infrastructure projects being developed.  Already, steps in this direction have been taken in 
some regions. For example, the European Commission has actively coordinated a strategy to 
develop a Regional Electricity Market in South-East Europe. A Memorandum of 
Understanding on creating a Regional Electricity Market in South East Europe and its 
integration into the Internal Electricity Market by 2005 was signed at a ministerial meeting in 
Athens on 15th November 2002. Further, A Strategy Paper listing all measures to be taken in 
that regard was approved at this occasion.740  
 
 A similar initiative has been suggested by the ADB for South Asia when it proposed 
a model of cross-border (multinational) projects for India, Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan.741 
The bank has mooted that the four countries could strengthen the economic cooperation 
among them by emulating the infrastructure funding model employed by the Greater Mekong 
                                                 
740 Office for South East Europe European Commission/World Bank , ‘Developing Regional Infrastructure Strategic Approach and Implementation of Projects’ 
(2003),  Note Prepared by the Secretariat of the Infrastructure Steering Group, May 24, 2003. 
741 The Financial Express, August 6, 2005. 
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sub-region, comprising Cambodia, Laos, China and Vietnam. The ADB has identified 
surface transport, tourism, environment and energy as the four sectors to be covered under 
the South Asian Sub-regional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) funding pattern. It has also 
set up task forces to explore the project/funding possibilities.742 
 
 The key reasons behind the need and desire to develop regional and cross-border 
infrastructure projects is the realization by most developing countries that such projects 
are mutually beneficial. For example, a power project in one country may be able to 
supply its excess power to a neighbouring country at a very competitive rate. Further, a 
landlocked small developing country may benefit from an advance transport network 
developed in partnership with a more affluent neighbour.  
 
 One constraint to foreign investment in some of the least developed countries is the size 
of their market. Regional and bi-lateral economic cooperation and integration can help overcome 
the problem of market size, attracting private sector investment in infrastructure. Thus, lesser 
known and least developed countries in regions could benefit from the spill-over effects 
of investment when regional infrastructure development projects are undertaken. Thus, 
understanding the regional and bi-lateral benefits of FDI is important for future 
development of infrastructure projects in developing countries. 
 
  To make regional and bi-lateral initiatives for infrastructure development more 
sustainable, it is critical that the policy makers and investment planners build the national 
capacity for managing regional public goods and sharing of experiences. A look across the 
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world reveals that some regional blocks have several countries in their regions that do not 
have the same level of development as others. A number of sub-regional blocks in Africa and 
the Asia Pacific regions still have huge disparities between the nations with respect to 
development. Further, some regional blocks do not have transmission infrastructure that 
directly connect the nations to one another nor cross-border connectivity for the nations that 
share common borders.  Thus, developing countries in such regions should take the initiative 
to address these issues in order to facilitate regional infrastructure development. Mechanisms 
should be established to enable regulatory bodies in different countries to share resources, 
facilities and experiences as these bodies could the help to articulate regional positions; 
encourage adoption of uniform technical and quality standards; promote harmonization of 
policies within the region; and facilitate regional/cross border connectivity and infrastructure 
development. 
 
7.5. Areas recommended for further Research 
 
 This thesis is one of a handful that has researched the changing nature of risks 
associated with FDI given the increasing practice among developing countries to employ 
mechanisms such as project financing techniques to develop infrastructure projects. There is 
need for more investigation to analyze how the developing countries could achieve 
sustainable development through the use of project financing techniques and how such 
techniques could be put into use for the benefit all project participants whilst at the same 
time, protecting the rights and freedom of people. The following key issues therefore could 
be recommended for further research:  
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1. What “best practices” could be developed to deal with the risk of conflict between 
central governments and local governments when the demands for political 
decentralization clashes with consumer and foreign investor preference to deal 
exclusively with central governments. 
 
2. How investment rules and policies could articulate broad common principles 
applicable to regional and bi-lateral infrastructure development while allowing for 
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